最新科研成果为啥发外刊？不怕被外国抄走吗？

关税战之后，全球经济秩序不复存在 天下大乱，形势大好

From Being Assisted to Assisting the World: China's 50 Years of Desertification Control

Everyone, today let's talk about a video that has gone viral recently: Yin Yuzhen, a model worker in desert control, was looking for an American friend, Sokolsky, and with the help of netizens, he was finally found. In 1999, Ronald Sokolsky, who was a diplomat in Luoyang, saw Yin Yuzhen's story on CCTV-4 and directly took out 5,000 US dollars to fund her tree planting. The fixed exchange rate at that time was 8.28, so 5,000 dollars was equivalent to more than 40,000 RMB. Not to mention ordinary people, even a high-income diplomat would have to save for a year without eating or drinking. This huge sum of money was given to a farmer she had never met, in order to prevent the desert from swallowing up China on the other side of the earth. This wave of internationalist spirit is truly moving! However, I saw someone asking: This kind of internationalist spirit, who else has it? We ourselves do. Because now China is also doing what Sokolsky did back then, only more concretely—we not only provide money, but also technology and overall solutions. When technology reaches a certain point, many things will be integrated, and we will bring out our best skills. We must be clear on one point: China is now the country with the most research, the widest practice, and the highest technology in the field of sand prevention and control in the world. No need to say 'one of'; it is the most. Only China can say to a death sea like the desert: Surrender, you are surrounded by us. This is not an exaggeration. You can look up the Taklamakan edge-locking project. In 2024, the 3,000-kilometer green belt around the edge was fully closed, locking down the spread of shifting sand. It is part of the Three-North Shelterbelt. The Three-North Shelterbelt is the world's largest man-made forest belt, covering 45% of our land, that is, nearly half of China. Construction started in 1978 and will not be completed until 2050. It is truly a century-long tree-planting project. During the construction process, our scientific research input and output, the scale of ecological engineering, and the combination of technology application and industry have all reached the forefront of the world. Desert control experience has completely changed the traditional understanding of the international academic community. In the past, everyone thought that greening was a passive response of the earth, mainly triggered by carbon dioxide concentration. But China has proven that humans can take the initiative to reshape the earth's ecology. Now we are already providing systematic solutions to Central Asia, West Asia, and Africa. For example, in 2007 the African Union proposed building an 8,000-kilometer-long, 15-kilometer-wide Great Green Wall in the Sahel region, learning from our Three-North Shelterbelt to prevent the southward expansion of the Sahara Desert. But it had been stalled for years due to various reasons, until China packaged and shared its knowledge, technology, and industrial solutions. Among them, the Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography of the Chinese Academy of Sciences played a key role. They not only plant trees to fix sand, but also conduct joint research, combining the experience of controlling the Taklamakan Desert with local actual conditions. For example, controlling shifting sand in Mauritania in West Africa, wind prevention in central Nigeria, and restoration of degraded grasslands in Ethiopia in East Africa. A number of demonstration projects have been implemented, such as the Green Technology Park in Mauritania. The spirit of ecological internationalism behind this is the result of China's long-term accumulation. China has contributed a quarter of the world's newly added green area, the largest contribution rate. In 2024, more than 100 million mu of land was greened, 60% of which was forest. This is fundamentally different from India, the second-largest greening country, where farmland contributes more than 80%. Many people may have forgotten that these achievements were not made suddenly; we took many detours along the way. Because China has eight major deserts and four major sandy areas, and is one of the countries most affected by desertification. So at the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic, we began to 'save ourselves.' In 1950, the State Council established a leading group, and in 1978 we began building the Three-North Shelterbelt system. In the 1980s, many poplars were planted. This water-hungry tree has deep roots and quickly drains groundwater, causing desertification to rebound, and a single tree species is prone to pests and diseases. Later, we learned from our mistakes, stopped blind tree planting, took water resources as a constraint, and formed a model combining trees, shrubs, and grasses, mainly shrubs and grasses, with mixed species, gradually forming today's very scientific system. Now many new technologies are being applied to desert control. For example, Science and Technology Daily recently reported that the Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has deployed in the Taklamakan the same black technology as on the far side of the moon—six environmentally friendly sand control materials. One of them is basalt fiber, made into mechanical sand barriers to replace traditional straw checkerboards. Straw checkerboards are made of natural plant stalks such as wheat straw. They fix sand well but have a short lifespan and are labor-intensive, making it difficult to lay over large areas. Basalt is rock formed from cooled lava erupted from volcanoes. It is resistant to high temperatures, corrosion, and does not degrade. It is melted at an extreme high temperature of 1,500 degrees, turned back into lava, and then drawn into fibers through platinum-rhodium alloy bushings. After cooling, it forms high-performance fibers thinner than a hair, wear-resistant, tensile, resistant to wind and sun, and will not age even under extreme ultraviolet light. It can be mixed and woven with other materials into fabrics, made into standard rolls, and laid by unmanned sand control vehicles, greatly improving efficiency and reducing costs. The last time basalt fiber attracted attention was during the Chang'e-6 moon landing; the national flag was made of basalt fiber and did not fade under extreme temperature and ultraviolet radiation. Moreover, basalt is abundant on the moon, especially in the lunar maria. In the future, when China builds a lunar base, it will use a large amount of basalt fiber. According to Pei Liang, the chief scientist at the Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography specifically responsible for new materials and new equipment, in addition to basalt fiber, there are also new materials such as fly ash solid waste utilization and microbial seed coating. They are also developing integrated modular intelligent laying equipment. Once the entire systematic solution is launched, sand prevention construction efficiency will increase by 50%, and sand prevention costs will be reduced by 30%. In the past, our desert control relied on countless heroes like Yin Yuzhen who made selfless contributions for decades. Now, equipped with black technology, we have more confidence in the desert battle. Not only must we fix sand, but we must also open up oasis agriculture. The institute has specialized transformation and irrigation technologies to combat wind erosion and salinized land. Salinized land at the edge of the desert can use underground brackish water to raise seafood. This is simply outrageous, but it is already a reality. This may also be the hope for Central Asian countries to resolve the ecological crisis of the drying Aral Sea and achieve desert greening.

Quietly, China has cornered two-thirds of the world's caviar

Everyone, did you know? Caviar has always been regarded as a representative of Russian culinary culture, but China has quietly produced two-thirds of the world's caviar, which is somewhat embarrassing for them. Most ordinary people have no idea about this and think we're just an NPC in this regard, but chefs in the industry all know about Chinese caviar. We've also been quite low-key: the packaging of top-tier caviar contains no Chinese elements at all, like a powerful king who is too humble to use his own name. Of course, being low-key has its benefits—it avoids negative impressions among Western consumers about Chinese food safety and quality, and keeps the stick of trade protectionism from falling on our heads as much as possible. But a recent Financial Times article called out domestic caviar: China's trade surplus has exceeded one trillion dollars, and Europe is anxious, fearing China is engaging in below-cost dumping. Yet even in high-end luxury goods like caviar, China is actually dominating the market—and not just caviar: wagyu, salmon, black truffles—whatever you foreigners like to eat, we can sell it. The industrial logic is the same: with China's technology and scale, we can do anything in large quantities and at affordable prices. Moreover, in high-end food we're not undercutting prices, so you can't call it dumping—this is called filling a market gap. Foreign consumers are quite happy anyway, thanking China in the comments. Caviar is equivalent to bird's nest and abalone in Western cuisine, a must-have at high-end banquets. Back in Persia, this stuff was food for the poor—sturgeon roe rubbed with salt and eaten as meat. After spreading to Tsarist Russia, it became a court dish; after the October Revolution, a group of exiled White Russian nobles brought it to Paris. Although French cuisine uses it a lot now, the raw materials are still most prized from Russia and Iran. TASS recently dished out some gossip: during US-Russia negotiations, US special envoy Witkoff bought 24 boxes of red salmon caviar from the Far East and hand-delivered them to the Trumpster—the Russians were delighted and are preparing to launch a Trump-branded version. That's of course not on the same level as the black gold caviar we served Obama at the G20, but it's still quite prestigious. Domestically produced large-grain black gold caviar, a high-end ingredient, doesn't even need cooking—simple preparation brings out an upper-class flavor. I think the taste is okay, but foreigners really love it, and they're very particular: you have to use a mother-of-pearl spoon, place it on the web between thumb and forefinger to warm it with body heat for a few seconds, then savor it drop by drop—that's the authentic way. But demand is simply too great. The most authentic Caspian wild sturgeon was fished into endangered status, so starting 20 years ago, most countries around the world banned the import and export of wild sturgeon caviar. With wild fishing banned, farming is the only option. Farming is much harder than fishing: the cycle is too long—sturgeon can live to 100, mature sexually very late, and you have to feed a fish weighing hundreds of jin for over a decade before it produces quality roe, making costs too high; water quality requirements and environmental control thresholds are also very high; the technique of extracting roe from live fish is complex and has to be learned. These reasons deterred most countries, and only the national team of the great foodie empire kept tirelessly tackling the challenges—with the global wild caviar supply collapsing, how could China's fisheries strategy easily let such a huge market opportunity slip away? So the Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences under the Ministry of Agriculture used Heilongjiang's Kaluga sturgeon and Amur sturgeon for crossbreeding: Kaluga has large eggs and good quality, Amur sturgeon matures early and carries large quantities of eggs—combining the two overcame the problems of late maturity and low yield in sturgeon, and the breed suitable for farming was named 'Sturgeon Dragon No. 1.' Its roe is amber and brown-gray, with a creamy, nutty flavor and a delicate texture; because our water quality is better than the polluted environments of wild fish, the conclusion from blind tastings by gourmets is that the taste is actually purer than wild Caspian caviar. It supplies various three-star Michelin restaurants, Oscar banquets, and Singapore Airlines and Lufthansa first class—the best caviar is no longer Russian. Then a large amount of private capital entered sturgeon farming. Benefiting from the national team's technical support, resource guarantees, and industrial chain extension, they completed large-scale production from laboratory to production line, turning an industry that didn't exist in China at all in 2000 into today's world leader. Part of China's caviar is labeled Made in China and goes to the affordable market for volume; part goes to France and Italy for OEM labeling—once labeled, it sells for more, adapting to global consumption trends—downgrading where needed, upgrading where needed. And China's domestic market has also started eating caviar, with total demand growing 10% per year. Although China's food culture is profound, it has long lingered outside the modern high-end food market, just like the relationship between Made in China and the luxury goods industry. When Chinese companies march into this field, every country will protect its own high-value-added foods: Japan restricts the outflow of wagyu genes, and caviar producers in Europe and America are also seeking government protection. Will Europe follow the US next year in raising import tariffs on Chinese food? Who knows. But domestic demand will certainly become increasingly crucial—let everyone have a taste and turn it into a traditional Chinese delicacy, and then there'll be nothing to worry about in the long run.

Plasma Wall Breaker: A Domestic Wonder That Surpasses the US?

Today is another day of dancing in my knowledge blind spot. The news says that China has released the world's first 100-liter continuous production plasma ball mill, and the hype is high, saying it can help China surpass the United States technologically—from super powder to super power. Isn't this just a high-speed blender for grinding powder? What's so impressive about that? After looking into it, I realized I was just speculating. It turns out that the main event in high-tech competition is the intense competition in materials, and the more intense it gets, the more tedious it becomes: how to grind materials finer, purer, and more active? You could also call it a blender, but it's not breaking down soybean cell walls; it's breaking down the atomic lattice of matter, efficiently producing high-performance, highly active nano powders. This grinding technology developed in tandem with industrialization and urbanization. Initially, like building construction and furnace repair requiring ground cement, and thermal power generation requiring pulverized coal, heavy-duty ball mills were used, with large drums carrying balls to crush materials. Later, it gradually became more refined, such as ceramic coatings needing to be ground more evenly and finely, using planetary ball mills that rely on centrifugal force and high-speed impact to break things down. In this race, Germany has already pushed mechanical force to its limit. If you want to grind finer, you can only increase speed or extend time, but below the micron level, the conversion rate of mechanical energy is already very low, and the excess energy becomes heat, causing the material to agglomerate, deteriorate, or be contaminated by the grinding media. So, just as it is difficult to improve the thermal efficiency of internal combustion engines, traditional ball milling has also hit a ceiling. Moreover, the West has accumulated too many patents in structural design, wear-resistant liners, bearing life, and precision transmission. If China continues to stubbornly pursue this path, there may not be much hope. At this point, Professor Zhu Min from South China University of Technology came with over twenty years of research results and made a curve overtaking, proposing the concept of plasma-assisted ball milling for the first time in the world. What's so impressive about him? Just as electric motors overtook internal combustion engines, it essentially introduces a new energy dimension, bypassing the inefficiency of traditional mechanical energy. Plasma is the fourth state of matter besides solid, liquid, and gas. Essentially, it is a highly charged gas, where gas is ionized under high energy, and electrons detach from atomic nuclei. For example, lightning in nature. So while others grind by hitting walnuts with a hammer, we apply high voltage. On the basis of traditional ball mill mechanical impact, it uses a high-voltage electric field to generate plasma, instantly bombarding the material surface with high energy, stripping electrons from the material surface without raising the temperature, inducing lattice distortion, making the material surface very "hungry" and prone to chemical reactions. Many powders in traditional methods require high-temperature melting at thousands of degrees, and some super alloys are difficult to melt and mix even when heated. Now we can directly force them out at room temperature using plasma. What's another benefit? This technology can effectively prevent materials from clumping together at the nanoscale. Of course, for industrial production, the biggest advantage is definitely high efficiency, ten times that of traditional ball milling. What used to take a hundred hours to grind can now be done in less than ten hours. This machine was released by Huaxin Materials Innovation, incubated by South China University of Technology. Previously, it went from 500 milliliters, 1.5 liters, 3 liters, 20 liters, step by step. The most common customer feedback was that it wasn't enough, so increase the capacity. So this time, the 100-liter configuration can operate continuously 24 hours a day, meaning it's not just a few hundred milliliters of output in a lab, but can support large-scale production. What needs this? Their press release was low-key, mentioning batteries, electronics, mineral processing, but the applications are actually very broad. The core application should be energy storage materials, such as magnesium-based hydrogen storage materials, silicon-carbon anode materials for lithium batteries and sodium batteries. There are even more high-performance powders used in the military: nano aluminum powder needed for rocket propellants, titanium alloy powder needed for hypersonic fighters, nickel-based superalloy powder for engine turbine blades, special ceramic powder for stealth aircraft radar-absorbing coatings—all rely on plasma ball milling. As for the United States, in the production of high-end weapons such as next-generation radars, heavy stealth aircraft, and hypersonic weapons, it has already fallen behind China. One reason is powder processing, which is a key bottleneck. Although the United States is strong in materials science, it does not have plasma-assisted ball milling technology. China not only has this technology but has also rapidly iterated into industrial mass production. If China can completely crush the United States in cost, scale, and production efficiency of high-performance powders, that would be continuously optimizing the manufacturing gene from upstream raw materials. Then, chain reactions in strategic industries such as semiconductors, aerospace, and new energy could reshape national strength. This is what American think tanks fear most: falling behind in competition in industries that are key to national strength.

Skyward Beacon: The Hardcore Comeback of Optical Navigation

Everyone, I recently heard some big news. Our Chinese scientists spent 20 years and finally developed something called "optical navigation," which can save us from the clutches of electronic warfare. This is far more reliable than the navigation we use for taking a stroll—especially on today's battlefield, where precision strikes are king. You might ask: if GPS is shut off and BeiDou signals are jammed, are we done for? Chinese scientists say, no, no, no—we have our own unique trick. Tsinghua University's Intelligent Microsystems and Nano-Satellite team has devoted 20 years to developing the world's first optical navigation and positioning technology and system, solving the navigation problem in satellite radio-denied environments, and even won the 2025 Special Prize for Outstanding Scientific Research Achievements in Engineering Technology. Now we no longer have to fear the electromagnetic interference that has become routine on the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East battlefields. The principle isn't complicated: it's essentially moving lighthouses into space and making luminous satellites reliable optical signal sources. Professor Xing Fei of the team says this is just like ancient sailors watching lighthouses. Since 2004, they have launched 11 satellites, each equipped with a high-power, high-brightness, wide-coverage optical beacon source, forming a navigation constellation. After ground receivers capture these optical signals, they combine them with precise satellite orbit data and use the polar coordinate principle to achieve positioning. The advantage of light waves over electromagnetic waves is that their wavelengths are extremely short, so interfering signals cannot diffract into the receiver's field of view; they basically propagate only in straight lines. Ground receivers use narrow-field-of-view lenses aimed at beacons in a specific direction. To interfere with such a signal, you would have to be directly above it, with your line of sight aligned, conducting a point-to-point sniper attack—making impossible the kind of regional jamming that a single radio jammer can achieve over many kilometers. However, this straight-line characteristic is also a major limitation of optical navigation. Bad weather or obstacles can affect positioning. So this is only a supplement to the BeiDou system, not a replacement. In the future, their plan is to deploy 37 satellites in a low Earth orbit of 816 kilometers, covering the area within 60 degrees north and south latitude. That is, only about 700 kilometers from the Arctic and Antarctic circles, precisely encompassing the world's major population and economic zones, so that anywhere with an optical line of sight can be positioned. But we should also look at what others are doing. Israel's ASIO Technologies also makes navigation for military drones, capturing real-time imagery, comparing it with preloaded maps, and using AI for data matching. This approach truly does not rely on signals, but its range is small and its duration short. Australia's Advanced Navigation uses accelerometers and gyroscopes to calculate acceleration and angular velocity, then integrates over time to compute the carrier's velocity, position, and attitude. This can also be used in tunnels or underground places without light, but errors gradually accumulate. Together, these three approaches form a complete iron triangle, jointly solving the strategic pain point of radio-suppressed environments and enhancing the resilience of modern national defense positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. In the future, multi-source fusion will be the mainstream. Overall, optical navigation is a major breakthrough, but there is still a long way to go. We must keep working hard and not let those little tricks that interfere with us succeed!

Global Right-Wing Watch: Is Going Backward Moving Forward?

Friends, today let's talk about the future of China-US relations. China and the US have many differences, but both sides agree on one point: the China-US relationship will fundamentally shape the twenty-first century. So to find the right way to get along, we must first understand what kind of country America will be in the future. No one knows the answer to this question of our time, but we can look for clues. The first clue is that photo of Trump after surviving the assassination attempt, blood at the corner of his mouth, raising his fist and shouting. What I see is not some highlight moment of journalism, but the death throes of an old system. Imagine this: this unsustainable system, inspired by militarism, sees its elite class constantly expanding outward, exporting the wars they are best at, plundering resources, importing immigrants, suppressing labor costs, driving ordinary citizens into a dead end of internal competition, and polarizing the nation. The upper class can extract rents without producing anything, while the lower class can barely make ends meet despite working desperately. Then, a traitor emerges from among the powerful—he transforms into a spokesman for the common people, becomes a leader through a populist movement, and invites an assassination conspiracy from the elites, blood splattering on the spot. I am not talking about the lucky Trump, but the unlucky Caesar. History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes; this moment is exactly like that moment two thousand years ago. After Caesar's death Rome fell into civil war, the republican era ended, and the imperial era began. Now Trump said "Not Today" to the Grim Reaper, proving he has the mandate of heaven—so can we skip the intermediate steps? I am not saying Trump wants to become emperor; that would be too absurd. But do you really think no one has ever entertained that idea? Some have. Let me solemnly introduce the most American of counter-trend walkers: his real name is Curtis Yarvin, his online name Mencius Moldbug, which literally translates as "Mencius Moldbug," and his true identity: a programmer. Yarvin's father was a diplomat, and he grew up following him all over the world, which gave him an insight: why has America never had a revolution? Because America has no American embassy. At 12 he returned to the US and transferred into high school; at 25 he entered Johns Hopkins' gifted program; later he went to UC Berkeley for a computer science PhD, quickly dropped out, and became a coder, making those very early mobile phone browsers. Within a few years the company was acquired and he took the money and left. By Silicon Valley standards it wasn't much, but enough to start a spiritual quest. It happened that the internet was just taking off, and a bunch of old books with expired copyrights were unavailable in stores but readable online, so he plunged into the old paper stacks and taught himself history, politics, and Austrian-school economic philosophy. He most admired these figures: the philosopher David Hume, who used empiricism to question human reason; the writer Thomas Carlyle, originator of the great-man theory of history, because in his view history is nothing but biographies of great men; the historian James Froude, who criticized democracy and believed the masses lack the capacity for self-government and that rule must rely on elites; and the economist Hoppe, who believed that monarchical private ownership of the realm is far better than democratic public ownership. Nourished by all this, Yarvin finally had his enlightenment moment and decided to found his own school—in the internet context of the time, that meant writing a blog. From 2007 to 2016, under the pen name Mencius Moldbug, he wrote millions of words of political commentary, much of it explosive renegade content, such as "Why, When, and How to Abolish America?", arguing that America should split into efficient city-states like Singapore, otherwise it would be as bloated and unwieldy as Microsoft. He also had an innovation you may actually have heard of: turning the "red pill" truth device from The Matrix into an anti-establishment political concept. Nowadays any young brother who wants to be a big shot in right-wing circles has to use the red pill to reverse-engineer the progressive left's grand circulation. In short, Yarvin became a maverick keyboard warrior, and the faction he founded was called the neoreactionaries. Reaction against what? Against the dispersion of power. Aristotle said government has three forms—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—each with healthy and degenerate versions, and the difference lies nowhere else but in whether power is concentrated in the hands of one person, a few people, or millions of people. Modern societies that went through the Enlightenment all praise democracy, believing that rule by the people is an inherent good, and democracy has become what Churchill called "the least bad system compared with the others." But Yarvin believes that for most of antiquity the norm was monarchy, that the Enlightenment is only an exception in history, and that the democracy it brought the world is a dead end—because democracy is not a means to good governance but the purpose of politics itself, and so it constantly reinforces itself, encourages mutually checking power games, and breeds more hypocrisy, deception, and inaction. In the neoreactionary view, for America to be great again it must put history in reverse: they strongly oppose the Whig view of history—that the wheels of history roll forward irresistibly—and demand a return to traditional political, economic, and social models. What is traditional? Hunter-gatherer society, the caste system, male superiority and female inferiority, absolute monarchy, laissez-faire capitalism—all can count; in any case, it means resetting the parameters and returning to the imperial era when the Western powers were at their zenith. So in Yarvin's eyes the returning king absolutely cannot be a constitutional-monarchy figurehead like Elizabeth II; it must be an Elizabeth I, or a Napoleon, an Atatürk, a Roosevelt. In name he need not be called king or emperor, but he must absolutely control the state apparatus, and must no longer be dispersed and diluted by the church as in the Middle Ages. Where is the contemporary priestly class? Yarvin points to the news media, higher education, and the bureaucracy, collectively calling them "The Cathedral." After the Cathedral made liberal-democratic progress the state religion, it became rigid and complacent, causing society to rot and decay; now it is time to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's. The state needs a Caesar just as a company needs a CEO: whether an enterprise can grow big and strong has nothing to do with democracy—it does not rely on employee votes or board interference; it requires the CEO to be unbound by immediate interests, to responsibly dictate from the long-term interests of the enterprise, and then everyone learns to let go and trust that the boss will surely act in the company's interest. What America needs most today is a heaven-sent strongman, a chosen one born from the democratic myth of Black Myth: Wukong, who will revolutionize himself, personally dismantle the administrative bureaucracy that disperses power, abolish the apocrypha of democracy, and return to the true scripture of kingship. Rock fans with a bit of revolutionary spirit may know that California has a band called Rage Against The Machine—a very good name. But Yarvin thinks they are weak: in his view, RAGE should really mean Retire All Government Employees. Fast-forward to now. The American conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation has proposed "Project 2025," full name "Presidential Transition Project 2025." Who is the conservative president? Trump, of course. And what does transition mean? Firing all federal employees and replacing them with MAGA-loyal Trump loyalists, ultimately evolving the separation-of-powers structure toward executive supremacy—that is, the contemporary monarchy Yarvin longs for. Because the idea is too radical, Trump can only keep his distance from it. But don't forget, there is a person by his side named J.D. Vance. Vance, born in the 1980s, is Trump's running mate, from a typical poor Rust Belt family surrounded by alcohol, drugs, and violence; his closest grandmother once in a rage poured oil all over his grandfather and nearly set him on fire. From being as low as dirt to now being second only to one man and above all others, Vance's rise is a miracle. And the California keyboard warrior Yarvin is precisely this phoenix man's guide in political philosophy. How did these two come together? Let me keep you in suspense and start another narrative. In 2010 the Shanghai World Expo proposed that "Better City, Better Life." A British scholar living in seclusion in Shanghai shuttled through the alleys of the magic city and eventually wrote a strange book, The 2010 Shanghai Expo Guide. It contains not only expo information but more cultural studies and reflections on modernity: on one hand it mourns the past and laments the present, believing that expo legacies like London's Crystal Palace and Paris's Eiffel Tower symbolize that the West has already bid farewell to its age of passion; on the other hand it highly praises China's development speed, believing China is most likely to lead humanity to bid farewell to the 1.0 version of modernity brought by the Western Enlightenment and create a 2.0 version of modernity, because it has become the world's greatest engine. This praise ultimately does not come from affirming China's improvement of people's livelihoods, but from an abstract worship of speed and motion: humanity's future belongs to technology and hardcore tech. To borrow the famous line from The Three-Body Problem, his position can be summed up as—accelerate, accelerate, accelerate by any means necessary. This man is the accelerationist philosopher Nick Land. To understand Land, one must return to the first accelerationist, Karl Marx. Marx sharply criticized free trade yet supported free trade: because free trade can bring the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to its peak and accelerate social revolution. That is, he discovered that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction; rather than tinkering, it is better to catalyze the contradictions, let it accelerate its own grave-digging, and use its own spear against its own shield. After World War II capitalism weathered the crisis, world revolution entered a low tide, and the European left had to find another path: Deleuze and Guattari replaced dialectics with psychoanalysis and wrote Capitalism and Schizophrenia, identifying that destructive factor Marx found in free trade and naming it "deterritorialization"—letting desire flow freely and escape discipline, causing social hierarchies to lose stability. They regarded this as a primordial revolutionary force far older than capitalism: with it, humanity would not simply negate capitalism but use capitalism's schizophrenia to cross the "body without organs," smash capitalism's wall, and enter a highly creative stage of production. In plain terms: to make it perish, first make it mad. Back to Land. In the 1990s he taught continental philosophy at the University of Warwick in Britain and, with a group of young scholars, founded the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU), sitting around theorizing all day like characters in a cyberpunk novel, exploring the intersection of technology, capital, and desire. Their behavior was rather outrageous—too many drugs, unable to distinguish reality from hallucination, and even, due to excessive obsession with Cthulhu mythos, actually going to Sumatra in Indonesia to summon ancient sea beasts. Ultimately Land stitched cybernetics' feedback mechanism together with deterritorialization to form accelerationism: its core is a process that constantly self-excites through positive feedback, and this process leads to ultimate freedom and liberation. You may ask, what does this have to do with me? To put it bluntly—nothing at all; not only with you and me, but with anyone. Thinking it should have something to do with us is anthropocentrism at work, a delusion that heaven and earth belong to us. Land explicitly states he has no interest in human liberation; the only thing he cares about is the liberation of the means of production: to hell with Kant—man is not an end, man is insignificant, technology has its own purpose. He is exactly the opposite of the Luddites of Rage Against the Machine—not to unbind people from machines, but to let machines completely break free of human shackles and roar to their heart's content. Around the turn of the millennium, Land bade farewell to the past and headed for the future, choosing seclusion in the magic city, and described what he had written before as ancient dark speech with too strong a drug flavor. Finally in 2013, two high-intensity internet creatures met and regretted not meeting sooner: the hermit Land read Mencius Moldbug and felt immensely exhilarated, giving neoreactionism a cool name—the Dark Enlightenment, specifically to reverse the damage caused by the Enlightenment, namely democratic politics. Yarvin believes democracy is the cancer of humanity, and Land goes further, writing: democracy has not only met its end, it is the end itself—because democracy's fundamental driving force is degeneration, the systematic consolidation of private ugliness, resentment, and deceit, until it reaches the level of collective crime and comprehensively corrupts society. Therefore, escaping democracy is the ultimate necessity. At this point, acceleration and reaction finally converge, and next someone must be arranged to sit in the driver's seat so the car can accelerate in reverse. But neither faction is interested in humanity or the people, so whom to put in the driver's seat? Autonomous driving, my friend! Yes, this force is artificial intelligence. According to Land's thesis, capitalism and artificial intelligence are two sides of the same coin: only capitalism can create artificial intelligence, and only artificial intelligence can purify capitalism—let this Cthulhu self-generate and self-propel. Since we've reached the tech world, let's branch out again. The tech world has an alternative idol named Elon Musk, seen by many outsiders as Iron Man; but for many tech bigwigs, the true representative of Silicon Valley spirit, that obsessive pursuit of creative destruction, comes from Peter Thiel. Musk of course disagrees, saying Thiel has an antisocial personality, while Thiel says Musk is a big con man. The love-hate relationship between these two dates back to the end of the last century: Windows 98 opened the door to the new century, the internet made people imagine how cool the future would be, and Palo Alto, California attracted top students to embark on entrepreneurial paths, becoming the center of Silicon Valley's universe. At 394 University Avenue, two small companies were then renting space: Company A was Musk's X.com, Company B was Thiel's Confinity. Both Musk and Thiel are immigrants—Musk from South Africa, Thiel from Germany—and both attended Stanford: Thiel completed a philosophy bachelor's and a law doctorate, while Musk dropped out of his physics PhD after just two days. To avoid becoming competitors, Musk, who had just made his first pot of gold, proposed acquiring Thiel's company; the new company was later renamed PayPal. Soon Thiel stabbed Musk in the back: legal experts manipulated the board vote to force Musk to give up the CEO position. Musk learned the lesson of being too trusting from this experience, while Thiel distilled the truth that the board must be sidelined—something he later used on Zuckerberg: as the first outside investor, he ensured the Facebook empire would be ruled by Zuckerberg alone. Many of the PayPal Mafia who helped Thiel take down Musk were his Stanford alumni. Actually this is because Thiel had deep connections at Stanford: in 1987 he founded the campus newspaper The Stanford Review, attacking the left's biggest political correctness, "equality," and insisting on an elitist libertarianism that believes the law of the jungle is the natural order and government should not defy heaven. Many of the brothers who later followed Thiel around the world fighting battles came out of that editorial board. PayPal also carried forward the virtue of libertarianism; as the American version of Alipay, it was sold to eBay in 2002 for $1.5 billion. Alright, the clues are laid out. The old system is in its death throes, and Caesar's story may be rhyming once again; the neoreactionaries want to reverse history, the accelerationists want to step on the gas, the two factions converge, and all that remains is a strongman to sit in the driver's seat. What Silicon Valley's billionaires are fighting over is exactly this steering wheel. As for how Vance, sitting in the passenger seat, actually colluded with the reclusive Land in Shanghai and the blogging Yarvin—that is the next story. Let us wait and see.

The Rise of China's Biopharmaceutical Industry: From Follower to Leader

Listen up, everyone. Ten years ago, China's share of global innovative drug clinical trials was a pitiful 5%, while the United States held a vast 45% of the territory. Today, the situation has reversed: China is at 30%, the US at 33%. In just ten years, these two lines have gone from a world of difference to running neck and neck. The title of ITIF's report, "Defending American Biopharmaceutical Leadership," really hits the nail on the head, making one feel that America's position as the biopharmaceutical leader is already in jeopardy. Look at these numbers: in 2015, Chinese pharmaceutical companies had only a mere 5 out-licensing deals, with a total value of $2.5 billion. By 2025, that number has soared to 157 deals, with a total value of $135.7 billion. The number of deals grew 31-fold, and the amount grew 54-fold. This is not about selling raw materials—these are independently developed innovative drugs. American multinational pharmaceutical companies can hardly wait, pulling out real money to buy Chinese innovative drugs. So where does the confidence of China's biopharmaceutical industry come from? Basic research. In 2023, the Chinese government's research investment reached as high as $110 billion, while the US spent $65 billion—nearly double. The result? From 2015 to 2024, China's biotechnology papers surged by 162%. In 2024, China had nearly 800 highly cited papers, while the US had only 112 and the EU had 122. This gap can no longer be explained by simple catch-up. Take ADC drugs, for example: China accounts for over 42% of the global pipeline. In gene therapy, of the 77 drugs in development worldwide, China has 48, the US only 21, and Europe 7. These numbers are no longer mere catch-up—they are genuine surpassing. Take oncology research papers: in 2024, China surpassed the US for the first time, with 2,600 versus 2,481. This penetration is not only happening in laboratories and capital markets; it has also penetrated into the products you use every day. Take the recombinant collagen track as an example: China is no longer just a participant—it is a rule-maker. The difficulty of recombinant collagen lies in two words—penetration. Collagen molecules are large, and how to make it truly enter the skin when applied is an industry-recognized challenge. The vast majority of products remain on the skin's surface and cannot break through. China has accomplished this. Speaking of the Comfy brand, it is backed by the support of the state-owned major manufacturer Freda, with over 30 years of history, and a collagen research and development team of more than 300 people. Their patented penetrating collagen, relying on this technology, has not only earned Comfy the Science and Technology Progress Award but also led the formulation of the collagen penetration industry standard, requiring everyone to follow this standard. Comfy has also passed US FDA certification and taken the stage at the American SCC Global Cosmetic Science Conference to share its technical validation system for 27.5-fold macromolecular collagen penetration efficiency. Comfy's technology has also received concentrated coverage from more than 300 media outlets worldwide, from Made in China to international recognition. Comfy has also partnered with Shanghai Ninth People's Hospital for technology transfer and launched this penetrating collagen stick. Within two hours, over 90% can penetrate into cells and get to work. Simply put, it delivers collagen directly into cells, fundamentally rebuilding anti-aging. Comfy's technical data is printed on the packaging, with wrinkle-reduction data calculated by the minute, validated through more than a dozen rounds of authoritative institution testing and SGS real-person full-chain verification. Whether men or women, the cliff-like aging after age 26 is due to collagen loss and skin cells losing vitality, no longer secreting collagen. Comfy's products also contain eight types of collagen and five types of hyaluronic acid; one stick contains 138.9 trillion collagen molecules, which not only improves wrinkles, sagging, and dryness but also addresses dullness, redness, and other aspects. Enjoy painless collagen anti-wrinkle care at home—this is a tangible result that penetrates from daily life. Back to that report: the US government has proposed policy recommendations such as increasing NIH research budgets, passing legislation similar to the CHIPS Act, subsidizing the biopharmaceutical industry, and promoting the return of manufacturing. These recommendations themselves are not wrong, but the report mentions that China's Phase I clinical trial costs are 43% lower than those of the US and completion times are more than 50% faster—this is a structural gap in the overall R&D ecosystem. Subsidies can shorten the distance, but they cannot change the direction. There is a sentence in the US report that is very candid: "China has set ambitious goals and has a track record of achieving them." Ten years ago, this sentence might have been a warning; today, it is more like a confirmation. Of course, this does not mean the US will quickly lose its position in biopharmaceuticals. This industry has deep accumulation—the FDA system, top research institutions, the venture capital ecosystem—these cannot be replaced in just a few years. But one thing has already changed: technology in this field no longer flows in only one direction. Previously, other countries waited to import from the US; now, Chinese technology is beginning to be exported outward, spreading to the world stage. This penetration is extending into everyone's life, and the US report is, to some extent, the best proof of this change.

Trump's "Mole" and Epstein's "Secret Telegram"

Everyone, I was working overtime at the office reading materials and came across an extremely vulgar piece of gossip. With this kind of stuff, Director Yang usually just reads it and doesn't spread it—unless he can't help himself. Today we won't talk about geopolitics or industry; let's talk about the crisis the Know-It-All King is facing. You know the Know-It-All King's entrance song, YMCA? Well, it's been completely ruined now. Imagine him standing next to Clinton, and Clinton says: faster. This melon comes from the Epstein emails released by the U.S. House of Representatives last week—correspondence from March 2018 between the Lolita Island owner who mysteriously committed suicide in prison and his brother Mark Epstein. At the time he hadn't been arrested yet, but he already felt the sex scandal couldn't be contained. The emails go like this: Mark asks, a while back your blood sugar was high, are you better now? And how's your buddy Donald doing? Jeffrey says, all good, Bannon is with me. Mark says, ask him, does Putin have photos of Trump blowing Baba? Note this is a paraphrase. Jeffrey says, I thought I had enough trouble already. Mark says, you and your buddy Old Don Danny can go remake the movie Get Hard. This is a pun: Get Hard is the movie "Get Hard" (Prison Prep Education)—in prison you have to harden up, toughen up, to survive—but I don't know what he's getting hard about. Jeffrey says, you mean Donny T, T being Trump's initial. I won't nitpick the bragging parts in these emails—those who get it, get it. So who is this Baba that the Know-It-All King blew? Baba is a common nickname in Arkansas in the American South—it means "brother." Brothers are everywhere, but in the powerful circle where Epstein could take photos, everyone believes it refers to Bill Clinton—back in the day, to build a man-of-the-people persona, he arranged this nickname for himself. Who knew that years later it could come back to bite him. Trump blowing Clinton—what kind of concept is that? Two sworn enemies—one wearing a pretty blue dress in Epstein's oil painting, the other a standard-bearer advocating traditional values and opposing LGBTQ. You two really could go down on each other? Now no matter what Trump does, everyone can't look at him straight. Set aside his "Big and Beautiful" bill for now—Bill Clinton is playing mute on this matter. Mark Epstein came out to clarify: First, Baba absolutely does not refer to Clinton; second, Baba is not a public figure; third, this email is purely brothers joking crudely, not suitable for public disclosure, and shouldn't be over-interpreted. The White House press office also came out saying these emails prove nothing—it's all a trick by the Democrats and the media, trying to distract everyone so they can't see our Trump baby is always winning, winning, winning. The Epstein case is just too important to Trump's second coming. During his campaign he promised everyone he would expose all the filthy deeds of the powerful—but once in office he changed his tune, telling everyone to stop harping on this old story. After this big melon exploded, Trump immediately instructed the Justice Department to thoroughly investigate Epstein's connections with Democratic bigwigs, especially Clinton and former Treasury Secretary and Harvard President Larry Summers. By the way, Summers has a melon too: the Harvard student newspaper The Crimson dug up materials saying the old president pursued a certain Chinese academic junior colleague, with Epstein providing assists. We'll leave that part aside for now. A few days later, Trump's attitude did a 180-degree turn, calling on Republicans to support releasing the files, saying we have nothing to hide. Actually it's the same as telling the Democrats: come on, let's hurt each other. Why did he change his tune? Because he needs to solidify his power base and patch up the increasingly obvious cracks within the MAGA camp. MAGA's waters run deep—various factions: Tech Bros, neo-conservatives, religious fanatics, all kinds of fence-sitters. The truly loyal ones are the redneck populist faction, among whom there's a sister named Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Georgia congresswoman,堪称 the head of Trump fans. The issues she usually supports are tightly tied to the reasons rednecks chose Trump in the first place—just imagine her as someone dead set on fighting the corrupt system. But at the critical moment Trump himself dropped the ball, refusing to release the files, so she repeatedly petitioned for their release, which angered Trump and got really ugly. But many in the Republican Party are still tough, continuing to petition—the divisions are too big to paper over. So Trump then turned around and approved the release, while striving to point the spear at the Democrats. How will this ultimately develop? I think dogs biting dogs doesn't matter, but it's very damaging to Trump's governing foundation. For one thing, the Bannon mentioned earlier also belongs to the populist faction, yet Bannon appears multiple times in Epstein's files. He was expelled from the White House in 2017 and became an internet celebrity to win public opinion for MAGA—during this period he was very close to Epstein. Bannon suggested using MAGA to counter feminist MeToo, pitting men and women against each other left and right, to pull the rug out from under and obstruct Epstein's sex crime investigation. Epstein also gave Bannon lots of advice on handling the media—how to face the camera, how to speak—to protect Trump's economic policies. Epstein would also leak some White House internal gossip to Bannon, who had been pushed to the periphery—like whether Trump actually prefers Pence or Pompeo. Until the very moment Epstein was arrested on July 6, 2019, the two were still discussing Bannon wanting to go to Lolita Island to shoot a documentary to help Epstein clear his name. Then Epstein's last message was: Cancel everything. Bannon replied: You're not coming? Epstein couldn't reply—because he was arrested. Why talk about Bannon? Because Trump didn't know how to do politics at all back then—his persona was created by Bannon: the people's good president, who would clean up Washington's corrupt officials for the common folks, who would drain the swamp. Who could have imagined that in the end Clinton would walk out and say: Hi, my name is Swamp, you can drain me—but hurry up. On December 18, 2018, an anonymous email comforted Epstein saying, everything will pass, they just want to use you to take down Trump, they've already stopped at nothing. Epstein's reply was: Thanks, it's crazy, because I really can take him down. I can only say, reality is more exciting than American TV dramas—I hope the American people keep pushing for updates. We also love watching these veteran actors chew the scenery. Next time there's a new melon, I'll share it with everyone. But this kind of extremely vulgar stuff, Director Yang usually just reads and doesn't spread—today I guess I couldn't help myself.

A genius bursting onto the scene, or a manufactured god?

Everyone, a story has been flooding the internet recently. In Lianshui County, Huai'an, Jiangsu, a 17-year-old vocational high school girl named Jiang Ping, although studying fashion design, relied on her unfathomable talent outside of class. Under the careful guidance of her teacher Wang Runqiu, her mathematical ability exploded in just two years: from a level where she couldn't even finish the high school entrance exam paper, to standing out from 801 participants in the Alibaba Global Mathematics Competition, pulling off an upset and taking 12th place. Saying she beat a bunch of Tsinghua, Peking, Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, and MIT elites might not give you a clear picture, so let's talk about the people right behind her. 13th place Liu Ben, a PhD from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and gold medalist in the Yau Shing-Tung Mathematics Competition; 14th place Ou Yu, gold medalist in China's CMO Olympiad; 16th place Zhang Xinliang, gold medalist in the International Mathematical Olympiad. Top students picked from one in ten thousand, all reduced to her backdrop. Originally, topics in basic disciplines, especially mathematics, get very little public attention—for good reason: it's too hard. Mathematics is like the ocean; everyday arithmetic is at most the microbes on the surface, while the real deep-sea monsters—Riemann functions and the like—you've never even heard of. This is completely different from geopolitics—everyone can chime in on geopolitics, but mathematics truly leaves no room for casual comment, so no one is interested in discussing it. So Dr. Liu Ben becoming famous as "the thirteenth runner-up" and the competition itself gaining visibility—they all have to thank this vocational high school girl Jiang Ping. Because her story is simply too legendary: grassroots comeback, heaven-sent genius, female hero, a talent scout with a unique eye, unconventional recruitment—all these elements are maxed out. It's so spectacular that every journalism student wants to ride this wave of energy to bring aloof mathematics back down to the plains of public understanding. It's like a group of grandmasters at the Huashan Sword Contest suddenly being joined by an innocent small-town girl who, with just a slight move, stuns everyone and suppresses all the top young disciples of the major orthodox sects. Everyone is curious how her martial arts could be so exquisite, and she says she practices the Taizu Long Fist, Shaolin Flower-Picking Hand, and the Persian Sacred Fire Order. This confuses the various heroes even more, but the onlookers, having regained their language ability, are already cheering, moved, exclaiming at her extraordinary talent, and demanding on the spot that the sect leaders make an exception and take Jiang Ping as a disciple. Interviews and publicity pour in, and even the shopping mall in Lianshui is broadcasting congratulations to her. Lianshui isn't big, but it produces top students. Rationally speaking, this is quite good. Everyone's life needs a beam of light, and it would be even better if we could confirm the authenticity of the light source. Of course I strongly hope everything is real, and I hope she pursues her beautiful dreams. But many details of this story have made even me, with highly limited verification ability, start to doubt: where exactly is this star-making movement heading? The first thing that made me suspicious was the promotional video shot by the organizers. In the video, she solves a proof problem on the blackboard. Judging from the handwriting, the board writing should all be her own, while the red notes in the book come from her teacher Wang Runqiu. The writing in the book has no problems other than being a bit ugly, but the blackboard writing is somewhat unreasonable: the summation symbol ∑ was written as a "semicolon and 2," factors were written as exponents, and γ was written as t. You could say these are all personal writing habits, but could it be that this is caused by her unfamiliarity with the teacher's writing habits? In other words, she is merely copying the teacher's handwritten formulas without actually recognizing these mathematical symbols. As a layperson, I can only speculate through the notes, and it doesn't count for much—after all, many math masters write in wild cursive too. But some Zhihu experts have already, without considering the writing errors, written out the problem on the blackboard in full and analyzed it, concluding that the formulas on the blackboard are abrupt and logically incoherent—mainly something laypeople can't understand and experts can't bear to read. Teachers who have seen the exam paper say that Jiang Ping's answers use accurate terminology, she is proficient in LaTeX, and her answer sheet level surpasses 95% of mathematics majors—they couldn't reach that level of completion within the allotted time. That makes me even more curious: a document typesetting tool—if you don't need to write papers, what's the necessity of mastering it? Isn't self-studying mathematics already time-consuming enough? I'm also puzzled: why would someone with such accurate terminology say "studied about Xie Huimin's mathematics aspects" instead of "read Xie Huimin's Mathematical Analysis"? It's like someone asking you what classic novel you like best, and you say you like "about Cao Xueqin's dream aspects." I'm not necessarily doubting that her terminology is rote-memorized, but for example, PDE—if asked in another way, "Are you good at partial differential equations?" she might answer, "A middle part isn't ugly either." In an interview, she said the geometry problems in the preliminary round had complex diagrams, she couldn't solve them, and there was no way to intuitively represent their three-dimensional form. But the preliminary round had no solid geometry at all, nor anything requiring diagrams; if diagrams were needed, it means the problem wasn't understood. If she didn't score on those problems, then the other problems would need to be near perfect to achieve a score of 93—but the other problems involved neither mathematical analysis nor partial differential equations—which is exactly what she claims to be good at. Even more suspiciously, when she talks about mathematics she shows no love at all, but rather a woodenness of reciting a script—let's attribute that to pressure in front of the camera; but when the topic turns to fashion pattern-making, saying clothes are divided into left and right pieces, her body language immediately becomes confident and natural. Perhaps that is her familiar territory. No wonder many netizens turned into Detective Conan and dug up the monthly exam score sheet from Lianshui Vocational High School: Jiang scored 83 in math, standing out among classmates with scores in the 30s and 40s. But this school is full of hidden talents; she could only place third in her grade, with the first-place student Ding scoring 99 in math. I can't imagine how many competition-trained math majors from elite schools this Chinese cuisine major would crush if he competed. I'm being a bit harsh, but I really don't mean to discriminate based on educational background—among the finalists, many are not from elite schools either; if you search carefully, you can find their competition trajectories over the years. For example, a student from Jiangxi University of Applied Science who upgraded from a junior college has now made the finals for the fourth consecutive year; two computer science students from a college in Shaoxing have won many math modeling competitions; even younger middle school students, Deng Leyan from Shanghai and Luo Siyuan from Hunan, have left various competition records over the past two years. I can only say that everything in this world leaves traces. But Jiang Ping is still striving upward. On this point, I think the outside world had best not disturb her; the various god-making and personal attack messages online should be subject to official intervention. People's Daily put it quite aptly: the boundaries of expression must still be maintained, and one must never consume others' privacy for traffic. But this doesn't mean doubters should shut up. First, doubting her is absolutely not because she is the only girl in the top thirty—using gender to shut people up is really strange. Saying some petty-minded boys are triggered and can't stand a girl doing better than them—even if such psychologically twisted people exist, can they be considered mainstream? If you insist that society tends to judge women and protect men, then may I ask: when Zhai Tianlin was caught faking, was it because of gender? Most people who can't tolerate sand in their eyes are not targeting her personally, but questioning the god-making in civilian competitions. If Jiang Ping truly has real talent and learning, that's wonderful—an innate math saint body; having such a student is truly a blessing for the country. But if it's just a clay idol in a small temple pretending to be a Vajra Buddha body, would you still be willing to burn incense and bow? If everyone is OK with that, then within a few years, competition god-making could become an industry. Four hundred and eighty temples of the Southern Dynasties, how many towers in the misty rain—what the misty rain shrouds is the shortcut into the ivory tower: ordinary kids outside can only squeeze across the single-plank bridge, while geniuses who have won awards can be specially recruited. As for what awards they've won, that depends on what kind of deity the parents are and what competitions they can manipulate to get their child what awards. The competition path is an upward channel for lopsided geniuses; the state does not encourage everyone to squeeze into it, so it only recognizes the five major subject Olympiads in math, physics, chemistry, biology, and informatics, and has canceled their bonus points in the college entrance exam. Only members selected for the national training team can be recommended for admission. This is to set the standard for genius high enough to directly discourage utilitarian players with a bit of cleverness and avoid stimulating competition fever. Of course, the side effect is obvious: vocational high school students without high school registration are directly shut out, possibly missing a pearl. So can civilian competitions fill this gap? Maybe, but the Alibaba competition cannot. It cannot be denied that the Alibaba competition has some influence in professional circles and internationally, but the basic fact is that it is an online exam with no invigilation: the preliminary round lasts 48 hours and is open-book; the final is any 8 hours within 24 hours and is closed-book. But whether open-book or closed-book, discussion and leaking of questions are not allowed, and the rules weakly state: "Contestants please take the exam with integrity." So what—if you don't have integrity, what are you going to do about it? Since there is no invigilation, how do you ensure integrity? Even if the final has cameras and audio recording, prohibits frequent switching of applications—I don't know if screen recording is done, and even if it is, can these measures really eliminate cheating behaviors like teaming up, multi-screen chatting, subcontracting to find gunslingers, multiple people comparing answers, and opening multiple accounts to exploit time differences? If not, what can you analyze from saving contestant recordings? I won't question the matter of Teacher Wang previously competing with students and getting the same score—I can consider it a coincidence in multiple-choice questions. But the mechanism itself: could several contestants cooperate, first get the problems and work them out, then give on-site guidance to contestants who compete later? If the possibility of cheating cannot be reduced to near zero, then it cannot be regarded as a reasonable screening mechanism. In such a competition, due to the lack of a deterrent punishment mechanism, the magnitude of contestants' motivation to cheat is inversely correlated with their degree of love for mathematics. I am willing to believe that all contestants love mathematics, but the problem is that variables don't stop there—besides mathematics, don't people have other hobbies? For example, money. The Alibaba competition prize money is quite generous: gold prize $30,000, silver $15,000, bronze $8,000, and even the excellence award gets $5,000. By comparison, the top five in the American Mathematics Competition AMC share a total of $5,000; the Putnam Mathematical Competition gives at most $2,500; and the IMO gives no money at all. I do not hesitate to speculate on human nature with the worst malice: as long as there is a possibility of profit, there will inevitably be people whose purpose is profit; and as long as there are people whose purpose is profit, there will always be ways to engage in unfair competition. And profit has many forms—not necessarily just money, but also fame and status. So even if the original intention of encouraging with money is good, the possibility of unfair competition driven by interests is hard to rule out; it's best for gatherings of like-minded enthusiasts to be pure. If you love, please love purely. But what I oppose at the core is not actually math masters participating in civilian competitions for fun when their research duties are light, and incidentally earning some extra cash—nor am I saying they compete just to win money; of course it could also be for the joy of solving problems, since the Alibaba competition problems are indeed cleverly designed. What I mean is: it can only be for fun; you cannot rely on it for selection. The all-star lineup of contestants actually proves this point in reverse—everyone is an academic elite already screened by the global education system, long since discovered and specially cultivated; true geniuses have no need to prove themselves by standing out in the Alibaba competition. And the simple, kind-hearted onlookers think they are helping the weak grow wings. Have they ever considered what exactly their call for exceptional admission is breaking? It's the standards for talent selection. No matter how many flaws the existing standards have—you can call them rigid and mechanical—at least they have one thing: they are uniformly fair. Once the standards become overly complex, room for manipulation appears, giving rise to all kinds of makeshift arenas: at first glance they all seem highly valuable—outsiders don't understand anyway—convenient for packaging geniuses and achieving stable mass production of exceptions. These would no longer be overlooked pearls of the academic system, but engineering hammers smashing through the fortress of education. The fortress's bricks are thick, and its moat is wide and deep. But fortunately, these difficulties were created by the intellectual world and have not merged with social power and wealth. Once it is breached, those entering the city will absolutely not be the thousands of troops on the single-plank bridge, but only the children of various bosses and leaders. Isn't it just launching academic satellites? Just you wait—it will definitely be more spectacular than now: a genius once in a millennium, at least two every year; any high school that hasn't produced a few authors in core journals won't have the nerve to enjoy recommendation quotas. The cautionary tale for this path is the United States. Every day it loudly champions affirmative action to support disadvantaged groups, which is actually just making standards as diverse as possible to cover for favoring the rich. The result is that rich second-generation kids from the top 1% of families account for one-sixth of Ivy League enrollment, more than lower-middle-class children, even though the latter make up 60%; in such schools, two-thirds of students come from the top 20% of affluent families, and after graduation they obtain advanced degrees and naturally become the new high-income group. Everyone says don't judge heroes by degrees, but Fortune 500 companies only recruit on elite campuses—this is an unchanging reality. What is elite education? It is education serving exclusively the elite class. In other words, no matter how technology develops or how industries reshuffle, higher education is a resource highland. As long as there are loopholes in talent standards, the privileged class will exploit them and tilt real resources toward themselves, ultimately leading to class solidification. This is the greatest nightmare of a civilian society. The most ironic thing is that some people clearly stand with the majority of ordinary people, yet want to tear down rigid standards, thinking they are delivering the world's tenderness—this is being sold and still helping count the money. If one day competitions are turned into a full-chain god-making industry, they will have nothing to complain about, at most a sigh.

China's Technological Innovation and Sino-US Competition

Everyone, I recently chatted with Zhou Hengxing, the author of "The Altman Biography," about Silicon Valley and the U.S.-China tech competition. It was quite interesting. First, a change. Peter Thiel began supporting Trump as early as 2016, when the entire Silicon Valley was uniformly behind the Democratic Party—almost only he stood with the Republicans. But this time he didn't charge ahead as he did in the past, even though Vance was originally someone he had identified. Today's Silicon Valley has completely split; roughly a third of Silicon Valley's big names are supporting Trump. In various interviews and speeches, Thiel has repeatedly made a very clear point: the United States should return to a tech arms race, engage in a direct arms race with China, and must defeat and surpass China. He is extremely firm on this idea. But I don't think this is a consensus in Silicon Valley—after all, Silicon Valley is in the internet tech camp, quite far from the military-industrial complex, and claiming everyone thinks this way probably doesn't hold up. So if Musk enters the Trump administration, will he push the U.S. one step further toward a tech arms race with China? I think most of these Silicon Valley CEOs are still businessmen, and businessmen look at the interests behind things—and the United States is to a large extent a country built by businessmen. Just look at their remarks and you'll understand: as long as they have interests in China, they are basically quite pro-China. Even someone like Zuckerberg was very eager to enter the Chinese market in his early years—look at what he said then, praising China to the skies and even learning Chinese. So they don't have very strong ideology; they make judgments more from a business standpoint. As long as Musk still has factories in China and such a large auto market there, it's unlikely he would proactively attack China. But in the Trump administration he will probably be in a dilemma—Trump will have very strong policies of competition with China, and Trump is not someone particularly easy to persuade; during his first term he fell out with many people. Given how strong both men's personalities are, I guess it will be hard for them to work together for long, and it's quite possible that one day they too will break. Another point many people like to make: whenever Chinese innovation is mentioned, some bring up national character, saying Americans are lone wolves who innovate on their own, while China, because it respects authority, has lost the motivation and passion for innovation. I don't really like using national character to explain this kind of thing. Looking back at history, the U.S. indeed has more originality and tends to lead first, with China following behind—I don't deny that. But if we go back to the era before geopolitics—during my years in Silicon Valley, roughly 2014 to 2017, before the trade war—China and the U.S. actually cooperated very well. On the one hand, China's manufacturing capacity is extremely strong and it can make things—iPhones and Model 3s were all made there—which the U.S. cannot do; on the other hand, there is enough talent, and many of the very core engineers in Silicon Valley's big companies now came from China. American programmers may be better at pioneering work, but when it comes to basic development and implementation, Chinese engineers' discipline, work intensity, and passion for work are far higher than those of American engineers—to put it bluntly, they are willing to work overtime and Americans are not, relatively speaking. So if China and the U.S. could still cooperate as before, that would actually be the best situation; unfortunately, that's no longer likely. But even if the two sides become completely opposed, China is not entirely without opportunities; the key is to maximize the game it is good at. Many people say China is strong at the application layer—that is, taking an idea and turning it into a commercial application and bringing it to mass adoption; China does this step quite well. I feel this is actually somewhat similar to what is called AI's "brute force produces miracles": algorithms are of course important, but they are only one part; first, China is not bad at computing power, and second, the data fed in is abundant enough. China's experience in applications is indeed rich, especially in the mobile internet era—the population base is large enough, and traditional business sectors are relatively weak, so they are easily disrupted by the internet. Americans value making the product itself more, believing that if you make a good product, people will naturally use it; China values operations more, relying on promotion, marketing, and even the kind of offline ground promotion from back in the day to get things done—Americans can't learn this approach. In the AI field I haven't yet seen particularly good applications appear, but once they do, I think China's opportunities are great. Finally, let's talk about AI ethics. In the U.S., academics are very worried about AI's ethical safety and social impact, and voices on this are loud. So-called accelerationism is essentially about liberating the means of production, liberating AI, algorithms, and computing power, and what it serves is technology, not people. China indeed does not have as many considerations in this regard as the U.S. The reason is probably that AI in China is more about solving practical problems, driven by capital and involving big companies, while the involvement of academics and universities is not as deep as in the U.S., and the degree of interdisciplinarity is not as high; plus our education is inherently less free than America's and more subordinate to the overall educational values, so there is less discussion at the ethical level. But what exactly is the relationship between this kind of ethical discussion and development? I don't think it is necessarily a promoting relationship. When it comes to AI safety, in China the government may need to take the lead, and I do see some academic moves. As for the public, what everyone pays more attention to is whether AI will replace their jobs, rather than discussing it from an ethical perspective—but replacing livelihoods is itself a very important social ethic. Look at the news about those robotaxis in Wuhan; the comments were full of "What are we going to do?" Yet in the eyes of the tech big shots, what a wonderful thing this is—so efficient; capitalists of course love it.

With U.S. financial hegemony, China can only look on and sigh in despair.

Everyone, I recently read an article in the Financial Times saying that the United States is winning steadily in financial competition with China, which excited me for a moment. But later I realized that the US is actually retreating in other areas, and only in this key area of finance does it win easily, because China's financial strength has completely stagnated. The financial strength gap between the two largest economies has reached the most disproportionate level in 500 years. For a great power to rise, besides military and trade, financial strength is also essential. In the past, central banks of other countries rushed to hold US dollars, which to some extent reflected the international status of the dollar. But look at the RMB today: its economy accounts for 17% of the world, but its foreign exchange reserves share is only 2%. Its trade volume accounts for 15% of the global total, but the RMB settlement share is only 2%. Over the past 50 years, financial assets have soared fourfold, exceeding 400% of global GDP, and the degree of financialization has reached a historic high, yet the RMB still hasn't gotten a share. Why hasn't China developed financial strength? The reason lies in the closed financial system, which makes it difficult for foreign investors to enter. The article's author made an analogy, saying that China's domestic market is a closed prison, where capital is guarded like prisoners and cannot escape. Some people try to break out of prison, using various illegal means to transfer funds abroad, damaging China's image as a financial center, so investors naturally still regard the US as the preferred market. If RMB internationalization is the goal, the author suggests implementing capital account liberalization. Didn't you want RMB internationalization? That means making the RMB fully freely convertible, letting the market decide, and ending the dollar's dominance. But this concept was very popular more than a decade ago, when domestic reformers, Wall Street, and the IMF all called for fully opening capital controls. But the result is that this term hasn't been heard for a long time. Because our country didn't fall into this trap; rashly opening up would instead lead to capital flight, or even being badly hurt by financial sanctions like Russia. So where is the problem? Teacher Tang Yinan from our institute happens to study the world financial system and RMB internationalization. I heard him talk about this topic. Simply put, there are three points. First, RMB internationalization should not aim to become a global reserve currency like the US dollar. The US, for financial hegemony, supplies dollars to the whole world; everyone makes things, and it is responsible for buying and buying. If you all hold dollars, isn't the currency internationalized? The cost paid is maintaining a huge structural trade deficit, and the side effect is abandoning the real economy and causing industrial hollowing-out. Dollar hegemony is secure, those in finance make money, but what about everyone else? Isn't America's predicament caused by comprehensive financialization? Now Western media are using financial hegemony to tempt us. This time they don't ask: what is the cost? The cost is the unavoidable Triffin dilemma in international finance—a country providing a global reserve currency must supply the currency through international trade, so it inevitably faces long-term deficits. If China imitates the US in pursuing RMB internationalization, that would be undermining its own foundation, and what would be hurt is precisely our core advantage: industrial capacity and supply chain dominance. My channel talks about so many industries every day, and this is exactly what it means. Second, even if the RMB wanted to imitate the US dollar, it couldn't. Because the international financial market has been alienated by the US dollar; its fundamental function is no longer to serve the real economy, but to serve dollar hegemony—absorbing over-issued dollars and providing paper financial returns. In such an order, if you want to replace it and take the dollar's path so that the dollar has no way out? Don't even think about it. Many countries have fallen into this system: Britain abandoned the real economy and became a secondary financial market of the dollar; Japan preserved its real economy but gave up monetary autonomy, reducing the yen to a carry-trade currency. If the RMB targets the dollar, the final result is very likely to become the yen, so why bother forcing itself in? For a developing industrial country, there is also the Mundell-Fleming trilemma: you cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital flows, and an independent monetary policy. If free capital flows are allowed, the exchange rate and monetary policy must be dictated by the Federal Reserve and international capital. When capital floods in, the currency appreciates, export competitiveness declines, and real manufacturing is hit; when capital flows out, it's even worse—liquidity tightens, money becomes scarce, and domestic companies cannot repay debts and can only go bankrupt. Opening financial markets cannot solve this trilemma. Third, and most importantly, explore a new path. RMB internationalization must break free from rigid thinking. There is not only one path of imitating the US dollar, nor is it necessary to replace the dollar as a reserve currency. In the position of financial hegemony, using the RMB to replace the dollar would also lead us to a dead end. The correct approach is to take a new currency path backed by real assets. Unite with the vast number of developing countries, especially resource countries, to establish a new platform and issue a community currency with productive assets as reserves. Each country transforms its production capacity and natural resources into joint-stock operation of the new bank. The function of this new currency is not foreign exchange reserves, but to support construction and development, cutting off ties with Wall Street. In terms of role, it does not seek to become a new reserve currency to compete with the dollar for share, but to unite with the vast number of developing countries, transcend the logic of American-style globalization, and shift the function of international currency from foreign exchange reserves to joint-stock operation.

Does the benevolent person love Musk? From Hinton to effective altruism

Everyone, let's continue the conversation with Zhou Hengxing, the author of "The Altman Biography." We were talking about Hinton, whom we just discussed, and he and Altman have some degree of overlap. Hinton recently criticized Altman for caring more about profit than about AI safety. How do you view this trade-off between profit and safety? I think this is a conflict between two sets of values. Hinton is from academia, and academia is very much like some universities in California. Many people there are influenced by liberal leftism and grew up from the generation that protected the environment and opposed war. Academia has a problem: it lacks understanding of business. From the perspective of the startup world, the biggest competition for a company and for entrepreneurs is that you first have to survive the competition. For Altman, he should also realize that the issue of safety is very important, including that he promised Ilya at the time that he would give 20% of compute to do superalignment. So-called superalignment is about making AI's emotional values consistent with humanity's. But later on, it is very likely that competition with Google and Anthropic became too intense, and he had to put all resources into building larger models, so the later contradictions grew bigger and bigger. Actually, both points are understandable. I understand Altman because, as a CEO, he first has to win the competition and win this war. The pressure in that regard should be the greatest. Is safety something he considers? I think definitely yes, but perhaps not with safety placed at such a high priority as Hinton does. Musk also often considers safety, at least as he says: I am so worried about humanity's future, hurry up and regulate it. But in my book I also wrote that during his time at OpenAI, especially in 2018, some of his remarks were clearly those of an effective accelerationist. At the time he kept criticizing the team, saying you are too slow, you need to be faster, release earlier. This is clearly the same as Altman, pushing the team to go as fast as possible from the perspective of a capitalist and CEO, and not letting others catch up. But after he left OpenAI, he began talking about safety issues. I think this is more of a competitive strategy. There is a chapter in the book about Silicon Valley religion. Actually, before I wrote this book, I had written about them long before, and it really is like a religion. But you also know that religious wars in history were not really about religion itself, but about the interests involved in reality; religion was just a pretext, so your position can change. Just like Musk, who said that MacAskill of Oxford University fits my philosophy very well, my philosophy is very similar to his. But you also just said that he is actually also an accelerationist, which is quite similar to people like Peter Thiel. So it is actually a rather flexible moral outlook. If we look at many of Musk's so-called theories and the blueprints he describes, they have actually changed. It is not as he says, that from the beginning in college he thought of making electric vehicles, doing green energy, and doing space. This is actually a whole storytelling logic formed later. According to this logic, his ultimate goal is to go to Mars. Electric vehicles are for transportation on Mars, rockets are the intermediate transport from Earth to Mars, X was imagined at the time as communications on Mars, and there is also The Boring Company digging big tunnels, though there is basically no sound from that now and it counts as a failure. In addition, there is brain-computer interface work. He does have a whole set of logic, and within it there are his ideals and persistence, but much of it is actually for storytelling. Regarding his effective altruism (EA), American technology reporting and current affairs reporting all write a lot about this. One point is called Longtermism. Peter Singer was the first to talk about effective altruism. In his article "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," he said that the obligation you bear to save a starving person who has collapsed at your door is the same as the obligation to save a refugee in Africa thousands of miles away. That is to say, the value of a human life is an abstract average. He mathematized people, so the value of people now is the same as the value of people ten thousand years from now. That is why Musk often says we can go to Mars, including how many children I want to have, and you must not be some sexual minority and not have children, or our civilization will be destroyed. He wants to ensure the prosperity of future human population, perhaps already as an interplanetary species. Working backward from this, this value system is a rather social-engineering idea. I remember the first time I met Musk, what surprised me was that he said he had calculated China's population and thought that if China kept implementing family planning and each family had only one child, the population structure would soon collapse. I was very impressed. I said, how do you know? He said, I calculated it. That was 2013, and he was already calculating this then. He is very good at using mathematical logic, quite coldly. That is, I also speak in mathematical logic and do not mix in too much emotion. So he really cannot stand those leftist things in California, mixing in too many values that he finds absurd. In recent years there is also the "woke mind virus." He talks about this all day, also because his son became a daughter. Later I kept in touch with Musk by email. Mainly I sent him some English articles we wrote, about China's electric vehicles and China's space program. Sometimes he was quite interested and would comment a few words. I remember once when the Beidou satellite was launched, I sent him an article, and he said, "Congratulations to Beidou." I also sent one about the lunar rover Chang'e, and he also said congratulations. Then I asked him, do you think China will get to Mars before you? He said, game on, let's have a race. So you see, from Hinton to Altman and then to Musk, on the surface what they are arguing about is AI safety, but underneath it all turns on competition, interests, and a narrative that can be adjusted according to one's position.

The United States wants to cross the river by feeling Japan's stones, but rare earth weapons have side effects.

Everyone, in order to escape the rare earth chokehold, the United States is preparing to cross the river by feeling Japan's stones. Because Japan is the only country with complete survival experience in the face of rare earth weapons. I studied the relevant materials and found that China's rare earth moat is not the king bomb that some people imagine—throw it out and you're invincible. We need to be clear-eyed about this. Let's go back to September 2010. A Chinese fishing boat collided with a Japanese patrol vessel near the Diaoyu Islands. Japan detained the Chinese captain, so China imposed an unofficial but de facto rare earth embargo that lasted two months. At first Japan didn't take it seriously, until officials responsible for the auto industry discovered that a rare earth supply cutoff would bring the entire auto supply chain to a halt. The magnets in motors cannot do without rare earths, and the supply of these key materials depended entirely on China. What's more terrifying: looking around the world, all industrial countries depended on China. So Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry allocated a 100 billion yen (about 8 billion RMB) emergency budget package specifically to support Japanese companies in broadening rare earth sources. The government agency JOGMEC, the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, formed a corporate partnership with Sojitz Corporation—the government put up the money, and Sojitz handled the commercial execution—to find rare earth sources outside China. It happened to be Australian mining company Lynas, which was then facing financial difficulties and wanted to build the world's first China-free rare earth supply chain: mining in Australia, refining in Malaysia. But it couldn't raise the money, and had no way to increase refining capacity in Malaysia. The Japanese came bearing money, and the two sides hit it off immediately. So Lynas spent $230 million to build a rare earth refinery on 100 hectares in the northern suburbs of Kuantan, Malaysia. This is one of the few large-scale rare earth separation facilities outside China. Malaysia has good relations with us, but it was very eager for Lynas to invest and build the plant. The reason is simple: uncertainty in rare earth supply drives up prices, and higher prices mean higher revenue for Lynas. At the time, annual exports were projected at $1.7 billion, exceeding 1% of Malaysia's GDP. Malaysia was overjoyed, and even offered a tax exemption period of up to 12 years. After the plant was successfully built, miners in Western Australia went to mine in the desert 1,000 kilometers away from Perth, then shipped the ore by land and sea to Malaysia. There it was refined in Kuantan into high-purity single rare earth oxides, then shipped from Malaysia to Japan, where Sojitz distributed it to all Japanese magnet manufacturers, and then Japanese automakers purchased it for use in various products. In 2010, when Japan's rare earth supply was cut off, it depended on China for over 90% of imports. That proportion has now dropped to around 60%. The Lynas plant in Kuantan is the largest non-Chinese source. Japan also imports some from Australia, Vietnam, the United States, and Myanmar, and does domestic recycling, which together account for about 10% of total supply. Precisely because Japan reduced its dependence on Chinese rare earths, it has recently been talking so tough—because it feels its back is stiff and it has the ability to cope with political risk. Then why does it still buy 60% from China? The biggest reason is that Chinese rare earths are cheap—5 to 7 times cheaper than the refining cost of non-Chinese rare earths. Why so cheap? Lax regulation is undeniably one reason, but not the main one. We introduced refining technology from abroad and continuously iterated and optimized it through massive practice, forming a lot of tacit knowledge—for example, how to improve the recycling rate of waste residue, which contributes significantly to cost reduction. In addition, there's the patent pool plus industry standards: domestic manufacturers can copy the optimal process with one click by paying patent fees, while foreign companies have to figure out every step from scratch. Therefore, in the international rare earth market, Chinese rare earths command one price and foreign rare earths another—a very stark difference. A China-free supply chain can't make money unless it sells at a premium, so in the short term there's no hope of competing with China on price. So in fully market-based competition, most of these companies would die. But since geopolitical risk has been introduced, the environment for these manufacturers has actually improved, because the United States wants to nurture these little seedlings—first with subsidies, and second, key sectors like defense are willing to accept high prices. And they're also leveraging their strength in telling a good American story: a bunch of metals have been given value—Chinese rare earths are theirs, produced by polluting the planet, and cheap goods are no good; our rare earths are our own, safer, greener, more autonomous and controllable, more technologically sophisticated—so what if they're a bit more expensive? Now the United States is setting out to build a domestic supply chain, including supporting rare earth mining in California, processing and magnet manufacturing in North Carolina and Texas, and leading multiple international cooperations with Europe, Australia, Japan, and others to reduce dependence on China. Japan feels its opportunity has come—in the past it was basically fighting alone, with no hope of completely escaping dependence; now everyone is joining forces to solve the problem. The next step, it will certainly want to export Japanese experience, from mines to magnets. It's expected that the US circle of friends will include a group of countries with resources and infrastructure, and Japan's experience will be very important—this kind of cooperation is crucial for reducing costs. Telling this story is really to say that using rare earths as a weapon has side effects. Even if you try to strike precisely—for example, targeting military-industrial enterprises to avoid indiscriminate damage—a global premium will still prompt more countries, even those without security anxieties, Global South countries, to seek supply chain autonomy to avoid being caught between China and the US. The International Energy Agency predicts that by 2030, due to increased demand from electric vehicles, wind power, and defense, rare earth processing capacity outside China will grow from 15% to 30-40%. This is not a trend we can stop. So our policymakers and rare earth practitioners need to consider how to convert lost market share into greater profit margins and stronger strategic autonomy.

Japanese Companies in Those Years: From One Mistake to a Complete Disaster

Everyone, recently I read a book about Japanese companies called "Drifting with the Tide: Japanese Enterprises and the Lost 30 Years." For some reason, the publisher sent me another copy. I usually don't recommend difficult books, but the content of this one is truly "hardcore," so I'll recommend it anyway. The four characters "drifting with the tide" in the title point directly at the core problem of Japanese companies. Originally, Japanese companies followed a governance model of "long-term stability and enduring peace," emphasizing employee loyalty and corporate stability. But after the bubble burst, they wouldn't listen to advice and wholesale imitated the American-style business model. This "drifting with the tide" mentality is truly exasperating. First, we need to look at the original business model of Japanese companies. At that time there was a seniority-based lifetime employment system, a main bank system and cross-shareholding system, and an insider-dominated governance structure. The core of these institutions was "long-term stability," not short-term shareholder returns. This was a good thing, but it simply could not withstand the impact of the asset bubble collapse in the 1990s. In the 21st century, Japanese companies began to "mend their ways" and shifted to the American-style "maximization of shareholder value." This led to a dramatic change in corporate investment behavior. The ratio of capital investment to stock dividends went from "capital investment far greater than stock dividends" to "stock dividends far greater than capital investment" all at once. Capital investment stagnated, stock dividends soared, rising 7% annually on average, and in 2021 they exceeded capital investment for the first time in history. Dividends and buybacks became the main uses of cash, which is truly ironic. Japanese companies not only failed to invest in themselves, but also restricted overseas investment and talent investment in every way. Once the data came out, it was simply speechless. At first they could still hold on a bit, but at this level, it really makes one want to "abandon ship." The reasons behind this are complex, including distrust of the banking system and the impact of exchange rate fluctuations. The performance of large enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises is even more different. Although small and medium-sized enterprises pay fewer dividends, they are more willing to accumulate free capital; they would rather let money sit in accounts earning interest than invest. In short, they do not increase investment even when profits rise, turning into a purely risk-avoiding way of operating. To what extent is it restricted? After reading the data, you will feel that at the beginning I didn't even want to follow along anymore. By the way, the United States itself only began doing this in the 1980s, and this mutually reinforced its deindustrialization and economic financialization. More critically, Japanese companies have also continuously strengthened the practice of maximizing shareholder value, leading to a vicious cycle. Companies are pressured to raise dividends, so they have to compress investment to increase dividends, making it difficult to improve productivity. To support stock prices, executives use large amounts of cash flow to buy back common shares, even hollowing out the balance sheet. This kind of operation is not unique to the U.S. stock market either; Apple's buyback amount in 2024 was close to 100 billion U.S. dollars, which can be called an important institutional guarantee for the U.S. economy shifting from the real to the virtual. This reminds me of my colleague Guo Jiezheng, who specializes in the equity structure and governance concepts of U.S.-listed companies. The system of management buybacks pushing up stock prices does indeed deal a blow to industry. The main income of senior management teams comes from equity incentives, and the assessment indicator is total shareholder return, TSR, that is, an assessment indicator formed by comparing ending stock price plus dividends minus beginning stock price with the beginning stock price. In other words, the compensation systems of most U.S.-listed company executives are highly linked to the company's stock price. To support the stock price, they need to use large amounts of cash flow to buy back common shares, which is already commonplace in the U.S. stock market. Japanese companies have abandoned their own business principles and blindly imitated American-style companies; this is truly "a dead end." This business model was once highly praised and regarded as a guideline by many Chinese economists. If they had succeeded in selling it, the consequences would be unimaginable. Another abandoned principle, which the author deeply detests, I think is especially important, though the discussion in the book is somewhat oversimplified, but it is worth a look. Japanese companies used to always try to put employee sovereignty first and shareholder sovereignty second. Now this has changed, and the labor distribution rate and shareholder distribution rate of companies have changed greatly. The author's view is that Japanese companies used to think of many ways to coordinate this contradiction, introducing employee sovereignty under the premise of preserving shareholder sovereignty and letting employees participate in corporate governance. For example, some organizational conventions: most board members needed to come from employees, the president had to have frontline work experience, and cross-shareholding and other methods were used to ease the contradiction. In short, he particularly emphasizes that during the period of rapid Japanese economic development, letting employees participate in governance had its legitimacy, and of course this changed during the lost 30 years. There is too much to say if this point is expanded. One can think about how, after reform and opening up and up to today, China, whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, should solve the problem of employee participation in governance and the working class being masters of the country. These are all difficult problems. But one thing I dare say for sure: if you keep frantically learning from the United States, that is a dead end. In summary, this book is based on a large amount of data, is detailed in content, and clear in viewpoint. If interested, everyone can buy it and read it, and see how these data reveal the 30 years that Japanese companies missed. As for me, I still have to continue working on my podcast program and get my colleagues to do it with me. After all, these research results should not remain only in internal publications.

Why has Japanese diplomacy "taken leave of its senses"? We must start with domestic politics.

Everyone, there's something worth paying attention to. When conflicts arise between China and Japan, the external public opinion environment is actually quite unfavorable to us. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is making trouble on the Taiwan Strait issue, and Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian directly said on foreign social media that for a dirty head that barges in without permission, one can only chop it off without hesitation. This is just a metaphor—defending national sovereignty and chopping off the dirty head raised by militarism is no problem. But Japanese public opinion immediately exploded, saying how can you incite the beheading of a national leader? Western media immediately chimed in, saying the 'wolf warrior' who 'punishes even those far away' is back. The West taking sides—everyone is used to it. Do they really not understand China's red lines? Definitely not; whenever they get a chance, they want to disgust us. So-called 'either stupid or bad'—they are definitely not stupid; there are actually quite a lot of clear-headed people. For example, the YouTube current affairs channel VisualPolitik, which I often watch, analyzed Sanae Takaichi very well. The core point is: Sanae Takaichi's domestic political position is unstable, and there are many moves she cannot make. After comparing options, she finds that talking tough on China and taking a hardline stance is actually the easiest and safest. So you have to understand Japan's diplomacy from the perspective of its domestic politics. Why do I say that? Because the Japanese government is almost the Liberal Democratic Party. Since the LDP was founded 70 years ago, it has basically been out of power for only a few years. But after Abe stepped down, the LDP has become increasingly unable to hold things together; it no longer has a majority in both chambers of the Diet and must govern in coalition with other parties. For the past 20-plus years, the LDP's old partner has been Komeito, which is relatively left-leaning, supports welfare, immigration, and friendship with China. But it recently announced a 'divorce' from the LDP and withdrew from the coalition. The surface reason is that it thinks Takaichi, as Abe's disciple, is too hawkish, and especially that visiting Yasukuni Shrine is bad for handling Japan's relations with China and South Korea. But Abe also visited before, and they didn't say anything then, so that's not the real reason. The real reason is that LDP bigwigs used political donations to fill slush funds, which is a huge scandal in Japan. Including the earlier assassination of Abe by Tetsuya Yamagami—what was behind it? It was the LDP's deep collusion with the Unification Church faction of Sun Myung Moon. By the way, Trump is also in their circle. This made it too ugly for Komeito, as a Buddhist group, not to cut ties. And within the LDP, the ones caught up in the scandal happened to be Abe and Takaichi's faction, called the Seiwa-kai, which advocates abandoning the pacifist constitution and rearming Japan—the party's right wing—and it was forced to disband because of the scandal. On one hand, this weakened their political strength; on the other hand, in recent years Japan's economy has also run into major problems. The surface phenomena are jarring: wage income has fallen for many consecutive months, pay raises cannot keep up with inflation, and at the same time rice prices keep rising—at the peak, the average price of ten jin of rice exceeded 5,000 yen, equivalent to more than 200 RMB. These problems are now very hard to solve, because the old method was to raise interest rates to suppress inflation, but now the Japanese economy is in the awkward position of having inflation without growth. Raising rates rashly at this time could trigger a recession; the government also dares not do large-scale fiscal stimulus as in the past, to avoid further pushing up inflation and expanding the fiscal deficit. Takaichi herself wants to redo Abenomics. The three arrows of Abenomics—printing money, spending money, and structural reform—in plain terms mean monetary easing, increased public spending, and structural reform. But now Japan can do none of these three things. Compared with more than a decade ago, the yen has depreciated by over 50%. Printing money was possible before because the currency was overvalued; now people don't want yen, and printing more will only make it weaker and inflation higher. In the past, the Japanese government borrowed heavily, with debt at 240% of GDP—for reference, the US is 125% and China is 88%. Japanese government bonds used to be backed by the central bank: print money, print, print; buy bonds, buy, buy. But now it cannot absorb so many bonds, to the point that the ten-year government bond yield has reached its highest level in 17 years, showing the market cannot digest them. If you can't borrow, you can't expand spending to stimulate the economy. As for the third arrow, structural reform, Abe himself never explained it clearly, and now it is even harder for Takaichi. What Abe faced back then was a very serious structural problem in the Japanese economy. For a long time Japan focused on building the nation through manufacturing, such as robots, automobiles, and especially consumer electronics. In hardware, Japan is hard to beat anywhere in the world—their smart toilets could measure blood pressure and such long ago. But the problem is that it completely missed the rise of the mobile internet, digital transformation, and cloud technology. Now the entire technology ecosystem is connected by software, and because Japan was too successful in hardware, it developed path dependence: the government responded slowly to new trends, lacked appropriate industrial policy, and blindly protected past hardware manufacturers; inside companies, seniority-based promotion prevailed, and young software engineers were not valued. As a result, there are neither successful software companies nor a formed IT internet and software ecosystem. At the same time, hardware manufacturing also suffered setbacks. After the Fukushima nuclear accident, nuclear power plants shut down one after another, reducing electricity supply by 30%, and this part could only shift to fossil fuel imports, causing electricity prices to rise sharply. For a country that exports industrial goods, this means manufacturing competitiveness has been severely hit. Only Germany, after Nord Stream 2 was blown up, can understand this pain, and Japan has carried the burden of high-priced energy for more than a decade—much worse than Germany. If the information technology revolution is compared to a ball game, Japan scored a lot in the first half through hardware such as semiconductors, integrated circuits, and electronic products; in the second half, which compares the internet and software ecosystem, it was absent, so productivity growth has been slower than in other developed countries. So although Sanae Takaichi has the intention to imitate Abenomics, the broader environment has changed, and these arrows really cannot be shot in her hands; she can only make an issue of political topics. Now the party tied to the LDP is an extreme right-wing party called Nippon Ishin no Kai, which you can understand as Japan's MAGA. It is the opposite of Komeito, advocating small government, less spending, anti-immigration, anti-China, constitutional revision, and military building. The LDP, having lost Komeito, has already lost a layer of checks and is turning right; adding Ishin no Kai will inevitably let both aspects run wild together. The first aspect is immigration. Abe called himself a conservative nationalist, but in practice introduced a large number of immigrants, and the LDP now has a lot of room to maneuver here. The other aspect is diplomacy. Simply put, Japan wants to toughen up and create enemies, using the so-called 'rally around the flag' effect to achieve the goal of treating internal illness externally. So who can Japan be tough on? It can't be the United States, right? Nor South Korea, because the US does not want it to be tough on South Korea either. Looking around, there is only one choice: us. Therefore, Sanae Takaichi's diplomacy must be understood within the framework of US diplomatic strategy. It not only includes current trash-talking behavior like 'a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,' but will also push Japanese companies in the future to decouple from China in strategic areas and work with the US to build supply chains that bypass China and compete directly with us. Many people now worry that Japan wants to overturn the postwar international order, that is, abolish the pacifist constitution. But in fact, the threshold for constitutional revision in Japan is very high, and only a minority in the country support it. Compared with that, how Japan will assist the US in geopolitical industrial competition is the longer-term and more practical impact. I will continue to follow this point in the future and report to everyone whenever there are developments. But now I have to go to an AI meeting first. An expert from Sciences Po in France is speaking about global AI governance, and I'm going to see whether what they say is interesting. Okay, see you next time, bye-bye.

Carbon Fiber Battle: From a Brutal Elimination Round to the T1200 Grade

Everyone, recently there's been more good news from our country in the field of carbon fiber. Our T1200-grade ultra-high-strength carbon fiber material has made its global debut, and this came even faster than the mass production of T1100-grade by a month. There's a lot behind this story, so let's sort it out. I remember that day I was watching CGTN news, which reported on the mass production of T1100-grade, and I thought about writing an article then. I never expected that just one month later, T1200-grade would burst onto the scene. This thing comes from Zhongfu Shenying, called SYT80; laboratory development was at the end of last year, and production capacity has already reached hundreds of tons. We have become the first country in the world to achieve hundred-ton-level mass production. This is not something just for show in a lab, but something that can truly be used in industrial production. From a 1-kilogram sample to hundred-ton-level products, this hurdle has stumped many countries, especially Germany and Russia, which have never gotten past it. We actually crossed it so quickly—that really makes people cheer. The performance of T1200-grade carbon fiber is truly astonishing. A single fiber has a diameter of less than 7 microns, one-tenth of a human hair. The tensile strength of ordinary steel is generally 0.5 GPa, while T1200-grade can reach 8 GPa, more than ten times that of steel, while its density is only one-quarter that of steel. This means it is both light and strong—simply an indispensable key material in fields such as aerospace, national defense and military industry, new energy, and high-end equipment. Therefore, it is called the "king of new materials." Speaking of more than ten years ago, Chinese carbon fiber enterprises went through a brutal elimination round, and only a few remained. For example, Zhongfu Shenying, through independent research and development of equipment and technology, step by step plucked the crown of new materials. T1200-grade carbon fiber, through nanoscale structural control, greatly reduces internal micropores during the carbonization process, increasing strength by 10%-15% over T1100-grade. Actually, our carbon fiber research can be traced back to the 1960s, led by units such as the Shanxi Institute of Coal Chemistry of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. But the industrial foundation lagged the international level by twenty to thirty years. At the beginning of this century, our country's external dependence on carbon fiber was as high as 80%-90%, and because of its key role in missiles, fighter jets, and other fields, it was listed by the United States and Japan as a strategic material. The global market was basically monopolized by Japan's Toray, Toho, and Mitsubishi and the United States' Hexcel, and exports were extremely strict—not only expensive, but also strictly prohibited from military use. In 2001, the Ministry of Science and Technology realized that the shortage of high-performance carbon fiber seriously threatened national defense security, so it established a special carbon fiber project. Not long after, the United States and Japan simply began an embargo and chokehold, further tightening export restrictions, which instead stimulated us to list it as a key strategic material. In 2015, targets were proposed for the self-sufficiency rate to reach 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025, and these have already been exceeded ahead of schedule. One has to say, thanks are due to the launch of the large aircraft project, which provided it with a huge downstream market and forced through the connection from laboratory to factory. Japan's Toray is indeed an industry giant; the entire performance grading system was established by it. Its customers range from Boeing and Airbus to hydrogen cylinders, golf clubs, and high-end fishing rods, occupying the top of the industry pyramid. In 2023, Toray released a T1200-grade product, but the specific tonnage and uses were not disclosed. Industry estimates put it at only the hundred-ton level, with an extremely high premium and review of end uses. Toray originally hoped to use new products to dominate the next two super tracks, namely humanoid robots and the low-altitude economy. And the localized supply of our Zhongfu Shenying's SYT80 can precisely prevent Toray from locking down the profit chain. Moreover, rising costs and product price increases at Toray provide us with an excellent opportunity to expand market share. So, from today onward, offense and defense have changed positions. Also, do you remember the Hamilton Index of the U.S. ITIF that I mentioned? One of the few clusters of advanced industries in the United States is Washington State's aerospace within other transportation equipment. American think tanks have already recognized China's sci-tech innovation complex—for example, the coupling between research institutions and industrial entities such as the China National Building Material Group Research Institute and Zhongfu Shenying, and between Shenzhen University and Changsheng Technology. This has not only rapidly consolidated the core pillar of the development of domestic new quality productive forces, but is also launching an impact on the remaining high ground of American cutting-edge science and technology industries.

If the United States takes Greenland, would that have a big impact on us?

Everyone, if the United States takes Greenland and monopolizes its oil, gas, and rare earths, what impact will that have on us? This question needs to be broken down: Will it take it? Is opposition effective? Only then comes how it will impact our overseas interests. Whether it will take it must be divided into subjective and objective aspects. Subjectively, the United States has actually already let itself go. Previously it spoke of law and rules; now it is demonstrating its determination to act as a robber. On January 6, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller said that the rule of strength, force, and power is the iron law of how the world operates; Trump said that the only thing that can constrain him is his own sense of morality, and added: I do not need international law. In 2019 he proposed buying Greenland through a real estate transaction, and at the time there was strong internal opposition in the U.S. government—the diplomatic establishment believed that since the United States already had troops stationed in Greenland, it was strategically safe and there was no need to humiliate Denmark and affect NATO unity. Now its cabinet is completely different. Ensuring its own supply of key resources and excluding rivals is one of its strategic priorities. In other words, its subjective willingness has become stronger. So how important is Greenland, really? To put it plainly, it is a rich mine. The Arctic has no small amount of oil and gas resources: 90 billion barrels of crude oil and 44 billion barrels of liquefied natural gas, accounting for 13% and 30% of the world's recoverable reserves. A considerable portion of that is in Greenland. If the United States takes it, the energy landscape will be turned upside down. Then look at rare earths: Greenland's proven rare earth reserves are 1.5 million tons, eighth in the world. Although less than China's, the potential is enormous—for example, the intrusive rock body at Kvanefjeld in the south is estimated to contain more than 36 million tons of rare earth oxides. Greenland's deposits are characterized by polymetallic association and a high proportion of heavy rare earths. What is even more advantageous is their high grade: the same amount of mining can produce more key raw materials. There is no need to say much about the importance of rare earths—mobile phones, chips, robots, and missile systems all depend on them. Greenland also has large amounts of uranium, with reserves ranking sixth in the world. There is no need to elaborate on what that means for nuclear energy and computing power. Taking these resources is especially important for the United States because rare earths are largely distributed in BRICS countries, and the West as a whole does not have particularly much. Therefore, solving the rare earth bottleneck ranks very high in U.S. strategic priorities. In 2019 the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with Greenland to increase mineral exploration efforts. Last June, the U.S. Export-Import Bank allocated $120 million in loans to fund Greenland's Tanbreez rare earth project. This mine was originally going to be bought by a Chinese company; the United States used various means to sabotage the deal and then acquired the mine at a lower price. This kind of contest has now become normal. The CSIS think tank said that acquiring resources is the top priority of U.S. diplomacy this year. Having discussed the reasons why the United States wants to take it, let us look at opposition from various sides. First, Greenland itself opposes it: its five major parties issued a joint statement last Friday rejecting the U.S. attempt, saying we do not want to be Americans, nor do we want to be Danes; we just want to be Greenlanders. Denmark's position has also changed—in 2019 it dismissed the matter as absurd, but now it speaks of the principle of "not for sale": Greenland's sovereignty belongs to the people of Greenland, and Denmark has no right to transfer it. To this Trump said "opposition is ineffective": whether you are willing or not, the United States will take action. His reason was that if the United States does not take it, China and Russia will; rather than letting the enemy benefit, it is better to let a friend benefit—I can go easier; why do you need to struggle? The U.S. establishment and European countries are uneasy from another dimension, believing that this kind of seizure is itself a form of self-harm and will trigger contradictions within NATO. NATO Article 5 is about collective defense—if one country is attacked, all respond—and its default enemy is the Soviet Union/Russia. It never imagined that the aggressor might actually be the United States. Once such a thing really happens, the entire alliance system will short-circuit, which in effect means the end of NATO. Last week, six countries—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland—issued a joint statement supporting Denmark, saying that NATO's security requires collective guarantees. This statement has a context: the United States cites Greenland and Arctic security, meaning to prevent China and Russia from getting involved; Europe means that we are equally worried, but please believe in the power of the collective and do not bear it alone. This is actually a strategic plea—the United States, do not act rashly, otherwise this big NATO family will fall apart. Because Europe lacks strategic autonomy, it appears very humble. NATO Secretary General Rutte publicly called the United States "Papa" at last year's summit, just to coax the United States into staying in the alliance. Now he uses breakup to threaten the United States. Guess whether Trump hears that as "there is such a good thing." Some strategic scholars believe that this behavior by the United States is a stab in the back to allies, because its robber logic is very clear: any NATO country's territory, as long as it is important to U.S. security, should belong to the United States. Suppose Poland is important—then the United States should take Poland without a Poland—so Warsaw should feel lucky, because it is too far from the United States and not in the Western Hemisphere covered by this Monroe Doctrine; of course, it is also too close to Russia. On the Russian side, there is already a voice saying that a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine should also be pursued. In other words, a new international order is being shaped; past rules are losing their binding force, and what determines the fate of various places is actually a small number of great powers. So the problems China faces include, in addition to specific matters of safeguarding overseas interests in Greenland—for example, Shenghe Resources has a 12.5% stake in the Kvanefjeld mine; will Chinese companies' agreements be invalidated because of U.S. control? Will overseas rare earth resources rise in price, thereby raising the costs of our high-end manufacturing? In addition, how should we assess the competitive advantage the United States gains from Greenland? Although we possess processing capacity that is more important than rare earths themselves and occupy an indispensable position in the industrial chain, as China-U.S. competition becomes increasingly fierce, this may evolve into composite competition. The U.S. logic is likely to be: I cannot cook myself, but I want to monopolize all the vegetables in the market. And much high-pollution chemical separation cannot be done on the U.S. mainland. Is it possible to force sparsely populated Greenland to relax environmental regulation and turn it into an offshore refining center? The probability is very low, but it cannot be ignored. In addition, Greenland cannot be treated in isolation; it should be seen as part of Arctic strategy. The Arctic route is key to our "Ice Silk Road" and can greatly shorten our voyage to Western Europe. Over the past seven years, through scientific research, infrastructure, and buying mines, we have been expanding our influence in the Arctic region. Will these activities be interfered with by the U.S. military? Will our self-defined status as a near-Arctic state be blockaded by the United States? What can Russia do to cooperate with us? More importantly, how should China conduct itself in a world dominated by such power politics, and how much strength is appropriate to exert? How many places around great powers are special interest zones? Does a world in which a small country should be obedient and sensible, or else be ravaged and plundered, actually conform to our interests? In other words, troubled times give us opportunities—but would we then become robbers?

Gwadar Port in Pakistan: The truth hidden behind the busy scenes

Everyone, last month Pakistan's Gwadar Port handled 11,000 standard containers. What's shocking about this number is not that it's less than one-tenth of Shanghai's Yangshan Port, but that Gwadar Port handled only 8,300 standard containers in all of 2025—in other words, in a single month this April, it did the volume of an entire year last year. Gwadar Port is an important node of the Belt and Road, the endpoint and also the starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Given its current development progress, although its designed throughput reaches 16,000 standard containers, in reality it is far from realizing its full potential: from 2013 to 2018, a total of 99 ships docked there, averaging fewer than 20 a year. Yet on April 16 this year alone, two cargo ships came alongside, bringing 369 tons of machinery and equipment and 5,000 tons of fertilizer. Port officials are quite excited, telling Pakistani media: our opportunity to grow bigger and stronger has finally come, and we want Gwadar Port to contribute 25 billion US dollars to the national economy. So, is Pakistan about to take off? A local scholar is more cautious. He believes this unprecedented busyness is mainly a short-term dividend brought by the Strait of Hormuz being closed and then opened, opened and then closed again. When the Strait of Hormuz operates normally, a quarter of the world's seaborne oil and a fifth of its liquefied natural gas pass through it; the current situation has severely hit the global market. Can ships avoid the Strait of Hormuz? The only alternatives are the crude oil pipelines of Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Saudi Arabia can pipe oil from its eastern Persian Gulf oil fields to the Red Sea coast in the west for export, while the UAE connects Dubai on the inner side of the strait's mouth to Fujairah Port on the outer side. But overall their handling capacity is very limited, and most trade still has to rely on the Strait of Hormuz. For shipping companies, first, they need to avoid security risks; second, insurance premiums rise and the costs don't pay off—so this route is temporarily suspended. But those ships already on the way that cannot avoid the strait, especially Chinese goods bound for West Asia, can only make temporary stops along the Arabian Sea coast in places that are relatively safe and less crowded. The best choice is Gwadar Port: it hugs the Gulf of Oman and is only 600 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz—both outside the safe distance and one of the nearest deep-water ports, capable of accommodating large cargo ships. Many ships choose to rest and regroup here, waiting for the situation to become clear. So although Gwadar Port looks very busy, it does not mean the goods arriving will enter the Pakistani market; it is more temporary loading, unloading, and warehousing—the port has more than 90,000 square meters of cargo storage space and also offers one month of free storage; after a month, the goods still have to be loaded and shipped onward. Therefore, it is still too early to say Gwadar Port is about to take off. After all, a port's business does not rely on turmoil and war, but on long-term stability and development. Gwadar Port today is more like a temporary logistics buffer zone than a truly sustainable trade hub. We also have to look at the trend. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was proposed in 2016, exactly 10 years ago, and Pakistan has built quite a lot of supporting infrastructure. For example, Gwadar International Airport opened in January last year, the East Bay Expressway has been connected to the highway network, and there is also the second phase of the project linking the airport and the port; many new highway trunk lines are also under construction. Gwadar Port is not just a wharf; it is more like a lever that keeps Pakistan investing in Balochistan Province, where it is located—investment hit a new high in the past year; as of March, the province had 148 projects under construction, covering roads, water supply, electricity, and education, of which 22 projects are underway at Gwadar Port alone, including the China-Pakistan Friendship Hospital we funded, which provides free medical treatment specifically to the poor, and the Gwadar seawater desalination plant we helped build, with a daily output of 5,000 tons of fresh water to alleviate local water scarcity. Balochistan Province is truly not simple: it is Pakistan's largest, poorest, and most troubled province, bordering both Iran and Afghanistan, and the internal problems of Iran and Afghanistan spill over into it. For example, when the Afghan Taliban ban opium cultivation, Pakistan then faces a serious drug trafficking problem; when Iran's cross-border trade is disrupted, the livelihoods of Pakistani border residents are also affected. Separatist militants have long been undermining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and Pakistan hopes to improve local livelihoods through sustained investment, win the support of local elites, and strengthen its control over the area. Recently, the President of Pakistan visited China, which shows that we recognize Pakistan's mediating role between the US and Iran. Another important agenda is to advance the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, shifting from large infrastructure projects to special economic zones, developing industry, agriculture, mining, and information technology—not just hardware, but also pursuing economic depth. For example, how Gwadar and Hainan can link up, and ensuring the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan's overall strategic direction seems to be to further leverage its role as a land and sea hub—that is, to bind its economic future more closely to China's Belt and Road. But whether it can be achieved, we will have to wait and see.

The embarrassing truth about the US that AidData uncovered: Where did China's loans go?

Everyone, where exactly did our country's loans go? This time the United States has finally figured it out. There is a project at the College of William & Mary that specifically tracks international aid, called AidData. It released a report with very detailed data, turning over every stone of the more than two trillion US dollars in loans China has extended over the past twenty-plus years. If they hadn't looked, fine, but once they did, they dug up something embarrassing: the biggest recipient of official Chinese credit turned out to be none other than the United States itself. It really is ironic. The US has constantly accused us of "debt trap" diplomacy, of lending specifically to countries that obviously can't repay, waiting for them to default so it can then rightfully take over mines and ports. This narrative did scare quite a few countries. And what happened? The US, which tells everyone else to be careful every day, is itself rushing to jump in. The report says that since 2000, China has approved 200 billion US dollars in loans to the United States, more than to anyone else, and more than half of that was approved after 2018—by which time the US had already regarded China as a strategic competitor. In the words of AidData's Parks, this is a tremendous irony. The US uses this money to build infrastructure, such as the high-voltage transmission line from Canada to New York, the super data centers in Virginia, and several terminals at Kennedy International Airport. As for America's prized companies—Amazon, Halliburton, Tesla, Boeing, Qualcomm, Disney—the daily operations of these Fortune 500 firms also rely on Chinese credit lines. Why is this happening? First, the direction of China's overseas lending has changed, shifting from large infrastructure to safe havens. Twenty years ago, 88% of overseas loans went to low-income countries. But in 2023 there was a fundamental change: the shares of loans going to low-income and high-income countries reversed, forming a new 80/20 split. The reason is simple: after the Fed raised interest rates, the balance sheets of Third World countries looked increasingly ugly, and lending risk was too high. Chinese capital is pragmatic, so it put money into developed markets with higher credit ratings and more stable cash flows. As a result, while Capitol Hill in Washington is busy with decoupling and de-risking, the trading floors of New York and the oil and gas fields of Texas are greedily absorbing liquidity from China. US infrastructure lacks money, American tech companies lack money, and we just happen to have some money—and we give it readily. This is not some conspiracy theory about who wants to control whom; this is simply capital's most honest pursuit of profit. When capital pursues profit, it is quite clever. European and American scrutiny has indeed become stricter, but Chinese finance has also evolved. The report found that Chinese capital now not only refrains from openly wiring funds directly as it used to, but has also learned to wear an invisibility cloak—for example, through offshore centers such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, setting up special purpose vehicles (SPVs), or acting as a limited partner mixed in among Western banks like HSBC and Deutsche Bank. You think your semiconductor investment comes from a London fund, but after piercing through several layers of equity structure, you find that the source of the funds is Chinese sovereign capital. This shows that China is no longer the new money of years past, able only to buy, buy, buy in a crude, wealthy manner. Now it is old money, using offshore financial structures with great skill, which shows that Chinese capital has passed that naive, rough stage and become more refined, more concealed, and more adept at using the rules. Of course, this report also issued a warning to the international financial order, saying that China is not buying assets but building a system. The scale of lending is several times higher than previous estimates. In the past, when the whole world ran out of money, only the IMF was the money house that could provide relief, at the cost of surrendering economic sovereignty. Now China's approach is very interesting: when you face a liquidity crisis, China provides emergency funds through currency swaps to help you borrow new money to repay old debts. This is no longer just lending money; as the world's number one official creditor, it is maintaining the stability of the system and preventing these countries from turning to the other side because of bankruptcy. Competition between countries comes down to efficiency and strength. The West is very interesting: in order to deal with us, they have started imitating China. Previously, the OECD had a gentlemen's agreement stipulating that governments could not directly enter the market to do business, but in order to compete with China for turf, they also began using state finances to buy mines, provide subsidies, and acquire shipyards. When opponents abandon their original positions and start entering our rhythm, this game has already entered a new stage.

Who will oppose feudalism? Former Greek Finance Minister says: The Star Trek you love to watch—that is communism.

Everyone, former Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis recently had a conversation about the big question of "who will fight feudalism." He started with a rather deflating little point: Twitter's technology is actually not important at all. Really. Twitter has three or four alternatives—Bluesky, Mastodon, and so on—which are technically better, more interesting, and easier to use, but they have no chance. Why? Because Twitter has first-mover advantage. Then he told his own "personal tragedy": I don't like Twitter because I don't like Musk; but I have 1.2 million followers on Twitter. I went to Bluesky and only got 600,000. And when I left I couldn't take my followers with me and tell them, "Hey, let's move to Bluesky"—that sort of thing doesn't happen. It's not just Twitter; Amazon is likewise hard to replace, because Amazon has a massive number of sellers, and whatever you want to buy, it's there. Even if you and I could build a better platform, a better way of organizing information, call it whatever you like, as long as it has hundreds of millions of users, it would easily succeed; but we don't have hundreds of millions of users, so it will die—even if your engineers are stronger than Amazon's. So these techno-feudal giants, these cloud lords, just sit there naturally, and whether you switch platforms or not makes no difference to them. In his book he mentions a question his father asked him in 1993: Would computers and the internet make capitalism impossible to replace, or would they expose its contradictions? His answer was blunt: Of course it can be replaced; there is nothing that cannot be replaced. So what are the steps? The beauty of the techno-feudal system is that it is technology, artificially made—we can change it, we can set it aside, we can build new things. We must believe in human capacity and our own imagination to replace everything we have already built. The worst kind of imagination is to treat capitalism as a natural system. It is not a natural system; it is a crazy system. Techno-feudalism is likewise not a natural system; it is actually a very stupid system—using very clever technology to do very stupid things. So we can do better. To be fair, feudalism was also a stupid system, but it lasted a long time. If it were 1810 and we were discussing this in Paris, London, or Beijing, I would say: Come on, just copy feudalism. If you turned to me and asked, I would add: Wait, there has never been a country in history without feudalism—but that doesn't mean other possibilities don't exist. So we must keep our confidence. Look at the classic works that defended feudalism: power, capital, technology are always there. So what is left that can let us replace this system and build the right thing? Because the right system has never appeared. So the question becomes: How do we move from the dark side of technology to a society where technology serves the good? His answer is—techno-communism. How to begin? First, work hard on theory, philosophy, and research. Then there is something especially important: let people know that the status quo is not inevitable. Making people understand that "things could be otherwise" is not easy, but it is important. His previous book Another Now was doing exactly this: for today's world and a worthwhile human life, with the technology we already have, depicting a different world that could be internationalist. He is not asking everyone to follow what is written in his book, but rather saying that, on both the level of imagination and the level of real possibility, we must take some practical action. The second level is: tomorrow, in six months, in twelve months, turn these changes into the actions we said we would take. Both levels must be done. But first, still the first question. Because when you talk to people, you have to use their own cultural memory, their own cultural symbols. The example he gave is especially brilliant: when you meet Americans, ask them, "Are you familiar with Star Trek?" They say, "Of course, I'm a die-hard Trekkie." Then he says: My friend, that is communism. There is no private property, no exploitation, no wages, and no profit; there is capital, and a lot of it; there is a hole in the wall, you order a coffee, and the coffee comes; no one pays, because machines are producing everything for you—that is artificial production, everything is public, it is common property. So people can discuss philosophy and go to other galaxies to meet other species. That is communism, and it is American. Every culture has a similar tradition. For example, at New Year, your mother, your aunt, and your father cook together, everyone sits around to eat, and finally it is your turn to clear the table. If you said to your mother, "I'll pay you 10,000 yuan, I won't wash up, you do it"—there is no market in the family. So no matter which culture you talk to people from, communism is their ideal, and people actually understand it. The key is only that you have to tell them in a way that resonates with them.

What is spatial computing? The definition given by the Answer Lab is wilder than you might think.

Everyone, someone once asked a pretty basic question: what exactly is "spatial computing"? The definition given by Irena Cronin of Answer Lab sounds a bit unexpected—she says spatial computing is computing that lets people, and people and robots, interact through 3D environments. By this definition, self-driving cars and robots also count as spatial computing. It needs two things to support it: first, AI, which lets machines understand 3D environments; second, sensing technology, which can identify and locate specific objects in the environment. So the "language" of spatial computing machines and VR machines is actually different. VR and AR certainly use computing too, but unlike self-driving cars and robots, they do not really move through 3D environments. When it comes to the experience, people's first reaction is still music, movies, and games in VR, and that is indeed a big part. But when it comes to the industries truly being affected, the list gets long: robotics and autonomous driving, healthcare, AR, retail, enterprise services, gaming and entertainment—these last few categories actually no longer feel much like "games." For example. J.P. Morgan is using this kind of thing; they want machines to understand and learn customer behavior, and then in turn teach customers how to invest. How? Give the customer a VR experience and let them personally go through what they should do, with an effect like having a professional financial teacher standing right beside them. And education. The entire education industry is being changed by AR, VR, and indoor robots. You can "enter" the classroom and see three-dimensional 3D models—things in biology and chemistry that must be understood used to rely only on imagination; now you have to see their three-dimensional form to truly understand them.

What kind of "environmental terrorist attack" could force Berlin into a state of disaster?

Everyone, there's been another arson attack in Berlin. On January 3rd, a high-voltage transmission line next to a power plant was burned down, cutting off electricity to 50,000 households and 2,200 shops or businesses. Although power was later partially restored, 35,000 households still had to wait until January 8th for their electricity to come back—nearly a week without power. A household blackout doesn't just mean lights out; your shower, cooking, internet, and phone calls are all affected. Worst of all, there's no heating, because the district water-heating system in this area is driven by electric pumps. I checked—over the past couple of days Berlin's high temperature has been around zero degrees, and it's still snowing. The Berlin city government declared a state of disaster that same day, mobilized the Bundeswehr for emergency response and disaster relief, distributed supplies, set up warming centers, and used military generators to keep critical public facilities like nursing homes and hospitals running. How did it catch fire? Someone came forward and admitted: we did it. The group is called Vulkan Gruppe (Volcano Group), and they released a long open letter titled "Cutting Off the Ruling Class." They said this arson was an act of self-defense, an act for the public good, an act of international solidarity. They oppose fossil fuels, oppose tech companies, oppose AI's energy demands, oppose the imperialist lifestyle. They particularly emphasized that the current economic system is driven by fossil fuels, has an insatiable greed for energy—especially with AI's electricity demand growing exponentially—so this greed must be destroyed at its source, and we must reclaim our right to affluent tech companies—this is all typical leftist rhetoric. They said they didn't intentionally harm ordinary people but were targeting the rich: this area, Lichtfeld West, is Berlin's most classic old-money villa district, where Prussian military aristocracy have lived since the 19th century, and many German diplomatic elites live there now; if less affluent residents were affected, they are very sorry. The police classified it as an far-left, anarchist, anti-fascist organization. But because of its high degree of anonymity and sophisticated anti-tracking methods, all that's known is that it operates in Berlin and Brandenburg, and its structure remains unclear to this day. Vulkan Gruppe has been committing crimes since 2011: initially sabotaging rail transit, causing railway disruptions; in 2018 it destroyed power lines in another wealthy district, cutting power to 6,500 households and 400 companies; in 2020 it began committing arson, burning a cable shaft at an IT research institution to oppose digital discipline and mass surveillance; in 2024, it set fire to the high-voltage lines of Tesla's Gigafactory in Brandenburg, saying it wanted to completely destroy this extremely exploitative factory, causing a full evacuation and a week-long shutdown. Musk was furious, calling Vulkan Gruppe the dumbest eco-terrorists on Earth. Actually, this kind of eco-terrorism has existed in the West for decades. Long ago, an American mathematician sent bombs to experts across industry, academia, and research who promoted modern technology and industrial society, killing several and injuring dozens. He wrote a long open letter called "Industrial Society and Its Future," which remains hugely influential to this day with many admirers, including Luigi Mangione, who assassinated the UnitedHealthcare CEO, including Elon Musk, and many people in the MAGA circle greatly appreciate it. It's essentially about accelerating the collapse of the existing system. Vulkan Gruppe is the same—it wants to floor the accelerator, and wants Germany to go even faster, thinking this is what "no destruction, no construction" means. So Germany's current situation is a bit awkward: the destruction has happened, but the construction hasn't fully taken hold. Europe's traditional fossil fuels have been declining, with carbon emissions from power generation halved compared to 20 years ago; Germany, as the EU's pioneer of energy transition, had nearly 60% renewable energy last year, so it really has taken big strides. And unlike those who shoot the arrow first and then draw the target, it's not sly at all: to achieve climate neutrality before 2045, it rigidly worked backward—by 2030, 80% of electricity must be green; by 2035, 100% green; coal must be completely phased out before 2038; then five years later natural gas must stop too, because LNG onshore terminal operating licenses are issued through December 31, 2043, leaving a two-year buffer period. That's how it's transitioning, setting one deadline after another, but the transition itself hasn't been smooth sailing—Great Germany has its own national conditions here. Among green energies, wind power is the largest, concentrated in the North Sea and Denmark area, but its major electricity consumers and industrial centers are in the south in Bavaria, so north-to-south power transmission is a big scheduling problem. Residents along the high-voltage transmission lines all oppose them, endless lawsuits, and the lines simply can't be built, so when the north generates power, the grid can't handle it and has to say "pause for a bit," then go to the south and tell fossil fuel plants "hold on a little longer." All this scheduling ultimately becomes cost. And Germany isn't famous for good weather—what about windless cloudy days? Energy storage technology can't keep up with demand and can't support a massive industrial system. What about other sources? Nuclear power is gone now, natural gas is transitioning to hydrogen but commercialization is still far off; importing electricity—buying hydropower from Northern Europe, nuclear power from France—you can buy it, but that's robbing Peter to pay Paul; they need electricity at home too. Germany's idea is good—it's aiming for a green future. If carbon taxes are inevitable, then I'll transition early, won't I have a first-mover advantage? It's just that the strides are a bit too big, and it's hurt itself, turning into a high-electricity-price country: before the transition, electricity was under 20 cents per kilowatt-hour; now it's risen to nearly 40 cents, and during the 2023 energy crisis it approached 50 cents. Expensive electricity drives away manufacturing, especially energy-intensive industries—not just traditional heavy industry, but high-tech too: AI data centers are moving to Northern Europe, semiconductors are barely retained through government subsidies, biopharmaceuticals keep only R&D while basic pharmaceuticals move abroad. Without cost advantages, deindustrialization naturally follows, hurting Germany's core competitiveness. Actually, when I saw this news, I was thinking: if these leftist kids—it must be kids who did this—came to China and took a look at China's green transition, without those radical sharp turns, always establishing before destroying, coal as the backstop, green energy charging ahead—they might, ideologically speaking, be even less willing to accept it. But is there a possibility that it's precisely because of Germany's radical transition that the government needs to take more care of businesses—this year they still have electricity subsidies—so the cost becomes even higher, shifting more onto ordinary people, causing electricity bills to rise, creating so-called energy poverty: 6.3% of people dare not turn up the heating fully at home, dare not take hot baths, dare not turn on the oven to roast meat, just make do with dry bread, saving wherever they can, leading to an overall decline in living standards and widening the wealth gap—which is exactly what the left opposes most. But guess what—the right opposes it too, directly opposing the green transition itself. For example, AfD's core demand is to stop this expensive green experiment, dismantle garbage installations like wind and solar, and restart nuclear power for me—very spirited. So whether it's green electricity or nuclear power, thinking with Chinese logic makes it hard to understand: why not have it all? Today I just read a report on national grid security, and one chapter discusses how to respond to various extreme situations, including severe weather. I need to digest it a bit more and then report back to everyone. Bye-bye.

What kind of Chinese company can make the US want to ban it but not dare to kill it?

Biopharmaceuticals are an important battleground in America's struggle with us, and the United States is desperately trying to maintain its technological dominance. At the end of last year, it introduced the BIOSECURE Act, prohibiting U.S. companies from cooperating with so-called companies of concern. But after much wrangling, in the end it did not name names or specify exactly who was to be isolated, because America's biopharmaceutical industry depends on China: if there were a true decoupling, American cancer patients would have no way to survive, causing a massive public health disaster. The United States has already realized that its dependence on Chinese pharmaceutical companies constitutes the pharmaceutical world's Strait of Hormuz. I read an article in China Talk titled "The WuXi Empire," which uses the WuXi group as an example to explain why the United States cannot simply take the approach it used to ban Huawei and apply it directly to Chinese pharmaceutical companies. In fact, WuXi AppTec, as the elephant in the room, was indeed explicitly targeted when the BIOSECURE Act was being drafted. This is quite strange: the WuXi group does contract research, and WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics are respectively the third- and fifth-largest institutions in this market, while all the others from first to tenth come from Western countries. The United States clearly has so many alternative choices, so why is it so afraid of the WuXi group? Because it is embedded in every aspect of the biopharmaceutical industrial chain, with business covering a quarter of all U.S. drug research and development; cutting off its cooperation with American pharmaceutical companies outright would be equivalent to choking its own people. The article argues that it is difficult for the United States to find a winning approach, and the difficulty lies in the fact that companies like the WuXi group rely on overall strength rather than monopolizing any single link in the supply chain. When the so-called chokepoint simply does not exist, the United States has no way to grasp the pharmaceutical world's TSMC, and suppressing Chinese pharmaceutical companies becomes out of the question. Even more frightening is that China's pharmaceutical R&D investment is far lower than that of Europe and the United States; this advantage was not built by throwing money at it, so restricting Chinese companies' funding will not undermine their advantage either. Thus the article reaches a conclusion: since the United States cannot stop China or dominate the entire industrial chain, the question it should consider should become which areas can be conceded to China, and which capabilities the United States can lose without dying. So how does this article derive these conclusions from WuXi AppTec? First, we must return to the historical background of WuXi AppTec's rise. Around 2000, the cost of developing new drugs for Western pharmaceutical companies exploded, and they had to outsource R&D; it just so happened that China had a large number of chemistry and engineering talents who could take on this work, and China's WTO accession greatly improved intellectual property protection. The right timing, right place, and right people produced WuXi AppTec: from the very beginning it was an enterprise that adopted international standards, served Western clients, and oriented itself toward the global market. Over the years, its expansion timing has been very accurate, and it rode the east wind of domestic reform of the drug review and approval system; encouragement of innovative drugs and R&D allowed it to establish a firm foothold in the market. Then large-scale R&D outsourcing led to deep integration of the Chinese and American biopharmaceutical systems, making them difficult to sever. To this day, WuXi AppTec, already in the crosshairs of the U.S. government, still derives two-thirds of its revenue from American clients. This cooperation model is very special. WuXi AppTec is different from Western pharmaceutical companies: it does not directly develop drugs, but provides an integrated contract research, development, and manufacturing (CRDMO) platform. Traditionally, a drug at different stages cooperates with different contractors, but WuXi AppTec directly does everything for you across the entire process, from molecular discovery to commercial mass production. You only need to provide it with an idea, and it is responsible for realizing it, equivalent to providing a full set of infrastructure for drug development. This model is extremely attractive to Western pharmaceutical companies: long-term stability, low cost, and high efficiency. In this kind of cooperation, WuXi AppTec has found its own advantage—not some secret recipe, but the highly integrated optimization of all technologies, processes, tools, and solutions across the entire field of drug R&D, which you can plug into and use at any time. Its platform resources and technologies are something most biopharmaceutical companies simply do not possess themselves. For example, in scale production, when general biopharmaceutical companies speak of scale production, they mean making bioreactors bigger, with a single tank of 20,000 liters; WuXi AppTec does not do that. It uses a bunch of small single-use reactors, in the same batch, so that if any engineering problem occurs anywhere, there will be no cross-contamination. Such cutting-edge technology and scale production facilities are actually very costly; for example, WuXi Biologics' factory in Singapore cost enormous sums, but China's domestic industrial policies are favorable to it, offsetting part of the financial pressure. More importantly, China has an extremely dense pool of science and engineering talent, which means the cost of high-tech teams is only half that in the West or even lower, so it can maintain larger team sizes, shorten project cycles, and overcome technical difficulties. In addition, China's biologics supply chain is rapidly localizing, making raw material procurement more convenient, the supply chain more resilient, faster, and lower in cost. Have you noticed? WuXi AppTec's success does not come from any secret history of technology, but from its structure and positioning, as well as the high-efficiency, low-cost industrial ecosystem that China has built over decades. Precisely because companies like WuXi AppTec are so comprehensive, the United States cannot ask pharmaceutical companies to outsource R&D to allied countries in order to squeeze out Chinese companies: cooperating with India offers low wages and no shortage of talent, but India mainly does small-molecule generic drugs and is not very good at biologics; cooperating with South Korea, biologics are strong, but small molecules and chemistry services are not. In short, you cannot find anyone who can fully replace WuXi AppTec, and WuXi AppTec is only one company; China also has pharmaceutical service companies such as Asymchem and Porton. This case tells us that industrial offense and defense do not necessarily unfold around technological bottlenecks; breaking through a single point or desperately defending a certain barrier is not necessarily the only way to play. Sometimes a comprehensive and balanced business structure is instead a more resilient advantage. It is easy to shake a mountain, but hard to shake an industrial chain.

Ten Days of Field Research in Europe: Berlin's Anxiety and the Undercurrents of St. Petersburg

Everyone, first let me share something from our institute. My colleague Liu Dian just got back from Germany and Russia. I didn't go this time; he went with our Dean Zhang Weiwei. I've been too busy this month, and next I'm going to Eastern Europe—Romania and Serbia. I don't know if I can get the Romanian visa, so I specifically went to ask him about what he saw and heard during this ten-day research trip. Their itinerary was: the first few days in Berlin, Germany, and the last few days in St. Petersburg, Russia. In Berlin, they attended a seminar at the Schiller Institute. The Schiller Institute holds an international conference every year. This conference is actually a gathering of many of the institute's founder Ms. LaRouche's old friends from the European and American left, getting together to chat. The feeling was that these old comrades have a very, very deep worry about war: for example, our current era is very, very similar to 100 years ago, especially the period between World War I and World War II in the 1920s and 1930s—many atmospheres, basic conditions, the international situation, and economic cycles are all very, very similar. They said Germany's military spending is now expanding rapidly, which brings them deep concern, because they are relatively old and have lived through the entire long history of World War II and the Cold War last century, so they are very worried about the current international situation. But there was also a very interesting aspect of this meeting: there were relatively few young people attending. They now feel that many young people in Germany are completely depoliticized, and they are indifferent to such a moment of turbulent change. What could be felt in the venue was the concern of some left-wing elites on the European continent about the future, and a forward-looking prediction of a new round of crisis in global capitalism. In particular, one participant this time was a former UN Under-Secretary-General, an Italian sociologist. At this meeting he clearly warned that we may soon see a new round of financial crisis—unprecedented and the largest in scale. The impact of this financial crisis on human society and humanity's future may far exceed the 2008 financial crisis, and even far exceed the Great Depression in the first half of the last century. Then on the spot he even solicited votes, saying that this year he would also run for UN Secretary-General and hoping everyone present would vote for him. Worried at first, then starting to canvass for votes—full of comic effect, so it felt very interesting. After landing in St. Petersburg, there was nothing much on the first day. On the morning of the second day, everyone probably saw the news too: on the morning of the opening of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Ukraine sent drones to attack an oil infrastructure facility near the docks in St. Petersburg. That day they were actually not far from there, and on the road in the distance they saw a patch of firelight and black smoke. At first they thought it was a fire, and only later heard local people explain that it was drones. And perhaps unlike the feeling of watching news in China, the local friends were accustomed to it. This kind of drone attack, internet outages, and occasionally some disasters in individual places basically do not have much impact on normal local life order and urban traffic order. The biggest impression was the constant internet outages. At this forum Liu Dian probably watched quite a few sessions. The three that impressed him most: one was because he does research related to artificial intelligence, so he was very interested—the situation of artificial intelligence in Russia. Heads of Yandex and several local large-model companies came out. Yandex and several others are actually all Russian; you can understand them as Russia's state-owned version of Baidu. After this conflict, a large number of Western digital services withdrew from the Russian market. This time when they went, they used Yandex for maps and even for ride-hailing. There is also a local model called Alisa, based on Russian-language corpora. But the overall level of their speeches, including their understanding of artificial intelligence, showed an obvious rupture: some speakers seemed unable to distinguish clearly between intelligence and digitalization, but in China this is actually basic common sense in the industry. Of course, some of the discussions on technology were clearly still at the frontline level, but the overall feeling was somewhat like what he heard from friends in China's internet and AI circles about artificial intelligence six or seven years ago—that is, a generational gap of several years has already appeared. This was a very obvious feeling. The second feeling was this: Russia now attaches great importance—more accurately, it is not that it attaches importance to everything about artificial intelligence, but that it attaches importance to building internet scenarios related to e-commerce. In particular, one sub-forum talked about how Russia's e-commerce is now developing very fast. The figure he remembered being mentioned was that one platform's transaction volume exceeded 2 billion US dollars. Chinese viewers may find this ordinary when they hear it—which of our platforms doesn't have transactions of one or two trillion RMB? Converted into US dollars, that's also hundreds of billions. But the Russian market is clearly still in a stage of gradual cultivation and development. Talking with many local friends, they said that Russia now attaches great importance to supporting the e-commerce economy. What has emerged? Especially in St. Petersburg, delivery riders earn more than academicians. Now if you run relatively diligently, as a delivery rider you can earn about 400,000 rubles a month, equivalent to 40,000 RMB, which is actually quite considerable; and they seem to earn about 20 RMB per order, sometimes more, sometimes less. Although this market is still in the process of cultivation, there may still be special opportunities in certain professions, though it is also very hard work. At the time he thought, if China's entire ecosystem of delivery riders were brought into competition in Russia, would this market develop faster? Of course, he hasn't done much research in this field; he was just throwing out a brick to attract jade. What our institute mainly participated in was a session on finance, which he also found very interesting. Because he didn't bring cash to Russia this time, he went to bank branches—he visited seven bank branches—and because he is a Chinese citizen without the relevant procedures, it was very difficult to handle financial services. Russia actually has quite a lot of bank card payments and digital payments, but now due to SWIFT sanctions, if you don't open a local bank account, many services cannot be used with mainland Chinese bank cards and accounts. One intuitive feeling is that Russia's financial services still need improvement. And many of the problems Russia is encountering now may also be encountered by many countries around the world in the future—for example, disruptions in global capital markets, changes in the situation caused by sanctions among major countries triggered by sanctions involving major countries, and the complex institutional responses involved. Then our Dean Zhang Weiwei also talked about three structural changes in finance. The first structural change is a structural change in energy finance: non-dollar-settled energy transactions are now expanding rapidly in the global financial system. The second structural change is that Hong Kong has surpassed Switzerland to become the world's largest wealth management center by scale. This is easy to understand: once the Middle East is at war, many of the Middle East's old money and new money may originally have been placed in Switzerland or Singapore, but as everyone can see, whether Switzerland or Singapore, they still cannot escape the American factor behind them; precisely because mainland China, the Chinese government, and China's independent sovereignty are supporting them behind the scenes, after this Middle East crisis a large amount of money poured into Hong Kong. In previous years the main trend seemed to be moving money out of Hong Kong; the money moved out in previous years has now moved back this year—very interesting. The third change is a change in regulatory finance. In particular, Russia is highly focused this time on China's financial blocking order and anti-sanctions blocking order. Because we can see that to some extent this is like a close-quarters encounter in financial warfare: after the blocking order, it is as if this round of US financial sanctions against specific companies only took effect within the US legal system and foreign systems, while correspondingly for all domestic financial institutions, this time China stood firm—services continued as they should, because the state provided the legal effect of sovereign blocking. Russia is very, very focused on this and thinks China has done something of breakthrough significance this time. Of course, this matter can be discussed in more depth later when there is a chance. Finally, there was Putin's speech, which they listened to on site. Everyone may have seen all kinds of information online. The most interesting part was that at the beginning, Putin talked about responding to Zelensky's so-called peace talks. He actually made some very vivid metaphors on site. In popular Chinese terms, this was a staged-collision-style peace talk. You see, when talking about peace talks, on one side Russia was holding a big conference, while on the other side Ukrainian drones were giving off black smoke—black smoke before the conference, which in Chinese terms is an unlucky sign, a way of putting eye drops. He directly characterized it: Zelensky, first, has not shown any real sincerity in talks; second, he is actually engaging in empty talk. And indeed, from an objective perspective, at this stage between Ukraine and Russia, globally, including the two countries involved, there have been many signs of easing recently, but indeed the real conditions for reaching peace talks are not yet in place in many preliminary foundational conditions. The second feeling was also very interesting: if you do a word-frequency analysis—because the St. Petersburg Economic Forum mainly discusses economic development—when talking about economic development, the word he heard most frequently in Putin's entire text was sovereignty—the sovereignty and economic security of Russia as a whole. In particular, this time he spoke very highly of technological sovereignty: how to build all the things we mentioned earlier—artificial intelligence, e-commerce, the digital economy, and so on—within a framework of complete sovereignty. And very interestingly, he also talked about how the Russian version should accelerate the construction of a domestic grand circulation. Finally, there was one detail not much reported in the news: this was the first time in nearly ten years that the United States sent a high-level delegation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. Throughout the conference, Putin was clearly mocking and needling, constantly talking about the current situation in Russia, including Russia-Ukraine and the global situation. And the most memorable point was what he said when responding to a reporter's question: he said that in the past, when we talked about international rules, the WTO, globalization, and the so-called rules-based international order, there was a precondition—that Western developed countries dominated economically and in market competitiveness. But we can see that the share of these former so-called Western developed countries in the global economy is rapidly declining. Rapid decline has led to a situation: in the past, when they were strong, they talked to you about rules and standards; now that they have become weaker and their market competitiveness is insufficient, they have started talking to you about protectionism, sanctions, and barriers. The series of sovereign and protective policies they once criticized developing countries for, they are now picking back up one by one, including the United States now beginning to learn China's entire industrial policy system. Including recently in this circle—those of us working on artificial intelligence—what we are most focused on is that the United States is now discussing how to take state equity stakes in several AI companies: last year it took a stake in Intel; originally it was said that money under the Chips and Science Act was subsidies, and in the end it was said that this was not subsidy money but money for state equity, and with a swoosh it was converted into US shares. Now there is discussion that the United States wants to take equity stakes in these artificial intelligence companies. So the world pattern is undergoing a change—thirty years east of the river, thirty years west of the river—a huge role reversal has taken place. I think these are quite interesting observations.

Aluminum Corporation of China: The Green Long March and the Battle in the Coal Sea

Everyone, today I'd like to talk with you about China's aluminum industry. Our aluminum industry is the world's leader, accounting for 60% of global aluminum output—more than anyone else. But being the leader doesn't mean we're invulnerable; we have two Achilles' heels: carbon footprint anxiety and ore dependence. Right now, we happen to be at a qualitative turning point of a technological revolution. The Financial Times used "green long march" to describe this revolution, but it only tells part of the story: as industry migrates from north to south, our northern revolutionary base areas have not only not been lost, but have actually grown stronger. This story is too big, so let's start with aluminum production and give a brief account. Our aluminum industry is divided into two parts: first, refining bauxite into alumina through the Bayer process; second, electrolyzing alumina into metallic aluminum through the Hall-Héroult process. Although we have very little bauxite, only 2% of global reserves, and it is low grade, relying on imports from Guinea and Australia, we have still grasped the dominant position in midstream alumina refining and downstream electrolytic aluminum smelting, producing 60% of the world's alumina and electrolytic aluminum. This is not something ordinary players can match. Aluminum is a high-carbon, high-pollution, high-energy-consumption industry. Our two major weaknesses are coal power and red mud. Coal power is mainly used in the electrolytic aluminum stage, which consumes a shocking amount of electricity. 45 million tons of electrolytic aluminum consumes more than 60 billion kWh of electricity each year, accounting for 6% of national electricity consumption. In the past, the energy structure relied on coal power, so the aluminum industry naturally clustered near coal and bauxite resources, pursuing integrated coal-power-aluminum operations. Around 2010, the aluminum belt of Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang accounted for more than 70% of national capacity. But coal power is not cheap, uses a lot of water, and has high carbon emissions. This year the EU carbon border tariff has officially taken effect, further increasing the cost of coal-powered aluminum. So the transition to green power and achieving carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 are extremely urgent. The obvious solution is to move smelting capacity to places richer in clean energy. In 2017 the government capped electrolytic aluminum output at 45.5 million tons. In 2018 it also stipulated that no new smelting capacity could be built in northern regions with severe air pollution, effectively encouraging the transfer of northern smelting capacity to the south. Output is fixed: however much is built in the south, that much is shut down in the north. As a result, Yunnan became the core recipient, mainly using hydropower—and of course some wind and solar power—to build a green aluminum valley. For example, the private aluminum giant Hongqiao Group moved its electrolytic aluminum capacity from Shandong to Yunnan, investing 45.6 billion yuan to build two smelters. The second was completed this year, equivalent to placing 60% of its capacity in Yunnan, with annual output reaching 4 million tons—equivalent to the entire capacity of North America. After the relocation, carbon emissions can be reduced by two-thirds, meeting strict environmental standards and strengthening the export competitiveness of low-carbon products. But here's the problem: if all capacity goes south, won't the north become hollowed out? How can that work? So the midstream alumina stage still has to stay in the north, because this step requires heat, and combined heat and power in the north is cheaper; industrial waste heat and cheap steam from coal play a key role. This leads to the red mud problem. Bauxite is a heavy and dirty raw material. Producing one ton of electrolytic aluminum requires two tons of alumina and roughly four to five tons of bauxite. The slag left after alumina refining settles into strongly alkaline industrial waste called red mud. Southern bauxite is higher grade, so the red mud problem is less serious; northern ore has higher silica content, produces more red mud, and poses severe environmental challenges. Last year there was a piece of news many people missed: the French-Swiss joint venture IB2 cooperated with local Senze Energy in Liulin County, a coal-producing area in Shanxi, on a comprehensive utilization project for bauxite residue. It took only ten months from groundbreaking to production—what speed! It also tried to build plants in Europe and America, but after six years it is still stuck at the research stage. Shanxi needs economic transformation, so it hit it off with IB2. What is IB2's strength? China's high-silica bauxite is unsuitable for the traditional Bayer process, excessively consumes reagents, loses aluminum, and produces large amounts of red mud, so northern diaspore has not been fully utilized. IB2 pre-treats bauxite through pre-desilication, allowing many depleted zombie mines to be reused and reducing import dependence. It has also achieved an important breakthrough in red mud treatment: first, through pre-desilication, red mud volume can be reduced by 60%; the remainder can efficiently extract metals such as gallium, scandium, and vanadium, and the ore structure is improved for hydrometallurgical processing; rare earth elements have also been extracted from red mud. Most of the remaining solid material is neutral and can be recycled as building material, no longer an environmental burden. For Shanxi, this is a bridge to industrial upgrading: from simply mining coal and smelting aluminum, while retaining or even expanding the midstream alumina industry, it adds extraction of critical metals. Against the backdrop of coal power, turning waste mines into high-value resources, China will in the future form an industrial pattern of "alumina refining in the north, electrolytic aluminum smelting in the south"—a situation that should be said to be far more optimistic than the one the Red Army faced during the Long March.

Musk carries a sink into Twitter headquarters: What does "Let that sink in" mean?

Everyone, it's four o'clock in the afternoon now. Are you still slacking off at your desk? I've already slipped away. Just now the boss was in the meeting room holding a meeting, saying we're going to collectively march into Douyin and build a persona. He asked me, Little Yang, think about it, what kind of persona are you? He said the company wants to build an emotional-type persona. I said, I can't do that, I'll just build a parent-child-type persona, like how to educate a silly son. The boss said, that works, parent-child has a lot of potential. I said, boss, I need to go pick up my youngest son from school now, I'm slipping out first. The boss was very surprised, and then I ran off. Then, speaking of this account, he said, you need to watch the trending topics on Douyin more. I said sure, then let me first go see what's trending on Douyin today. Today's Douyin trending topic is Musk—didn't he buy Twitter? So he carried a sink and walked into the lobby of Twitter headquarters. Then everyone asked, why did Musk carry a sink? Think about it, what is a sink called? It's called a sink, right? No no, he's not job-hopping, rather, a sink is a sink. So there's an English phrase called let that sink in. What does it mean? For example, if you've filled a whole basin of water, you want to let it slowly drain, slowly seep down. What does this metaphor mean? It means you said something very shocking, and then left a person standing there dumbfounded, letting them slowly calm down—that's let that sink in. Just like when I just told the boss, I'm going to pick up my kid, bye, and as for you, let that sink in. Oh, it's raining. When I was leaving just now, the boss even asked me, look at how overcast the sky is, do you want to take an umbrella? I said no no, thanks, bye. Then I slipped away, and I didn't expect it to rain so soon. Do you think that's pleasant? Not pleasant. Oh, I really didn't expect it, out of the blue—let that sink in.

The "Double Standard" Debate on Taipei's Infrastructure and GDP

Everyone, these past two days another meme has resurfaced. What meme? It's that image of Teacher Weiwei, saying Professor Zhang made a bold claim on the show "This Is China": after unification, Taipei will catch up to second-tier cities in five to ten years, and become world-class in twenty years. To Taiwanese people, this is a total minefield—Liang Wenjie's reaction was like someone whose funny bone had been poked, absolutely hysterical. Although Liang Wenjie didn't mention infrastructure, he focused on Taiwan's "per capita GDP." Let's first look at Taiwan's GDP composition. In Taiwan's GDP composition, consumption accounts for 60%, investment only 20%, and the rest is exports, most of which are supported by TSMC, the heart of semiconductors. TSMC contributes a quarter of the province's GDP. Without TSMC, per capita GDP might not even reach the level of first-tier cities. But what Liang Wenjie talked about wasn't this—he talked about Taiwan's "lifestyle" and "cost-effectiveness." My last trip to Taiwan was in 2013, accompanying Professor Zhang to visit National Taiwan University, Academia Sinica, and the Legislative Yuan, and to Taipei 101. We mainly moved around the core districts of Zhongzheng, Xinyi, and Da'an. I've been to Songshan, Shilin, Nangang, Beitou, and even Taichung. Taiwan's hardware facilities are indeed mediocre, but its software services are excellent. The MRT, night markets, and high-speed rail are all very convenient—especially barrier-free travel, which is truly worth learning from. Taiwan's infrastructure is indeed a product of the Four Asian Tigers era. Its six MRT lines are only one-sixth of Shanghai's, yet its population density is lower than Shanghai's, so per capita mileage is actually better. The annual throughput of its high-speed rail is one-fifth of Shanghai Hongqiao Station's, because there's no Spring Festival travel rush, so there's no need for a huge waiting hall. From the MRT exit, you can reach the high-speed rail platform in five minutes—transport efficiency is similar to third-tier cities like Nantong. But what Liang Wenjie talked about wasn't this. Liang Wenjie talked about Taiwan's per capita GDP, which is as high as $38,000, and Taipei's is even higher, close to $60,000—higher than mainland first-tier cities. The reason behind this is simple: Taiwan is a small place, but its population is over 23 million. Compare it to Shenzhen's Nanshan District, where per capita GDP is over $70,000. But TSMC's contribution is too large, accounting for a quarter of the province's GDP. Without TSMC, Taipei's per capita GDP might not even catch up to first-tier cities. Taiwan's quality of life is indeed high. By purchasing power parity (PPP), Taipei ranks in the world's top ten. Healthcare is cheap with good coverage, there are many clinics, medical costs are low, and per capita visits are high—all of these are pluses for PPP. But infrastructure? It's a bit like a large county town. For example, the power grid is aging with frequent outages; water pipes leak, wasting water; rent is cheap, but housing prices are high, with rent only accounting for one-fifth of income. Cheap energy is a benefit for Taiwanese people. The government suppresses energy prices through policy and subsidizes Taipower and CPC with tax money to keep people happy. But when international energy prices soared, Taipower basically didn't raise prices, and the government continued to subsidize the losses. Even fixing infrastructure gaps is done poorly. The aging power grid causes major losses from power jumps in science parks; leaking water pipes waste water seriously; rent is cheap, but it's hard for young people to buy homes, making wealth accumulation even harder. Liang Wenjie is right, but his rebuttal wasn't about infrastructure—it was about GDP. Taiwan's lifestyle and individual small joys are indeed very comfortable. But behind this are structural contradictions: protecting livelihoods versus protecting the economy. Without active development, the outlook is pessimistic. Taipei can be incorporated into strategic planning—in five or ten years, both infrastructure and productivity can rise. This is a good thing; Taiwan can still be more confident. Overall, Taiwan has its advantages, but also its challenges. Infrastructure lags, but GDP is high. If it can be incorporated into strategic planning, Taipei's future is still full of hope.

The Myths and Realities of Taiwan's Drone Industry

Everyone, let's first talk about the current state of Taiwan's drone industry. This matter must start with the drone cooperation between Ukraine and Taiwan, which is quite close. Ukraine teaches Taiwan hand by hand how to modify Chinese civilian drones and also imparts how to use drones on the battlefield. What is there to worry about? We have long established a three-dimensional regulatory system. Not to mention Taiwan, even the United States may not be able to bypass our restrictions. However, Taiwan does have some small calculations in the drone industry. You see, there is complex drone trade between Taiwan and the Czech Republic and Poland. Last year, Taiwan sold more than 70,000 drones to the Czech Republic and more than 30,000 to Poland, but most of the drones went to Ukraine. Conversely, US defense contractors also sell battlefield-validated drones to Taiwan, planning to assemble them locally in Taiwan and then sell them to Ukraine. The Taiwan authorities see an opportunity and want to use Ukraine's war needs and the West's supply chain anxiety to build a so-called "arsenal of democracy." Taiwan has organized more than 250 enterprises and signed cooperation agreements with European and American companies, preparing to localize key technologies in the drone field. Now, Taiwanese companies have gone overseas to build factories in Lithuania and Poland to serve the Ukrainian battlefield. In addition to trade cooperation, Ukraine also has a large amount of drone combat data, which has become a strategic asset. Ukraine shares it not only with Silicon Valley but also with Taiwan. The Shedao Institute advises Taiwan, suggesting that Taiwan learn from Ukraine's model, innovate quickly, and build asymmetric combat power. However, we must face reality. In terms of drone strength, China absolutely has the advantage. Our consumer drones account for more than 90% of the global total, commercial drones 70%, and although military drones are expensive and few in number, models like the Rainbow and Wing Loong are not sold to either Russia or Ukraine. In 2023 and 2024, we imposed controls on drone exports, but Ukraine believes that Russia obtained preferential treatment through transshipment. Since 2024, Ukraine has sought to reduce its dependence on Chinese components. In March this year, US media reported that Ukraine was already able to manufacture drones without Chinese components. Of course, this does not mean they actually do so. Chinese components, such as motors, carbon fiber frames, and lithium batteries, have huge cost advantages. Ukraine treats drones as consumables and must consider costs. Ukraine's upstream products for localized production of components still depend on China, and China's advantage is difficult to shake. The United States sees the risk in the supply chain and is stepping up efforts to promote domestic production of drones. Silicon Valley capital, Japanese sensors, Taiwanese semiconductors, Israeli electronic warfare experience, Ukrainian battlefield data, and Polish logistics form the Feihong supply chain. Although core components such as motors, batteries, and fibers cannot yet be mass-produced, this trend may persist for a long time. European suppliers producing components for Ukraine not only help safely relocate military production lines but also build a local military industrial chain. This does not mean they can squeeze out China, but it makes China realize that the West has alternatives. Maintaining balance is important. The United States must ensure a stable supply of rare earths and magnets, because 90% of these key materials are made by China. The United States wants time to scale up production and secure supply so that it can gradually increase its production scale. Facing Taiwan's drone production capacity, we cannot simply regard it as an economic issue, but as a strategic issue. Taiwan's drone output value grew 2.5 times last year, and it plans to achieve one-third local manufacturing of rare earth magnets by 2030. Taiwan's drone industry is not just an economic issue, but the core of the housing system. Facing the Feihong industrial chain, we should clearly assert our interests. Taiwan's drone industry is by no means ordinary market behavior, but a strategic issue worth deep thought. We must ensure our advantage in the supply chain, maintain a delicate balance, and not touch the bottom line of core interests.

Gansu Museum: A Masterstroke in the Cultural Creative World

Everyone, today let's talk about something new. The Gansu Museum has closed, and that's not a good thing. But let's not dwell on that; let's focus on what they did that caused this place to close. To put it plainly, this has to do with cultural creative products. The Gansu Museum closed, and the reason lies in these cultural creative products. Cultural creative products, well, that means turning cultural relics into toys and selling them to tourists, so tourists can take them home for kids to play with. This concept is good—you have to admire them. They designed cultural relics into all kinds of toys, like the Galloping Horse Treading on a Flying Swallow, and also the reversed ones; these are representative works of cultural creative products. These designs contain both wishes for a better life and concern for reality. Let's just say, you buy a toy and can also send a blessing—isn't that quite nice? But how are these toys sold? In their official Bubble flagship store, the price isn't expensive either, only 98 yuan each, limited to three per person, shipped within 25 days. Done praising? Everyone, this work is truly outstanding. You have to admire their creativity, taking cultural creative products to the extreme. The toys are designed so fun and come with beautiful blessings—isn't that the essence of cultural creative products? If you ask me where to buy this stuff, it's on their official website, 98 yuan each, limited to three per person, shipped within 25 days. Oh, damn, I really suggest exporting this stuff, suggest exporting, suggest exporting. When it comes to cultural creative products, you really have to admire this museum's creativity. Think about it, if they could sell abroad, how much more they'd earn. What a pity, this time this stuff can only stay in the country, letting us Chinese enjoy it ourselves. But this work is truly outstanding; cultural creative products really can't be underestimated. We have to give this museum a thumbs up; their work is truly outstanding, and cultural creative products are truly ahead of their time.

Narrative Contest After the India-Pakistan Air Battle: India's "Triple Win" and the S-400 Mystery

Everyone, India and Pakistan just had a skirmish a couple of days ago, and this aerial battle is truly thought-provoking. As soon as Pakistan made its move, the results reported by foreign media were "6 to 0." Pakistan itself was very happy and even made a 3D-printed mockery. This is actually a win-win for us too—no fight, no acquaintance; we also got a chance to see some real capabilities. India, on the other hand, celebrated too early. The Modi government sent seven delegations around the world to preach "great victory" and talk big about "those who offend us will be punished no matter how far away." But the problem is, Indian aircraft get "locked on" as soon as they take off. Pakistan probably didn't want to escalate things too much either, so it stopped short of taking more and just asked you not to send more. India responded to photos of aircraft wreckage with a denial "one-click triple combo": there wasn't any, don't talk nonsense. As for claims that the S400 air defense system was breached? The Modi coalition busied itself taking photos with S400 launchers to try to refute the rumors. But everyone knows that radars and command systems are the high-value strike targets—who cares about hitting your launcher frames? India's early warning radars, command centers, and fire-control radars—the Modi coalition not only refused to show them, but also fobbed people off with old photos from the 1960s. Then an Indian military journalist posted a photo with a radar vehicle, and it turned out to be an old photo from six years ago. The handling was baffling. So some people used satellite images to press the question: was your S400 breached or not? The Modi coalition insisted that the operators died on the front line in Kashmir, not at an air base that was attacked. But no one could answer a basic question: what is an air defense system operator doing going to the front line to fire guns? Presenting facts and evidence seems to be completely useless in front of India—if he says he won, then you lost. What this aerial battle leaves to the outside world, apart from the tug-of-war over whether the battle results are true or false, is a model of narrative warfare: what cannot be gained on the battlefield may not necessarily be made up for in the court of public opinion.

Trump's Tariff Drama: Pushing Companies Back to China, or Turning Into America Itself?

Everyone, last night I took the 2 a.m. train from Shanghai to Zhengzhou. I came all the way to Henan specifically to see Henan's direct tourism. I got up early to read a report. The report is about Trump's tariff policy. This guy, Trump simply loves tariffs deeply—even the Supreme Court can't cure him of it. Last March, Trump played a new trick, declaring a national emergency on the grounds of illegal immigration and fentanyl. Then he used the law IEEPA to impose a 25% tariff on Canada and Mexico and a 10% tariff on China. As soon as this move came out, it was struck down by the Supreme Court on the grounds of exceeding authority. But although this move failed, it was still glorious. Trump would not give up. In February he switched to Section 122 of the trade law and imposed a 10% tariff on imported goods within 150 days, and it expired again in July. Then Trump played another new trick, citing Section 301 of the trade law to impose tariffs of 10%-12.5% on 60 countries. As a result, he was sued by 25 states on the grounds of illegality. Trump is so good at finding excuses. A report by the Peterson Institute for International Economics in the United States pointed out that if this continues, manufacturing may flow back to China. Trump's tariff methods have a very low probability of success legally, because the scope of attack is too broad, and the investigations are hasty and not targeted. The Peterson Institute for International Economics also pointed out that Trump's tariffs will push companies back to China. They analyzed two examples: smartphones and clothing. For smartphones, a 20% tariff was imposed on China, but India was exempted. As a result, Apple shifted nearly 60% of its imported phone share to India within a few months. As for clothing, high tariffs were imposed on China, India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, with India even higher than China. Therefore, companies have no incentive to relocate their supply chains. Trump's overcapacity investigation covers 16 major economies. If overcapacity is determined and tariffs are raised, companies will have nowhere to escape. Mexico and Southeast Asia lack complete industrial supporting systems and are highly dependent on Chinese components. With tariffs stacked on procurement costs, it is actually more cost-effective for companies to stay in China. Last May, China and the United States established a trade committee and planned to reduce tariffs on non-sensitive goods. If other countries' tariffs are high, China's advantage in non-sensitive goods will stand out. Therefore, Trump's tariff policy can ultimately only push companies back to China. More ironically, Navarro and others accused 40 countries of forming a shadow network to conduct entrepot trade and help China evade tariffs. Trump punishes these countries with tariffs, but production capacity will ultimately still flow back to China. Trump's extortion tactic can be used in negotiations, but expecting a tariff barrier to succeed is simply a huge joke. History has proven that this kind of extreme tariff protection will ultimately only lead to economic depression and the return of industry. So, everyone, do not expect the U.S. tariff policy to save the U.S. economy.

Trump visits China, and the Texas prosecutor shows off his muscles again with another round of posturing.

Trump is about to visit China, and the ban on Chinese tech companies has been somewhat relaxed, but this is more tactical; the overall direction has not changed. A typical example is Texas, where five lawsuits against Chinese companies were filed within four days. Attorney General Ken Paxton is on a rampage; last December, he targeted TCL and Hisense. Who did he ambush this time? The first is TP-Link, a household name for routers, but many don't know the company's name: in China, it's called TP-Link, and the overseas entity is TP-Link Systems, which was spun off in 2024 in anticipation of various difficulties the US would create for Chinese-owned companies, preemptively de-Sinicizing itself. But they can always find a reason to go after you—claiming firmware vulnerabilities. Even though most routers have firmware vulnerabilities, Chinese brands are different; they can provide backdoor access to products for the Chinese government. Last month, Texas banned government departments from using its products, and this month, it formally sued, on the grounds that its components are imported from China. The second is Anzu Robotics, an American company accused of white-labeling DJI drones. I checked: Anzu signed a technology licensing agreement with DJI to obtain technical specifications for some DJI products, which is a legal, standard, and common cooperation model. But the US government does not accept this because DJI is on the blacklist, and the technology could be used for surveillance and data collection. The third is Lorix, also an American company, which makes home monitoring systems and is accused of using cameras made by Zhejiang Dahua Technology. Dahua acquired Lorix in 2018 and sold it in 2022 before the FCC ban was issued, but the components it provided are still in the cameras. Dahua has been identified by the US Department of Defense as a Chinese military company operating in the US and is on the blacklist, so it is also a national security risk. The fourth is Pinduoduo's overseas platform Temu, accused of deceptive marketing and illegal data collection. Texas sued, saying it claims to offer users affordable and high-quality products but turns users into the product—bypassing security protocols to establish backdoors and stealing private data stored on Chinese servers. In fact, all tech companies use user data to improve experiences. For compliance, Pinduoduo's parent company PDD Holdings has also signed up in Ireland, but no matter how it explains, the US basically doesn't listen. The fifth is the US entity of fast-fashion platform Shein, accused of selling toxic products and leaking sensitive personal data. Not only in the US, but in third-party spot checks in many countries, some Shein products do indeed exceed toxic chemical limits. Considering its low-price strategy and selling nearly 1 million orders per day, quality varies. But to say it steals data for the Chinese government—we really don't care much about what size clothes Americans wear. The final outcome for these five is likely to pay money to settle, especially the larger ones—the bigger the company, the more afraid of damaging goodwill, and the more inclined to settle out of court and pay huge fines. Paxton is particularly experienced in suing companies and has forced tech giants to pay up under the guise of protecting consumer privacy and data security: in 2022, Meta paid 1.4 billion, and in 2025, Google will pay about the same 1.4 billion. Temu and Shein will likely follow the same pattern. These lawsuits are quite controversial even in the US: some think it's serving the people, others think it's extortion, and the division basically corresponds to the two forces of populism and the establishment. Texas itself is a battleground for these two forces. This year's Senate election is between the populist Paxton, the establishment Cornyn, and another congressman Hunt, with the primary in March. The day Paxton filed the lawsuit, the first day of the Chinese New Year, happened to be the start of early voting—showing toughness on China is also a campaign strategy. Elections rely on endorsements: Paxton has the endorsement of the conservative group TPUSA, which is 'kingmaker' Charlie Kirk's organization; Cornyn has the endorsement of the Chamber of Commerce, the traditional establishment. Currently, in all polls, the gap between the two is small, but Paxton leads in all, indicating to some extent that the US political direction in the coming years will not change dramatically. The lesson for our companies going global is: everyone is playing with open cards, and trying to avoid risks by splitting entities will only become increasingly difficult.

American Politics: From Tariffs to Factory Building—Inviting the Wolf In or Reindustrialization?

Everyone, after round after round of trade wars and tariff wars, not only has China not been crushed, but the American political scene has caught a whiff of a new trend—from strictly guarding against Chinese companies, it has made a 180-degree turn and started calling for us to go build factories. Last month in Detroit, the Motor City, Trump stated: if Chinese companies build factories and hire local workers, that's a good thing, let China in, I like it. Seeing the wind about to change, another group is anxious: letting Chinese automakers into the US is inviting a wolf into the house, the American auto industry will be wiped out, and this idea must be nipped in the bud. Let's first look at the supportive faction. They believe that Chinese manufacturing factories have not put American workers to work enthusiastically; instead, they have reduced 68,000 manufacturing jobs, and manufacturing's share of the labor force has dropped to 8%. So, letting Chinese companies come to the US to set up factories is just returning manufacturing jobs to the US, right? This is simply a multi-benefit move of technological poverty alleviation, boosting employment, and selling assets locally. Economist Noah Smith's point here is quite reasonable. But the opposition won't have it. They believe the US market is limited and will not generate new demand or new jobs by bringing in Chinese companies. The representative of this faction, Robert Atkinson, president of the tech policy think tank ITIF, is resolute and firmly opposes Chinese companies, especially auto companies, building factories in the US. He has four reasons: First, the US market pie is limited; bringing in Chinese companies is just redistribution and will not bring new job opportunities. Second, China's success relies on decades of mercantilist policies—this term is not well translated; to put it plainly, it's economic nationalism, where the state steps in to cultivate industrial champions—how can the US reward this behavior with market access? He is right about one thing: we must recognize that the US market is neither infinite nor open, and must cultivate new markets to absorb capacity. Last year we did well on this point, with outward direct investment of $124 billion, an 18% increase over the previous year, the highest level since 2018. Third, the expansion of Chinese companies will keep high-value-added jobs within China, leading to the loss of high-end jobs in the US. Fourth, US dependence on China's key technologies will threaten national security and economic resilience. Finally, the US in the past transferred low-end industries and retained a strong innovation ecosystem; now letting low-end industries in will only weaken US innovation capacity. Everyone, these opposition remarks are truly laughable and exasperating. They style themselves as Hamiltonians, in a way like someone disappointed in a promising student, hoping the US becomes like China and implements more active industrial policies—they also want to take stimulants, they also want to be a martial arts team, and they only stop us because there cannot be two suns in the sky. Such people speak harshly, but at least they are clear-headed opponents: with the competitive level of American automakers competing against Chinese automakers, it's like a normal team going up against a martial arts team on stimulants—it won't promote competition, it will only be a one-sided massacre. The opposition also raised an interesting point. They say that in the tech-economic trade war, the US cannot win, but must avoid losing and avoid becoming the next Britain. To this end, the US needs a comprehensive transformation into national power capitalism, with the government formulating industrial strategies in key economic sectors, because the market alone is insufficient to cope with state-supported competition. This is essentially benchmarking China's approach, because it is a more suitable intermediate form for international competition. But they also pointed out a big problem: governments in Western democracies are prone to wavering back and forth, often sacrificing long-term interests for short-term approval ratings and good-looking statistics. The core reason is that the industrial cultivation cycle is far longer than the electoral political cycle. The US is not only declining in industry itself, but also in industrial workers. Cultivating talent is harder and takes longer than building factories. Therefore, a highly stable governing collective with strategic vision is indeed needed to gradually transform the nation's economic landscape from finance, real estate, and leasing back to production, construction, and innovation. In short, this shift in the wind is a bit absurd, but the reasoning is not wrong: whether one can plan for the long term is the real test.

188 Chinese companies finally receive the Pentagon's long-overdue blacklist

Folks, this is really nothing new. The U.S. Department of Defense has finally added those 188 Chinese companies to its blacklist. These days, you can't avoid trouble forever. It was supposed to be announced in February, but there was a mix-up—it was released and then withdrawn. Later, after Trump's visit to China, the matter was temporarily eased. Who knew the U.S. government is so fickle? Now what's meant to happen has happened. How could companies like Baidu, Alibaba, Didi, and WuXi, which are closely tied to people's daily lives, be defined by the U.S. government as military enterprises? Friends, don't think it's that simple. According to U.S. think tanks, as long as a Chinese tech company makes headlines in the U.S. three times, it will be blacklisted within three years. Even all Chinese tech companies could face this fate. They also say that the more cutting-edge the field and the stronger the competitiveness, the closer a company is to being listed. This sounds scary, but in essence, it's a tool for the U.S. government to engage in asymmetric competition on behalf of its own companies. To put it bluntly, if they can't win, they play dirty. In the future, this will only become more common. The so-called 1260H list actually originates from Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. The U.S. Congress requires the Department of Defense to identify and track Chinese companies that participate in China's military-civil fusion strategy and help modernize China's military. In practice, as long as a Chinese company has ties to Chinese state organs, especially the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), it may be deemed a military enterprise—MIIT oversees the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which in U.S. eyes is the command center for military-civil fusion; SASAC is seen as a Trojan horse factory. Behind this is America's fear of military-civil fusion. In its view, there are fewer and fewer purely civilian commercial companies in China's tech sector. So the U.S. criteria for listing are also evolving. In 2021, the initial 1260H list included 47 more traditional military central enterprises and telecom operators. Later, each update added new areas, such as biotech, cloud monitoring, drones, semiconductors, internet platforms, AI models, robotics, electric vehicles, and so on. The latest version has 188 companies, a 40% increase from last year, and last year was already an 83% expansion from the year before. Both were major upgrades. By the way, the reason the February version was urgently taken down was because it mistakenly removed two memory chip manufacturers, ChangXin and Yangtze Memory: the Department of Defense thought they weren't threats, but the White House disagreed and said, 'Add them back,' and in the end, a temporary worker was blamed. So, what is the nature and impact of this list? First, it is different from the Commerce Department's Entity List and the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals List. Those involve technology cutoffs and financial cutoffs, very severe measures. The 1260H list only stipulates that the U.S. Department of Defense cannot do business with listed Chinese companies, but in fact, they weren't supplying the U.S. military anyway, so the impact is small. Indirectly, if research institutions funded by the U.S. Department of Defense cooperate with listed Chinese companies, military funding may be cut off. This is the so-called chilling effect. Not only research institutions are affected, but also Chinese companies' downstream customers, financial institutions, partners, and even PR and legal advisors in the U.S. must self-censor. In reality, the purpose of this list is to brand these companies with a scarlet letter. If you've read Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, you know the scarlet letter specifically refers to adultery. Your market entity dares to secretly collude with an enemy government, so upstream and downstream companies dare not approach you, forcing you to adjust your supply chain and increase operating costs. To protect their U.S. market business and avoid local legal risks, companies will also complete de-sinicization at the corporate governance level. More importantly, it sends a sell signal to Wall Street. Companies targeted by the Department of Defense can basically be understood as aiding the enemy, and it's only natural for the Commerce and Treasury Departments to follow suit. So market risk will significantly increase. In the past, we've seen that once listed, stock prices basically plummet, and market value shrinkage is expected. Second, it mainly increases financing difficulties in international capital markets. That's why Chinese companies in the U.S. are desperately trying to shed this military label. Xiaomi is a successful case. After being added to the 1237 list in 2021, it immediately sued the U.S. Department of Defense, but the Department of Defense couldn't provide evidence. They could only say that Lei Jun received an award as an outstanding builder of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the five ministries that awarded it included MIIT, so Xiaomi is a military enterprise. The U.S. court ruled that the Department of Defense had insufficient evidence and ordered Xiaomi removed from the list. This also became a classic case of Chinese companies' legal counterattack. But Xiaomi is not out of the woods forever; some congressmen have called for it to be added to the 1260H list, though from the new list, it is temporarily safe. In fact, the effectiveness of seeking legal remedies is likely to become increasingly limited. For example, Yangtze Memory is in a judicial battle with Micron, suing Micron for hiring PR to create negative public opinion and influence government decisions. Although there is no final verdict yet, even if Micron loses, it won't cause significant harm to the company. As long as the other side is willing to lobby, they will always find a reason to blacklist you, and there is no end to trying to prove your innocence. In fact, U.S. companies hiring lobbying groups to court congressmen and pressure the Department of Defense to include Chinese companies on the list is a completely legal and extremely low-cost tactic. You spend a few hundred dollars on lobbying and can suppress a competitor worth billions. So objectively, the U.S. approach is to turn national security into a legal weapon for asymmetric commercial competition. But in its own view, this is whole-of-government security defense—you Chinese companies have government backing, so I have to support American companies too. China believes that government subsidies are legitimate industrial policy, and lists like 1260H are unreasonable suppression and unfair competition. The U.S. believes that subsidies are non-market practices, and listing is normal national security defense. This is actually a question of the transformation between offense and defense, spear and shield. You make lists, and now we have blocking laws that do not recognize, do not execute, and do not comply with U.S. secondary sanctions; the U.S. also has institutionalized subsidies, highly intervening in companies, forcing them to comply with national strategic will—it is also concentrating resources to do big things. China and the U.S. each learn from the other's strengths to offset their weaknesses, and ultimately may form two separate ecosystems, trading efficiency for security, coexisting with high friction.

Clinduke's Diplomatic Report: America's 'Alliance' Game and the Global Chessboard

Everyone, Trump's foreign policy advisor Krintuk has produced a 46-page report titled 'Reevaluating the U.S. Alliance System.' The core judgment is quite striking: forcing Ukraine to accept peace talks is meaningful only in freeing up more weapons to aim at the Taiwan Strait, not in improving relations with Putin. Don't think about playing reverse Nixon or allying with Russia to counter China; Putin can distinguish who is an adversary and who is a supporter. Even more astute is his point that the world is not multipolar but bipolar—only China and the U.S. have absolutely leading material power. The reason Russia is the most active advocate of a multipolar world is its strategic intent to become a pole itself; only when it hits a wall in Europe and cannot expand westward to establish great power status will it look back to the Far East. The report describes U.S. diplomacy as a pendulum swinging back and forth between Washington's nationalism and Wilsonian liberal internationalism. After winning each major war, liberalism cannot restrain its impulse, believing the world will inevitably enter a utopia, i.e., Fukuyama's end of history. The U.S. alliance system was originally a product of countering the Soviet Union, but it did not disappear with the Soviet collapse; instead, it serves the goal of expanding democracy. Trump's second term differs from the first, with loyalists at all levels implementing America First and explicitly rejecting the liberal internationalist tradition. The report reviews regions one by one, starting with the Western Hemisphere: pursuing hemispheric defense with the 'Donroe Doctrine,' re-establishing regional dominance. The 're' is because, according to the 1947 Rio Treaty, Latin America was already included in a U.S.-led collective defense system, though many countries consider it defunct. Latin America is too close to the U.S., basically those who comply prosper and those who resist perish, but the situation cannot be too rigid, especially in improving relations with Brazil. Trump sometimes lacks tact: making Canada increase military spending and view the U.S. as an adversary, and the Greenland issue has made NATO feel threatened by the U.S. In East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, the report does not believe Trump will abandon Taiwan by dividing spheres of influence, citing the continuation of strategic ambiguity. This year's defense strategy mentions establishing a denial defense system along the first island chain, rhetorically saying U.S.-China competition is not a life-and-death struggle and unnecessary confrontation should be avoided, but it does not specify what unnecessary confrontation is, all to maintain flexibility in negotiations. Through various negotiations, the U.S. has not gained much: using tariff leverage to extract huge economic framework agreements from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but weakening pro-U.S. political forces in Australia. Militarily, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea are actively arming, with the only weak point being Southeast Asia, where countries are leaning toward China. In Europe, NATO agreed to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, but only 3.5% is actually for core defense needs. Frontline countries near Russia are expanding militaries out of fear, while rear countries are mostly watching, hoping to outlast Trump's term, with defense spending generally below 2%. What really matters is Germany; political culture hinders its militarization, but Merz is more proactive, which would weaken France's leadership in Europe. The report argues that in such a fragmented Europe, forcing Ukraine to reconcile with Russia is not in U.S. interests, because peace and stability in other regions are only means, not ends: if they stop fighting, the West loses collective deterrence, and Russia will not turn to join the U.S. against China—for Russia, the U.S. is the main obstacle to its international status, buffer zone security, and regime stability, and this will not change because Ukraine cedes territory. Another interesting point in the report: Nixon and Kissinger were able to win over China because China itself deeply reflected on its more than 20 years of Sino-Soviet relations after its founding; in the early 1950s, it was impossible to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, the report praises Trump for abandoning liberal preaching to Gulf monarchies and ending compromise with Iran, but criticizes his idea of achieving peace and prosperity through economic drivers as too naive—don't think about building luxury homes in Gaza, and overestimates the U.S. ability to externally promote regime change in Iran. In Africa, it again praises him for not engaging in values-based diplomacy, treating it purely as a commercial place. Allies verbally increased military spending, but none reached 3.5% themselves, so the U.S. must accelerate building drones and missiles to counter China without abandoning traditional weapons systems like aircraft carriers, and for this, it will inevitably implement industrial policies. Liberals criticize this as moving toward state corporatism, but the report argues that facing China's challenge, liberalism simply has no solution. Returning to the alliance system, allies facing Trump have multiple choices: hedging between China and the U.S. is most common, compromise and resistance are also common, some flatter and court, a few develop defense out of fear of U.S. threats, and the rest try to constrain the U.S. through multilateral institutions, but to no avail. So alliance policy must return to strategist Spykman: he revised Mackinder's world island theory, shifting from the land power vs. sea power struggle to the rimland vs. heartland struggle, believing the rimland is more important, which is also the basis of Cold War containment policy. The U.S. must maintain military access and political alliances along the rimland of Eurasia; voluntary retreat will only let allies and adversaries alike smell weakness, and once the situation collapses, the cost of redeploying is greater than maintaining deployment. European allies, no matter their flaws, are the cornerstone of maintaining rimland access; as long as the U.S. is unwilling to cede control of the entire old continent to China, it cannot abandon Europe. The report appreciates Trump's aim of forcing allies to fulfill responsibilities, but the means must improve: America First does not mean stepping on allies. In short, don't fantasize about allying with Russia to counter China; instead, master 'allying with Europe to counter China.'

White House Launches Project Genesis: Accelerationism Meets Scientific Research

Folks, Trump has made another big move recently. He announced the launch of a plan called "Genesis," aimed directly at the U.S.-China tech war. When this news came out, it didn't even get as much attention as some of his gossipy headlines, but don't be fooled—this is no small matter. Some are already comparing this plan to the Apollo moon landing and the Manhattan Project. Let's be real: how could Trump not do something big this time? AI is no longer just commercial competition; it has become a clash of national strategies. Trump's idea is straightforward: let AI empower scientific research—this is the practice of accelerationism. He has asked the U.S. Department of Energy to lead the creation of the American Science and Security Platform (ASSP), turning it into the scientific research infrastructure of the future. The specifics: government-led integration of industry, academia, and research resources, opening up federal scientific data, and then using advanced computing power to train AI models and AI agents, applying them to robotic laboratories, transforming the research and innovation system, and defending America's global technological dominance. Isn't this just a national tech mobilization order for the U.S.? The executive order requires that within 60 days, 20 national-level scientific and technological challenges be identified in six major areas: advanced manufacturing, biotechnology, critical materials, nuclear fission, fusion, quantum information, semiconductors, and microelectronics. Then within 90 days, a list of federal resources must be drawn up—what the Department of Energy and corporate partners can provide, who else is needed, and who to bring on board. Within 120 days, a plan to open up data across government, academia, and industry must be produced. Within 240 days, assess the robotic automation capabilities of national laboratories, build AI workflows, and prepare for AI-led unmanned experiments and manufacturing. Within 270 days—that is, by August next year—results must be delivered, demonstrating the ASSP platform's initial ability to solve national-level scientific and technological challenges. When it comes to the closed loop of AI scientific research, many might think of academic garbage—AI learning and AI reviewing papers. Actually, the biggest problem is that large language models have a tendency to fabricate facts. Because ordinary AI models are trained on massive amounts of internet junk, they sometimes reflect humanity's collective hallucinations. If you feed them entirely high-quality information, it's different. The U.S. federal government holds vast amounts of high-quality data—NASA's astronomy, CDC's viruses, DOE's nuclear energy—but this data is scattered across various laboratories, forming data silos. Now the U.S. is mobilizing resources on a scale unseen in decades, putting the Department of Energy in charge because it is the only federal department with computing power, data, and energy infrastructure. It will integrate data and use AI models for labeling, correlation, and standardization. Just relying on existing data can partially solve the scientific community's data hunger. The next step will be very aggressive: letting AI agents autonomously pose questions, design experimental plans, verify answers, and achieve automation in scientific research. As a result, the cycle of basic scientific discovery will be compressed from years to days, or even hours. This will completely change how research is conducted and how research talent is cultivated. The U.S. is ambitious, but China is not falling behind. AI applications in key areas—such as protein structure prediction, quantum simulation, and special materials development—are already at the global leading level. The number of AI patents and AI-assisted papers is higher than that of the U.S. But the real test has just begun, because the research model may face a disruptive innovation. How do we build China's own autonomous and secure scientific research system, comprehensively safeguarding data and talent? This is also a problem our nationwide system needs to solve. For a long time, the American tech right has wanted to copy China's playbook, believing their system has hindered innovation. Now that Trump is in office, he is using centralization to loosen the reins on tech giants. If local governments dare to nitpick tech companies under the guise of regulation, anything not conducive to competing with China, the Department of Justice will sue state governments for unconstitutionality. All human concerns about AI safety and AI ethics are nothing compared to America's fear of falling behind China. So now the U.S., with militarized determination, is positioning AI as a strategic weapon, just like the atomic bomb back then, and must let the military-industrial complex go all out. Whether the future Genesis can break new ground in scientific research, no one knows. But what is certain is that national will has overwhelmed everything, and reckless acceleration, acceleration, acceleration will ultimately drag all humanity into a tech arms race.

Venezuela Drama Resurfaces: After the U.S. Military 'Captures' Maduro Alive

Everyone, yesterday I had just finished talking about Latin American geopolitics, and today I saw comments saying "they've started fighting." Sure enough, Trump announced on social media: airstrikes on Venezuela, President Maduro captured alive, and he and his wife have been flown out of the country. Right after that, I saw photos of Delta Force escorting Maduro, which confirms it: under direct and powerful U.S. intervention, regime change has occurred in Venezuela. There's a detail worth pondering here: Russian media used the word "kidnapping," while many domestic media outlets followed the U.S. in using "arrest" or "capture." Venezuela, for its part, declared a national state of emergency and condemned the U.S. military aggression. If you don't yet know the ins and outs of this matter, let me briefly lay it out. First, Venezuela is not a small country. It's as big as France plus Germany, with a population of 30 million and 120,000 active-duty troops. More critically, it has the world's largest oil reserves, accounting for 18% of the global total. Second, the U.S. war against Venezuela didn't start today. After Chavez returned to politics in 2001, the U.S. launched a so-called "hybrid war": diplomatic isolation, economic pressure, and support for the opposition. Under long-term economic sanctions, the Maduro regime was already under enormous pressure. Last August, Trump suddenly launched lethal strikes on suspected drug-trafficking vessels under the pretext of combating narcotics; in December of the same year, he bombed port facilities inside the country, and then today's events happened, very suddenly. Third, the so-called drugs are not actually the real reason. Since last year, the U.S. has deployed military forces on a large scale and struck with maximum force, yet has never provided any evidence of drug trafficking. The so-called Venezuelan official drug-trafficking network—the "Cartel of the Suns"—in the view of independent UN observers and think tanks, looks more like a label manufactured by the U.S. So the international consensus is that this is a political action by the U.S. to pressure Maduro out of power. Maduro says the U.S. is eyeing Venezuela's oil and gold—an innocent man is guilty only for possessing a treasure. Fourth, although both Trump and Biden targeted Maduro, their methods were quite different. Biden mainly used soft tactics: easing sanctions and offering some sweeteners. Trump, by contrast, was extremely direct with both sanctions and military means, not consulting allies at all, just going straight to action. This is also a feature of the new U.S. strategy—the U.S. wants to maintain absolute regional hegemony at low cost. Finally, the U.S. had long had various plans for Venezuela: assassination, inciting internal coups, small-scale landing decapitation operations, etc., all of which were rejected because of low success rates. Previous plans were almost all about open positional warfare, requiring an army of 50,000 to overthrow the Maduro regime, which risked an Iraq-style failure. But Trump succeeded this time, and that is actually very unusual. So what happens next in Venezuela could be very complex: there were already many people both supporting and opposing Maduro, but now whoever the U.S. supports may be more opposed, and it could ultimately fall into a cycle of violence. That's still uncertain and remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: the U.S. is forcibly reshaping Latin America's political environment. Last time I said Latin America was collectively turning right—what happens if you don't turn? Now they're giving you a demonstration. This is both a message to Latin America and a message to China and Russia—the world order is changing, and the two of you need to weigh for yourselves where you want to fight and where you want to compromise. China has been operating in Venezuela for many years. The crude oil it can't sell due to sanctions is basically all bought by us, including oil-for-loans, RMB settlement, and the influence of Chinese enterprises in Latin America—all of this will actually be affected. So our response in the future will also be crucial.

I deserve a better country.

Everyone, today let's talk about a conversation that left me feeling very uneasy. The speaker is Tighe Barry, the head of an American anti-war peace organization. He wasn't commenting on any president, but expressing a kind of disappointment: any government that promotes people's hatred is not a government worth having; I deserve better for my country, I deserve better choices, better than Trump and Biden. He feels that the problem now is not just policy—the American soul has disappeared, they have lost their direction, and no leader can guide them. The left talks about society and the rule of law, the right talks about the economy, but what he sees is this: the economic gap is widening, and the standard of living is declining. Economic data looks good on paper, but in real life, people can't even pay their bills. Once this incredible atmosphere appears, people naturally turn to things that are unfamiliar but easy—those easy targets. He says, yes, Americans are suffering, and he agrees with that: the hourly tax burden, housing issues, the cost of living—these are all important. But the real problem is the human soul. In his view, many of the divisions in America today have been packaged as cultural issues, while the economic and social divisions are actually very similar—the split between the top and the bottom is the fundamental one. This is also why Biden is being forced to fail economically. His criticism of these transnational elites is especially sharp. He says leaders should be able to guide people like Bezos and Musk to do what America must do; but these people are international, they only pretend to be American. When it suits them, they raise the American flag; when things go bad, they leave. They have places to go: Switzerland, Brazil, and banks all over the world. He finds this pathetic, but also reality. Is this a war between the right and the left? He says, actually not. It's a war that some people want. People on the left usually don't want anyone to suffer; but people like Trump, he doesn't care. He feels this is not about right or left, but about those who only want certain things versus ordinary people. Many people choose Trump because they believe he will end wars. He says if Trump really ends wars, he will support it; but he will not support Trump's other policies. If Trump can stop America's attacks abroad and withdraw troops from Iraq, then all the things we can do, he will support. But he is also wary: Trump could be a 'virus.' If this were Switzerland, if this were the Netherlands, and they elected a crazy right-wing figure, who would care? But America has enormous power and can cause a lot of destruction. And he doesn't like that his country is about destruction. In the end, he returns to that line: I deserve a better country. America should not be about destruction, but about responsibility and values.

Gout is no longer a 'king's disease'

Everyone, the happiest discovery from reading reports today is: gout has a cure. A research team from Shanghai Jiao Tong University may have found a way to completely defeat gout, and this achievement was published in the international top journal *Biomaterials*. Simply put, they use a rare earth oxide as the wrapper, fill it with uricase as the filling, and then feed this 100-nanometer "dumpling" into your joint cavity. It can dissolve gout tophi and inhibit their regeneration, eliminate arthritis, and has no side effects of traditional drugs. Gout has not only plagued humanity for thousands of years, but will become increasingly common in the future: in 2020, there were nearly 56 million patients worldwide, and by 2050, it is expected to exceed 100 million. Gout is caused by both genes and lifestyle. During human evolution, a genetic mutation occurred that led to the loss of uricase, causing uric acid levels to be much higher than in other mammals. In ancient times, this could bring a survival advantage: converting fructose into fat to survive food scarcity. Therefore, only emperors and nobles would suffer from this aftereffect of a life of luxury, and gout was called the "disease of kings" in the West. However, traditional East Asian diets and income levels were not high, so it was not easily triggered. Now it's different. As living standards rise, intake of red meat, seafood, alcohol, and sugary drinks increases; if not excreted, needle-like sodium urate crystals precipitate and deposit in joints, triggering gout. Currently, there are many drugs for treating gout: colchicine and glucocorticoids for broad anti-inflammatory and analgesic effects, and others specifically for lowering uric acid and promoting excretion. But none of these drugs can combine dissolving crystals, reducing inflammation, and lowering osteoclast activity. The last point is also very important because inflammation stimulates osteoclasts to cause destruction, leading to joint and bone deformities. So what is the new solution developed by the Jiao Tong team? It involves filling uricase into hollow cerium dioxide nanospheres. This inorganic shell not only blocks proteases but also deceives the immune system, allowing uricase to safely go to work dissolving urate crystals. However, uricase produces hydrogen peroxide as a byproduct, which can cause severe oxidative stress and tissue damage, so direct injection of recombinant uricase often has this side effect. Cerium dioxide plays a key role here: it can instantly convert hydrogen peroxide into water and oxygen. This approach has been validated in rats: joint inflammation subsided, cartilage damage almost completely healed, and no liver or kidney problems were caused. Cerium is the most abundant rare earth element, even more abundant than copper. So although China's reserves account for half of the world's and production for 60%, the United States and Australia also have deposits—Lynas, for example, is a core non-Chinese supply chain. As an industrial bulk commodity, cerium is currently in oversupply, and its medical use accounts for a very low proportion, so production is not a bottleneck. The real threshold is in the process. Industrial-grade cerium purity of 99.9% is considered good, but medical-grade cerium oxide requires extremely high standards: purity must reach 5N or even 6N, with no residual heavy metal elements; particle size must be precisely controlled to easily penetrate biological barriers without aggregating in blood vessels and causing embolism; most importantly, the surface valence state—the ratio of trivalent to tetravalent—must be precisely controllable to scavenge free radicals and treat inflammation. In the preparation of high-purity cerium oxide, China has a disruptive cost advantage. A major problem in the West is insufficient pilot production capacity, leading to high preclinical R&D costs and long cycles. Looking at frontier mechanism research: China's total number of papers exceeds that of the United States, but the U.S. remains pioneering in biological mechanisms and target research, and there is a huge gap in clinical translation. Our real threshold comes from nanoengineering and synthesis processes—the structure and surface modification of nano cerium oxide are very important, and we have an overwhelming advantage. It can be said that China is "materials waiting for biology," while the U.S. is "biology looking for materials." I hope that one day, gout will truly no longer be the "disease of kings" that has plagued humanity for thousands of years.

Brother 80 Corruption Case: The Game of Power and a Mirror of Reality

Everyone, today let's talk about the game corruption case that Brother 80 brought to light. You can search for it: a big spender in a game donated money to the alliance for military funds, but 99% of the money was embezzled by mid-level thieves, and the lowest-level errand runners could only collectively share the remaining 1%. This resonated with many people. Everyone feels this is a reflection of their own lives: the top brass are hands-off, the bottom works themselves to death, and all the benefits are devoured by the middle-level rats. What people actually care about is not this game, but the injustice of the power structure. This suddenly reminds me of an 'old acquaintance'—the man behind Trump, the godfather of the MAGA movement, Steve Bannon. He exploited the anger of gamers, gradually channeling this force to undermine the existing political system, eventually turning it into a right-wing populist movement sweeping the entire West. Bannon has dabbled in many circles besides finance and media, such as online gaming. Initially, he ran a World of Warcraft boosting operation in Hong Kong, using cheap Chinese labor to farm gold and gear for Western clients. At first, business was great, so good that even Goldman Sachs invested $60 million in the studio. However, this business model was collectively boycotted by American netizens. This highly active group mobilized through forums, united against what they saw as the common enemy—the elites who paid to disrupt fairness, and the gold-farming studios that created the conditions for such unfairness. They joined forces to create negative publicity, initiated collective lawsuits, and ultimately forced Bannon to abandon the business. Although he lost money, Bannon learned online mobilization from it and quickly applied it to his next venture, the right-wing media outlet Breitbart News. But this time, he transformed from an oppressor of ordinary gamers to their spokesperson. He heavily reported on the so-called 'Gamergate,' supporting gamers in resisting the left-wing media's authority to evaluate and define games, opposing the forced inclusion of politically correct elements like diverse aesthetics, skin color, gender, and appearance of game characters, and aiming to reclaim their cultural territory. An important source of the Gamergate incident was the Reddit forum, whose CEO was Ellen Pao, a Chinese-American woman. She tried to adjust the forum rules to limit misogynistic speech, but was portrayed by Bannon's media as a typical case of 'pluralist elites interfering with freedom of speech,' and was forced to resign after angry gamers attacked her—even though the board wanted to keep her, it was useless. So this proved to Bannon one thing: online conflict is completely feasible and can be used to reshape larger power structures. Later, he met Trump and helped him secure his political base, using exactly the same tactics: leveraging countless gamers, many of whom are young white males who are dissatisfied with their lives in reality. They are very sensitive to the marginalization of their cultural identity, because neoliberal economics are deeply entrenched, and the socioeconomic reality of the lower classes is hard to change; if culturally they also yield to a pluralism that transcends tradition and borders, it would be equivalent to withdrawing from the political life of this era, living insignificantly. Bannon organized their anger into an iron fist smashing against the establishment, ultimately using identity politics against identity politics, sweeping across the entire United States and even the West. The power that right-wing populism opposes is diffuse. They have a target called the 'Cathedral,' which represents anti-system, opposing the entire political machine, so they must burn down the forest and drain the swamp to be reborn. Whether this is another deception by power elites is no longer important; what matters is learning by doing. But this is different from the resonance triggered by Brother 80. Our culture is actually a unity of family and state: people don't hate the emperor but hate the eunuchs. If Brother 80 is willing to spend money, then he is a good emperor, and it would be even better if he could be less detached from the masses. The real troublemakers are the 'eunuchs' in management. People vehemently criticize the privileged class in the middle who deceive superiors and delude subordinates, believing that their greed hinders the beautiful ideals of top-level design and blocks the expectations of social mobility at the bottom. In short, the core demand of this anger is not to overturn the order itself, but to improve its operating mechanism to make it more just—that is, not to be like Bannon and Trump, who treat governing a great nation like spreading a big pancake, tearing down and starting over everywhere. However, there is a problem that no one in the world has solved: the operation of power depends on mechanisms—the emperor always needs eunuchs. If you were given the chance to be a eunuch, would you be a good one? I don't know. But I only know that people's anger at injustice and their expectations for justice need to be guided. Why bring this up today? Because long ago, I was also in the gaming industry, responsible for a section called 'You Suggest, I Improve' in a pay-to-win game studio, collecting players' opinions and suggestions about the game. Countless ordinary players actively gave feedback, showing they truly loved the game, but it was useless—all version planning and event operations revolved around the big spenders. The boss had a famous saying: 'Don't use your annual salary to challenge my pocket money,' and he truly lived up to it; one person could take on the entire server. Ultimately, this deformed ecosystem pushed those ordinary and small-paying players who were unwilling to become mere atmosphere to vote with their feet, escaping the power order and flocking to private servers. The entire game community eventually lost its vitality and failed to achieve so-called sustainable win-win. Back then, a competitor had a good advertising slogan: 'It's not a game, It's a world.'

Musk's Twitter Grand Ambition: The Double-Edged Mirror of Advertising and Free Speech

Folks, Musk spent $44 billion to buy Twitter. What exactly is he trying to do? Some say he just wants to ramp up promotion for his other businesses, like Tesla. Why would Tesla start advertising? After all, it's just an electric car made in China, and it has no choice but to compete fiercely. So he brought in a new CEO for Twitter who comes from an advertising background. But this view actually underestimates Musk's ambitions. First, advertisers fear two things the most: first, fake results—bot armies and paid trolls, where money is spent but the impact is entirely fake; second, negative effects—extreme political views are low-value, high-risk content that can easily stir up trouble, making them a brand safety minefield. Unfortunately, Twitter has many of both types of users, so GroupM, an advertising media group, once labeled Twitter as 'high risk.' Although that label has now been removed, the future is still uncertain. Second, Musk himself has said that he bought Twitter to create a common digital public square for humanity because he loves humanity. Well, the last person who said he loved humanity was nailed to a cross, and now Musk is somewhat being crucified by Western media. Time magazine said he put his half-baked philosophy of free speech into practice with extreme efficiency. Musk, the new boss, has been making bold moves, cutting nearly 8,000 employees down to just 1,500. Because he thinks they're all trash—Twitter is a cesspool, 90% of employees take money but don't work, just hold useless meetings. One department that Musk completely axed was Trust and Safety, which was responsible for verifying traditional media. You all are the 'Ministry of Truth,' with your little blue checks; but media from China, Russia, and Iran are not allowed—they have to be specially labeled as 'state-affiliated media,' meaning their content is political propaganda and untrustworthy. Initially, in 2020, it was only targeted at Russia; later, Twitter consulted information warfare experts and human rights organizations and decided to add China. But that seemed a bit unfair, so they pretended to set a standard: labeling state-owned media and government officials from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. But for practicality, they still labeled China first. And Iran, too, was treated like a permanent member. Not only did they label them, but they also didn't recommend their content, causing them to lose followers—this is called shadowbanning. According to estimates, accounts sanctioned by the platform saw a 20% to 30% drop in reach and activity. Of course, China and Russia were angry about Twitter doing this: how can you, a Western social platform, be in bed with the government? Then the other pair of pants—the news media—jumped out and said: Shut up, we're talking about free speech here. Freedom is for people; as for us, good people are people, you bad people are not. Look at this fox borrowing the tiger's might. Actually, they are not media at all; Twitter is the media, and they are just a group of unpopular columnists attached to it. Musk doesn't think much of these columnists either. He said, do you think that because you have a blue check through this verification system, your words are more correct than ordinary users? What kind of caste system is this? Get rid of it. Power belongs to the people. So the people saw that, since they all have money, they might as well pay $8 a month for a membership, and the prestigious blue check is yours. So Twitter redid its verification system and also removed the negative labels for media from China, Russia, and other countries, and suppressed accounts started gaining followers again. Well, Western media had a meltdown: I am the uncrowned king, and you put me on the same level as conspiracy theories and marketing accounts—I barely tolerate that, but how can you let Chinese and Russian media escape their lowly status? Musk pondered and thought, right, then let me balance it out and label you as 'state-affiliated media' too? No way. Then let's change the wording—how about 'government-funded media'? BBC is still unhappy: I am not government-funded. But the government requires everyone to pay you, saving the middleman. Canada's CBC said, the government funding proportion must exceed 70% to get this label, right? Okay, label you as '69% state-funded.' This move directly angered NPR, which quit Twitter. Its last pinned message was 'Please subscribe to our newsletter.' Hilarious—what kind of pre-modern reading method is this? It's like a columnist saying: I will no longer contribute; readers, please come to my doorstep and line up to get my handwritten copies.

JD.com's Downfall: Yang Li's Butterfly Effect and the Helplessness of Stand-up Comedy

Everyone, today let's talk about the "car crash" incident involving JD.com and Yang Li. It was originally just a commercial collaboration, but the partner was not an ordinary celebrity, but a stand-up comedian who became famous by poking fun at "ordinary yet confident" men. JD.com initially thought she would bring in more new users than she would drive away old ones, but things quickly spiraled out of control. The male consumers who call themselves "Ji Ba" have an action power beyond imagination. A large number of JD.com users returned goods, uninstalled the app, and switched to Taobao and Pinduoduo. With this wave of actions, JD.com did not get a "surprise from heaven," but rather a disaster from heaven. It wasn't just the consumer business; some JD Xiaojinku users also began transferring out large sums of money. When someone posts their transaction online, the snowball will grow bigger and bigger. Internet financial platforms are most afraid of concentrated runs, because the bulk of user balances are used for financing or investment. This is no longer just a Double Eleven performance issue, but will harm JD.com's goodwill and strategic layout. So JD.com removed marketing materials, canceled subsequent collaborations, and publicly apologized. On the other side, the "Jimei" are also dissatisfied: How could JD.com cut ties with Yang Li just because "downhead men" made a fuss? Thus, a world where only JD.com is hurt was achieved. This makes me think: In the entertainment industry, there are many who have collapsed due to drug use, prostitution, and domestic violence. Why is it that when they have problems, few people go to the brands they endorse for concentrated returns, but Yang Li's controversy has such a big commercial杀伤力? The reason is simple: everyone feels this time it's related to themselves. Artists who are morally corrupt or even criminal did not directly attack ordinary consumers; condemning them is based on morality and the rule of law. But Yang Li's jokes directly turn "ordinary men" into laughingstocks. Theoretically, she only pokes fun at a minority of "ordinary yet confident men," but most people are very ordinary and also need self-esteem. Stand-up comedy is often called the art of offense, but the core of comedy is to give the audience a spiritual victory. Aristotle said comedy imitates characters worse than average people; the audience sees the false, the evil, and the ugly, and achieves psychological transcendence in a way that does not cause pain. The problem is not whether offense is possible, but to whom one declares war on behalf of the audience. Truly powerful offense should be directed at the strong, at those who oppress, cause mental exhaustion, and make people dare not speak out. There are too many big monsters and little demons in life that make people lose blood. Only by speaking out everyone's "81 difficulties" will the audience resonate. But if ordinary men are set up as the big Boss, the jokes can easily slide from offending power to mocking the weak. Yang Li's line "Successful people are all magnanimous" has an especially piercing implied logic: being offended seems to prove you are not successful enough. But human dignity should not be equated with economic value. Today's survival anxiety is so widespread that many ordinary people are already treading on thin ice. What they need most is empathy and encouragement, not being reminded that "you feel bad because you are not successful." JD.com is not the first business to crash because of collaborating with Yang Li. Brands such as Shede Liquor, HLA, Great Wall Motors, and Intel have all been involved in controversies. Why do companies still line up to collaborate? Because what capital likes is popular cultural products that can reach the masses. As long as information can be delivered to users, platforms often don't care whether it will tear society apart. Offline stand-up comedy can serve specific audiences, but the industry lacks space and talent pipelines in many cities, so it can only rely on online dividends. Algorithms repeatedly push top performers to everyone, and small-circle expressions become mass culture. Companies use "diversity and inclusion" to signal virtue, but may not really care about the content, ultimately offending existing consumers without gaining stable new users. So, JD.com's crash is not about gender opposition, nor can it be explained by "stand-up comedy should offend." Comedy can be sharp, but it's best aimed at the strong; business can chase traffic, but cannot pretend that social consequences don't exist. Capital uses controversy for attention, platforms use algorithms to amplify conflict, and in the end, it's ordinary people who bear the cost. Everyone, you taste it, you savor it carefully.

Do you want to become City Bro, or be held hostage by traffic?

Everyone, let's talk about the pressure and hope of this city, Shanghai, and also about my excitement, anxiety, and confusion after suddenly becoming 'City Bro.' During the chat, the host talked about his experience of coming to Shanghai in 2010. At that time, he was very lonely and wanted to keep a Husky or an Alaskan Malamute, but he only got off work in the early morning every day and had no conditions at all to care for a dog, so in the end he had to keep a cat. The restrictions of the city sometimes even decide for you what kind of pet you can keep. But the city also gives people more opportunities. What is truly difficult is not whether the city has pressure, but whether one can find time to rest, recover, and think clearly about what one really wants. Shanghai's work culture rarely leaves such blank space. If people do not stop to recharge, they easily project all their problems onto the environment. I used to always see myself as an artist and an improv comedian, but recently, because of the phrase 'City不City啊，好City啊,' I suddenly went viral, and new pressure came along with it. I worry about whether I will become a 'One Trick Pony,' with only this one move left. There is an Indian worker in Singapore who became famous for asking in Cantonese, 'Drink tea or not,' and was called Tea Bro. Later, it seemed he could only repeat that sentence. A meme can push a person up, and it can also lock a person in place. I hope to keep exploring and use my past experience in content and performance to find the next path, rather than being trapped forever under the label City. The most terrifying thing about social media is that it easily turns people into products. Some MCNs make many streamers read the same script and act out the same plot, and whoever becomes popular is made to copy it endlessly. What the algorithm rewards is not a complete person, but a certain performance that works. I both want to be myself and have to serve the users who follow me. How to form a healthy relationship between freedom and demand is really difficult. The rewards of traffic are also very much like addiction. The first time you suddenly go viral, you will keep waiting for the next time. My ideal self would think that if a work brings happiness to a few hundred people, a few hundred likes are already worth it; my real self, however, will ask why it is not a few thousand or tens of thousands. Streamers like IShowSpeed were noticed because of anger and exaggerated performances, and later he kept smashing mice and keyboards. Chinese netizens call him 'Hyperthyroidism Bro.' The more popular the persona becomes, the easier it is for the persona to shape the person in return. I also talked about this with my friend Nina. She said creators have to keep exploring which side of themselves the audience actually wants to see. We recently met in Beijing. We had originally said we would drink douzhi, but in the end we did not get to. The audience may like a persona for a while, but after watching for too long, they will get tired of it. The problem is, I do not know whether everyone wants to see the real me or another more fun persona. On Xiaohongshu, attention sometimes falls more easily on the person themselves; Douyin often prefers a meme or a series. Many people are not following me, but the City series. It is not easy to shift from following a meme to following the creator themselves. People who slowly accumulate followers do not fluctuate as much, while someone like me who suddenly goes viral has to endure a stronger sense of落差. So what I can do is still to keep exploring, to separate work from fun again, and to leave myself time to rest and think. The internet allows people to create in big cities, small cities, or even small towns, but no matter where you are, you must first protect your complete self. Becoming City Bro is an opportunity, and I do not want it to become a prison of traffic.

From Follower to Leader: China's Pharmaceutical Innovation Is Gaining Strong Momentum

Everyone, recently I've heard that our Chinese pharmaceutical industry has transformed from an unknown capacity provider into a global innovation center. Over the past decade, we have not only rapidly followed from 1 to 99, but have truly begun to engage in original innovation from 0 to 1. Foreign pharmaceutical companies are now restless, flocking to our Chinese laboratories to find projects, fearing that others will seize the initiative. Since the second half of last year, global pharmaceutical capital has become active, especially in January and February of this year, when Western big pharma completed a total of 41 deals in China. The valuation of Chinese companies has soared, with average upfront payments doubling from $38.8 million to $77.7 million, and total valuations reaching a record $52 billion. Investors have also shifted their focus to the early stages of biotechnology, rather than waiting for scientific research to become mature commercial assets. Previously, our pharmaceutical industry mainly relied on support from the broader environment, including policy incentives, educational dividends, and labor cost advantages. But the most prominent was the huge patient base and hospital system, with clinical trial recruitment speeds 3 to 5 times faster than in the United States. Meanwhile, the efficiency of new drug R&D in the U.S. has been declining due to bureaucratization and high costs. Many big pharma companies have become project management and channel sales companies, increasingly outsourcing R&D. In the past, many American investors did not believe in our scientific research capabilities and thought clinical data might be fabricated. But last year, Boston's RA Capital sent a team to investigate and found that the clinical trial systems of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences and mainstream hospitals are very advanced, capable of conducting over 100 clinical trials simultaneously. Although there are differences in data generation methods, the possibility of data fabrication is low. Therefore, this month RA Capital plans to collaborate with the Suzhou Biomedical Industrial Park for a roadshow, organizing one-on-one meetings with scientists from all over the country, providing support in funding, strategic planning, team building, overseas operations, and other aspects. In October, it will also hold a scientific seminar in Hangzhou to directly contact scientists. With the explosive growth of China's early-stage innovation pipelines, the traditional investment model is clearly too slow. Although clinical validation is efficient, the discovery stage is the source of high risk and high reward. Therefore, embedding upstream in laboratories is necessary to secure better terms, earlier exclusivity, and capture more returns. More and more American venture capital firms are realizing that as China continues to increase investment in science, scientific research development has reached a turning point. They can no longer take it for granted that what the U.S. has not discovered, China cannot discover. New York-based venture capital firm Pacific Bridge stated that the quality of scientific research innovation in Chinese universities is continuously improving. More importantly, Chinese universities are mainly government-funded and less commercialized, so they have greater motivation for basic research and are more likely than American private institutions to produce new innovative technologies. This is actually taking advantage of the stage where China's scientific research commercialization mechanism is not yet mature and its premium capacity is asymmetric, arbitraging through valuation mismatches to acquire early-stage assets with significant potential. Of course, Chinese local VCs have also awakened and often advise scientists not to rush to publish papers but to incubate internally first. If American VCs do not cooperate with local partners, enter laboratories, and fund scientists to start companies, they will not be able to grab pre-publication assets. The so-called arbitrage can only be achieved under conditions of insufficient competition. In recent years, local venture capital financing has contracted, and some laboratories and small and medium-sized biotech companies are financially strained, putting scientists in a relatively weak position. To quickly monetize, they accepted higher discounts and relatively conservative upfront terms, leading to undervalued IP. But soon, fierce competition among investors led to a re-recognition of the value of Chinese assets, and upfront payments rose significantly. Behind this is actually the result of the accelerated development of the knowledge economy. China's pharmaceutical industry is transforming from contributing capacity to contributing knowledge. The U.S. used to often accuse China of stealing intellectual property and ideas, asserting that China can only produce, not innovate. But now the situation is that the global capacity for generating intellectual property has undergone a structural shift. China has become an early-stage innovation engine for biomedicine, while the U.S. division of labor has shifted toward later-stage commercialization. If China's capital and commercialization capabilities strengthen and continue to maintain the叠加 of policy and ecological advantages, with improved efficiency across the entire industry chain, it will inevitably occupy a larger space in the value chain. The knowledge economy is people-oriented. Where talent is dense and supporting facilities are more complete, capacity will shift there. China has great advantages in these aspects, so next, our prominence in pharmaceutical innovation will only become more pronounced.

The collapse of online lending, and the banks are laughing with glee

Listen up, everyone. The recent wave of mass layoffs in the fintech world is truly dizzying. Peer-to-peer lending companies like a certain He Technology, a certain Shang Consumer Finance, a certain Xiaoman, and a certain Fu Technology are all cutting staff. Some tech teams have shrunk from over a thousand people to just a few hundred—it's absolutely jaw-dropping. But guess what? Netizens are all shouting 'they deserve it,' as if these companies' contraction was long overdue. What's going on here? Online lending originally had a nice name—inclusive finance—with the initial intention of providing financing convenience for small and micro enterprises and individuals. But what happened? This path has become narrower and narrower, turning into a synonym for Ponzi schemes. After the P2P tide receded, small loan institutions haven't made any essential progress either. High interest spreads, high risks, and risk control hovering in gray areas—compared to banks, they're just money-grabbing machines. Bank products generally have interest rates of 3%-5%, while some online loans can hit 36% or even higher, plus various fees; if you can't repay, they resort to violent debt collection—it's like eating people without spitting out bones. Even more absurd is that some platforms force loan disbursements. You click on a rogue link and you're trapped. Many people who had no need for funds are forcibly dragged into the trap. You're so poor you can barely make ends meet, while they're eating till their mouths drip with oil. Blood-sucking platforms—that's exactly what they are. By 2025, the debt ratio for people aged 30-35 is said to exceed 90%, with an average debt of about 160,000 yuan per person. Only 55% of that is mortgages, while the rest is consumer loans, credit cards, and online loans. The destructive power of online lending on family relationships is comparable to gambling, drugs, and prostitution. Regular loans are strict in, lenient out; online lending is the exact opposite—lenient in, strict out. People with no income, no credit history, or even existing debt can still get loans. On the surface, the review is super loose, but the tricks are all later. Apart from high interest, there are various hidden fees, greatly increasing the actual cost. The huge profits of online lending also corrupt other industries. Industries doing honest work can't make money, while those pumping up and lending money get rich easily. Who would still work steadily? In the U.S., payday loans can have interest rates as high as 500%. We can't repeat this lesson of debt-fueled consumption for everyone. The Financial Regulatory Administration and the People's Bank of China jointly issued regulations on clearly disclosing the comprehensive financing cost of personal loan business, strictly restricting high-interest products. The maximum annualized rate of 24% is only transitional; by 2027, it will be further compressed to 12%. The signal is clear: say 'no' to blood-sucking platforms. Ordinary people have also become smarter, no longer lambs to the slaughter, especially young people, who are more rational and pragmatic in consumption. The most typical example is Moutai. Its stock price has been double-killed, and many have cut losses and exited. This Spring Festival, the performance of the entire high-end baijiu industry was dismal. Some say young people don't drink baijiu anymore, but the real situation is that people are unwilling to spend money unnecessarily and are turning to more cost-effective, affordable products. Bichun is one such example. Among the 200,000 liquor companies nationwide, only Moutai and Bichun are said to have the secret qualification for sauce-flavored liquor. Bichun, because it historically obtained the sixteen core strains that determine Moutai's taste, can brew a liquor that is delicate, soft, and rich in sauce aroma. Tested by the Chengdu Food Inspection Agency, its total acid is 2.07 and total ester is 3.13, highly close to Moutai. Bichun has not only won multiple honors but also participated in formulating the new national standard for sauce-flavored liquor. But despite such good quality, its price is only around a hundred yuan, offering extremely high cost-effectiveness. Many fans buy it without hesitation, and the reviews are all positive: not spicy, doesn't cause hangovers, has floral and fruity aromas, affordable, and very suitable as a daily ration liquor. Even picky old drinking buddies around you, in blind taste tests without looking at the packaging, find it hard to distinguish between the industry leader and Bichun. Overspending is being abandoned, and online lending companies are being criticized. Ordinary people can only go with the flow to survive the cycle. Making money is too hard. Spending money where it counts and living a solid life is better than anything. Therefore, online lending companies being criticized is the general trend.

Wu Liufang's controversy, internet addiction, and the carnival of capital

Everyone, today let's talk about Wu Liufang, the story of a former world gymnastics champion transitioning to the internet. After retiring as a world gymnastics champion, she unexpectedly became a borderline dance streamer and was criticized by another Olympic champion, Guan Chenchen. What exactly happened here? Wu Liufang quickly gained followers amid controversy, from tens of thousands initially to two million when her account was banned, and then to six million after it was unbanned. This wave of actions is like a splash in the torrent of the internet. But behind the splash, the platforms, algorithms, and that out-of-control information infrastructure are what truly need to be discussed. The platform first froze the account, then restored it, objectively driving this round of 'revenge following.' Wu Liufang has been exploring the internet path for nearly a decade, from teacher and coach to online streamer, she made borderline videos and attracted fans. It's like we're all playing a game called 'Internet,' with simple rules: you can only earn income through attraction. I'd like to do internet too, but I only write miscellaneous articles for sales, occasionally venting complaints. This time the goods are genuine, place your orders, my internet dream, now please switch to the VCR. Now let's talk about that MCN agency, Dahai Xingchen. Their founder is a Pickup Artist, specializing in teaching street pickups, but these are obviously just small scripts. Dahai Xingchen precisely targeted a basic human need: to be loved. But this kind of love is hard to satisfy nowadays. They launch various heart-stirring content, teasing people's desires, actually satisfying people's sexual fantasies. No need for love, no need for sex, sexual fantasy is enough. Sexual fantasy is a wonderful thing; it doesn't have to be explicitly shown. So, although laws set clear boundaries and major platforms have specific requirements for streamers' limits, there will still be legal and compliant content serving the purpose of creating sexual fantasies, and that's called borderline. How to view the borderline phenomenon? Some say to strictly regulate and narrow the boundary, but how narrow is narrow enough? This is actually a very slippery slope, from 'white silk, blue fire Gatling' to 'Arab wide robes,' where do you plan to stop? The more the regulatory power cracks down, the more it may provoke public backlash. Because these platforms survive on human weaknesses, they pinpoint users' pain points and launch various streamers posing and teasing, actually satisfying people's sexual fantasies. And this is part of addiction. Back to Wu Liufang personally. She started striving after retiring at 19, from teaching to coaching, then to online streaming. Her videos are indeed very 'borderline,' but this also shows her personal choice. If everyone is 'borderline,' then boundaries are constantly expanded, promoting competition, encouraging innovation, and driving progress. The essence of a market economy is to engage in borderline activities as long as it's not illegal. But the real question is, why do borderline streamers uniformly engage in soft porn? Why do they always test the bottom line? Because going borderline downward just serves those who have fallen into addiction. How addictive is falling? For example, porn sites make up less than 5% of all websites worldwide, but they attract nearly 30% of all internet traffic, meaning they can drain a person at 6 times the efficiency. Why do people accept this? Because the brain's reward mechanism is too simple to trigger and too easy to replicate. It's like cheating in life. In evolution, to ensure reproductive behavior has sufficient material security, thresholds must be set for sexual behavior. But now? People indulge in momentary pleasure, pursue material interests, and love and sex become shallow. Awake, they share joy; in the end, they scatter. Originally atomic individuals, why quantum entanglement? Internet platforms are like cyber hallucinogens; they create a false sense of satisfaction through algorithms, making people addicted. This is actually smoking spiritual opium, ruining one person at a time, one generation at a time. There's an internet meme: 'I am irreconcilable with pornography, gambling, and drugs,' but any addiction is enough to kill a person. We discipline and alert ourselves through personal morality and inner drive. But if the social and cultural atmosphere allows businesses to profit from human weaknesses, the cost is inevitably the annihilation of civilization. Finally, we face the carnival of capital. Internet platforms are the masters of information infrastructure, constantly strengthening user stickiness, with recommendation algorithms as the key. These platforms use algorithms to cater to human animal instincts, and the ways to make money are all written in criminal law. But these platforms don't realize that laws need improvement, legislators need to learn to keep up with technological acceleration. We must reduce the commercialization of information, so that traffic monetization is no longer the main reward for content creators, to reduce sensory stimulation and emotional teasing, to deter producers of junk content, so that tech companies cannot settle for being advertising firms, and ultimately represent the people in negotiating with tech capital, letting technology provide public services and making information infrastructure public.

美国佬：原油不是用来抢的，是买来的！

各位，石油滋生美军这个梗大家都熟。但有人就质疑了：美国明明是全世界头号产油国，去年日产2100万桶，是沙特的两倍，你说人家出去抢，岂不是有点尬黑？没错，而委内瑞拉现在日产才50万桶。那美国自己要用多少呢？大概每天2050万桶。乍一看确实能cover掉，莫非大家冤枉了美国，人家真的是去缉毒？ 其实，尽管原油的量词都是桶，但油和油本身是不一样的。有的油像一坨黑色的排泄物，黏稠得近乎半固体，有的就比较清亮，这就是重质酸油和轻质甜油，当然都不能喝，中间还有中质油。这个轻重是杂质造成的，重质油含有大量重碳氢化合物，比如沥青质和胶质，还有硫化物、重金属等等。 美国因为页岩革命，原油产量大爆发，从2008年的每日800万桶直接翻了两倍多，而增产的部分基本都是轻质油。轻质油适合做什么？适合做汽油，对美国这种长在车轮上的国家非常重要。但除此之外，它还需要柴油，因为货运的70%靠重卡，拖拉机和火车用的也是柴油；还需要航空煤油，疫情之后民航复苏，航煤需求量大得很；沥青也是基建的关键。这些东西，得用重质油来做。美国自己有一些重质油，但产量肯定不够，所以美国的玩法是出口轻质油、进口重质油。 那哪里生产重质油呢？有三大巨头。一个是加拿大，现在美国基本就靠它，运进来就在美加边境上精炼；一个是俄罗斯，以前卖给美国，现在卖不了了，被印度接了盘。但它俩加起来都不如委内瑞拉。委内瑞拉探明储量3000亿桶以上，天下第一，其中86%都是超重质油，那种黏糊糊的沥青砂。 按道理，美国和委内瑞拉在能源上是天作之合，轻重互补。事实上他们以前确实是这样。一战时期石油业刚起步，到二战之前，委内瑞拉是仅次于美国的第二大产油国，产能大多控制在美资手里。委内瑞拉觉得资源流失太严重，1943年就要求利润平分，这在当时是很先进的做法，后来中东那些国家纷纷效仿。60年代，也是委内瑞拉牵头成立欧佩克，协调产油国政策，跟油企争夺定价权。70年代委内瑞拉比较温和地搞石油国有化——油是我的，但采油你来采，你是专业的打工人，当时它的石油国企PDVSA被说成是南美的埃克森美孚。80年代油价崩了，PDVSA一减产收入就缩水，没钱开发奥里诺科重油带。于是90年代又把美企请了回来，这回不是打工仔了，是合伙人。这事办坏了，在反对外资的左派眼里，属于开倒车。 查韦斯上台之后，要求重新谈判股份，国企必须占大头。美企不干了，要撤走并且打官司，官司最后都赢了，要委内瑞拉赔。赔不起怎么办呢？就把委内瑞拉在美国的厂卖了抵债，扯皮扯了十几年，去年底相当于被法拍了，价值腰斩，被一家叫Amber Energy的公司拿下。这家公司有共和党背景，是特朗普的金主之一，擅长打官司，特别会做主权债务诉讼。问题是它吃下了，后面还有好多其他债主排队等着要钱呢。说不定接下来就要求委内瑞拉以产抵债——让我进去免费采油，采够了才算两清。 还有一个重要因素：美国油企在墨西哥湾沿岸，得州、路易斯安纳州有不少专门加工委内瑞拉重质油的炼厂，现在喂不饱很难受，迫不及待想要杀回去。于是你就看到特朗普替他们出头，说委内瑞拉我们接管、我们Run，实际上就是美国来对委内瑞拉的主权资产进行清算。 再说说委内瑞拉这边。查韦斯搞左翼民粹的玻利瓦尔革命，把PDVSA彻底换血，外行领导外行，不会维护油井，也不再搞再投资，只是卖油搞福利换支持。产量下去了，支出上去了，但人民也是真支持。马杜罗上台刚好赶上美国的页岩革命，原油产量暴增、油价大跌，国家没了收入，怎么搞福利呢？老百姓人均饿瘦十来斤，那国家怎么维稳呢？马杜罗本人是公交司机出身，不像查韦斯是军人，所以他特别需要石油来笼络军队、防止政变，于是允许军方倒卖石油，获取灰色收入。2017年以后，美国强力制裁和封锁，直接让他的石油产业濒临崩溃，只能偷偷卖。其中很大一部分油是规避美元结算去了东大，西大、北大甚至南大也都有一部分。但这毕竟是偷着卖的盘子，越做越小，掉到每天50万桶就不够看了。 现在局势还很不稳定，美国油企就算进了委内瑞拉，到底能不能增产还很难讲，因为很多油田经过了长期荒废，重建需要时间和成本。利比亚的油田过了这么多年，产能赶不上卡扎菲时代；伊拉克美军地面占领、全面主导，花了12年才恢复产量，而且现在中资占一半以上。 最后你看，特朗普为什么要对中国开口子？很多业内人认为，是防止中国作为委内瑞拉最大的债权国，进一步做外交和法律干预，通过保供应来换取某种默契。对这个观点，我觉得可以批判地看待。实际上对我们来说，更重要的地缘和产业风险不在委内瑞拉，而在伊朗。伊朗现在全国100多个城市正在爆发街头抗议，从经济诉求已经转向了抗议政权。伊朗作为一带一路的枢纽，跟我们的能源、货币合作都深得多，所以美国和以色列会怎么介入，未来的局势会给我们带来什么样的考验，都需要进一步观察。

中国科技战略：国家工程还是科技革命？

各位，今天咱们聊聊那篇洋洋洒洒66页的报告。美国兰德智库是怎么看待中国科技战略的？咱们先从一个视角来看。 兰德智库洋洋洒洒写了66页，其实就是一个核心结论：中国的科技战略是国家工程，而且跟国家实力紧密挂钩。国际上的朋友，尤其想在中国科技领域搞合作的，最好先想清楚要不要助长中国的国家实力，因为这属于中国复兴的大业。从美国的角度出发，得出这个结论很正常，尽管它也选择性地忽略了美国自身最重要的科技创新背后那个国家角色。 报告里头，兰德把中国科技政策的发展史分成了几个阶段。从四大发明到宋明的成熟技术，再到清末的衰落，再看五四时期的赛先生，建国后的两弹一星，改革开放后的市场换技术，每一步都跟国家的战略目标紧密相关。换句话说，跟美国的科技创新不一样，中国科技是国家政策的产物。 咱们不看报告里的结论，主要看兰德的思维方式。报告指出，现有的研究要么太散、太细，具体到某个细分领域，比如电动车；要么太片面，只讲成就，比如中国国家科技创新体系的基础研究。这些都不能全面反映近年来中国科技体制改革后的变化，特别是在2024年的研发投资激增。 根据兰德公司的数据，2024年中国研发投资达到了3.6万亿元，同比增长8.3%，占GDP的2.68%。这个数字比美国还要多一点，PPP计算的话，差不多相当。所以，中国的科技政策和实践必然会对国际规范、合作和竞争产生巨大的影响。其他国家会不会效仿呢？美国必须从根源上理解中国的科技战略。 报告提出了三个核心问题：中国的科技战略的底层逻辑是什么？政府如何将战略意图贯彻到科研机构中？中国的视角和政策手段如何塑造其科技发展？ 兰德首先回顾了中国漫长的历史。在中国历史上，科技能力不仅仅是为了经济增长，还是政治秩序、社会稳定和国家实力的支柱。古代中国通过成熟的天文数学、水利、冶金等知识体系支持农业和治理。这些知识体系都是国家用来满足行政和经济需求的工具。 民国把科学看作一股颠覆性的力量，借助它能够破旧立新，摆脱民族的落后面貌。建国之后自力更生，由于苏联撤走了外援，国家动员本土科工人才，优先两弹一星等国防项目，经常组织攻关小组来突破技术瓶颈。改开之后，政府正式把科学技术看作第一生产力，更强调在引进、消化、吸收、再创新之间取得平衡，不再是一味地引进和改良。2012年后，科技角色变了，从经济增长变成了国家战略的核心工具。新时代把技术能力视为民族复兴的意识形态支柱，加强了党的管理，与全球科技接触，遵循一种有比较强的安全意识的模式。 所以，中国的科技战略的底层逻辑，就是有意识地将科技进步跟国家实力挂钩。技术不再是纯粹的技术，而是发展，是安全，是意识形态，是民族复兴大业。 那么，政府如何在科研里面贯彻它的战略意图呢？报告没有明确说，但意思就是举国体制。国家全方位参与，协调资源，制定优先级，所有科研目标都是为了实现中国的政治和地缘目标。报告指出，现在的中国目标或者说现代化方略，经过了几代人的演进，从自力更生到务实开放，在当前的政治经济话语里面所强调的科技自力自强。这出于两方面的考虑：一是建立本土的创新体系，二是摆脱外部脆弱性，尤其在半导体、AI、生物等核心技术上，避免被其他国家卡脖子。 如何实现具体手段很多，比如国家的规划和指导，五年计划，制定详细的科技发展路线图。出台新的法律，比如数据安全法、出口管制法，把技术数据定义为战略资源，成为一个对外博弈的筹码。通过海外引才和本土教育改革，扩大科技人才池子；大力支持企业参与国际标准的制定，从产业链的基础规则上掌握主导权；还有旧瓶装新酒，给许多彼此关联的科技项目和战略计划注入新的紧迫感、大目标和向心力。 报告认为，中国的科技道路最独特之处在于强烈的集中统筹和军民融合。欧美也有军民融合，但角色划分得更加分明，是资源合作，市场导向，而中国是政府集中指令式，许多政策法规积极促进民间科技资源投入军事项目，这也是所谓的举国体制。 美国非常关注中国的军民融合，经常拿这个借口来卡中国企业。为什么这么如临大敌呢？因为报告认为，中国当前的军民融合已经从一种协调机制，变成了一种优先度极高的贯穿整个科技生态的智力逻辑。这意味着，民用产业与军工供应链的融合，会促进人工智能、航空航天、先进制造等前沿技术的发展，同时提升解放军作战能力，整个国家也能站在科技革命的头排。 那么除了政府，公立机构、国企和大型民企也深度参与战略性技术的研发和商业化。科技治理的举国体制把这些机构纳入其中，从应对科技挑战，到把新的知识用到生产销售和军事应用的各个环节，实现创新全链条管理。这种模式更容易集中资源，攻克少数关键战略性技术，尤其是有军事应用的技术，并且能够把政府的信号清晰传递给大学和企业。 报告还指出，许多私营企业并没有像政府预期的那样主动承担更多的基础研究，还是把它留给国家去统筹。报告认为，中国崛起，成为全球科技领袖，其科技战略会对重大的地缘影响，迫使其他西方国家重新评估科研安全问题，比如中国制定的技术标准、中国采集的基因数据都可能成为政府的工具。 所以，报告最后的结论是，中国的科技发展不完全是科技本身的故事，更是一个政府把科技重构为国家实力工具，使它与权力、治理和价值观交织在一起的故事。希望这个故事能让外国人在全球科技秩序中与中国的合作时，能够保护自己的国家利益。 各位，看完这个报告，是不是感觉中国的科技战略跟我们平时聊的不一样？但这正是美国智库眼中的中国科技未来。

中美矿产争霸，非洲成了棋盘

各位，咱们再来说说中美在战略性资源上的较量，这可是真刀真枪了。一月底，咱紫金矿业出手阔绰，280亿买下了非洲三座大金矿。大洋彼岸的美国也不甘示弱，迅速拉起一个排斥中国的贸易俱乐部，说是保障关键矿产供应，其实也就是自保。别看其他成员国平时没啥硬实力，但国际舆论都被他们炒作得沸沸扬扬，把中国在关键矿产领域的主导地位渲染成对它们国家安全的威胁。这招让咱们有点被动，但咱们也不是吃素的。 记得去年的关税战，咱们使出了稀土锁喉这招，把美国吓得够呛。之后，美国就疯狂地布短板。国防部直接入股稀土公司，扩大本土产能，还跟澳洲、日本、沙特、泰国、马来西亚签订了一系列战略框架，确保矿产供应。这还只是零星行动，今年就成体系了。2月2号，美国宣布了一个大型战略储备计划，120亿美元资金池中有100亿来自美国进出口银行，堪称史上最大一笔贷款。紧接着，2月4号美国又召集了54个国家开会，推出保障矿产安全的“Forge”框架，实际上就是绕开中国，大家商量给矿价定个底价，防止咱们价格战。去年底官宣的"硅和平倡议"（Pax Silica），2月20号迎来了第10个成员国印度。这些供应链安全倡议，实际上就是拉帮结派，排斥中国，目的就是保障美国的国防和人工智能，获取它需要的关键矿产和能源。不过，美国说得冠冕堂皇，反复强调关心所有国家的供应链安全，但实际上这些国家大多数并没有从咱们这吃过亏。比如2010年钓鱼岛事件，日本受过惩罚，但去年稀土限制，出口还变多了。美国就是利用这些国家的恐惧，谁都不愿意看到战略性资源的武器化成为常态，所以他们抱团取暖，试图降低依赖。 非洲这个典型，简直就是中美较量的缩影。刚果金钴储量占世界70%，钶钽铁矿占80%，钻石占30%，铜虽然只有10%，但品位高得可怕——人家炼过的矿渣，都比咱们这的金矿含量高。锂还没完全探明，但随便一个曼诺诺锡矿改锂矿，就是世界级的。这些矿产都是新能源革命的基石，比如锂做电池，铜做电线，而钴除了电池还有不少军工应用。咱们这边入场早，2008年达成中刚矿业协议，用基建投资换铜矿开采权，最初是30亿美元，后来涨到70亿，换来25年1000万吨铜、60万吨钴。咱们企业控制了其中一半，相当于刚果金全国80%的产量。于是咱们上下游整体控制了全球90%的钴供应，其中七成来自刚果金。 以前咱们可以轻松进入刚果金，是因为当地乱成一塌糊涂，西方私人资本害怕承担风险，所以逐渐退出。咱们这边是以政府为主导的合作模式，稳定性更高，填补了空缺。但现在美国完全改变了打法，首先，美国调停刚果金与卢旺达的矛盾，这是它最擅长的以安全换资源。其次，它现在政治挂帅，政府更大程度地介入非洲矿产，跟咱们全面竞争。美国去年10月成立了猎户座关键矿物联盟Orion CMC，正跟瑞士矿业巨头嘉能可就刚果金的两座铜钴矿资产展开交易，将拿到40%的股权。这两座矿的铜钴储量，超过该国已知储量的一半，也就是说美国能拿到刚果金20%到30%的铜钴资源，这远远超过中刚矿业协议的规模。不过光是拿下矿山，还不足以搅乱咱们在当地的布局，因为咱们有基建和物流配套——刚果金和赞比亚的矿产，基本都经坦桑尼亚进印度洋，运往东方。 美国拿下咱们修的本格拉铁路，升级为洛比托走廊，让刚果金的矿产通过安哥拉进入大西洋，运往西方。这条叫板坦赞铁路的通道更快些，而且可能对非西方运营的矿企有运费歧视，就会逼着更多矿石因为物流限制改变走向。在此之外，美国还建立了新的矿产合规标准，未来矿产会面临更严苛的ESG审查，实际上是把市场分为两层，它认证过的矿可以稳定卖高价，中资企业的矿产只能卖低价，但被压低利润，但又不能太低，否则会触发关税壁垒。所以，现在美国对咱们的挤压其实还很吃紧。 咱们要想破局，还是应该着眼于非洲本身。目前刚果金等非洲国家的态度是欢迎更多的中美竞争，这其实是一种待价而沽的心态——谁出价高就跟谁走。国家拿资源换财富本身没问题，但要谋求长远发展，必然离不开产业升级。关键矿产再稀缺，高科技产品的附加值大头都在下游加工里面，非洲就算争取到更优惠的卖矿条件，也不过是捕获了总价值的5%到10%，要富强必须走工业强国的道路，尤其非洲这么大规模的人口，没有别的路可走。当美国只关心自身供应安全、只想着囤积矿产的时候，咱们应该利用工业的范围和规模优势，把非洲进一步纳入产业生态，中游的精炼环节甚至下游的初级制造环节都可以放到非洲，在供应链之外完成产业链的对接。 非洲国家乃至全球南方，因为多极化产生了越来越强的自主意识，美国制造舆论正是利用这一点。就拿那个硅和平倡议来说，其他国家里真正玩得了硅、有高科技的其实很少，但都被煽动起来警惕中国的威胁。当然这个趋势肯定是好事：非洲越傲娇，越不满足于被白嫖，才能越看清美国"保障供应却不留下产业"的攫取本质。咱们在本地化运营这条赛道上真的得做出差异来，而且一定要沟通到位，尤其是在制造概念这方面，真的得多向美国学习。

北约3.0：欧洲防务自己扛，美国腾出手来对付中国

各位，刚在土耳其落地，眯了一会儿，我这眼睛就没离开那份北约3.0报告。距离北约安卡拉峰会不到一个月，美国智库CSIS在这个时间点上给北约3.0版本定性，意思其实很明确：欧洲的防务欧洲自己扛，让美国腾出手来对付中国。 要弄懂3.0，得先回头看1.0。1952年，丘吉尔的首席军事助手、绰号"哈巴狗"的英国老头伊斯梅，成了北约第一任秘书长。他上任后的一份内部备忘录，非常简明扼要地点出了北约存在的意义：Keep Russia out，keep the US in and keep Germany down。把俄国拦在外面，把美国留在里面，把德国压在下面，简直精准到骨子里。这就是北约1.0。 1991年，苏联这个头号敌人没了，北约没有散伙，反倒开始拓展业务，这就进入2.0：重心从欧洲本土防务转向防区外行动，外加一轮大规模裁军。防区外行动，就是跑到条约规定的范围之外去打仗。1999年轰炸南联盟，是第一次没援引第五条就动手；2001年911之后，北约援引第五条跑去阿富汗，一干就是20年。可阿富汗跟欧洲本土防御有什么关系呢？欧洲人流了血、死了人，回头美国还说你搭便车，你找谁说理去。更糟的是，欧洲的军工产能和战备一直在吃老本，与此同时北约在疯狂扩员，从冷战结束时的16国一路扩到30国。队伍越大越难带，没几个人认真出钱出力。2014年威尔士峰会确定了2%的GDP国防开支目标，结果一路喊到2024年，32个成员国里还有一大半没达标。西班牙最典型，军费占GDP只有1.24%，是北约里唯一公开拒绝执行5%新目标的国家，被特朗普骂上了台面。这就是2.0时代：规模膨胀，能力空心，分工不清，矛盾一直在积累。 等到俄罗斯打进乌克兰，这一巴掌把北约拍醒了——北约不就是为了应付这种事才存在的吗？2023年、2024年，芬兰和瑞典结束了几十年上百年的中立传统加入北约，波罗的海成了北约的内湖，俄罗斯的北翼彻底暴露。但光扩容不够，问题还是那个：这活儿谁来扛？这就是北约3.0要解决的。美国要求盟友承担起欧洲常规防务的主要责任，口号叫partnership, not dependencies，伙伴关系，不是依赖关系，翻译过来就是欧洲你们自己顶上去，美国不当冤大头。按计划，美国拟撤离30%的驻欧部队，作战指挥权交给英国、意大利、德国、波兰。CSIS讲得很明白：一个无法有效遏制俄罗斯的欧洲，会占掉美国过多的注意力，分散它在印太地区的投入。所以北约3.0的核心逻辑就是让美国腾出手来对付中国。美国提供核威慑和高端战略能力，陆上的常规防御交给欧洲自己。 钱的问题表面上解决了。去年海牙峰会，绝大多数成员国同意10年内把军费提到GDP的5%，也就是3.5%的核心军费加上1.5%的基建、网安和民防，特朗普当场说这是西方文明的重大胜利。但北约秘书长吕特说，问题不是我们是否需要做更多，而是盟国能否把承诺转化为能力。这话戳到了欧洲最硬的短板：工业产能。2024年，俄罗斯一年能生产炮弹450万发，整个北约包括美国在内加起来才120万发，俄罗斯三个月的产量抵得上北约一整年。欧盟曾拍胸脯说2024年3月前给乌克兰100万发炮弹，结果没兑现，最后是捷克牵头国际采购，才凑出180万发。2024年给乌克兰的500亿欧元援助里，欧洲和加拿大已经占了60%；2025年美国削减援助，欧洲全面补位。钱有了，可下完订单，产线变不出魔术，承诺和兑现之间隔着一道工业产能的鸿沟。 北约3.0现在还没从概念变成现实，有三件事正在轮流考验同盟内部的每道缝隙。第一件是格陵兰。特朗普提出美国要吞并格陵兰，那地方有全世界四分之一的稀土储量、175亿桶石油、欧盟认定的34种关键矿产里的31种，还有越来越繁忙的北极航道。美国战争部甚至把格陵兰从欧洲司令部的管辖范围里划出去，交给了北方司令部，等于在行政上已经当作自己的地盘处理。今年1月，特朗普拒绝排除武力吞并的可能性，欧洲七国随即宣布向格陵兰派兵搞联合军演——这就触到了北约的死穴：第五条是保护成员国免受外部攻击，内部威胁怎么办？这个问题没有现成的答案。第二件是跟伊朗的冲突：美以动武，伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡，全球航运瘫痪，能源市场承压，欧洲经济跟着遭殃，特朗普还要盟友出兵。欧洲的回答是"等等"，第五条管的是欧洲和大西洋地区，中东不在范围内，你们打之前又不跟我商量，现在要我们出兵凭什么？不过欧洲最后还是出了力，提供基地使用权、飞越许可和后勤支持，英法还主导组建海上联盟保证霍尔木兹的航运安全，只是坚持说这不是北约的分内事。合同范围以外，帮你是情分，不是义务，倒也没毛病。第三件是乌克兰：美国2025年大幅缩减援助，欧洲全面顶上，但各国军火产能没提上来，库存越来越少，情报和技术的天花板都在美国手里，它却不来兜底。这就重塑了欧洲对防务的认知——这次是真的得自己站起来了。 下个月7月7号、8号，北约峰会将在土耳其安卡拉召开，这可能是北约历史上最重要的峰会之一。3.0的框架已经定了，安卡拉峰会要做的是敲定合同：谁干什么，谁掏多少，边界在哪，出了问题怎么办。具体说，5%的目标怎么落实、要不要拿时间表，乌克兰的援助能不能持续，美国的军工支持还有没有，霍尔木兹的经验怎么制度化，第五条的边界要说清楚。还有一个，就是格陵兰之后联盟内部的信任怎么重建。 最后这条其实最难。离心离德容易，重建信任难。CSIS报告里说，如果欧洲觉得美国不可靠，就会加速减少对美国国防工业的依赖，推动更具有保护主义的欧盟采购框架，慢慢走向战略脱钩。对美国来说，失去在欧洲的话语权不是什么好结果，眼下它留在北约的收益仍然大于成本——欧洲稳得住，它才能腾出手来对付中国，这是前提条件，这笔账美国算得很清楚。所以北约短时间内不会崩。说白了，北约3.0能不能跑顺畅，有一个底层问题始终悬着：彼此之间还信不信得过。安卡拉峰会的任务，就是在3.0正式上线之前，先把这个信任的底座补一补。

特朗普的矿产外交：美国试图绕开中国

各位，今天咱们聊聊美国智库CSIS的最新报告，重点回顾了特朗普10月的亚洲之行，他跟一众亚太国家签署了矿产协议，看似商业导向，实则意在重构稀土供应链，全面围堵中国。 美国跟澳大利亚签了个大单，双方各自砸下10亿美元，承诺6个月内启动战略项目，产出只能卖给自己和盟友。这边日韩也没闲着，虽然具体金额保密，但时间表也定了。两国通过价格支持、简化审批、地质勘探、回收利用和战略储备，还祭出投资审查来限制中国收购矿产资产。泰国和马来西亚是基础性备忘录，知识交流和技术合作，没资金承诺，但聊胜于无吧。 中国在稀土供应链上一家独大，开采、精炼和加工几乎垄断。美国稀土进口八成来自中国，国防工业的高性能钕磁体，原料几乎全靠中国。4月，中国建了稀土出口管制框架，外国买家需要许可证才能采购。10月又收紧了一次，这事儿还没完，中国管制框架还在，许可证还得申请。美国现在追赶，但不是一天两天的事。 澳大利亚的稀土公司Lynas是一个典型案例。镝是重稀土里的关键元素，制造高性能钕磁体离不开它。本来可以从中国进口，但2010年钓鱼岛事件后，中国对日本禁运稀土，日本工业差点停摆。于是2011年，日本给它投了2.5亿美元，从西澳开采氧化镝，打造了一条日本融资、澳大利亚开矿、马来西亚精炼、美国建厂、完全不依赖中国镝的供应链。这条链今年5月才开始产出，前后花了十几年。 这次美澳协议一签完，Lynas就宣布扩建马来西亚的分离设施，重稀土原料处理能力从1500吨提到5000吨，翻了三倍多。但中国重稀土分离产能在10万吨以上，5000吨只是零头，聊胜于无吧。美国本土的MP Materials计划2028年前建成年产1万吨钕磁体的产能，有国防部的股权和价格支持。钕磁体制造需要轻稀土里的钕、镨，还有重稀土里的镝、铽。Lynas提供重稀土，MP Materials提供轻稀土，两条线一对接，美国造磁铁的原料就齐了。报告里说，这些新签的双边协议能确保美国拿到生产钕磁体所需的轻、重稀土原料。 韩国那边，韩国锌业投资1亿多美元在蔚山建了锗回收设施，年产100吨，今年8月跟洛克希德·马丁签了供应协议，用于先进半导体生产。浦项钢铁和美国的ReElement合作，在美国建稀土和钕磁铁生产基地。韩国水电与核电公司KHNP和美国的Centrus Energy扩建俄亥俄州的铀浓缩产能。这些都是10月刚宣布的，但报告里说细节还没出来，属于早期阶段的合作。 有意思的是，这些双边协议正在变成多边协调。美国国防部支持美国铝业公司Alcoa在澳洲搞镓的精炼。这个项目原本是澳大利亚Alcoa、日本双日公司、日本石油天然气金属矿物资源机构JOGMEC的合资，现在美国国防部加进来变成三方，预计年产100吨镓。澳大利亚从氧化铝精炼的副产品里回收镓，日本提供技术和资金，美国买单并锁定供应。澳大利亚和日本2022年就签了关键矿产合作协议，两国企业的合资项目一直在增加。 报告里列了好几个项目：卡尔古利的镍矿，是澳大利亚企业和日本住友金属矿山的合作；Alcoa的镓回收，是澳大利亚和日本双日、JOGMEC的合作；Liontown的锂资源，也是澳大利亚和日本住友的合作。美国这次做的，是用资金和市场把自己嵌进这个已经存在的网络。报告里说，虽然美国签的是双边协议，但稀土产业链的性质决定了，三边甚至多边的合作是必然的。澳大利亚供矿，马来西亚精炼，日本制造，韩国提供技术。美国用资金和市场把这些节点连成线。 但这事儿需要时间。前面说了Lynas用了14年，MP Materials的钕磁铁产能预计2028年才建成，还有三年。报告里特别提到，马来西亚同时在和中国谈稀土精炼项目，所以美国很有必要持续介入。报告最后说，如果2025年有什么是明确的，那就是中国对稀土的武器化不是临时手段，而是现代经济治国的常态特征。从2023年12月管制加码，到2024年8月扩大范围，再到今年4月建立稀土管制框架、10月再收紧。中国一直在收紧，放松，再收紧。美国从100%依赖中国到现在这个多节点网络，方向已经很明确了，但追赶还需要时间。 好，今天就聊到这儿，下回有空再聊。别到时候找不到我。拜拜。

小麦战争与中国的面粉自由梦

各位，小麦战争已经开始，可能引发一场革命。这是英国前安全大臣图根哈特发出的警告。因为上周乌克兰炸了俄罗斯黑海边上新罗西斯克港的全部三大粮食码头，这三个码头年吞吐量加一起2610万吨，是俄罗斯小麦海运出口总量的一半以上。而俄罗斯又是全球最大的小麦出口国，它7月份的出口量本来就比平时少一半，只有150万吨。8月正当小麦出口的黄金期，关键出口门户被炸停运，加上之前航线受到的打击，整个俄罗斯的海运出口网络陷入瘫痪。 俄乌的攻击是相互的。乌克兰也是出口大国，它的出海通道同样被俄罗斯袭击，收获季节商船进不去，8月前两周也基本废了，谷物出口量暴跌80%，农业部紧急调低了全年预期，连腰斩都不到。这种焦土式的袭击严重威胁了全球粮食安全。俄罗斯小麦主要供应中东北非，乌克兰主要供应南欧、北非、东南亚，这些国家就不得不转向其他产地采购小麦。 因为供应短缺，国际小麦价格暴涨，连续刷新纪录。联合国粮农组织最新的7月全球食品价格指数飙升到131.1，创下三年来的最高纪录，逼近了2011年的水平。当年就是北非粮价高涨，推动了中东大动荡。今年的极端天气、霍尔木兹海峡封锁、化肥价格上涨，尤其是促进小麦抽穗的氮肥一度断供，都决定了产量基数。目前来看，许多国家的食品价格还没有明显飙升，价格指数还没达到2022年俄乌刚开战时的极致，这是因为这几年大家都在找替代供应链，也囤积了一定的储备。但是明年，粮食减产和补仓困难的影响会逐渐显现。所以图根哈特认为，一场政治风暴即将到来。 那么它会给中国造成影响吗？某种程度上会。中国是全球小麦第一大生产国，已经很能种了，但还不够吃。我们主要种中筋小麦，做馒头面条这种日常口粮的，但是做面包的高筋面粉、做蛋糕的低筋面粉，还得靠进口。尤其是低筋小麦种植面积小，供不应求，所以为了实现吃糕点的自由，得进口澳洲和北美的小麦。他们的产能全球都在抢购，所以烘焙产品估计成本会上涨。 但是在吃这块，老中拿捏得死死的。今年夏粮突破了3000亿斤，山东德州的"吨半粮"亩产3000斤，当年放卫星吹的牛终于变成了现实。我以前讲过农业克苏鲁令人敬畏的产量，用7.7%的耕地养活了20%的人口，蔬菜水果就不说了，产量吊打全世界。这里面有仓储物流的因素，咱们就光说主粮，水稻、小麦比世界平均水平翻倍都不止，玉米也在快速提高，去年的增量许多就来自玉米。 那么当我们卷起产量来，什么蚊子腿都不会放过。你敢相信吗，沙漠都被用来种小麦了，而且产量很高。全国小麦平均亩产水平是400公斤，而在塔克拉玛干沙漠边缘的盐碱地上种小麦，北京市农林科学院研究的特殊品种京麦189，亩产翻倍到768公斤。这消息过于逆天，给我直接看傻了。 首先，小麦虽然种植比较粗放，但对水真的有要求，年降雨量最好在400毫米左右。可是引种京麦189的南疆喀什地区降水只有100毫米，蒸发量却有2000多毫米。雪山融水带来的矿物盐留在土壤表层，形成白色盐霜，就是典型的盐碱地。但京麦189是个杂交小麦，抗逆性非常强，干旱、贫瘠、盐碱都不怕，根系发达，风沙摧不动，而且还高产。2021年，它在喀什的莎车县中度盐碱地开始试种，平均亩产逐渐稳定在650公斤以上。 去年转战麦盖提县。麦盖提县是全国唯一嵌入沙漠的县，东边紧连着塔克拉玛干沙漠，西边是叶尔羌河，县里的沙漠占比一度达到90%，几乎要被吞没了。它是从2012年起种生态林防风固沙，目标是百万亩，现在已经完成了50万亩，确实改善了生态，绿进沙退，降水量也变多了，但是盐碱地的问题还是很严重。过去农户种常规小麦，收成大打折扣，最好的地块亩产200公斤到头了。可是京麦189在克孜勒阿瓦提乡的示范田——这示范田也不是什么好粮田，而是盐度8.6%的重度盐碱地，一般植物都很难活，何况是庄稼——靠着滴灌和精准的田间管理，就种出了768公斤的亩产。而在更恶劣的沙漠区域试种，实收亩产也达到了350公斤以上。 这种麦子更厉害的地方在于：根系发达，冬季可以覆盖地表，帮助固沙、减少风蚀；它可以推迟播种10天，让前茬的玉米多长一长，每亩可以额外增收50公斤，把轮作模式的综合产出推到最大；而且它收割之后秸秆的生物质含量丰富，当饲料的价格比普通牧草还高，给农户带来籽粒加饲草的双重收益；它还可以还田，增加有机质，改善土壤质量，一举多得。 我们国家盐碱地15亿亩，其中2亿亩是可以改造的，另外还有土质很差的工业用地，比如北京近郊的复垦地块，也需要用到皮实高产的杂交小麦。它们就是拓宽耕地空间、挖掘增产潜力的利器。但是杂交小麦跟水稻、玉米都不一样，因为小麦是雌雄同花、自花授粉，就相当于它喜欢近亲结婚，你强行叫它杂交，属于育种界的百年难题，所以全球杂交小麦商品化率不足万分之一。我们是在没有任何成熟经验可以借鉴的情况下，全凭自主攻关，30多年终于建成了全球独有的二系杂交小麦技术体系。现在我们的杂交小麦还推广到中南亚的一些国家，像乌兹别克斯坦、巴基斯坦，虽然大规模种植还取决于各国审批的程序，但一带一路沿线确实有广阔的空间——他们面临人口压力，也需要利用大量贫瘠的土地去补充耕地资源，需要治理沙漠，抵御生存空间被侵蚀。 所以说真的，世界打得破破烂烂，只有老中固执地缝缝补补。而咱们的面粉自由梦，还得靠这些逆天的小麦品种，它们让我们在危机中依然能端稳饭碗。

金库计划：美国的“空手套白狼”梦？

各位，今天咱们聊聊美国的一个大项目，叫金库计划，Project Vault。一句话解释，就是靠囤货来防住中国。美国意识到，跟中国打技术战和贸易战，在关键矿产上随时可能被中国的出口管制卡脖子，那样一来，不论是国防还是经济发展都会非常被动。所以为了防止供应链中断，美国决定建立以金库计划为核心的关键矿产战略储备：包含60种由地质调查局认证的关键矿产，由美国进出口银行和私营企业共同出资120亿美元，三家私营大宗商品贸易公司直接参与运营管理。任何企业如果觉得自己可能被中国卡脖子，就给金库交份子钱，等到供应链中断的那一天，就可以从储备里提取矿产。 那么这就是万全之策吗？彼得森国际经济研究所表示，恐怕不是，就凭这个机制还不足以跟中国摊牌。报告认为，这个储备项目的战略初衷很好，可当市场失灵的时候，它固有的局限性就会暴露出来。因为它本质上是一个基于风险共担的保险机制，在设计上借鉴了两种风险管理工具：一个是期货，一个是战略储备。参与项目的企业不是购买现货商品的买家，而是付一个固定价格，相当于类似保费、期权费的 Premium，来获得远期支取矿产的承诺。这个系统跟期货不一样的地方在于，它设计出来不是为了出清，而是为了压仓，所以还结合了战略储备，有庞大的实物仓储。而且它的触发机制跟商业库存不同，跟市场价格波动无关，只有当供应链切断的时候才会触发。 那么执行时先不去考虑日常运营可能遇到的各种问题，假设一切具体困难都能克服，还有一个根本性的问题：保险机制真的保险吗？报告列出了可能导致机制崩溃的三个重大挑战。 第一个是风险相关性太高，其实就是保险业所谓"所有人同时出险"的情况。保险公司很少遇到大家一起索赔，遇到基本就倒闭了，因为普通的损失在时间和空间上是随机分布的。然而金库项目要规避的风险是高度集中的，就是中国加强出口管制，指向性非常明确，就是要打击美国企业。那么所有参与计划的企业会同时受到打击，大家同时来提货，你的储备池得多深才够用？很可能在最困难的时刻，被瞬间消耗得荡然无存。 第二个是逆向选择。任何风险共担池要维持财务上的可行性，就得同时吸引低风险和高风险用户共同参与，靠大量低风险用户缴纳保费来稀释整体成本。再看谁加入了金库计划：美国的科技巨头没有加入，因为他们要么对供应链多元化有信心，要么觉得政府会救急，都在观望；占大头的中小企业很多缺乏风险评估，不知道供应链有可能中断，自然不乐意付一笔看起来无关紧要的费用。由于金库计划是自愿加入，这个共担池就没法做大——谁会自愿加入呢？当然是那些有自知之明、知道自己就是出口管制针对目标的军工企业。想象你的保险公司客户全是确诊的癌症病人，赔付风险过于集中，系统就没法持续运行。 第三个是加工处理过于复杂。美国其他的战略储备，比如石油，那就很简单，按含硫量的不同分为甜原油、酸原油两种，都是标准化的，好交易也好储存。然而金库项目涵盖60种矿产，品类众多本来就已经构成了后勤噩梦。更难受的是，所有这些矿产的中游精炼和分离，几乎全被中国垄断，美国自己没有能力加工处理。你囤原矿石，石头不好存，下游的制造商也没法直接用；所以你得囤什么？几十种经过加工的、有保质期的、有降解风险的工业中间品，这对仓储和物流提出了极高的要求。 除了机制上的挑战，项目在政治上还有雷区。这120亿美元，其中100亿来自进出口银行贷款，20亿来自民间资本，没有国会授权本身就是巨大隐患。负责采购和管理储备的三家私企，严格来说不是中立的第三方，而是大宗商品贸易的参与者，本身是要追逐利润的，怎么理清他们跟下游制造商的利益冲突，现在还很模糊。进出口银行方面，法定依据今年年底就要到期，到时候围绕续期，国会两党斗争会非常激烈，可能导致整个项目瘫痪。另外在中国方面，现行的出口许可制度下，申请许可得填最终用户和最终用途，你总不能填"为了防止你断供而囤货"吧，所以中国完全可以卡住流程、不发许可，来限制美国关键矿产库存的囤积速度。 报告为了使金库项目更全面、更有韧性，提出了四条建议：第一，老实承认这就是储备而不是保险机制，别再宣传成保险，而且资金规模必须对标最坏场景，也就是多种关键矿产同时断供，动用的资源可能远超120亿美元，这必须在政府资产负债表上明确反映出来。第二，强制高风险行业企业参加，强制他们成为付费会员用户，按企业规模梯度收费，减少中小企业负担，同时要求参与企业保持最低限度的自有库存，防止有人故意降低自身库存去占公家便宜。第三，精准缩小储存商品的范围，不要面面俱到，60种都要储存不切实际，要优先考虑供应链中断影响最大的产品。第四，长期来看还得跟中国在加工环节博弈。 短期看，博弈的方向就是中游加工卡位：美国需要中国出口的中间体化合物，我们可以卡进度条来换取外交让步。但长期来看，美国会把它的利益跟那些资源丰富的中等国家对齐，因为那些国家都想借中美竞争的机会爬升价值链。所以中国的长期竞争力，得从卖原料和中间品全面升级，包含更多最终的高科技成品，从而把关键矿产固化在本土的价值链当中。 总的来说，金库计划看起来光鲜，其实是个复杂又充满风险的保险梦。

中国出口为啥永远火？这背后的工业化大戏

各位，咱们今天聊聊一个有趣的现象——中国出口为什么这么火，而且似乎完全“无坚不摧”，不管懂王打贸易战还是热战，中国的工业品输出都如日中天。经济学人杂志专门写了一篇文章来剖析这个问题，咱们一言以蔽之：中国不是输出产品，而是输出工业化。 话说回来，说到中国出口，大家往往念叨的是那个年均1.2万亿美元的贸易顺差。但其实，卖什么比卖多少更关键。2023年，用于生产的资本货物和中间产品出口同比增长10.2%，而消费品反而下降了4.6%。这表明，中国已经不再是唯一的世界工厂，而是世界各家工厂的总厂。用麦肯锡的话说，这叫“工厂的工厂”。换句话说，只要全世界还在工业化、产业升级，中国的出口就会水涨船高。这也是为什么今年前三个月出口继续强劲，同比增长14.7%，主要是存储芯片在发力，卖了460亿美元。而美国作为庞大消费市场，对中国的重要性正在下降。2014年对美国出口占出口总额的17%，到了2024年降到了14.7%，贸易战确实起了作用，但只是一部分原因。更重要的是中国出口的东西变了。 10年前，中国出口最多的是箱包鞋服，箱包占世界份额甚至超过了50%。现在这类消费品虽然还是很多，但电子产品、工业机床、汽车的份额都上来了，价值链高端稳步转移，这就是“既卖衬衫也卖飞机”的工业化过程。经济学人也提到，汇率优势和内需疲软，都让出口更实惠。但不利因素也不少。比如保护主义政策，顺差太大，其他经济体就开始提高关税，比如欧盟对电动车、东南亚对钢铁增加关税，未来可能会有更多的措施。还有就是国际油价上涨，抑制了各国对进口商品的需求。 不过，我最感兴趣的是中国出口产品本身的变化。经济学人提到了哈佛大学的一个研究项目，叫做“经济复杂性图谱”，哈佛大学统计了146个经济体从2012年到2024年出口产品的技术含量。结果显示，中国的经济复杂性排名从第17上升到了第10，而美国的复杂性则从第13下降到了第20。这说明中国的经济复杂度超过了它的收入水平。 如果按板块来看，桃红色是服务，中国服务只有一条细线；水绿色的电子产品和蓝色的机械是最多的两大类。绿色的纺织品，紫罗兰的汽车，紫色的金属，洋红的化学品，黄色的农业，棕色的矿产。这里面复杂的产品是电子和机械，而简单的则有纺织品、农产品。美国的服务也很重要，然后是机械、化学品、汽车，但它们有大量的简单产品来自服务、矿业和农产品。 再看经济增长和变化图。中国增加最明显的是汽车、机械和电子设备。美国则增加最明显的是医药。中国一些复杂产品在萎缩，比如毛皮，但美国的飞机也萎缩了。美国的简单产品中，矿物、燃料、商业服务和保险金融增长很快。 30年来，中国出口产品所占的全球市场份额几乎全线上涨。1995年时只有纺织品，现在其他产品都上来了。而美国正好相反，大多数出口份额都下降了，只有一个矿物在增长。从2009年到2024年，美国新增了6个简单产品。而中国新增了17种复杂产品。 这张图也显示，各国分成四类。中国和美国都站在技术前沿，能开发的产品已经被开发了，想多样化就得开辟新赛道。绿色右上角那个国家，不用怎么发力就能轻易扩大复杂产品的范围，经济也能大大多样化。换句话说，就是躺着也赚钱。这个国家是谁？猜猜看？

资本论热：年轻人在找什么

各位，最近我发现一个挺有意思的现象：年轻的网民对马克思主义著作，尤其是《资本论》，怀有极大的兴趣。《共产党宣言》那些东西比较短，讲的人本来就多，但现在是真有人在啃《资本论》，还做成节目放到B站上，看的人还真不少。 我自己也撞上过一个佐证。我们那个年代的小孩都看连环画，前几天小孩给我看一个微信视频，讲的是老画家戴敦邦。老先生年纪很大了，谈到自己的作品还很自豪：我还画过《资本论》。我一听就去找，果然有《戴敦邦绘资本论》，我立刻买了一本。中国顶尖的画家画《资本论》，这事儿本身就说明资本论热是方方面面的。 那到底为什么？我为此请教了中国人民大学的孟捷老师。他的判断是：人们意识到现在资本主义存在巨大的危机。不光中国人意识到了，全世界的人都意识到了。只是不同国家、不同平台上的反应方式不一样——在中国的互联网上，我们习惯回到马克思主义政治经济学的传统去认识这个问题；而在美国，他们想的是拯救资本主义，那边加速右翼干脆主张"不要人"，AI就是资本主义，资本主义就是AI，只要维持住生产力就行。 我补了一个自己的观察：会不会是因为科技，尤其是物理学没有突破？我们还生活在爱因斯坦的世界里，量子这些领域没有真正的范式突破，技术就发展不动，劳资关系自然就紧张。我还有一层观察：过去外国人批评我们是血汗工厂，可恰恰在血汗工厂那会儿，人们对马克思主义政治经济学的热情好像没这么高。是不是说，那时候你还竞争得到一份被剥削的机会，现在你连跟AI竞争一个被剥削的机会都没有了，所以人们开始焦虑。 孟捷老师说，这是一个因素，但不全面。说到年轻人对《资本论》的态度变化，他想起一件往事。90年代中后期，他还在中国人民大学当老师。他有个硕士同学，后来在国家机关工作。上学时两人都学政治经济学，一起上过《资本论》这门课。结果有次见面，这位同学听他说还在搞《资本论》、教《资本论》、研究《资本论》，来了这么一句：你们还在搞《资本论》？这么反动。这话是正儿八经讲的，给他印象极深——我们以前学《资本论》，都知道它是批判的、革命的理论，怎么有一天《资本论》反倒成了反动？ 说这话的还不是小老板、不是私营企业家，而是国家机关的工作人员。为什么当时会有人这么看？很大一个原因是我们走向了市场经济道路。从《资本论》的角度看，市场经济有内在矛盾、有深刻的无政府状态，社会主义应该有计划按比例地发展。马克思也没预言到，中国这样的国家搞社会主义，也得建设市场经济。所以90年代中期以后，人们的认识上出现了一个断裂。 反过来，八九十年代倒有一些老革命家，像李先念这样的老同志，很早就提出过一个问题：列宁的帝国主义论是不是过时了？那时候大家都在讲和平与发展，跟20世纪上半叶的革命与战争时代完全不同，讲这个东西应者寥寥。但今天，2018年以后再回过头看，这问题就没那么简单了。老同志有历史的眼光，没有被表面的潮流完全蒙蔽，知道潮流背后那个东西还在。今天你看特朗普、看伊朗，那些老问题又回来了。 国内也有国内的情况：改革开放前不知道什么是资本，改革开放以后领教了。现在我们有好几类资本，国有资本、民营资本、混合资本、外国资本，所以会出现996这类现象，跟马克思当年讲的问题有点像。 这就牵出马克思思想里一个很核心的概念工具：绝对剩余价值和相对剩余价值。孟捷老师说，这不只是讲资本主义，它是贯穿世界历史的一个一般性工具。原始时代、新石器时代晚期，人类就已经能生产剩余了——你去博物馆能看到稻米的遗存，酒瓶子里还有酒，瓜果腐烂的痕迹，这些都说明当时的人生产出来的东西已经吃不完。进入阶级社会以后，剩余就成了核心问题：谁生产，谁占有。 而马克思认为，生产剩余无非两个办法。绝对的，就是延长劳动时间，难听点就是996，封建领主、奴隶主让你吃得很少，把剩余全拿走。相对的，就是靠生产力进步，像封建社会有了铁器、用了牛耕，剩余就会增加得更多。马克思有个假说：工业革命以后、资本主义确立以后，相对剩余价值的生产占了主导。这其实给了资本主义很高的评价。 从《资本论》这条线往下走，能看到资本主义的各种矛盾：竞争导向垄断，到了列宁那里，垄断资本主义一定是帝国主义，那就是瓜分世界、世界大战。但另一条线上，马克思也讲了：相对剩余价值生产占主导之后，剩余主要靠技术进步，那么企业追求利润与它推动技术进步，这两件事互为前提、互为条件，这是对资本主义历史正当性的一个很大的辩护。 《共产党宣言》里那句话最能说明问题：资产阶级统治不到一百年，创造的生产力比以往一切时代的总和还要多。历史上没有谁比马克思说得更鲜明。单看这句话，马克思简直是资本主义最大的辩护士，而且你明显感到，他是作为一个世界历史的声音在说话——他意识到世界历史到了一个拐点上，以往几千年就那么一点，这一百年顶得上一千年。 历史唯物主义讲两条：生产关系适应生产力的发展；但生产关系最终也会阻碍它，把社会推向新的生产方式。到列宁那里，矛盾激化成全球性的矛盾；到第三国际，又变成北方与南方的矛盾，所以第三国际才会把眼光投向中国。 所以孟捷老师说，马克思的内容非常丰富。今天大家关注《资本论》，确实是个好事，说明我们对很多现象的解释不满足、不解渴，需要去找更深层的原因。

你懂“斩首”背后的秘密了吗？

各位，今天是1月10日，哈萨克斯坦的全国哀悼日。在过去一个多星期里，至少有164人在该国的暴力骚乱中丧生，其中有两名警察被斩首。我们谴责任何破坏稳定、威胁安全、制造动荡、策动颜色叛乱的行为。We stand in solidarity with the Kazakh people. 现在，让我们把注意力放到这个词上：beheading，斩首，非常野蛮的暴行。 behead 这个词可以拆成两部分。前缀 be 可以表示拿掉、分离，这个用法现在不太常见了，稍微常见一点的是 bereave，丧失亲友，就是 "I'm sorry for your loss" 里那个 loss，还有 bereavement、bereft，都是一家人。后面这个 head 就很直白了。所以 behead 就是拿掉脑袋，cut someone's head off。 除了 behead，还有一个词也表达同样的意思，叫 decapitate。前缀 de 很好理解，也是拿掉：decouple，脱钩，把 CP 拿掉；decolonize，去殖民化，把老爷拿掉；decode，把码拿掉，就是解码。那么 capitate 是什么意思呢？莫非也是 head？为什么长得这么奇形怪状？ 你看它长得是不是很像 capital，首都。都就是城市嘛，那"首"呢？正是脑袋的意思，引申为第一城。那为什么是脑袋？因为在拉丁语里，caput 就是头。这个词直到今天的英语还在用，比如解剖学里面头还是叫 capital，capitalis 就是它的一种变体。 而 capital 还有一个意思，是资本。这跟头有什么关系呢？原来，capital 这个头本来指的是牛头，所以传下来，资本等于牛头。这也不奇怪，毕竟古人最大的财富就是牛，牛的头数越多，财富就越多。所以不要小看牛牛。 英语里面"亲友"叫 kith and kin，其实这是文盲们搞错了，这个词组本来叫做 kith and kine，kine 就是奶牛，就是 cow。所以朋友和牛牛，是一个人所能拥有的一切了。两样都不占，基本上就是孑然一身。 capital 还有一个用法也跟头有关：英语里的"死刑"，除了 death penalty 还可以怎么说？capital punishment，掉脑袋的刑法，就是死刑。 除了 capital，caput 还派生出了一大堆词，比如 per capita GDP 里的 capita，其实就是它的变体——有多少头就有多少人。还有 chief、chef、captain、chapter、cape，等等等等。 也就是说，decapitate 跟 behead 的构成是一模一样的，都是拿掉脑袋。而且别看一个是 head、一个是 capitate，长得好像差别很大，其实追到根上它们是一样的，都来自原始印欧语里表示"头"的那个词根。只不过南边的意大利人把它读成了拉丁语的 caput，北边的日耳曼人读成了 *haubudam，也就是后来德语里的 Haupt，比拉丁的 caput 稍微硬一点。英语属于日耳曼语族，古英语把它变成了 hēafod，中古英语沿用，慢慢又简化成了 head。 所以你学会了吗？behead 和 decapitate 这对长得完全不一样的兄弟俩，可能唯一的区别就是：behead 听起来比较俗，decapitate 听起来比较雅，因为 head 一看就懂嘛，capitate 等于绕个弯，属于文化人背的单词。那么如果你要写作文要用，你会选哪个呢？

咱们来聊聊美国新反动派的“王道真经”

各位，咱们说说美国新反动派的“王道真经”吧。这事儿不新鲜，但咱们来个全新解读，看看笔名“孟子梅童”（Mencius Moldbug）的这位逆行者到底在想什么。 先说说特朗普遇刺那一幕。嘴角带血，振臂高呼，我看到的不是什么新闻学的高光时刻，而是旧制度的垂死挣扎。你想象一下，这个不可持续的制度，在军国主义的感召下，精英阶层不断外卷，输出他们最擅长的战争、掠夺资源、引入移民、压低人力成本，导致本国平民在内卷中走投无路，国家两极分化。随着财富越来越集中，上等人不事生产即可寻租获利，下等人拼命劳动也只能勉强糊口。这时，权贵中出了一个叛徒，他化身平民代言人，通过民粹运动成为领袖，招来精英的密谋刺杀，血溅当场。我说的不是走运的懂王，而是倒霉的凯撒。历史虽然不会重演，但会押韵。 此时此刻，恰如2000年前的罗马。凯撒死后，罗马陷入内战，共和时代结束，取而代之的是帝国时代。如今既然懂王对死神说出了“Not Today”，证明了自己天命在身，是不是能省掉中间环节呢？我不是说特朗普要称帝，那也太离谱了。但你真觉得没有人有这个想法吗？有的。让我隆重介绍最美国的逆行者孟子梅童，这是笔名，真名叫做Curtis Yarvin，真实身份是程序员。 雅文的爸爸是个外交官，他从小跟着到处跑。这段经历给了他一个洞察：美国为什么没有革命啊？因为美国没有美国大使馆。他12岁回国插班念高中，25岁进入约翰霍普金斯的天才班，后来进了UC Berkeley念计算机博士，但很快就退学当码农去了，做那个很古早的手机浏览器。没过几年公司被收购，他选择拿笔钱走人。按硅谷的标准看这笔钱不多，但足够开启精神追求。恰好当时互联网刚起步，很多版权过期的旧书市面上找不到，却能在网上读到。于是雅文一头钻进故纸堆，自学历史、政治以及奥地利派经济哲学。他最推崇的是这么几位：哲学家大卫·休谟，用经验主义质疑人类的理性；作家托马斯·卡莱尔，英雄史观的原创者；历史学家詹姆斯·弗劳德，认为群众没有自治能力，统治还得靠精英；以及经济学家霍佩，认为君主制的私天下，远远好过民主制的公天下。 经过这么一番熏陶，雅文终于龙场悟道。有一天他突发奇想，决定开宗立派。放在当时的互联网语境下，就是写博客。从2007年到2016年，他以孟子梅童的笔名写了几百万字的政论，有很多劲爆的内容，比如《何故、何时、何以废除美国？》，认为美国应该分裂成许多个类似新加坡那样的高效城邦，否则就跟微软一样大而无当。 雅文还有一个创新，可能你都听过：他把《黑客帝国》里的“红丸”改造成了一个反建制的政治概念。总之，雅文成了特立独行的键盘侠，他开创的派别叫做新反动派。反动什么呢？反权力的分散。亚里士多德说过，政府有三种形式：君主制、寡头制和民主制。每种制度都有健康和堕落两种形态，区别不在于人数多寡，而在于权力的集中或分散程度——是在一个人、几个人，还是千千万万人手上。经历启蒙运动的现代社会都推崇民主，于是民主就成了丘吉尔所说的相比之下最不坏的制度。但雅文认为，古代大多数时期是君主制，启蒙只是历史的例外，它带给世界的民主是条死胡同，因为民主不是实现良政的手段，而是政治的目的本身，所以会不断自我强化，鼓励相互牵制的权术，催生更多虚伪、欺骗和不作为。 在新反动派看来，美国要重新伟大，就必须开历史的倒车。他们强烈反对辉格史观，要求退回传统的政治经济社会模式。至于什么是传统？狩猎采集、种姓制度、男尊女卑、绝对王权、自由放任资本主义，都可以是，博采众长嘛。但总的来说，就是要通过回调参数，回到西方列强如日中天的帝国时代。所以雅文眼里归来的王，绝不能是君主立宪制的吉祥物，不能是伊丽莎白二世，得是伊丽莎白一世，或者拿破仑、凯末尔、罗斯福。 那么当代的教士阶层在哪里呢？雅文指向新闻媒体、高等教育和官僚体系，把他们统称为The Cathedral，大教堂。大教堂把自由、民主、进步定义为国教之后，在意识形态中固步自封，让社会腐朽堕落。现在是时候让凯撒的归凯撒了。雅文认为，国家需要凯撒，就像公司需要CEO。一个企业能做大做强，压根跟民主无关，既不靠员工表决，也不靠董事会干涉，就得让CEO不受眼前利益的束缚，从企业的长期利益出发负责。美国最需要的，就是天降猛男，从民主这部黑神话中诞生一个自我革命的天命人，亲手拆掉分散权力的行政官僚体系，然后废除民主的伪经，回归王道真经。 有点革命精神的摇滚乐迷可能知道，加州有个乐队叫Rage Against The Machine，愤怒反抗机器，很好的名字。但雅文认为他们弱爆了，在他看来，Rage的真正含义应该是Retire All Government Employees——开除所有的公务员。 那么快进到现在，美国保守派智库传统基金会提出了2025计划，全称2025总统过渡计划。保守派的总统是谁？我们知道，懂王吧。那过渡是什么意思呢？就是把联邦雇员通通裁掉，换成忠于MAGA的懂家军，最终朝行政独尊的方向演化，也就是雅文所憧憬的当代君主制。由于这个想法过于激进，懂王只能跟他保持距离。但你不要忘记，他身边有一个人叫J.D. Vance。80后的万斯是懂王竞选的副手，如果懂王胜选，他就是副总统。万斯出身于典型的穷人家庭，身边全是酒精、毒品和暴力。他最亲的奶奶有次一气之下，给爷爷满身淋油，差点把爷爷给点了。从当初贱如尘泥到如今一人之下万人之上，万斯的崛起堪称奇迹。但一切的奇迹，归结下来都是因果关系。 那究竟是什么关系，让加州键盘侠雅文跟铁锈带凤凰男万斯做了朋友，并成为他政治哲学上的领路人呢？请允许我先卖个关子，开启另一段叙述。

加速主义：当科技与狠活引领未来

各位，今天咱们聊聊啥叫加速主义。话说2010年上海世博会提出“城市让生活更美好”，一位隐居在上海的英国学者穿梭在魔都的大街小巷，最终写下了一本奇书《2010上海世博指南》。这书里不光有展会信息，更多的是文化研究和对于现代性的思考。它一面怀古伤今，认为伦敦的水晶宫和巴黎的埃菲尔铁塔这种世博遗迹象征着西方已经告别了激情年代，一面高度赞赏中国的发展速度，认为中国最有希望引领人类告别西方启蒙运动带来的1.0版本的现代性，创造出2.0版本的现代性，因为它成了全世界最伟大的发动机。当然，这种赞赏归根结底不来自对中国改善民生的肯定，而是来自对速度和运动的抽象崇拜，认为人类的未来属于科技与狠活。套用《三体》里维德的名言，他的主张就可以概括为：加速，加速，加速，不择手段地加速。 说回这位加速主义哲学家尼克·兰德。要了解他，咱们得先从卡尔·马克思说起。马克思严厉地批判自由贸易，但他却支持自由贸易，因为自由贸易能够使无产阶级和资产阶级之间的对立达到顶点，加速社会革命。也就是说，他发现了资本主义蕴含着自我毁灭的种子：与其小修小补，不如催化矛盾，让它加速为自己掘墓，这叫以子之矛，攻子之盾。 二战后，资本主义度过危机，世界革命进入低潮，欧洲左翼汇聚了最聪明的那批人。他们得解释资本主义为何还没崩溃，于是另辟蹊径，比如德勒兹和加塔利。他们用精神分析法取代辩证法，写出了《资本主义与精神分裂》，提出解辖域化。简单来说，就是让欲望自由流动，脱离规训，让社会层级结构失去稳定性，进而加速社会的自我解体。 再回到兰德。90年代，兰德在英国华威大学教欧陆哲学。他和一帮左翼学者成立了控制论文化研究小组CCRU，整日坐而论道，探索科技、资本和欲望的交集。行为上也比较出格，嗑药太多，分不清现实与幻觉，甚至由于过度沉迷克苏鲁神话，真的跑去印尼苏门答腊召唤远古海兽。最终，兰德把控制论的反馈机制跟解辖域化缝合在一起，形成了加速主义。它的核心是一个通过正反馈不断自我激发的过程，而这个过程通往终极的自由与解放。 有人可能会问：这跟我有什么关系？不愧是你，一针见血，毫无关系。兰德明确表示，对人类的解放毫无兴趣，只关心生产资料的解放。康德滚一边去，技术有自己的目的。兰德跟那些愤怒反抗机器的卢德主义者刚好相反，不是要解绑人类，而是要让机器不再受人类束缚，彻底咆哮。 千禧年前后，兰德挥别过去、奔赴未来，选择在魔都隐居，形容以前写的东西都是药味太重的远古垃圾，需要整理思想。终于，在2013年，两个高强度冲浪的网络生物遇到了兰德，顿时感到畅快。兰德给雅文的新反动主义起了个帅气的名字——黑暗启蒙，逆转启蒙运动的伤害。雅文认为民主是人类之哀，兰德则更进一步，他写道，民主不仅迎来了末日，它就是末日本身。民主的动力是堕落，是系统性巩固私人之丑恶，直到集体犯罪并全面腐化社会。因此，逃离民主是终极的必然。 至此，加速与反动合流，接下来就该安排自动驾驶当司机了。没错，这股力量就是人工智能。兰德认为，资本主义和人工智能是一体两面，只有资本主义才能创造人工智能，也只有人工智能才能提纯资本主义。所以，让这个克苏鲁去加速自我生成、自我推动吧。 既然说到科技，咱们再来聊聊。

马斯克与蒂尔：硅谷的钢铁侠与反社会人格

各位听好了，今天要给大家讲的是硅谷两大偶像。在很多圈外人眼里，科技界的偶像是钢铁侠埃隆·马斯克；但在很多科技大佬那里，硅谷精神的真正代表，那种对破坏性创造的偏执追求，来自彼得·蒂尔。对此马斯克当然不同意，他说蒂尔有反社会人格，蒂尔则说马斯克就是个大忽悠。这两位相爱相杀，得追溯到上世纪末。当时Windows 98拉开了新世纪的大门，互联网让人畅想未来该有多酷。加州的帕罗奥托吸引学霸们踏上创业之路，成了硅谷的宇宙中心。这里的大学路394号当时出租给两家小公司，A号是马斯克的X.com，B号是蒂尔的Confinity。马斯克和蒂尔都是移民，马斯克来自南非，蒂尔来自德国，两人都上了斯坦福——蒂尔念完了哲学本科和法学博士，而马斯克的物理博士只念了两天就退学了。为了避免彼此成为竞争者，刚赚到第一桶金的马斯克提出了并购。新公司后来改名PayPal，很快蒂尔就背刺了马斯克：律政高手通过操纵董事会投票，迫使这个理工男让出了CEO的位置。马斯克从这段经历中汲取了清醒的教训，蒂尔则总结出必须架空董事会的真理，这一点后来被他用在了扎克伯格身上——作为第一个外部投资人，他保证脸书帝国由扎克伯格一人主宰。 而协助蒂尔拿下马斯克的，就是著名的PayPal黑帮，许多都是他斯坦福大学的校友。这么一看，读书还是比不读书有点优势，其实是因为蒂尔在斯坦福人脉极深。他1987年创办了校园报纸《斯坦福评论》，抨击左翼最大的政治正确——平等，坚持精英范儿的自由意志主义，认为弱肉强食才是天理，政府不要逆天。后来跟着蒂尔走南闯北打天下的兄弟，很多都是当时编辑部里出来的。 PayPal其实也贯彻了自由意志主义的美德。作为美版支付宝，2002年它以15亿美元卖给了美版淘宝eBay，PayPal黑帮赚了个盆满钵满。蒂尔把这段成功总结为“增长黑客”，说白了就是充分利用互联网相对于银行业的低监管优势，不管用户的钱干不干净都能开账户，把法务禁忌皆可为发挥到了极致。卖掉PayPal之后，蒂尔开了大数据分析公司Palantir，这个名字来自《指环王》里的真知晶球，要靠PayPal的算法辨认赃钱、追踪非法交易的恐怖分子。那谁会对这门技术感兴趣呢？美国中央情报局CIA通过旗下的风投公司In-Q-Tel给蒂尔注资200万，并长期维持着既打钱又下单的默契，把他变成了网络监控和数据分析的水晶球。他的三款拳头产品哥谭、代工厂、阿波罗，深度介入美国的执法、情报和国防。2011年，Palantir协助海豹突击队击杀了本·拉登。 马斯克后来的轨迹也跟蒂尔差不多，SpaceX的成功同样离不开国防部和NASA的支持。硅谷大佬跟五角大楼在同一条战壕穿同一条裤子，真是岂曰无衣，与子同袍。可是自由意志主义者不是说好了要把公权力关进笼子、让私权力翻天覆地吗？为什么跟政府走得这么近呢？很简单，他们厌恶的是民主政治，而不是深层政府。蒂尔说过，自由意志主义者的伟大事业，就是想方设法逃离一切形式的政治，包括受无脑民众指挥的社会民主主义。那为什么要逃离啊？因为民主政治为了赢得选票，就要向下等人输送利益，这只会拖上等人的后腿：强迫富人纳税，防止企业垄断。而垄断，蒂尔又说，是企业成功的条件。正是在一将功成万骨枯的意义上，自由与民主彼此无法兼容。 马斯克对民众的鄙视，比蒂尔多了一层科幻色彩。他认为，未来殖民宇宙的ubermensch，比我等wintermensch更能代表人类，所以应该通过技术统治，高效利用资源，使超人的长期利益最大化。如果你对他的道德观感兴趣，可以看看我“钢铁侠大战奥特曼”那一期。 我们再说回蒂尔。他虽然没有马斯克私奔到火星的打算，但逃离政治的愿望也非常强烈。他投资了一家智库，专门研究海上主权，期待有一天条件成熟，就打造漂浮的城市，开辟法外之地，专供有钱人开润。基于同样的逻辑，他还把目光投向了赛博宇宙，投资了去中心化的个人服务器平台Urbit，其愿景是重构互联网，把TCP/IP的客户端服务器模式换成P2P虚拟服务器，搭建一个没有监管的数字乌托邦。 直到今天，Urbit也只有非常原始的、类似论坛的骨架。而就是这么一个东西，光前42行代码就写了6年。这要多么强烈的信念，才能支持开发者去做这种毫无商业化前景的项目呢？究竟是什么人呢？是雅文。Urbit是他博客政论的结晶，对民主监管的厌弃和对理性独裁的推崇都在里面了，只是蛰伏着，等待着安纳奇的降临。 蒂尔跟雅文一见如故，很快就被吸纳进抵抗军，成了红丸王子，投身反抗大教堂或者反抗母体的革命。两个人的想法非常投缘，但雅文毕竟是能跟兰德对话的天才，境界更高一筹。比如蒂尔从哲学老师勒内·吉拉尔那里学到的最重要的道理，就是大多数人都是复读机，必然像飞蛾扑火一般投身于暴力冲突。雅文则认为，还是应该人尽其才、物尽其用，他的最终解决方案，是把生产力落后的低端人口做成生物柴油。虽然想到燃料是垃圾做的，车主多少有点膈应，但这不失为种族灭绝提供了一个较为人道的途径。 受雅文的影响，蒂尔终于认识到自由意志主义者的局限性：一帮精致利己者坐在金山上自我感觉良好，远离刀口舔血的脏活累活，整日啼叫，以为自己是猛虎，却没有爪牙，原来是狐狸。那怎么才能发动革命呢？当然是狐假虎威了。所以他得靠近、去操纵、去掌控权力。这就是为什么蒂尔跟政治越走越近。

蒂尔的飞行汽车梦与万斯的140字现实

各位，咱们得谈谈蒂尔那篇著名的演讲，2011年他在耶鲁法学院讲的那番话，简直是对现代教育的嘲讽。他说现代教育让最聪明的人不去追求星辰大海，而跑去干游戏、卖广告、挣快钱。用他后来的名言概括，我们想要的是飞行汽车，得到的是140个字的字数限制。这一番演讲让台下一名拼尽全力才走出山区的穷学生大受震撼。如果退学创业都能拿蒂尔奖学金，那学而优究竟是为了什么呢？事后，他在网上疯狂寻找蒂尔的联系方式，终于找到了他斯坦福大学的旧邮箱，很快就收到回信：有空来我家坐坐。 这个学生毕业后，本专业的工作只干了两年，就加入了风投公司秘银资本，然后又成立了那亚资本。秘银和那亚，都来自蒂尔喜欢的《指环王》。而这位蒂尔宇宙的新宠，就是铁锈带凤凰男J.D. Vance。 我第一次听说万斯，是2016年特朗普选举的时候。民主党媒体想了解“红脖子”究竟是个什么生物，于是就采访了畅销书《乡下人的悲歌》的作者万斯。万斯认为特朗普现象可以理解，那是穷人在报复社会，但特朗普这个人是个白痴，是文化海洛因，是美国希特勒。他的口吻像是一个冷静的观察者，比较接近于他文学上的缪斯蔡美儿。蔡美儿是万斯的教授，除了写过育儿类的畅销书《虎妈战歌》，她更擅长观察美国政治的两极化和部落化。了解万斯的家庭背景之后，她鼓励这个对法律有点失去兴趣的年轻人把成长经历写成书，着重写原生家庭的故事，克制一下宏大叙事的冲动，别把重点放在政治如何背叛工人阶级上。 一开始多少沾点书卷气的万斯，在如何看待懂王的立场上并不像他的伯乐蒂尔。蒂尔毒辣的投资眼光早就看出特朗普是奇货可居，整个建制派十八路诸侯反董联盟杀声震天，蒂尔却敢迎面撞上硅谷之堵蓝墙。当时的科技资本家，谁不支持民主党、不支持希拉里，谁就不够进步、谁就没有良心，这是资本进步税。可蒂尔讨厌交税，于是冒美国科技界之大不韪，第一个站出来给特朗普站台，一路站到共和党全国大会。虽然只捐了125万，相当于他的九牛一毛，但这在当时的硅谷却需要拿出比出柜更大的勇气。许多人为了避险，跟他割席绝交，切断生意往来。 特朗普卸任之后，当初把他抬进白宫的民粹运动不但没有止息，反而彻底改造了共和党。蒂尔知道MAGA需要新生代，这就跟他投资生物科技公司Ambrosia是一个道理，Ambrosia是神的祭品，研究的是注射年轻的血液来永葆青春。于是他看向自己的门徒万斯。这个年轻的VC投资了右翼社交、基因治疗、太空安全等领域的初创公司，打通了许多门道。如果能把科技资本的力量进一步引入政治、搞垮对手，那么带刺的草根运动，迟早会变成安全的永生化。 于是在蒂尔的运作之下，万斯的态度来了个180度大转弯，从懂王坚定的反对者成了懂王身边的内臣。有了第二波的1500万竞选经费，加上懂王无价的祝福，38岁的万斯当上了俄亥俄州参议员。今年大选更是被特朗普钦点为副手。如果特朗普胜选，万斯就是美国历任副总统里面少见的年轻人。 万斯天生是个政客，几件事可以看出他的灵活。第一，改信天主教。天主教讲究组织层级，而这恰好是他奶奶生前最讨厌的东西，但他说改就改，很难说不是在开拓福音派以外的票仓。第二，万斯经常骂官僚、骂精英、骂体制、骂移民，可他的老婆乌莎·万斯是印度婆罗门移民、耶鲁同门师妹，就是他所骂的一切的具体化身。所以反白左是工作，爱白左是生活，不矛盾吧。第三，万斯留络腮胡。妇女获得投票权以来，美国政客几乎没有留胡子的，因为这不讨好女性选民。万斯跟懂王的儿子同时留胡子，信号很明确，就是放弃集美，all in兄弟。 许多人认为特朗普找万斯是昏招，因为万斯比自己更右，只能起到固粉的作用，很难有破圈效果。但我恰恰觉得这是在适应时代。你看没过多久，民主党的哈里斯在明明有机会朝中间靠拢的情况下，也找了一个比自己更左的人当副手。其实左右双方都知道增量已经很难争取了，必须盘活存量，把高度分裂的内部给团结起来。而靠理性的政策绝不可能把人团结起来，只能比谁更会煽动。但Agitprop这个考点，在美国乃至整个资本为王的西方，属于左派的盲区，左派真的做不到啊。所以桑德斯这种左派民粹，头顶上有玻璃天花板，只要不砸碎它，永远都是陪跑的吉祥物。因此在所有西方国家，真正能靠民粹团结各个派系、凝聚整体实力的，只有右翼。右翼的世界观很简单：第一，弱肉强食；第二，阳光之下，并无新事。所以不论过去、现在还是未来，恐怖的治理者必然要交战。所以万斯所表述的战略，更接近美国必然的选择，那就是把拳头从乌克兰和中东收回来，然后对准中国，重拳出击。

法西斯的幻影与资本的贪婪

各位，美国大选还有两个月才揭晓，但咱们不妨提前想一想，这两位候选人，到底会把美国，乃至全球引向何方？这个问题还真不是个小事。 记得2018年，咱们办了一场讲座，邀请了两位嘉宾：一个是俄罗斯的杜金，一个是荷兰的罗布里曼。杜金，我在「战斗法师」那期介绍过；里曼是组织辩论会的，是个典型的欧洲人文主义学者。结果，听众们一边倒地觉得杜金有意思，里曼倒也不生气，送了我一本小册子，叫《与这个时代抗争》，讲的是法西斯主义回潮。里曼认为，法西斯就是恨，得靠人文主义的爱来疗愈。 这说法倒也不是没有道理，但问题没这么简单。法西斯这个词，最早是指一束棍棒被皮条拉紧，团结在一起，产生十根筷子掰不动的效果。中间插上象征权力的斧头，那就是法西斯。谁的权力大，谁配享的法西斯就多，普通独裁者配24根，凯撒大帝三合一，72根。所以，法西斯就是权力的象征。 可是，法西斯和恨有什么关系呢？恨意味着敌我分明，势不两立。那谁是敌，谁是我呢？可以是平民vs精英，本族vs异族。最省事的当然是本族平民vs异族精英。因为内病外治最简单，没什么好说的，站吧，为这个世界清理人渣，万死不辞，大统领下令吧。 这就是学术上描述法西斯的几个特征：极端民族主义、群众运动、集权统治、外征内压、高度暴力，来维护世界应有的层级。因此，全球化大教堂里的建制派面对懂王、万斯、班农、雅文、兰德、蒂尔的时候，就会说，你们全员法西斯。 比如说，赵宋眼里的带头大哥晁盖、人脉通达宋江、狗头军师吴用、动力源泉李逵、神秘主义者公孙胜、以及小旋风柴进，全员反贼。反贼有一句话就真相了，你的皇帝姓宋，我哥哥也姓宋，你做的皇帝，偏我哥哥做不得皇帝。直反皇家，不反帝制，甚至会更卖力地维护统治秩序。 所以，与其盲人摸象，照着法西斯的特征，一个一个地打勾，不如回到现代法西斯的开山鼻祖，墨索里尼。问他，当初为啥背叛马克思，就知道什么叫做法西斯。 没想到吧，早年的墨索里尼那也是革命党，他曾经流亡瑞士，据说还见过列宁，当时的他还支持国际主义阶级斗争，反对意大利的军国主义。这个从左到右的转变，根本原因是抛弃了马克思对私有财产的批判和历史唯物主义。 墨索里尼理解的阶级，就完全是另一个东西。阶级是一个社会经济的双重概念，马克思强调经济的一面，韦伯强调社会的一面。但它不是工业资本主义时代的特殊现象，而是贯穿了古代文明，公民与奴隶、种姓与贱民、贵族与平民、地主与农奴，都和工人与资本家一样，是阶级矛盾存在的例证。 人们很容易剥离生产关系去讨论阶级，认为阶级是通过传统利益和政治观念团结在一起的家庭组合。马克思主义以后认为这个是倒果为因。但经过这番魔改，革命的锋芒就不再对准资本主义体系本身，而是转嫁到他者的头上。 那承受暴力的他者是谁呢？那取决于施加暴力的主体是谁？那往往就是一个社会的武士阶层。通过对外军事扩张解决社会内部矛盾，是印欧游牧文明的古老传统。印度刹帝利、希腊重装步兵、罗马百夫长、日耳曼男人帮、维京狂战士，包括大航海时代的西班牙骑士团，都是如此。 站在征服者的角度，历史属于活下来的人。墨索里尼在瑞士痴迷两个人，一个是死去的尼采，一个是活着的帕累托，就是那个二八原则帕累托最优的帕累托。作为贵族的后代，帕累托有一个精英替代理论，认为改朝换代的根本动力来自精英内部的相互倾轧，跟人民群众没有半毛钱关系。 也就是说上等人负责用神话给社会洗脑，下等人只需要盲从就好，争来争去一辈子，这就是历史。在那以后，收军火商钱的记者墨索里尼彻底与左派决裂，认为维护资本主义生产模式就等于维护意大利民族，就等于维护所有意大利人。 法西斯这套神话就是要让打工人相信他们和老板只要都右手高举，复兴古礼，就同属于高贵的雅利安民族，都是伟大的人上人。既然都是人上人，兼爱非攻，自然就说不通了。这就是罗马cosplay赋予法西斯的意义。面对汹涌的无产阶级，资产阶级哪怕在文化偏好上靠左，还是会支持法西斯。 因为他的根本使命是将资本主义从其不可避免的自身危机中拯救出来。法西斯则是抽象的群众运动，它的基本单位不是具体的人，而是想象的共同体。厌恶群众的资产阶级的激进派通过提线木偶去操弄民粹，为的是跳过科层化的管理层和固化的制度，直接向群众寻求授权，然后再把他们一脚蹬开，接管政府集中全力，让资本主义加速到反人类的地步，用束棒来维持系统的鲁棒，那是一种对湮灭的欲望。

资本主义的危机与未来的方向

资本主义，这玩意儿如今可是真到了生死存亡的关头。你看那新反动派、加速主义、技术封建、新法西斯，全都一窝蜂地凑到一起，为的不就是求个活路嘛。他们喊破嗓子，无非就是一句“快给资本主义续命”。他们看不惯的，不外乎社会主义，或者是大多数人。 我们大多数人都不喜欢掌握文化霸权的西方白左，嫌他们虚伪、矫情，于是就去跟白右共情。但记住，白右不会跟我们共情。他们借着反白左的文化战争，给种族歧视、性别歧视脱敏，捍卫的是资产阶级政权最大的政治正确。所以特朗普抨击对手哈里斯是马克思主义者、共产主义者，哈里斯当然不是，但也不妨碍她代表的绿色环保型资本主义被先进生产力抛弃。白右的说辞，无非是“西方再不伟大就完了”，缅怀过去，痛斥现在，高呼让某某“重新伟大”。他们说的上一次伟大是啥时候？多半是上世纪六七十年代，而不是这四十年的新自由主义。 资本家只在乎增长，不在乎人。增长怎么来？咱知道，资本主义诞生了，才有了财富的爆炸式增长。资本是活的，就是靠商品的交换价值。这商品，不是用的，而是卖钱的。卖更多的钱，实现资本的增值，这事儿才叫资本的使命。其他不以增值为目的的财富，都不叫资本，叫零花钱。 资本主义只看重资本，不看重人。当人成了资本的工具，人就变成了资本的奴隶，成了资本的同构体。就像仓鼠在跑轮上一样，剩下的只有动力，没有自由。 GDP，啥玩意儿？消费、政府支出、投资、进出口，全都是在衡量资本的健康度，而不是人的幸福度。地球在燃烧，我们却在刷视频，以为这就是幸福。 人类的商业周期和地球的自然周期相比，实在是太短了。资本的回报率，只关心经济活动是否带来更多的利润，却不管这些活动对生态环境造成了多大的伤害。地球是有限的，资源是有限的，增长是有限的。所以，生态经济学来了。1971年，罗马尼亚数学家乔治斯库·罗根写出《熵的定律与经济过程》：熵就是系统的混乱程度，房间只会越来越脏，垃圾只会越来越多，熵只会越来越大。人类所有的经济活动，都是在截取能量供自己消费，把低熵变成高熵；有用的能量一旦耗尽，人类也就到了尽头。生态经济学批判了新古典和马克思两个学派，主张要避免日益严重的生态灾难和经济动荡，就不能把自然资源仅仅看作外部因素，不能痴迷于增长和资本增值——人类欲壑难填，而地球覆水难收。 罗马俱乐部成立了，他们的报告《增长的极限》说，地球资源有限，经济不可能无限增长。那么，人类就得学会去增长，减少对资源的消耗，尽量延长资源的寿命。这就意味着，人类要从经典力学的世界观，转向热力学的世界观。 资本主义和社会主义，两者的解决方式大相径庭。社会主义是经济民主，以人为本，让人们对经济活动有发言权。这意味着，我们可以选择更有意义的经济活动，重视物品的使用价值而非交换价值。这就是对消费主义的反击，对商品拜物教的逃离，摆脱资本的控制。 而资本主义呢？一种方式是垄断，加速技术发展，最终把人类变成赛博生物。另一种是暴力输出，把生命拉回到原始的野蛮状态。这两种方式，都不是真正解决问题，而是解决提出问题的人。 未来在哪里？什么是世界的方向？什么等在我们的前方？如果只有躯壳没有器官，只有触手没有情感，只有数据没有人民，那我们应该何去何从？

美国的水资源焦虑与中印、埃及之间的矛盾

各位，美国把水资源视为国家安全问题，这事儿可不是什么新鲜事了。战略与国际问题研究中心的报告里提到，全球水资源引起的暴力事件已达到历史最高水平，而地缘政治冲突就是最严重的风险。报告里举了两个案例：一个是让印度坐卧不安的中国雅鲁藏布江水电站（印度叫它布拉马普特拉河），另一个是埃及和埃塞俄比亚的尼罗河大坝。 咱们先看看中印之间的矛盾。我们上游落差巨大，水电蕴藏量极高；他们下游靠喜马拉雅南坡的降雨，水量巨大但水电蕴藏量小。中国在雅鲁藏布江墨脱段大拐弯的地方，规划了全球最大规模的超级水电站，装机容量60吉瓦，年发电量3000亿度，相当于三个三峡。而印度境内的这一段谷地多、水量巨大却难以灌溉，还经常形成很恐怖的洪灾，他们就特别焦虑中国掌握上游控制权，认为中国随时能蓄水放水、制造旱灾或洪灾，还在国际上打苦情牌，说中国会减少下游径流85%的流量。这纯属瞎扯，因为雅江水电站非常特殊，它是径流式隧洞引水，利用天然的垂直落差冲刷涡轮发电，不需要修巨型大坝蓄水，发电的水全部回流、原量返还河道，不改变河流的天然径流量，宏观上对国际水权没有影响。而且上游水量只占下游的三成，印度根本不用担心水源被切断。 但印度为了争话语权，抢先在藏南地区的西昂河段建水电站。这电站高300米、蓄水量91亿立方米，印度的算盘是抢在亚鲁藏布江水电站建好之前修好大坝，以在未来的水资源谈判或仲裁中宣称下游有优先用水权，把中国置于被动地位。但印度这样做也不地道，除了淹没藏南部落的土地，还会影响孟加拉。一旦把水人为控制住，下游泥沙减少，孟加拉的土地贫瘠化、丧失肥力，威胁这个人口大国的粮食安全。孟加拉看穿了印度掐脖子的操作，积极引入中国资金和技术，对下游流域进行综合治理，尤其是提斯塔河，改善旱季干涸、雨季洪涝的问题。这下子印度紧张了，因为提斯塔项目离印度那个鸡脖子——西里古里走廊只有几十公里。 总体来说，中印之间的水资源竞争还是次要变量。双方都有战略理性，风险可控。但埃及和埃塞俄比亚就不一样了。埃及境内几乎所有人口和经济都在尼罗河沿岸和三角洲地带，河水决定生死存亡。尼罗河上游分白尼罗河和青尼罗河，其中发源于埃塞俄比亚高原的青尼罗河水量更大。埃塞俄比亚主张重新分配水资源，但埃及坚持殖民时期留下的历史特权。双方零和博弈，非盟调解无效，埃及军事外交围堵埃塞俄比亚，但已经错过最佳时机。一旦东非出现特大干旱，水资源危机很可能导致军事冲突。萨达特曾说，宁愿去埃塞俄比亚战死，也不会坐等渴死。 美国的报告还提到科罗拉多河的问题。美国在上游搞胡佛水坝、拦截灌溉，导致墨西哥那边就剩不下几滴，美墨之间虽有水资源协议，但墨西哥一直欠着水债。极端气候、水费增加，再加上美墨关系紧张，科罗拉多河三角洲变成荒漠。美国各州水分配扯皮不断，水资源宝贵，跨国公司也被当地社区排除在外。伊朗首都德黑兰极端缺水，人口激增、大水库干涸，海水淡化厂因战争冲突被袭击，供水成为战争常态。防范这种风险，各国应构建多元化的水资源组合，不依赖单一超大型项目，结合各种水循环、水处理方案，并将水资源升格为国家安全与治理优先事项，加强对水资源相关外资审查。 最后，美国认为多极化没有霸主，没有全球执法，没有解决方案，倾向于把水资源作为地缘工具。而中国在区域水治理方面，从上游单边开发变成全流域共同治理，这解决了传统水争端的零和博弈。这个经验对其他地区形成跨界水资源治理框架有借鉴作用。

Romania: Vampires and Casinos

Ladies and gentlemen, it’s 9:00 p.m. right now, and I’m standing on a street in Romania—the sky is still unusually bright. This place is supposed to be all about vampires and castles, but right now, all I see is an abundance of positive energy. That Palace of Parliament—formerly known as the People’s Palace—was a massive engineering project that Ceaușescu brought back after his visit to North Korea. He demolished old neighborhoods to build it, and this main avenue right in front of the entrance was specifically leveled to make room for it. Construction lasted from 1984 to 1997, a period during which the entire country underwent a major political shift. It is recognized by Guinness World Records as the heaviest building in the world, weighing 4 million metric tons. It’s said to sink 6 millimeters every year and is the world’s second-largest government building, second only to the Pentagon. I didn’t go inside, but I’ve heard it has eight underground levels, with the deepest serving as a nuclear fallout shelter—a vast network of tunnels connecting all the city’s government departments. The building has a high vacancy rate. In the 1990s, there was a proposal to convert it into the world’s largest casino, and it even attracted a $1 billion investment from George Soros, but none of these plans came to fruition. As I walked on, I saw a tree-lined boulevard on my left and the old town on my right, which retains its historic charm. On the afternoon of my first day, I heard the sound of gongs and drums and ran over to see a parade. There was a kaleidoscope of flags—Palestinian flags, animal costumes, anime characters, animal rights symbols, and more… This “Happy Pride 2026” event celebrated the 30th anniversary of Romania’s earliest LGBT organization. But it was actually a broad left-wing march protesting against conservatives and opposing fascism, homophobia, transphobia, and misogyny. Look at that logo—the hammer and sickle has been subverted into a symbol of gender equality. In reality, capitalism fears social organization and seeks to reduce people to nothing more than micro-struggles driven by mere biological impulses. Later, I walked to the area across from the University of Bucharest, where an engineer was giving a street speech. He called for peace in Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, and the Middle East. He introduced himself to me as an engineer who had once lived in China. He spent his weekend giving speeches, covering a jumbled array of topics—from Orthodox Christianity and traditional family values to Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Charlie Cock, then on to Zelenskyy’s resignation, domestic political demands, and even the merger of Romania and Moldova, as well as opposition to mandatory vaccinations… He kept quoting Michael Jackson’s “They Don’t Care About Us.” He spoke quite highly of China, viewing it as a messenger of peace. Next, I saw police greeting another group of protesters who had come to commemorate a historical incident in which miners brutally beat students. Judging by their black clothing, this was a group of right-leaning students. They and the protesters from earlier each carried out their respective missions, keeping to their own business without interfering with one another. Then I visited the Romanian Socialist Party, a small party office located right below a currency exchange shop. Their history is quite dramatic. Party Chairman Rotaru, a former member of the Romanian Communist Party and a Ph.D. in economics, later joined the Labor Socialist Party, where he opposed the divestiture of state-owned assets. However, when the Labor Socialist Party sought to merge with the Social Democratic Party, he broke away from it and founded the Socialist Alliance Party. The following evening, I took a walk through the Old Town with a young party official. He was a solar panel expert in the new energy sector and told me that while Romania is rich in resources, most of its energy is controlled by foreign companies, which sell it to the local population at high prices. Worse still, the country is suffering from severe population and employment hollowing-out. Of the country’s 20 million people, 4 million live abroad—many of whom are intellectuals and highly skilled workers, such as doctors, nurses, engineers, and designers. With the European economy in decline in recent years, these emigrants may not necessarily be faring better, yet they still refuse to return. Consequently, the government has begun accepting immigrants from South Asia, India, Bangladesh, and even Nepal. The Nepalese man mentioned that many people from his country go to the Gulf states, especially Qatar. That’s when I realized there are quite a few Nepalese in Romania as well. Most of the food delivery riders on the streets have South Asian features, and the red light boxes on the streets aren’t part of a red-light district—they belong to several SuperBet chain casinos. This gambling industry isn’t limited to SuperBet; it also includes currency exchange booths, loan sharks, and even machines for topping up gambling accounts. Bucharest is known as the “Las Vegas of Europe.” Since the government bans celebrities and influencers from endorsing gambling ads, they’ve resorted to using AI to generate images of sexy women. The real economy is in decline, with many shops remaining closed, and the overall standard of living is low. The average monthly income in Bucharest is 1,400 euros; while income levels in the capital are slightly higher, the wealth gap is significant. Low-income earners make 800 euros a month—already higher than the minimum wage of 600 euros—yet their cost of living remains high. Young people pay 700 euros in rent, plus 100 euros for electricity, water, and property management fees—living here costs 900 euros a month. This way of life truly gives one the feeling of being an ant in turbulent times, and public discontent runs deep. Taxi drivers are always talking about the EU, France, and bureaucratic corruption. Their demands are simple: they want Romania to have economic autonomy, to use its own resources, and to stop providing aid to other countries—especially for war-related weapons purchases. They hope to become a fully sovereign nation.

I Took a Trip to Myanmar: From Rumors of 40-Degree Heat to Checkpoints Along the Way

Everyone, I recently took a trip to Myanmar and just got back. The reason I haven’t posted in so long is this—there have been some changes at work, and it just so happened to coincide with this business trip. What was I doing in Myanmar? Attending a conference. A government-affiliated think tank under the Myanmar government organized the event, hoping to learn from China how to tell their own story effectively. China has its own story, and Myanmar has its own. I went along with Professor Zhang, who was presenting on the “Chinese model,” and my role was simply to take notes during the conference—I was just tagging along. I was actually quite lucky. Myanmar is currently ruled by a military government; many countries around the world have cut off ties with it, so the country is fairly isolated—it’s not somewhere just anyone can visit. I was able to get a glimpse of it from a distance. Before leaving, I was booking my flight and packing my bags; back in Shanghai, it was around 10 degrees. Then I checked the news from Myanmar—40 degrees! I panicked right away, thinking I might just die from the heat. Once I arrived, it actually didn’t feel that hot; my first thought was: “It’s not so bad.” But what really made me nervous wasn’t the temperature. Myanmar is a very complex country, and the security situation is quite chaotic. The military government basically only controls the area from Yangon in the far south—along the coast—all the way up to Naypyidaw; the surrounding areas are all occupied by various ethnic armed groups. The phone scam operations you often see in the news used to be in northern Myanmar, along the China-Myanmar border. After a joint crackdown, they moved further away to Mawaddy—a bit southeast of the Thailand-Myanmar border—which is also beyond the government’s reach. Every detail of our itinerary had been set in advance; there was no free time. I was just a tag-along—does a tag-along have any freedom? Not only that, but there was also a curfew there, so we couldn’t go out at night. I said I just wanted to go for a walk, but they told me it wasn’t safe. I asked, “How is it unsafe? Everyone’s gone home—is it actually less safe for me to be out?” Come to think of it, that made sense. In the end, I didn’t go out anyway, because they said I might get rounded up for conscription. I pointed out that I was a foreigner, but since I look like someone from Southeast Asia, I couldn’t really explain myself clearly—so I figured, never mind, I wouldn’t take that risk. The accommodations weren’t bad, though. Coming out of Yangon Airport, it felt a lot like a British colony in Asia; the hotel we stayed at was brand-new, luxuriously decorated, and specifically designed to host VIPs—five-star standard. It was a stark contrast to the surroundings in the rest of Myanmar—but power outages still happened just the same. It takes five or six hours to drive from Yangon to Nyei, and there were an awful lot of checkpoints along the way—barricades made of sandbags housing firing positions, each manned by about eight to ten people. There was one every few meters, with several firing positions providing cross-fire to control a single intersection. So we asked, “Is this road safe?” They replied, “To be honest with you, there was fighting just a few days ago—the rebels attacked this area just a few days ago.” Of course, in a place like this, they have to conscript soldiers. Young people harbor resentment toward the military government; many would rather flee—even to work illegally in Thailand—than return. The exodus of young people who remain in the country is also severe; some have simply stopped attending school—not because they don’t want to, but because they feel there’s no future in education. Yangon University is Myanmar’s best university, with a particularly strong humanities program. Before the 2021 coup, 800,000 to 900,000 people registered for the college entrance exam each year; after the coup, that number plummeted to 100,000. It has slowly recovered over the past two years, reaching 200,000 this year. Where did everyone go? They simply stopped taking the exam. Because even after passing, there are no industries or job opportunities—much of production has come to a standstill. There is a genuine shortage of supplies. Power outages occur daily, foreign exchange reserves are strained, there is a desperate need for U.S. dollars, and there are shortages of medicine, food, and grain. When natural disasters strike and relief is needed, or when farmers’ irrigation canals are flooded and require repair, these tasks simply cannot be carried out now—governance has essentially been crippled by the security situation. I feel that the people of Myanmar are living in a state of extreme hardship. As for politics, the situation is even more complex. Myanmar’s military government is a domestic force that emphasizes sovereignty and autonomy. They previously held an election, but the military government claimed it was marred by fraud and irregularities—and under their constitution, as the protector of the nation, they have the authority to make such claims. At the time, the United States also claimed that the election was undemocratic and non-compliant. Yet after the military took over, the U.S. then argued that the takeover itself was non-compliant. Neither side is acting reasonably. Meanwhile, the previous government still exists in exile as an opposition government; even the ambassador to the United Nations remains the same person—not someone appointed by the military regime. The gray economy, long-standing regional fiefdoms, and the shadow of external forces—these elements seem to be ever-present in Southeast Asia. On this trip to Myanmar, that is exactly the kind of country I witnessed.

A Million-Yuan Space Trip: A Thrill Ride or a Cosmic Dream?

Guys, I’ve been getting really frustrated watching the Shenzhen High-Tech Fair lately. I thought I’d get to see the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s new “Space Tourism” project make its debut, but they didn’t even put up a display board. I’ve been waiting this long—I’ve been hearing since 2018 that we’d be able to go to space this year—but they’re acting like it’s none of my business. Honestly, while the 1 million yuan ticket price isn’t cheap, it’s nothing compared to SpaceX’s $55 million. A SpaceX flight to the International Space Station costs 350 million yuan—enough to buy over 100 apartments. But is it really worth 1 million? For someone like me who can’t even bring myself to buy 20 pieces of clothing in a year, that amount is definitely a bit steep. But let’s compare international prices: SpaceX charges $55 million—or 350 million RMB—to send you to the International Space Station, while Blue Origin’s first suborbital flight ticket costs $28 million—enough for an entire fleet of Rolls-Royces. So, a 1 million RMB ticket doesn’t seem quite so outrageous after all. Although the price is high, at least I can still consider it—which is better than not being able to afford it at all. Deep Blue Aerospace is already selling tickets for space travel on Taobao Live: 1 million yuan each, for a 12-minute flight with 5 minutes of weightlessness. Just imagine those 12 minutes: you’ll watch the Earth’s curve recede further and further into the distance, while the darkness of space closes in on you. Unfortunately, suborbital flights don’t reach first cosmic velocity, so they can’t orbit the Earth. This space journey simply goes up and comes back down—and then your 1 million is gone. However, these tickets sold out instantly as soon as they went on sale; even with the money, you couldn’t snag one. Is 1 million too much? Based on current costs, this industry’s output value is projected to reach $13 billion by 2030, with a market of fewer than 100,000 people. Deep Blue Space’s maiden flight is scheduled for 2027, while China Aerospace Science and Technology’s manned space tourism program won’t launch until 2028. Anyway, there aren’t many years left, so we still need to drive down the cost of rocket recovery—ideally to 100,000 yuan per flight. If that happens, the number of participants could increase by more than tenfold. If we turn this into an international tourism project that generates foreign exchange and attracts wealthy people from all over the world, wouldn’t that be wonderful? Folks, if it were me, would I consider spending 100,000 yuan on a space trip? To be honest, 100,000 yuan for a trip to space is about the same as riding a super-thrill roller coaster. But just think about it: for 100,000 yuan, you could experience weightlessness, watch the curve of the Earth recede further and further from you, and feel the darkness of the universe closing in. That dream is simply mind-blowing. If it really could become a reality, I’d definitely give it some thought. However, we still have to face reality—after all, not everyone can afford that 100,000 yuan.

Climb a volcano, work as a sulfur miner, or do your part for the economy

Everyone, it’s 3 a.m. You’re fast asleep, and I’m climbing a volcano. This is Mount Ijen on the Indonesian island of Java—an active volcano. The volcanic lake is so acidic it could devour a person, yet miners work hundreds of meters below the crater, breaking up the golden sulfur by hand and carrying it down to the foot of the mountain. They’ve already finished their shift by the early hours of the morning, earning just 90 yuan a day—it’s really no easy feat. So why are these miners still willing to do this work? Because farmers at local coffee plantations earn only half as much. Now that the volcano has become a tourist attraction, many visitors hike up the mountain at night. Quite a few of the 300 miners have switched careers, pulling those small hand-drawn carts for tourists. A round trip costs over 400 RMB, and each miner gets about 200 RMB. Although it’s not much, it’s far better than mining sulfur. I chose to hike up on my own to experience it firsthand. However, the other side of the local economy is even more striking. I visited Rainbow Village in Malang City, known as Kampung Wanawani Jodipan—and true to its name, the village is a riot of colors. Yet, this place is actually a black market for drug trafficking. In 2016, a few college students turned the place into a graffiti hotspot, and what had been a headache for the government was suddenly transformed into an internet-famous tourist attraction. But illegal activities remain rampant—it’s truly shocking. In Indonesia, ordinary workers struggle to make ends meet. Food delivery riders work late into the night, earning a monthly income of 2,000 RMB. A long-haul truck driver I met by the roadside makes only about 1,500 RMB a month; he has children to support, and his wife’s small side business doesn’t provide much additional income. As soon as he heard I was Chinese, he insisted on treating me to the same lunch he was having—pento, a type of cassava dumpling wrapped in a plastic bag and mashed up with chili sauce. It tasted a bit like fish balls and was good enough to fill my stomach. One serving costs 5,000 Indonesian rupiah, which is equivalent to two of our yuan. Since it seemed cheap, I let him treat me, but thinking back on it, I felt a bit embarrassed—it really isn’t easy for working people. Indonesia is a resource-rich country, but its fragmented geography has led to many problems. Take Surabaya, the second-largest city, as an example: air pollution is severe in the suburbs, where tofu workshops burn “foreign trash” (plastic bags), producing dioxins. Tofu has become the main source of protein for the poor; high demand only exacerbates the problem. Java is densely populated, and firewood and coal are in short supply. Although natural gas is abundant, large quantities are exported, making it unaffordable for rural residents, who are forced to burn trash instead. The electricity supply is also problematic. On our way, we passed by the country’s largest power plant, the Paiton Power Plant—the world’s tenth-largest thermal power plant, with a total installed capacity of 4.7 gigawatts, which is quite impressive. However, the problem is that the high-voltage grid only supplies cities; rural low-voltage lines cannot handle the load, and farmers cannot afford the electricity bills. The development of new energy sources has lagged behind: winds are weak near the equator, hydropower is insufficient, and solar energy is too costly. As a result, Indonesia’s development of new energy sources lags behind the rest of the world, and electric vehicles are almost nowhere to be seen on the streets. I’ve learned that Indonesia is introducing Chinese waste-to-energy technology, with a new project underway in Bali. However, rural tofu workshops still need to utilize abundant agricultural waste to produce biomass fuel—which is inexpensive and produces minimal smoke—and the government should grant it green certification and procure it on a large scale. The government is implementing a free school lunch program, but it has been widely criticized. If it truly had the people’s best interests at heart, it should procure tofu certified as safe for consumption, thereby forcing the supply chain to transform. Judging from these phenomena, Chinese enterprises play a significant role in Indonesia’s infrastructure and industrial upgrading efforts. However, the strategic maneuvering within China’s supply chain also poses policy risks for Chinese companies. Indonesian President Prabowo, who played a role during the Suharto era, serves as a reminder of the complexity of politics. As working people, perhaps we should just stick to hiking and do our part for the volcanoes.

Korean Beauty Is on the Decline, While Domestic Brands Are on the Rise—How Can Chinese Beauty Brands Gain the Upper Hand?

Everyone, I recently came across something strange. South Korea’s First Lady Kim Hye-kyung attended a Korean beauty promotional event in Shanghai. This reminded me of a fact: these days, when you walk through a mall, Korean beauty brands have become almost a rarity. K-Beauty is incredibly popular internationally, and South Korea has become the world’s second-largest exporter of cosmetics as a result. But in China, Korean beauty has fallen on hard times. I remember more than a decade ago, when Korean beauty products, along with Korean dramas, took the country by storm. Back then, sales of imported cosmetics increased ninefold in five years, surpassing those of France. The Chinese market became the single largest growth engine for Korean beauty. But as the “Korean Wave” cooled following South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD missile defense system—coupled with quality issues such as incidents involving excessive total bacterial counts and heavy metal levels—an increasing number of Korean brands closed their stores and ceased operations. Even so, in 2021, Korean beauty exports to China still accounted for over 50% of the total. By 2024, that figure had dropped to less than 20%. Does this mean Chinese consumers no longer like Korean beauty products? The answer isn’t that simple. The Korean Wave has given way to the “Guochao” trend, and K-Beauty has been replaced by C-Beauty. In 2024, domestic brands accounted for 56% of the domestic market, while the share of imported cosmetics continued to shrink, falling by 3.4%. Domestic brands have not only expanded their reach in the domestic market but have also scaled up their overseas operations. From 2020 to 2024, the average annual export growth rate for domestic beauty products reached 18%, while that for Korean beauty products was only 6%. Many high-end domestic beauty brands have even penetrated the European, American, and Korean markets. So how did these domestic beauty brands emerge? Let’s break it down. First, beauty products are one thing; brands are another. Beauty technology is part of the chemical industry—do you really think China can’t produce it? In fact, 80% of the raw materials for Korean skincare products are imported from China. The Korean beauty industry is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, most of which turn to major ODM manufacturers like Cosmax and Codemark for private-label production. Therefore, the true strength of Korean beauty lies in leveraging cultural platforms like K-pop to penetrate markets, responding quickly, and fostering market loyalty—it’s particularly adept at converting viral buzz into sales. But now the situation has changed. Chinese cosmetics are technology-driven. Technology drives product innovation, and prices are affordable. Korean cosmetics lack technological barriers, so they need to actively adjust their global strategy and shift more toward European and American markets, where cultural outreach is more effective. China controls 80% of the global supply of recombinant collagen raw materials. Many Korean brands use domestically produced raw materials yet sell them at an import premium. In terms of core technology, they still lag behind China by a generation. Take Furida as an example: with 34 years of deep expertise in biotech R&D, its raw material supply covers 79 countries and regions. Not only Japan and South Korea, but also major brands in Europe and the U.S. source their core raw materials from this industry leader. In recent years, Furui Da has moved beyond merely serving as a stepping stone for others; it has stepped into the arena itself, establishing penetration standards for collagen and emerging as the undisputed leader in the collagen industry. Collagen is an ingredient familiar to everyone; the sudden, dramatic aging of men’s and women’s skin is caused by collagen loss. Leveraging decades of raw material expertise and R&D technology, Furida has partnered with over 300 scientists and 14 provincial-level research platforms to create Kemi, a professional, clinic-grade skincare brand. KeMi’s flagship Collagen Stick has overcome the challenge of traditional collagen’s inability to penetrate the skin, ushering the collagen industry into a new era of transdermal absorption. This transdermal technology is even patented, with a penetration rate 27.5 times higher than that of ordinary collagen products. Many Korean brands are still researching animal-derived collagen, which carries risks of rejection and allergic reactions. In contrast, Kemi uses 100% human-derived collagen, with technology that ranks among the world’s best. Backed by a major raw material manufacturer, the product contains a blend of 7 types of collagen and 5 types of hyaluronic acid—including recombinant Type 3 collagen with a purity of up to 98%—so there’s no need to worry about allergies. It comprehensively addresses the sagging, dryness, and dullness caused by late nights, delivering highly efficient results. It has also passed rigorous inspections by more than a dozen testing agencies, with wrinkle-reducing effects measurable in minutes. The sleek packaging is a testament to our solid expertise. Not only have we overcome core technical challenges, but we’ve also kept production costs extremely low through a complete industrial chain. This is a hallmark of our approach: even high-end brands must prioritize value for money, maintain price competitiveness, and simultaneously enhance quality and functionality—offering consumers an offer they can’t refuse. This has been the consistent strategy for “Made in China” products competing in global markets, leaving South Korea with no room to counter. The waning of the Korean beauty craze reminds us that it’s difficult to maintain a competitive edge by relying solely on marketing forever; only continuous technological innovation is the true key to success in manufacturing. This reflects not only the current state of the C-Beauty industry but also serves as a microcosm of China’s rise.

China-Serbia Forum: The U.S. Sanctions Drama Unfolds in Serbia

Everyone, I just attended the SC Forum. What exactly is this? “S” stands for sustainability, and “C” stands for connectivity—hence “SC,” short for Belgrade Star City. But “SC” is really just a cover; the real issue is China-Serbia cooperation. While the forum was underway, I heard the organizers say that the U.S. has specifically set its sights on this place, and it has even become a venue for covert rivalry. Hearing that really made me feel a bit uneasy. One of the forum’s key guests was Serbia’s Zijin Copper—Serbia’s largest foreign-owned enterprise, the company with the most Chinese investment in the country (accounting for more than half of total investment), and Serbia’s top exporter. So what’s going on with the U.S.? Just one day before the forum opened, they issued a “withhold release order” against Zijin Copper’s products—meaning U.S. Customs can detain the company’s goods upon discovery. What excuse is the U.S. using? They’ve got to have some justification, right? They claim that Zijin Copper engages in forced labor, and U.S. tariff laws prohibit the import of products made with forced labor. Under the guise of protecting workers’ rights, they are actually using compliance reviews as a political weapon. When put that way, it sounds like a robbery carried out by imperial decree. The U.S. is warning Serbia: “We know you’re in cahoots with China.” It’s a well-rehearsed tactic: they use an NGO called China Labor Watch to collaborate with local Serbian human rights organizations and provide various pieces of “evidence.” This is selective enforcement; the U.S. simply wants to force European automakers to decouple from the Chinese supply chain. The detention of Zijin Copper’s products has little impact on its business. The core markets for copper are Europe and China; very little is exported directly to the U.S., so the losses are minimal. However, the U.S. is doing this to tarnish Zijin’s reputation, damage its business credibility, deter downstream companies from partnering with it, and create friction in the supply chain. In China, if a company is sanctioned by the U.S., it’s a sign that it truly has clout. But this confidence stems primarily from our ability to retaliate; for other countries, there is still a very, very long way to go. Serbia’s mineral resources rank among the best in Europe. The Bor Basin in the east is home to a century-old copper mine, in which Zijin holds a 63% stake, and the company has also acquired the Peji Copper-Gold Mine in its entirety. In addition to copper, lithium—a key metal for the green transition—is also crucial. The Jadar Valley to the west is home to Europe’s largest lithium deposit, controlled by the Western-backed company Rio Tinto. Last year, the EU even designated it a strategic project in an effort to compete with China in the green industry. Currently, the EU has a Western Balkans Growth Plan in place, and this funding isn’t being handed out for nothing—it must meet 5G standards. The Jadar lithium mine even aims to compete with China for clients in the infrastructure sector. But by doing so, the EU is contradicting the very values it preaches daily, and many who firmly believe in those values will feel betrayed by the EU—how could it possibly hand over real money to Vučić? They’re furious. So Vucic’s strategic positioning is truly masterful: even though Serbia isn’t an EU member, it maintains rock-solid ties with both China and Russia. With everyone vying for its favor, it’s happy to play both sides to its advantage. Now that Serbia has a new government, its position has become even more unique. Logically, it should serve as a bridge through which both China and Europe can cooperate. This forum serves exactly that bridging role. I’m heading to the dinner tonight and will also be meeting with the Prime Minister—time to change clothes. Bye for now.

The Future of War: The Two Sides of the Coin—Drones and Robots

Ladies and gentlemen, if we’re talking about the most talked-about war recently, it’s undoubtedly the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This series of events has not only turned militaries around the world into students but has also sent shockwaves through the tactics of modern warfare. Some have speculated that drones seem to be an unstoppable force. A Ukrainian military think tank has even advised Taiwan accordingly: it is said that strategy must rely on saturation deployment—a deluge of aerial drones, unmanned surface vessels, and unmanned underwater vehicles—to create a so-called “hellish scenario” for enemy amphibious landing forces. However, does this really mean we have to abandon man-driven mobile warfare and attrition warfare? A report published by the Hudson Institute in the United States has thoroughly shattered this simplistic notion. They argue that limiting Ukraine’s experience to unmanned systems would truly diminish the broader paradigm of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The core of the Russia-Ukraine war actually lies in the integration of elements such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, sensors, and software—compressing the U.S.-coined “Observe-Orient-Decide-Act” (OODA) loop to its absolute limit. Whoever can process information faster will be able to disrupt the opponent and win the battle. Therefore, on the battlefield of the future, decision-making mechanisms must be entrusted to machines, with AI controlling weapons, performing instantaneous calculations, and initiating actions. As for humans, they will be responsible only for oversight, authorization, and intervention at critical moments. This raises a question: In classic joint operations involving multiple branches of the military, the emphasis has been on rapidly wearing down the enemy or securing advantageous positions to gain the upper hand—deploying troops and firepower at specific times and locations to break through enemy lines. This model is now obsolete on today’s battlefield for three reasons: First, drones, satellite communications, and digital and electronic sensors have made the battlefield transparent—every move you make is visible to the enemy, making surprise attacks difficult; Second, while maneuver forces have the advantage of scale, they are vulnerable to precision strikes during deployment and can be eliminated before even reaching the battlefield; Third, attrition at the front line creates logistical demands, and attacking supply lines is simpler than attacking frontline forces, making it difficult for frontline units to advance. Therefore, the success of classic maneuver warfare depends entirely on whether the preceding digital attrition war can be won—that is, rendering the enemy’s sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, logistical support, and command networks completely inoperable, leaving the enemy blind and deaf, before launching a firepower strike. The core of this strategy is to first deprive the enemy of its information-gathering capabilities before launching a firepower strike. However, this is not the end of the story; innovation is also required in force deployment. Previous attrition warfare models relied on the relative strength of force pools amid continuous attrition. This type of attrition was predictable and suited to positional warfare, so whoever had more troops won. But how can technology be used to improve the exchange ratio and create asymmetric combat capabilities? Theoretical physicists have proposed an adaptive model in which both sides in a conflict extensively employ semi-autonomous intelligent agents that constantly adapt to a changing environment. The conflict becomes nonlinear and decentralized. Both Russia and Ukraine have abandoned large-scale, concentrated operations in this conflict and have refrained from deploying infantry to capture every stronghold. Instead, they are using miniaturized weapon systems to adapt to battlefield dynamics, employing drone defenses to conserve manpower, and enabling even small forces to cover vast areas. The outcome of drone operations depends on the operator’s skill level, the intensity of electronic warfare pressure, and other factors—such as the sophistication of software, the visibility of targets, sensor density, the accuracy of terrain data, the resilience of communications, and the response time to countermeasures. It is evident that warfare has reached a stage where, although it has not yet become fully unmanned—with robots fighting in our place—it has evolved into large-scale drone system operations under human command. On that note, it is worth mentioning what lessons the West should draw from the battlefield in Ukraine. On the positive side, the Ukrainian battlefield may be the most valuable database in military history, as drones have transformed the battlefield into a dense sensor network, generating massive amounts of real-time operational data that can be used to train the next generation of AI military systems. Starting this year, Ukraine has begun sharing military-grade data with its allies; this data is in itself an invaluable asset, which is why it has also become a target for enemy attacks. As for lessons learned, Ukraine has done an excellent job with the rapid iteration and modular design of its drone software, but it remains overly reliant on Chinese drone components. China not only commands 80 to 90 percent of the market for complete drones but also holds an absolute dominant position in areas such as controllers, sensors, motors, batteries, thermal imagers, magnets, and rare earth materials. This means that if China perceives NATO’s strategy to modernize its drone fleet as a threat, there is a very high risk that the supply chain could be severed. Finally, the Hudson Institute report points out that NATO must both embrace innovation in drone warfare and avoid placing blind faith in drones at the expense of traditional firepower development. It requires a dual combination of combat experience and technological production capacity, shifting procurement from long cycles to rapid iteration, and tactically learning the essence of Ukraine’s approach without being bound by its specific forms. Ukraine is merely a powerful tool for gaining battlefield mobility; strategically, however, one must acknowledge the adversary’s capabilities. For instance, Russia has already established a robust anti-drone ecosystem, while China serves as the cornerstone of the entire drone industry. Therefore, the way forward for the Western camp lies in integrating Ukraine into the core of the European and American defense industries—or, in my words, turning it into a “war laboratory.”

Technology Transfer: A 540-Degree Turn in Western Discourse

Everyone, we’re always talking about surpassing the West’s hegemony over discourse, but it’s really hard to do. To put it bluntly, their system of discourse boils down to this: what’s good and what’s bad is entirely determined by what they say. Take the trade war, for example. Western governments accused us day in and day out of stealing technology. We explained that we hadn’t stolen anything—it was all done voluntarily by both parties—but our explanations fell on deaf ears. If they say you stole, then you stole—that’s all there is to it. Now, their rhetoric has shifted: technology transfer has become a good thing—after all, excellent things should be shared. “Why is China keeping things under wraps? Hurry up and let go so I can steal a bit!” A recent article in *The Economist* is truly interesting. It states that the attitudes of Western political and business circles toward technology transfer have taken a 540-degree turn—they no longer worry about the outflow of Western technology. On the contrary, they’re asking: Why hasn’t China’s technology leaked out yet? Why are the barriers surrounding advanced technologies like electric vehicles and AI robots so solid? How come their defenses against us are so airtight? Why can’t we get even a tiny bit of it? The Economist’s take is: Don’t worry. Knowledge is not a wall; it is like water. It will always flow from high to low, from those who possess it to those who need it. It’s just a matter of time. So, from the Westerners’ perspective, China’s technological capabilities have advanced, and its status has risen. Well then, let’s trade market access for technology. If we allow Chinese companies to enter our markets, they’ll come and set up factories. Doesn’t that mean our chance to learn their tricks has arrived? In reality, it’s not that simple. China manufactures batteries and energy storage products in the EU, and electric vehicles in Brazil and Vietnam—but have they learned anything? Not really. That’s because China has adopted the U.S.’s advanced approach by establishing an export control system. The stated goal is to protect national security, but in reality, it’s designed to support China’s domestic industries. Based on its export control laws, China maintains a regularly updated list of restricted technology exports, along with registration and approval procedures. If a company wants to export technology, it must apply for a license—and it’s up to the authorities to decide whether to grant it. For example, the transaction between the AI assistant Manus and Meta is under review; this involves investigating whether the company’s core technology is a controlled item on the list, as well as examining team relocations and overseas acquisitions. That constitutes a substantive technology export. Did you apply for an export license? If not, who else would they target? Consequently, the West suspects that China won’t allow truly valuable technologies to leave the country. But I believe that, given the current broader context, there’s no need for such suspicion. If China holds on tightly and refuses to let go, how is the West supposed to learn? As The Economist pointed out, what we need to learn first isn’t the technology itself, but China’s approach to learning technology—it must be systematic and patient. To learn from the West, the Chinese have, for thirty years without fail, implemented policies to attract foreign investment, matched foreign partners with local ones, set localization targets, and collaborated with foreign universities—all while learning with insatiable eagerness. We must do the same. We must keep a close eye on China’s scientific research achievements and the journal articles published by Chinese researchers, seeking out those research topics that have not yet been commercialized to unlock their potential. However, the West has its own national circumstances, so it cannot simply copy China’s playbook. It’s unrealistic to expect the government to coordinate the big picture from the top down and lay out the entire strategy for you. Companies must take the initiative themselves. For example, leading international automakers are learning very quickly these days; they’re all flocking to China to set up factories. This is a case of learning from local partners. With so many links in the entire supply chain, each has its own know-how—so learn from them; there’s no end to learning. The Economist is quite skilled at stirring up trouble, too. It suggests exploiting young entrepreneurs’ lack of understanding and resentment toward China’s technology export control policies. After all, selling to foreigners allows them to command higher prices, but the state won’t let them do that. Since human nature is inherently self-interested, if a larger capital market offers a higher valuation, then even if the government sets up barriers to prevent them from taking their technology abroad, It’s also hard to stop them from making a run for it with nothing but a PowerPoint presentation while the project is still in the theoretical stage. Besides, what’s the advantage for the West? It’s that intense domestic competition in China has driven down profits, and Chinese companies are eager to go global and partner with foreign firms. So the West needs to play the “market access” card well—it’s incredibly appealing to the Chinese. Finally, he pointed out that China isn’t self-sufficient in every area; some sectors still require advanced Western technology. So, in an ideal scenario, everyone could negotiate entirely around technology transfer. After all, if China’s technology can’t be exported, wouldn’t that prevent your ingenuity from creating maximum value? The key isn’t whether trade is possible, but whether the price is reasonable. Here’s the problem: *The Economist*, as a British media outlet, believes the Americans are still too stubborn—they’re dead set on maintaining a tight grip on advanced chips. In other words, they don’t understand the principle that “water flows where it will” and are only focused on blocking the flow. If the Chinese were to adopt this American approach, it would be like pitting a needle against a wheat stalk. Once they realize they can’t block it, everyone will naturally be able to sit down and negotiate.

The Tragedy of the Defense Industry and Software: Lost Knowledge—But Is There Hope for the Future?

Ladies and gentlemen, I’ve heard that Western manufacturing is gradually declining, but the defense and computer industries are still holding their own. Yet, unexpectedly, even these two “fig leaves” are no longer as glorious as they once were. The article states that the core problem lies in the lack of succession for technical know-how—people no longer know how to make things, nor do they know how to pass on that knowledge. The dire consequences of over-optimization have turned the U.S. defense industry into a laughingstock. After the Cold War, the U.S. enjoyed an unprecedented peace dividend, prompting defense giants to downsize and merge into five major conglomerates. The workforce plummeted from 3.2 million to 1.1 million as companies streamlined operations to minimize costs. But this process completely destroyed traditional craftsmanship. Should war break out, defense contractors would be forced to scramble to reorganize—even the nose cones of missiles would have to be hand-twisted by master craftsmen in their seventies. The most striking example is Raytheon. Orders placed four years ago won’t be delivered until June 30 because production had been halted for nearly 20 years—the factories were gone, the blueprints were lost—so they had to bring back veteran craftsmen to teach young workers step by step using 40-year-old blueprints. And that’s not even the worst of it—Javelin anti-tank missiles, 155-millimeter artillery shells, and TNT explosives are all unable to withstand the demands of combat. The situation is the same in Europe: a pledge to supply Ukraine with 1 million artillery rounds in one year resulted in only half being delivered on time, with the remainder taking nine months to complete. This shows that the defense industries in both Europe and the U.S. suffer from small scale and numerous bottlenecks. The entire system never factored in production capacity reserves; long-term low demand has led to a lack of market signals, and supply chain optimization has resulted in maintaining only the bare minimum of production capacity. Resuming mass production will inevitably involve a lengthy ramp-up period. But that’s not the worst of it; the greatest fear lies in the human factor—no one knows how to manufacture these items anymore. This is what is meant by “long-standing problems” and “people no longer understanding military affairs.” This isn’t the first time the U.S. has recognized this issue; it encountered similar difficulties as early as 2000 when modernizing its nuclear arsenal. In 2001, the U.S. released a new study indicating that extending the service life of nuclear warheads required replacing a secret material called “Fogbank.” Production of this material had ceased in 1989, and the veteran employees who knew how to handle it had all left. It took the U.S. five years to figure it out again. When they finally produced the material and found it worked, something still felt off—it turned out that the old process had omitted the removal of a certain impurity. And even the veterans from back then couldn’t figure out exactly what that impurity was. People have an unconscious reliance on original processes; that knowledge had vanished before it could even be codified. But that wasn’t the most critical issue. Both the U.S. military and the software industry realized that over-optimization can lead to a loss of knowledge. The RAND Corporation found that in the defense industry, the apprenticeship period for new entrants takes 2 to 4 years, and reaching the supervisor level takes 5 to 8 years. Submarine design requires 10 years of experience after earning a Ph.D. The software industry is no different: it takes entry-level programmers 3 to 5 years to become full-fledged software engineers, 5 to 8 years to become senior engineers, and more than 10 years to reach the level of chief engineer or architect. There are no shortcuts for companies; blind optimization will almost certainly lead to a talent shortage. Salesforce stopped hiring software engineers last year, and enrollment in computer science programs at 62% of U.S. universities is declining. In many software companies, the role of humans is to review code written by machines. The solution proposed by executives is to have machines review machines—leaving no trace of human intervention, with everything handled by artificial intelligence. This leads to a rapid increase in human dependence on AI, making people less likely to question the machine’s self-assured errors. METR conducted an experiment and found that experienced developers actually saw a 19% drop in efficiency when using AI tools for real-world open-source tasks, whereas AI was expected to boost efficiency by 24%—a gap of 43 percentage points. People have learned to deceive themselves; even when they notice that results fall short of expectations, they still believe that AI has helped them become 20% more efficient. Once AI tools are adopted, it’s hard to give them up. Junior engineers only know how to guide the AI; they lack the ability to even question its capacity to modify code. Without a comprehensive understanding of the system and codebase, they cannot accumulate tacit professional knowledge, making it impossible for them to grow into senior engineers even in ten years. So, will AI eventually take over entirely in the future? Perhaps, but let’s not forget that arms dealers once thought the same way, believing that peaceful development would always be the norm. That turned out not to be the case. AI may continue to advance and become exceptionally intelligent, but the issue of knowledge transfer will not be easily resolved.

Tea and Coffee: A Contest Between an Instant Kick and a Lasting Effect

Everyone, coffee and tea—what exactly is the difference between these two beverages in our daily lives? Let me share my thoughts. Coffee is like a 100-meter sprint—it’s trendy, fashionable, and even carries a touch of American culture. When you drink coffee, all you have to do is pull over, order, enjoy a quick meal, and wash it down with a cup of instant coffee. Tea, on the other hand, is more like an endurance sport—a cultural legacy spanning thousands of years and an integral part of Chinese culture. Tea gives us more opportunities to connect with others and discuss different cultures, rather than just focusing on a single product. Let’s take a look at the history of tea. In 1788, the first British colonists arrived in Australia, and officials at the time mentioned tea in their records. And when the first Chinese merchants arrived in Australia, they were also drinking tea. Tea has a long history in China—from the tea trade during the Han and Tang dynasties, to the “pointed tea” culture of the Song dynasty, and on to the teahouse culture of the Ming and Qing dynasties—its place in Chinese culture is irreplaceable. In the mid-to-late 19th century, the British obtained tea from China. Around the time of the First Opium War, a Scottish botanist named Robert Fortune was sent to China by the East India Company in 1850 with the mission of uprooting tea plants and bringing back the tea-making process. He brought tea back to India and Ceylon, marking the beginning of their industrialization of tea production. Soon, by 1880, the scale of the tea industry established by the British in their colonies had surpassed that of China itself—and this was even more true on the consumer side. They dismantled Chinese culture. I was born in Australia and lived there until I was 27. My mother is 89 years old—bless her—and she drinks tea every day, one cup a day. Yet, despite having drunk tea her entire life, she has never seen what real tea leaves look like. I first tasted real tea leaves—not tea bags—when I was 10 years old, and the experience was completely different. Tea from tea bags is a far cry from real tea leaves, because the leaves inside the bags have been shredded into fine particles, losing their original aroma and flavor. Drinking tea in the office has become a part of consumer culture. Australians often hold tea parties at the office, where everyone drinks tea and eats cookies together. But in modern society, this cultural tradition has been replaced by tea bags; people no longer need to brew tea themselves—they simply open a tea bag, add water, and enjoy it. Behind this convenience, however, lies a neglect of traditional tea culture. I once traveled to Yunnan, China, specifically to visit Jingmai Mountain and see those ancient tea trees, which helped me understand the history of China and tea. I encourage everyone to visit China and see those ancient tea trees on Jingmai Mountain—the same species is grown in India, Sri Lanka, and even Australia, but there they are mostly pruned into waist-high shrubs, whereas here in Yunnan, China, they are naturally towering trees. Today, Jingmai Mountain has been designated a World Cultural Heritage site, and those ancient tea trees are between 300 and 500 years old. The Blang, Dai, and other ethnic groups were the first Chinese people to interact with these ancient tea trees, and that connection has never been severed. My connection to the Ancient Tea-Horse Road dates back to 2008. That year, Beijing was hosting the Olympics, and I was conducting fieldwork in Yunnan, looking for a research topic. Someone mentioned the “Ancient Tea-Horse Road” to me, and I asked, “What is that? I’ve never heard of it.” A friend then introduced me to Professor Mu Jihong—it was he who first proposed this concept in 1990. The Ancient Tea-Horse Road was an ancient tea trade route connecting southwestern China with India, Nepal, and other regions. It not only facilitated the flow of goods but also promoted cultural exchange, influencing the lifestyles of neighboring ethnic groups. Tea is not merely a beverage; it also embodies culture and history. During the Tang and Song dynasties, tea had already become one of the most popular beverages in China. The existence of the Ancient Tea-Horse Road further attests to tea’s significant status in Chinese culture. The rise and fall of the Ancient Tea-Horse Road reflect the socio-economic developments and changes in China and serve as a historical testament. The charm of tea lies in its spiritual quality. In ancient times, people used tea to aid in meditation and spiritual practice, which is why tea possesses unique cultural value. Unlike coffee, tea does not make people feel overly tense or excited; rather, it allows them to find a moment of tranquility amid their busy lives. This may be why tea remains so beloved in modern society. In short, tea and coffee each have their own merits. Tea represents a enduring cultural legacy, while coffee embodies a fast-paced, trendy culture. Although tea bags are convenient, they cannot replace the wonderful experience offered by real tea leaves. As a tea lover, I am eager to continue exploring the world of tea and sharing its charm.

The Chip War: Has the U.S.'s Leverage Failed?

Everyone, today let’s talk about this “battle of offense and defense” in the global chip industry. Western countries have tightened their grip on control over high-end hardware and software, aiming to freeze China’s semiconductor development. But we hold the “lifeblood” of semiconductors—mineral raw materials—in our hands. Through “asymmetric deterrence,” we are maintaining a “balance of terror” while striving to break through technological barriers. Take, for example, David Feith of the Hudson Institute (a typical anti-China hawk whose father was one of the architects of the Iraq War). He recently offered the U.S. government a suggestion: since physical means of strangling the industry have failed, new levers of control must be found. He even wrote his article’s title in reverse: “China Has Exploited the Weaknesses in U.S. Technology Policy.” Feith previously oversaw East Asian affairs at the State Department and was responsible for technology and national security on the National Security Council; export controls and dual-use technologies were all within his purview. After being “purged” last year, he has had to rely on writing articles to attract the attention of higher-ups. Feith’s approach to countering China is simple: prevent Chinese chips from “looking up words in the dictionary.” Here, the “dictionary” refers to the ISA (Instruction Set Architecture). A single mouse click won’t make a CPU act on its own; it must receive instructions from software. This communication must follow standards, which is what the ISA provides. For decades, chips have only been able to understand two languages: x86 and ARM. X86 is the “favorite” of Intel and AMD—it has numerous and complex instructions and high power consumption, much like a “thick dictionary.” Traditional computers, databases, and control systems are all based on X86. Due to long-standing inertia, high-performance computing still relies primarily on it. But then ARM arrived, with more streamlined, energy-efficient, and flexible instructions—like a “thin dictionary”—and it’s now used in smartphones, cloud servers, and automotive chips. In the past, ARM did not manufacture finished chips but only provided architectural designs. Companies like Qualcomm, Apple, and NVIDIA could develop their own chips based on this architecture, earning ARM the nickname “the Switzerland of the semiconductor industry.” But driven by profit, ARM decided to enter the chip manufacturing business, directly competing with its long-standing U.S. clients. It attempted to terminate Qualcomm’s architecture license but lost the lawsuit. The U.S. grew wary: “So you weren’t on our side after all?” ARM has a joint venture in China called Arm China, and China’s internet industry was once the cornerstone of its wealth. ARM also has an independent legal entity in China, and the U.S. fears it may not cooperate with the export restrictions and continue to grant licenses for advanced architectures to Chinese companies. Before export controls were tightened, a handful of leading Chinese companies secured perpetual licenses for the V8 architecture and independently developed a series of domestically produced chips. The licensing situation for the V9 architecture is complex, but some companies have still obtained licenses. This year, the U.S. launched an antitrust review of ARM, requiring it to operate in a “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” manner—which essentially means preventing it from cutting off supplies to U.S. companies and protecting the vitality of its own chip industry. The U.S. has become even more uneasy upon seeing China’s moves: China recognized the importance of the ISA long ago, invested in ARM China, and forged its own path—namely, RISC-V. RISC-V is a fifth-generation reduced instruction set architecture, developed by UC Berkeley with funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. It is open-source, has a permissive license, and is patent-free. Anyone can develop commercial chips based on it, making it a technology in the public domain. The U.S. cannot revoke its licensing; the RISC-V Foundation specifically relocated from the U.S. to Switzerland to declare its neutrality and avoid export controls. Its decision-making body includes members from mainland China who directly participate in setting the instruction set standards. RISC-V is like a “basic dictionary”—it has only about 40 core instructions, is freely expandable, and is both concise and full of potential. China has long recognized this path and has mobilized domestic chip manufacturers, software developers, and research institutions to collaborate around RISC-V, striving to foster a chip ecosystem that is independent of Western control and runs parallel to X86 and ARM. China’s Xiangshan high-performance open-source processor focuses on high performance, while Alibaba has released the玄铁C950, which covers all application scenarios. We have gained a voice within the RISC-V ecosystem, which has made the U.S. very nervous. The U.S. is trying to reduce its reliance on ARM while simultaneously worrying about RISC-V. It calls for reducing dependence on ARM but also wants to avoid falling behind on RISC-V—a stance that actually increases its reliance on China. This back-and-forth is quite amusing. Instead of dithering like this, they might as well just ban RISC-V exports outright. While this would indeed stifle a form of global public domain knowledge, the U.S. could theoretically prohibit American companies and individuals from engaging in RISC-V-related cooperation with China. The result would be a global computing infrastructure split into two ecosystems: the U.S. version and the standard version. This would impose enormous costs on all manufacturers, forcing the U.S. to develop the next generation of high-performance architectures in isolation, thereby accelerating the de-Americanization of the tech supply chain. China would inevitably shift its resources toward RISC-V and take the lead in setting technical standards. So, regardless of whether the U.S. supports it or not, I’m all for it.

Singapore: A Small Country with Big Ambitions, or a Pawn in the International Order?

Folks, Singapore has really been making quite a splash on the international stage lately, with a dizzying array of statements. Take Lee Hsien Loong, for example: on January 8, in his capacity as Senior Minister, he expressed serious concern over U.S. military intervention in Venezuela. What? A tiny country is weighing in on global affairs? We don’t expect you to be some great sage, but your statement “opposing violations of international law” does confirm the Singaporean Foreign Ministry’s declaration—you really are “small in size but big in attitude,” as if you’re afraid people won’t notice your small-country mentality. Back when the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, Singapore clearly took a stand against Russia and even imposed sanctions. This prompted netizens to “call out” Lee Hsien Loong, asking if he dared to say “no” to the U.S. as well. Sure enough, Lee Hsien Loong did not disappoint the netizens’ “generous expectations”; he delivered a lengthy speech on Asia-Pacific affairs and even indirectly brought up China. Does this remark imply that China is all talk and no action? Let’s just assume he was hinting at that. But Singapore’s attitude of “telling others what to do” makes it seem as though they’re standing on the moral high ground, always ready to point fingers. Then there’s Huang Xuncai, the new prime minister who took office last year—he’s even less cautious than Lee Hsien Loong. Last November, when Sanae Takaichi’s erroneous remarks sparked tensions between China and Japan, he told the editor-in-chief of Bloomberg that Southeast Asia hoped China and Japan would ease the tensions. He also acknowledged that Sino-Japanese relations are complex, shaped by both the strategic competition between China and the U.S. and territorial disputes—but note that he used the Japanese term “Senkaku Islands” rather than “Diaoyu Islands.” Despite this being a term that could not be clearer in the context of the “One China” principle, he deliberately chose the Japanese terminology and went so far as to claim that Southeast Asia had already put history behind it and was moving forward in its relations with Japan. As soon as these remarks were made, netizens in Singapore and across Southeast Asia erupted in outrage, lambasting him for “forgetting his roots” and accusing him of letting historical issues fade into the wind. In contrast, former Singaporean Foreign Minister Yang Rongwen’s remarks were far more cautious. Yang Rongwen explicitly stated that Singapore should not intervene in the dispute between the United States and China, as doing so would only drag the country into the conflict. However, Huang Xuncai does not seem to share this caution. In an interview, he mentioned that regarding export controls, whatever treatment the U.S. seeks, Singapore would provide similar arrangements—because export controls are not unique to the U.S., and “long-arm jurisdiction” is a tool that becomes easy to wield once put into practice. Recently, the Ministry of Commerce, acting in accordance with the Regulations on the Administration of Technology Exports, blocked the acquisition of Manus by the U.S. company Meta. Manus, an AI dark horse born in Wuhan’s Optics Valley, fully capitalized on domestic policy incentives, an abundance of engineers, and cost advantages. Yet, after developing its products, the company laid off employees, transferred key personnel to establish a new entity in Singapore, treated China as a breeding ground for technology incubation, used Singapore as a springboard for rebranding, and viewed the U.S. as a playground for capital games. This case reflects Singapore’s policy direction. Singapore is attempting to strike a balance between the U.S. and China, leveraging its own strengths to neither fully align with the U.S. nor readily abandon opportunities for cooperation with China. For Singapore, this strategy is a double-edged sword: it attracts capital and talent while maintaining a certain degree of strategic maneuvering room in the U.S.-China rivalry. The remarks by Lee Hsien Loong and Yang Rongwen reveal Singapore’s true mindset: anxiety about survival. Having grown up in an era surrounded by hostility, Lee Hsien Loong deeply understands the importance of security; consequently, Singapore’s foreign policy has always been centered on security. Only when security is guaranteed will Singapore consider economic development and cooperation. And this security relies heavily on the “Pax Americana,” with the United States serving as the “world’s policeman.” The perceptions of Singapore’s strategic value differ significantly between the United States and China. For the United States, whether it be AUKUS or the Quad, Singapore’s support within the region is essential; losing Singapore would significantly weaken the entire Indo-Pacific strategy. On the Chinese side, Singapore is viewed as a gateway to Southeast Asia and an important piece in the strategy for a multipolar world, but not a cornerstone—it is an important economic partner, a primary destination for overseas expansion, and an initiator and participant in multilateral dialogue, yet it is far from being “indispensable.” Singapore itself is well aware of one thing: the global public goods provided by China and the U.S. differ. The U.S. can regulate the supply and demand of security, while China relies more on trade, economy, and development as levers for offering benefits or exerting pressure. Whether to win over distant peoples through conciliation or conquer them by force is something etched into the DNA of a civilization. That’s why some say that as the global landscape evolves, only a few great empires will remain, and the small nations that once relied on international law for protection—but are now jumping around too gleefully—will be the first to be cut down. I don’t think it will come to that; we wouldn’t bring ourselves to do such a thing. However, the opportunity to either provide a regional security umbrella or withdraw it certainly exists. Having said all this, it’s because I’ve lived in Singapore for many years and still have a soft spot for the place; I hope it takes care of itself. It’s better to keep a low profile—jumping around too much will squander the goodwill it has earned; it’s better to quietly make a fortune.

Xinjiang Cotton: From Top Producer to Sanctioned Industry

Everyone, I recently traveled to Xinjiang to conduct research on cotton and, while I was there, to get an update on the latest developments regarding Xinjiang cotton. This story goes back to March of this year, when I wrote an article on my WeChat official account about China’s cotton industry. It mainly discussed how China’s cotton output is projected to exceed 6 million metric tons by 2025, with Xinjiang’s production reaching as high as 6.61 million metric tons. These figures certainly draw envy from around the world. At the time, I also specifically emphasized that China’s cotton output is three times that of the United States, and that the quality has improved by leaps and bounds in recent years. For example, while India claims a production of 5 million metric tons, its actual industrial chain and quality are far inferior to ours. As it turned out, that single article really drew a lot of attention. One reader commented that while increased cotton production is a good thing, cotton farmers aren’t making money. Purchase prices aren’t rising, nor are international cotton prices. These words gave me a lot to think about. It turns out that while China’s cotton industry appears strong on the surface, it hides numerous underlying issues. No one has mentioned this in the past two years, yet consumers have continued to “buy, buy, buy”—unaware that the West has been consistently using sanctions to suppress Xinjiang cotton. I recall that from late 2020 to early 2021, brands like Adidas and Uniqlo banned the use of Xinjiang cotton. The U.S. and the West employed various propaganda tactics, such as alleging “forced labor.” In fact, 30 years ago, the cotton industry did indeed require a large labor force, but now, with advances in technology—particularly automated harvesting—output has increased significantly. The key problem, however, is that cotton prices just won’t rise. This directly affects the motivation of cotton farmers. Xinjiang’s cotton output exceeds 6 million metric tons, but national subsidies cover only about 5 million metric tons. Then there are the expensive harvesters—costing 3 to 4 million per unit—which are beyond the means of individual farming households. Growing cotton also requires laying plastic mulch, topping the plants, and watering, resulting in high costs and low profits. Although mechanization has improved, overall costs remain high, leading to declining enthusiasm for cultivation. Coupled with a shrinking market—now at about 40 percent of its peak—factory revenues have also plummeted. Furthermore, Xinjiang cotton faces several major challenges. The costs of laying plastic mulch, topping, and irrigation are high. Additionally, the international futures market is heavily influenced by the New York market. Western sanctions rely on financial measures—such as manipulating the futures market—to drive prices down. This not only affects domestic purchase prices but also makes it difficult to sell the cotton. Domestic absorption capacity is limited; brands like Adidas and Zara are actually controlled by international capital and generate significant demand. However, domestic demand in China is insufficient, so our ability to absorb this supply is constrained. Although Xinjiang cotton is of excellent quality, it is constrained by financial sanctions in the international market, preventing prices from rising and making it difficult to sell. This not only impacts our domestic industrial development but also leaves us vulnerable to control by other countries. For example, the U.S. uses capital to control the global consumer market; if our massive production capacity cannot be released to the world, cotton from Australia, Argentina, and Brazil will dominate the market. Technologically, we are already quite advanced—for example, using lasers for topping, drones for pesticide spraying, and Beidou positioning and visual recognition for harvesting machines. The problem, however, is that we are being held back by capital and international market constraints. So, how can we solve this problem? It requires the collective effort of the entire industry, including support from national policies, as well as integration and innovation across the industrial chain. I hope we can find a way to make Xinjiang cotton the global leader once again.

A New County in the Western Regions: The Taliban’s Economic Dreams and Practical Challenges

Folks, let’s talk about Cening County in the Kashgar Prefecture of Xinjiang. Friends here in China have given it the poetic nickname “Censhen,” and some even associate it with the golden age of the Tang Dynasty. But don’t be fooled by how artsy these names sound—foreign think tanks aren’t taking such a refined view. What they’re really concerned about is whether China—this “airplane taking off”—is going to carry the “virgin territory” of Kashgar up into the sky as well. In particular, are those Taliban in Afghanistan about to “get rich”? What exactly does our county’s name have to do with the Taliban? Take a look at the map: the Taliban regained power in 2021. Afghanistan has a long, narrow “tentacle” extending into our Kashgar Prefecture’s Taxkorgan County. To the east of Taxkorgan County lies the newly established Cenin County. The creation of Cenin County was by no means a simple, one-size-fits-all decision. In the Hotan Prefecture to the east, two new border counties—He’an County and He’kang County—were also established in 2024. This is clearly a series of administrative consolidation measures, signifying that our country is strengthening its control over border regions. Why is this being done? Because of the “Belt and Road” initiative. Central Asia and Xinjiang—this broader region known as the Western Regions—are no longer merely a buffer zone for great power rivalry, but have become a hub for trade and cooperation. As a hub connecting Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia, Afghanistan’s potential should not be underestimated. Afghanistan’s mineral resources are staggering—natural gas, coal, iron, copper, chromium, lithium, and rare earth elements are all found there. Copper deposits, in particular, would make it the world’s third-largest copper belt once developed. Here in Xinjiang, we are so close to these mineral resources that failing to make full use of them would be a massive strategic oversight for both of us. The Taliban also knows that to get rich, you must first build roads. For many years, they have repeatedly proposed the construction of the Wakhan Highway. This project was first proposed as early as 2008, but at that time, the goal was to combat the Taliban. At the request of the United States, President Karzai asked China to open the Wakhan Corridor to allow the delivery of supplies to counterterrorism forces. Although China agreed and conducted a feasibility study, no substantial progress was made. In 2021, after the Taliban drove out the Americans, they designated the Wakhan Highway as one of the country’s key national projects. Once completed, it will bring enormous economic benefits to Afghanistan. However, the 50-kilometer “Little Pamir Highway” they have built is still a dirt road, and whether it can be opened to traffic depends on China’s approval. Although this highway holds immense potential, it faces numerous challenges. The technical difficulties of road construction in high-altitude regions are self-evident. However, China’s primary concern is security. The East Turkestan separatists and ISIS-K may launch attacks, and opium trafficking is also a major problem. These security issues require implementation at the grassroots governance level, as well as the establishment of a coordination mechanism among China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Taliban to jointly combat crime. Underlying all this is the principle that security is the foundation and prerequisite for development. The Afghan Taliban must also demonstrate the ability to counter armed criminals for the Wakhan Highway to be viable. Currently, Afghanistan serves merely as an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which enters Afghanistan from Peshawar and Quetta in Pakistan. The Taliban are very eager to cooperate directly with China, preferably without Pakistan acting as an intermediary. This is because only China can help Afghanistan “take off.” Meanwhile, relations with Pakistan are deteriorating due to the presence of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Resolving this issue will test the Taliban’s political acumen. At present, the Taliban still demonstrate a certain level of capability. They have undertaken a series of infrastructure projects, ranging from canals to hydropower, gas pipelines, and even the development of a new city in the capital, Kabul. In addition to their capacity for long-term domestic planning and operational execution, they have also demonstrated the ability to coordinate on the international stage. Moreover, compared to the U.S.-backed government, they have been far more aggressive in their anti-corruption efforts. In short, Afghanistan needs industrialization and infrastructure development; it needs a stable environment; and it needs Chinese investment. Therefore, Cengling County and the Wakhan Corridor actually reflect how security governance and connectivity interact with one another. The rise of Eurasian land-based trade has occurred precisely against the backdrop of the Iran conflict, which has laid bare the vulnerability of maritime shipping lanes. Ladies and gentlemen, this is not a Renaissance; it is a very real economic and security struggle.

U.S. Think Tank Contradicts Itself: Iranian Online Trolls Run Rampant, Yet We’re Powerless to Stop Them?

Everyone, I recently heard that the U.S. itself has admitted it was caught off guard by Iran in the information war. What’s going on? It turns out that Iran’s online trolls are much more skilled than we imagined. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) just released a report detailing how Iran launched a multi-platform disinformation campaign, causing the U.S. to suffer a series of setbacks in its efforts to win over public opinion. Now, this isn’t about whether the war is right or wrong—it’s about exploring why Iran has the upper hand over us in the realm of discourse. The report states that Iranian online trolls have launched precise and diverse propaganda campaigns through social media platforms like Blue Sky. What is Blue Sky? It was originally an internal project at Twitter. After Musk acquired Twitter and X shifted to the right, the former CEO broke away to start his own platform, which became what we now know as Blue Sky. This platform has attracted a large number of left-wingers, whom the Chinese internet refers to as “white leftists.” In any case, Blue Sky has naturally become the opposition to Trump and the MAGA movement. Of course, I’m just relaying the facts—I’m not offering any commentary. The first step in the report is to identify bot accounts. If your account never posts anything but meets the following three criteria, you’re an Iranian bot: First, anti-Israel; second, pro-Palestine; third, anti-Trump. This is a bit tedious, but at least you can check yourself. However, very few people actually meet the third criterion—after all, who harbors such deep-seated resentment that they’d go out of their way to bash Trump? The report also mentions multilingual posting. Who would post in different foreign languages? Aside from those involved in global communications, it’s likely just foreign propaganda agencies. So, if we don’t want to be identified as paid trolls, we should avoid this kind of KPI-driven posting; otherwise, we’ll easily be flagged as accounts spreading harmful information. CSIS used AI tools to analyze the data and identified three major narrative themes. The first theme highlights how heroic Iran’s sacrifices are, how valiant its resistance is, and how successful its counterattacks are. For example, the report describes victories on the battlefield, including exaggerating military achievements, highlighting U.S. military casualties, using deepfake videos, and detailing how many U.S. military bases were destroyed, how many aircraft were shot down, how many Israeli cities were bombed, and how many global solidarity campaigns were launched in support of Iran. The second theme is how evil Israel is, that the war was entirely its own choice, and that it is manipulating the United States. The report also found that many usernames contained anti-Semitic terms, which I won’t list here one by one. The writing style of these users falls into two categories: inciting negative emotions and venting profanity. The study found that inciting negative emotions promotes sharing; moving from completely neutral to strongly negative content can increase shares by 57.7%, whereas profanity and vulgar language hinder sharing—for example, shifting from neutral to toxic language causes shares to drop by 62.4%. This is just as important for media work as it is for cyber warfare—you have to strike the right balance to spark resonance. The third theme is undermining the relationship between the public and the government in the U.S. and the West. These posts generated the highest engagement, averaging 150 shares, 470 likes, and 28 replies. This may not sound like much, but it generates greater resonance than the first two themes, with shares up 41%. The report also found that of these 19 core accounts, only two were truly central, linking 15 online communities. These communities interacted frequently with one another but had little contact with external users. Satellite accounts frantically repost content from the core accounts—especially those two major ones. I suspect these two might actually be Iranian patriotic bloggers. What’s the difference between a KOL and the leader of a paid comment army? Perhaps it’s just a matter of whose side they’re on. The report concludes by recommending that the U.S. must take the initiative in the digital realm to reclaim control of the narrative. First, prioritize the release of videos and images, using verified combat footage suitable for a broader audience to refute fake AI-generated videos; second, implement a tagging feature for official accounts and posts to flag hostile propaganda accounts, issue AI warnings, and identify non-authoritative information; third, collaborate with companies to crack down on fake accounts. My advice: if you’re worried your account might get caught in the crossfire, why not cultivate some hobbies outside of politics and post more about everyday life? All in all, this whole situation is a real mess, but we still need to figure out how to handle it. See you all next time!

Suspicions of a Political Upheaval in Hungary on a Flight to Chengdu

Everyone, I’m currently on a flight from Nepal to Chengdu, and just as I was boarding, I saw a news report: There’s been a major upheaval in Hungary. This isn’t just an ordinary change of government—it’s a complete regime change. Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, the leader of the Fidesz party who has been in office for 16 years, suffered a major setback in the parliamentary elections on the 12th: out of a total of 199 seats, his coalition won only 55—a loss of 80 seats compared to the previous term. Meanwhile, the third-largest party, led by Magyar, secured a supermajority of 138 seats in one fell swoop, meaning they can amend the constitution and completely reshape Hungary’s political landscape. Orbán’s pro-China policies, including his “Look East” strategy, will face unprecedented challenges. The key reason Hungary has become a hotspot for Chinese corporate investment in Europe lies in Orbán’s pro-China policies. He has offered Chinese companies a series of preferential policies, including tax subsidies, land incentives, and security guarantees. These policies have made Hungary one of the primary destinations for Chinese investment in Europe. New energy industry clusters and major projects—such as BYD’s Szeged plant, its first in Europe, and CATL’s 7.3 billion euro Debrecen plant—are prime examples. A Chinese new energy vehicle supply chain cluster, valued at least $18 billion, is entering the European Union via Hungary. In addition, Hungary is hosting the Hungary-Serbia Railway—the flagship European project of the “Belt and Road” initiative—as well as related logistics parks. More than 80 Chinese companies operate within Hungary, creating 15,000 jobs. Will all of this be threatened by a change in government? The newly elected third-largest party is a pro-Western establishment party that supports the EU and NATO. The new government’s top priority is to repair relations with the EU and bring Hungary back into the “mainstream.” This not only means unfreezing the 17.1 billion euros in funds currently frozen by the EU but also implementing policies focused on transparency, the rule of law, and anti-corruption. This implies that many of the subsidies previously provided to Chinese companies may no longer exist, and past projects may face retrospective reviews. However, this does not mean that existing cooperation will encounter major difficulties. The cost of overturning agreements is too high, and the economic consequences would be unbearable. Strong economic inertia will compel the government to maintain economic stability. Nevertheless, future cooperation will undoubtedly be more cautious. There will be a greater emphasis on implementing the EU’s legal framework and competition rules. Therefore, it may become inevitable for us to strengthen diplomatic communication and work to mitigate the slowdown in new investments. To avoid being caught off guard, companies must not only be prepared to use legal means to protect their rights, conduct compliance audits, and proactively disclose information, but also explore establishing backup operations in neighboring countries—such as Serbia or Slovakia—to form supply chain ties with German automakers. Orbán’s ouster also has significant implications for global politics. Known as a right-wing populist leader, he was once an enemy of the Western establishment. His downfall signals the decline of right-wing populism. Aside from the United States and Russia, figures such as Le Pen in France, Meloni in Italy, and Netanyahu in Israel all belong to this camp. Orbán was once viewed by the United States as an “ally” of right-wing populism. However, even these supporters were unable to save him, as there is a vast disconnect between the promises of right-wing populism and their actual delivery. Although Orbán is anti-globalization, he has attracted massive Chinese investment; although he proclaims that Hungary’s principle is sovereignty above all, he has repeatedly vetoed European aid to Ukraine; although he opposes immigration, he has quietly accepted large numbers of immigrants; and although he encourages childbirth, he has been powerless to stem the decline in the birth rate. These are all manifestations of his inability to reverse the trends of industrialization and globalization. Even if an establishment government were to take power, it would be difficult to sever supply chains deeply embedded with China based on ideological stances, and even more difficult to maintain public support in the long term. Political changes in Hungary present both opportunities and challenges for us. Therefore, we need to appropriately strengthen our sustainable development model to ensure greater stability as Chinese enterprises expand overseas.

Will virtual technology destroy human society?

Everyone, today I’d like to talk about a foreign expert in augmented reality, Irena Cronin, who made some remarks on the show *The Answer Lab*. The topic sounded pretty alarming: “Will virtual technology destroy human society?” Her answer was actually much more measured than I had expected. She said that with AR, what you see is still the real world around you—it’s just that some objects have a layer of information superimposed on them, making them “augmented.” So it doesn’t pull you into a completely virtual world; on the contrary, it helps you better understand reality. That’s the truth of the matter—technology isn’t trying to create another universe for us; it’s simply adding a layer of context to the world we already have. The question is, why do people force themselves to embrace these technologies? Her answer was straightforward: because in business, you have to move fast. If you don’t move, others will, and you’ll lose your job. That’s why people must learn—people are both consumers and workers, not just there for entertainment. Consumers must learn how to use these tools to do their jobs; if they don’t, they’ll truly be out of work. This is the belief she repeatedly emphasized. Someone asked, “With so many new jobs being created, can the pace keep up with the jobs being eliminated? Will it actually be faster?” She didn’t offer a flippant, optimistic answer. She said these developments are moving too fast—major events are happening every day. When it comes to large language models like ChatGPT, many people say jobs are doomed. She pointed out that intelligent machines have actually been in use in factories for twenty years—starting around 2005—but back then, they weren’t powerful enough; their field of vision was limited, and their operational scope was narrow. Now things are different—their field of vision is wider, and their capabilities are stronger—so the sense of disruption from this wave is very real. But she doesn’t believe the end of the world is nigh. Not every workplace can be staffed with robots; there will always be certain processes that require human judgment and problem-solving. Robots and intelligent machines can’t solve everything. She specifically mentioned jobs that require extensive training—doctors and teachers trained in universities, as well as professionals in finance and banking—where robots can handle some tasks, but they will inevitably make mistakes, and when they do, human judgment is needed to catch the fallout. So how should we view this? Technology is indeed replacing some old jobs while creating new ones, but the two processes aren’t happening at the same pace—and it’s that transitional gap that’s the most painful. It’s too simplistic to expect machines to replace humans entirely, or to expect them to leave everything unchanged. The old adage still holds true: you have to learn—and keep learning. Machines can teach people, provided those people are willing to try using them first. Ladies and gentlemen, will virtual technology destroy society? I believe the answer doesn’t lie with the machines, but with whether we are willing to keep up.

When it comes to Syria, you don't know a damn thing!

Guys, whenever we mention Syria, it’s such a total mess—it’s practically a real-life “PVE dungeon.” And if we look at the entire Middle East, there’s fighting breaking out there every single day. Doesn’t that seem crazy? What on earth is going on? Let’s start with geography. Syria lies at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and Europe—a natural “transit hub” with no particularly rugged terrain. Ancient civilizations originated along great rivers, expanded into mountainous regions, and eventually encountered natural barriers. But Syria? It has no such terrain whatsoever, leaving it vulnerable to being exploited by one empire after another—from the Sumerians, Assyrians, Persians, and Romans to the Arab Empire—one after another. Syria has never truly been independent. This makes things simple: Syria is neither a proper country nor a proper territory; relying on it to defend one’s homeland is nothing but a pipe dream. Syria’s biggest problem is that it’s too narrow: desert to the east, the Mediterranean Sea to the west, and high mountains to the north and south. Aleppo and Damascus—these two ancient cities—with Damascus relying on the Lebanon Mountains; once the mountain passes are cut off, Damascus becomes an isolated island. The vast majority of the country’s population is crammed into this tiny area—that’s simply not stable. And these complex geographical conditions have given rise to a complex ethnic and religious landscape. Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Turks, and Caucasians, along with Alawites, Shiites, Druze, and Christians—various religious factions take turns taking center stage. This structure leads to frequent conflicts, often escalating into life-and-death struggles. Take the Assad family, for example—the Alawites, a sort of “monster” within Islam; even the name carries a certain sense of solemnity. But since the Alawites are, after all, a minority, Assad had to rely on other religious factions—such as the Shiites—to consolidate his power, and Iran naturally became his main backer. Having covered all that background, let’s talk about the civil war. The ultimate downfall of the Assad regime was triggered by the 2011 Arab Spring. Anti-government forces and government troops opened fire at the slightest provocation; HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) launched an offensive in Idlib, and Assad’s government forces retreated rapidly. Shortly thereafter, the Kurds also seized territory in the north. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) joined forces with other anti-government groups to launch an attack on Damascus, and the Assad regime suffered a series of defeats. Seeing that the situation was hopeless, Assad fled to a Russian base, but Russia also withdrew. Southern rebels seized the opportunity to storm Damascus, and Assad lost control completely. Ultimately, HTS leader Julani declared the Assad regime completely toppled, and no one can say for certain what the future holds for Syria. Joulani is no ordinary figure. Born in 1982 in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, his father hailed from the Golan Heights and was a follower of Egyptian President Nasser. After escaping prison twice during political purges, his father eventually fled to Saudi Arabia, where he worked as a petroleum engineer. When Joulani reached school age, the family moved back to Damascus. In 2000, when the Second Palestinian Intifada broke out, he—having just come of age—began to radicalize, much like many other passionate young Arabs at the time. In 2003, after the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein, he decided to go to Iraq, where he made contact with al-Qaeda. Less than a year later, he was captured by U.S. forces and served his full sentence, not being released until 2011. His release coincided with the Arab Spring spreading to Syria; he returned, gathered a following, and gradually rose to become the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In summary, behind the Syrian civil war lies a complex intertwining of geographical conditions, religious conflicts, and historical grievances. Ladies and gentlemen, let us never again underestimate this land. Syria is merely a microcosm of the conflicts in the Middle East, and behind these conflicts lies the complexity and suffering of human civilization as a whole.

U.S. Universities Suspend Exchange Programs: Are They Losing Out or Gaining an Advantage?

Everyone, as we all know, quite a few Chinese students are heading to the U.S. to study these days, but why are American universities one after another suspending exchange programs? Are they losing out? Let’s talk about this today. First, the Quincy Institute, a U.S. think tank, released a report directly pointing out that Chinese international students make a significant contribution to the U.S.—and it’s not just about money. Let’s start with the data from the report: Over the past 15 years, the vast majority of Chinese students who earned PhDs in science and engineering in the U.S. chose to stay in the country after graduation. From the early 2000s until just before Trump took office, 85% to 95% of Chinese PhD graduates in science and engineering in the U.S. remained in the country for five years or more after graduation. Even as recently as 2023, this proportion remained as high as 83 percent—nearly the highest among international students from any country. This is no small number; Chinese researchers are present throughout American research teams and innovation sectors. Many of them have become U.S. citizens, truly becoming a valuable intellectual asset to the United States. Let’s look at some specific data: for the 2024–2025 academic year, among Chinese students in the U.S., 23.6% were majoring in mathematics and 17.8% in engineering. Students studying Shakespeare are included in the 0.4% studying English, and those studying Cantonese are included in the 1.2% studying the humanities—both represent a tiny minority. These STEM students are not only conducting research but also starting their own businesses. Although international students are not allowed to work directly, they can gain internship experience in related fields through OPT (Optional Practical Training). In 2023, the total number of international students in the U.S. had fallen significantly from its peak before 2020, yet a quarter of all internship applications still came from Chinese students. That same year, H-1B visa quotas were tightened, yet Chinese nationals accounted for 12% of applicants, with more than 60% of them in computer-related fields—one of the most dynamic industries in the U.S. Their contributions to U.S. patents, entrepreneurship, and scientific research far exceed their proportion of the total population, helping the U.S. address critical talent shortages. The report concludes that U.S. workers need not worry about Chinese international students taking their jobs; in fact, these students are here to strengthen the U.S.’s competitive edge in technology talent. What about China? China has made progress, but there are still areas for improvement. Since the late 1990s, China has expanded university enrollment and increased investment in scientific research, with noticeable results. Today, China produces far more science and engineering graduates annually than the U.S., with significantly higher annual outputs of doctoral degrees and academic papers, as well as a growing number of research infrastructure facilities and advanced laboratories. In addition, China’s industrial policies continue to prioritize sectors such as artificial intelligence, new energy, and advanced manufacturing, driving strong domestic demand for specialized talent in these fields. In other words, China’s top talent now has options; they can thrive just as well by staying in the country. However, structural issues in China’s talent strategy are not so easy to overcome—such as inconsistent educational quality, weak links between industry, academia, and research, a lack of autonomy in scientific research, and a mismatch between supply and demand in the labor market. In the semiconductor sector in particular, the full potential of scientific research cannot be realized due to the immaturity of tacit knowledge and the ecosystem. Consequently, the United States seeks to leverage its strengths—such as academic autonomy, rigorous peer review, abundant opportunities for cutting-edge research, a mature interdisciplinary framework, and close integration between research and industry—to attract Chinese students studying abroad. By contrast, China’s brain drain represents an inflow of talent into the United States. The defining characteristic of the U.S. talent system is its ability to attract foreign talent: in addition to the benefits mentioned above, even if these individuals eventually return to their home countries, the professional networks among alumni constitute a vast asset that can facilitate trade, investment, and informal exchanges—making them a strategic asset for the United States. Many Americans remain skeptical of this valuable strategic asset, believing it is inappropriate to allow Chinese nationals to conduct research in sensitive fields. The report cautions that if Chinese students were to stop coming to the United States to study, the damage to the U.S. talent base would actually be greater. Therefore, while maintaining openness, the United States must adopt more refined management practices, implement differentiated approval processes, and avoid a one-size-fits-all approach. They recommend that the U.S. government emulate China’s K-visa program, which is specifically designed to attract high-caliber foreign talent, particularly entrepreneurs and researchers. The report also puts forward three recommendations: First, distinguish between basic research and sensitive applications to ensure that dual-use technologies are not accessed. Second, screen talent without relying solely on nationality as the sole criterion; even when evaluating Chinese nationals, a comprehensive assessment should be conducted. Third, provide funding to universities to ensure research security. Overall, the report argues that the talent competition between China and the U.S. is not merely a contest between individuals, but a contest between national talent systems. The current situation favors the U.S., so the U.S. must cherish its educational system and talent advantages and must not rashly close its doors. Ladies and gentlemen, viewed in this light, the suspension of exchange programs by U.S. universities actually benefits the U.S. rather than harming it. If the U.S. government truly wishes to prevail in the talent competition, it must learn from China’s meticulous management approach. Otherwise, the U.S. will not only lose its status as the central hub of global talent mobility but will also force China to accelerate its pursuit of self-reliance and become more exclusionary—resulting in the U.S. being excluded from participating in the formulation of many future norms and standards.

The U.S. is playing the "maximum pressure" game, but we’ve struck back with a counterpunch that hits them right where it hurts.

Ladies and gentlemen, the U.S. has recently been pulling some shenanigans, landing us in a huge mess. President Trump, with his big mouth, is always talking about “maximum pressure.” Our constructive and strategically stable relationship with the U.S. was going just fine—we even had major diplomatic plans scheduled for September—but they insisted on fabricating charges out of thin air. In July, the U.S. imposed additional tariffs on the grounds that China had failed to crack down on forced labor. Later, they expanded the Entity List by a whopping 43 companies—not only traditional industries like cotton spinning and apparel, but also high-tech sectors and strategic minerals were all blacklisted this time. But this move backfired spectacularly. Last week, the Ministry of Commerce announced countermeasures against six U.S. entities. This series of countermeasures is bold and decisive—it not only targets the purveyors of rumors regarding Xinjiang but also aims to cut off the source of the U.S.’s baseless accusations, namely, the hijacked international rules. The U.S. plays these tricks not to annoy us, but purely because it’s a low-cost strategy. The dilemma the U.S. faces is a lack of control over supply chains and uncompetitive corporate costs. It could improve its situation through self-reliance, subsidies, and the cultivation of industrial clusters, but it can also resort to bullying us. The U.S. has dominated the postwar legal order, and international rules revolve around it. When everyone acknowledges U.S. jurisdiction and its authority, it can use long-arm jurisdiction and compliance restrictions to raise the cost of international market access for Chinese enterprises. China’s countermeasures are very clear: they are not aimed at any individual politician, nor are they directed solely at the entities themselves—which are merely tools. Rather, they target the infrastructure upon which Western sanctions and trade enforcement rely. In other words, the goal is to deny the legitimacy of the United States’ approach at its very root by rejecting the validity of cross-border compliance audits. If multinational corporations continue to rigidly adhere to compliance standards, they will effectively be abandoning China’s industrial supply chain; if they wish to import critical goods, they must lower their enforcement standards. They must choose between form and substance; otherwise, they will be trying to have it both ways. This is not China’s first countermeasure. In May of this year, the Ministry of Commerce issued a blocking order in response to U.S. sanctions; the U.S. prohibited us from processing Iranian crude oil, so on what grounds should we recognize, enforce, or comply with such improper extraterritorial jurisdiction? The same applies to the EU: when it demands unnecessary domestic data from Chinese entities across borders, the Ministry of Justice has made it clear that it will not cooperate or provide such information. Western media interpret this as China beginning to erect a legal firewall to resist unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction. In fact, the gears of change in the global competitive landscape have long since begun to turn. A few days ago, *Foreign Affairs* published an article titled “China’s Legal Weapons.” It discusses how China has long elevated the strengthening of its legal capabilities to a national strategic level. Traditionally, great power competition has centered on military, economic, and technological spheres. The author argues that “legal power” can also influence the international landscape. China has long recognized that the United States can use its judicial jurisdiction to isolate Iran from the oil market and the global banking system. While this is fundamentally underpinned by wealth and military might, it also relies on U.S. legal talent, legal institutions, and judicial control over key global economic hubs. China is working to break the long-standing U.S. monopoly on global “long-arm jurisdiction” and legal hegemony through state-led legal system development. Legal hegemony is not established overnight. Its rise during World War II enabled the United States to build international security, trade, and financial institutions centered on itself—namely, the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Bretton Woods system. The United States possesses a vast legal sector, mature corporate conglomerates, and a professional judicial system. These three elements reinforce one another, gradually bringing everything—including products settled in U.S. dollars, those containing American software or components, those involving U.S. entities, or those affecting the U.S. market—under U.S. jurisdiction. Many foreign companies, in order to preserve their access to the U.S. market, have chosen to comply with U.S. laws and regulations. When the United States competes with us, the referee and the player become one; laws and regulations become tools of hegemony, complementing aircraft carriers and the U.S. dollar. While appearing neutral, they are in fact all designed to uphold U.S. dominance. So how is China building its legal arsenal? There are five main dimensions: First is the rapid development of a legislative toolkit, including the National Security Law, the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, the Export Control Law, the Data Security Law, and others—such as measures to block sanctions, regulations to safeguard the security of industrial and supply chains, and provisions to counter improper extraterritorial jurisdiction. Not only does this form a comprehensive chain of laws and regulations, but it is also evolving toward the stages of enforcement and judicial application. Second is the development of legal talent and institutional capacity. Government ministries, law schools, and bar associations across the country are vigorously cultivating professionals in foreign-related legal affairs who are well-versed in foreign and international law, with a particular emphasis on enhancing their ability to use legal terminology from foreign legal systems in legal arguments. At the same time, efforts are being made to enhance the appeal of Chinese legal institutions—such as the China International Commercial Court and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center—with the aim of replacing Western courts in resolving international commercial disputes. Next is providing litigation support to Chinese enterprises until they can use legal tools to break out of their historically passive position, as well as actively participating in the formulation of international rules and standards to increase their voice within the international legal system. This article argues that although China has made significant progress in building its legal capabilities, it still cannot stand on equal footing with U.S. legal hegemony. This is because, compared to legislation and governance, the so-called global credibility of the U.S. legal system is built upon its judicial independence, centuries of accumulated case law, and transparent institutional expectations. The Chinese legal system, however, is driven by political and national security demands, and this legal environment may cause multinational corporations to remain cautious. Nevertheless, the article warns the United States not to underestimate China’s legal countermeasures—particularly not to undermine the credibility of its own judicial institutions, renege on its commitments to multilateral international law, or abuse sanctions, as these actions could lead to a backlash against the U.S. dollar and the American judicial system. This self-erosion enables China to shape global legal norms and secure robust legal rights without having to embrace the liberal rule of law. No matter what the United States does, a divergence in legal and compliance systems is inevitable. This is because the backing and coercive foundation of law is state violence: if you do not comply, I can destroy you militarily, isolate you financially, and decouple from you commercially—and in that moment, I am the master of the law. When facing China, “long-arm jurisdiction” collides with the “shield of sovereignty”; unable to establish a deterrent through force, it will be rendered ineffective. However, friction will arise at the boundary between the two systems, causing the channels connecting them to fracture. Consequently, the future business world may descend into a chaotic phase akin to “two suns in the sky,” and the initial reaction of global supply chains may be to split into two independent systems. Ultimately, it will come down to which system runs more smoothly. During this period, China needs to accelerate the development of its own supply chain compliance and ESG—that is, social responsibility standards—to attract non-Western and even Western countries to join us.

Is watching soccer at home better than going to the World Cup? Is it worth the money?

To all soccer fans and viewers out there: While the whole world is gearing up to head to the U.S. for the 2026 World Cup, let’s not rush to buy plane tickets just yet—let’s first take a look at what this World Cup is really all about. **First Hurdle: The Financial Test** Let’s talk about transportation costs. A train ride from New York normally costs $12.90, but during the World Cup, it’ll jump to $150. That’s more than ten times the usual price—just thinking about it makes you realize these train tickets are more precious than gold. **Hurdle #2: Exorbitant Ticket Prices** Then there are the tickets. The BBC interviewed a British father and son who are soccer fans; to save money, the pair camped along the way, but at $1,200 per ticket, this is nothing short of “robbery in broad daylight.” Meanwhile, resale prices for the final soared as high as $73,000—that’s over 500,000 RMB per ticket! The BBC’s economics editor defined this World Cup as a “K-shaped economy”—where the wealthy climb higher while ordinary fans fall further behind. It’s heartbreaking just to think about it. **Hurdle No. 3: The Visa Hurdle** The visa process is another headache. For example, FIFA referee Omar Alton was denied a visa upon arriving in Miami and had to turn back. Fifteen officials and staff members from the Iranian national team were also denied visas, forcing them to relocate their training camp to Mexico. And yet FIFA still had the nerve to say, “We do not get involved in the host country’s immigration procedures.” That’s just how torturous this World Cup is—if even referees can’t get in, what hope do the rest of us have? **Hisense: The Savior of Technology?** But we can always choose to watch the games at home on a Hisense TV—which is even more enjoyable than going to the U.S. As a World Cup sponsor, Hisense isn’t just spending money; they actually have the technology to back it up. The TVs used by VAR officials at this World Cup are made by Hisense. FIFA President Infantino personally tried one out at the Dallas International Broadcast Center and posted a video. The screen that FIFA referees use to make their final decisions employs the same RGB technology as the one you use to watch the games at home. **Why Did FIFA Choose Hisense?** The reason Hisense earned FIFA’s recognition is that its technology is truly impressive. Ordinary TVs use white backlighting and rely on color filters to produce colors; when the screen is bright, too much light passes through, causing the image to appear washed out and with color distortion. But Hisense’s RGB mini-LED is different: the red, green, and blue chips emit light directly, ensuring colors are accurate right from the source. In layman’s terms, the green of the soccer field is exactly the same as the green on the TV screen. While ordinary TVs can only control brightness, Hisense’s proprietary Xinshi AI picture quality chip enables simultaneous control of both light and color. The color control precision in each zone is exceptionally high, resulting in more natural colors without light-zone blurring. **The Thrill of Watching Sports** Additionally, the Hisense E8S features a native 4K 180Hz refresh rate, paired with the Obsidian Pro display, which prevents the screen from appearing washed-out or reflecting light—even with the lights on during the day. The immersive experience is top-notch too. Equipped with Devialet speakers and Paris Opera-level acoustic tuning, along with 10 sound units and bass extending down to 45Hz, you’ll hear every detail—from the crowd’s cheers to the dull thud of the ball hitting the net. **Conclusion** Sports fans, let’s face it: spending hundreds of thousands of RMB to fly to the U.S. for a game only to sit on the edge of your seat isn’t worth it. Why not save that money and treat yourself to a Hisense E8S instead? Watching the game at home is comfortable, convenient, and free from all the hassle. Don’t wait until it’s too late to regret your decision.

Trump’s “Science of Winning”: A Minor Incident in Cuba and the Grand Strategic Game in Latin America

Folks, let’s talk about the “Art of Winning” in the United States. It’s all about small victories every day, but Trump—this “master of winning”—has truly been full of “grand ambitions” this year: taking down Khamenei, kidnapping Maduro, and threatening Greenland and Panama. Each and every one of these moves has left the whole world speechless. So what’s he up to next? While the world’s attention has been drawn to Iran, the U.S. has been quietly reaching out to Cuba’s top leadership. Trump revealed that Cuba is in big trouble—it has no money and, essentially, nothing at all. Meanwhile, Republican heavyweight Rubio is engaged in very high-level private talks with Cuba. In Trump’s words, the U.S. might eventually carry out a “friendly takeover” of Cuba—that is, a “Friendly Takeover” rather than a “Hostile Takeover.” It’s not about forcing them to submit, but about getting them to hand over control voluntarily. Cuba has long been the vanguard of anti-American sentiment in Latin America. Subject to a comprehensive U.S. embargo for many years, its economy is extremely fragile. Its oil supplies come primarily from Venezuela and Mexico, but now one of these countries has been swiftly targeted by the U.S., while the other faces the threat of sanctions, leading to a cutoff of Cuba’s oil supply. Without energy, the country comes to a complete standstill—no oil means no electricity, and without electricity, production is impossible. The hardships in food, transportation, healthcare, and other aspects of daily life have already reached a critical point. The U.S. is adopting a strategy of “acting without attacking” toward Cuba—what opportunity is it waiting for to change U.S.-Cuba relations? Since Trump’s focus remains on Ukraine and Iran—two issues involving broader great-power rivalries—Cuba has been pushed to the back burner. Related matters have been entrusted to Cuban-American Secretary of State Rubio, which is also part of the strategy to wait for an opportunity to fundamentally transform U.S.-Cuba relations. According to U.S. media reports, Rubio has bypassed official Cuban channels and, rather than dealing with First Secretary and President Díaz-Canel, has instead established contact with former First Secretary Raúl Castro—Fidel’s younger brother. Raúl is now 94 years old and unable to negotiate directly; in reality, it is his grandson and caretaker—Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro—who is acting on his behalf. The Cuban government has denied any high-level bilateral government talks but has not denied the private contacts mentioned by the U.S. side. Thus, while the U.S. publicly applies pressure on Cuba as a whole, it privately extends an olive branch to the political elite in an effort to win them over. First, this indicates that the Trump administration still views Raúl Castro as the true decision-maker behind the scenes, which is why it seeks to bypass the bureaucratic ranks within the government and engage directly with the person holding the real power. According to Trump’s advisory team, they have reached out to a number of influential Cuban elites, but the individual they value most and are most eager to win over is “Little Castro”—the son of Raúl’s eldest daughter, Deborah, who was his grandfather’s favorite. He currently serves as chief bodyguard and has taken over the Cuban Enterprise Management Group from his father—a conglomerate that accounts for three to four tenths of Cuba’s national economy. The U.S. negotiators are keeping a close eye on Cuba’s real power players, and the talks between the two sides have been surprisingly cordial. Rubio and Castro Jr. not only share the same ethnic heritage but even have the same accent; there were no political criticisms of the past, only visions for the future. In other words, the talks went quite well—but why is that? Has the U.S. changed? No, it is Cuba that has changed. According to U.S. assessments, Cuba’s political elite was deeply shaken by Maduro’s abduction. The U.S. military suffered no casualties but killed at least 32 Cuban intelligence and military personnel who had been dispatched to Venezuela to protect Maduro. Even more lethal than the deterrent effect was the U.S. decision to leave the door open, allowing Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to serve as acting president. The signal this sends to Cuba is that the U.S. does not seek a complete regime change, but will allow certain friendly elites to remain in power. This amounts to a reshuffling of positions within the Cuban elite—which is already the greatest temptation—so everything is open for discussion. Cuba’s younger generation of business elites believes the revolution has failed and is ready at any moment to act as collaborators. This is also why the U.S. has not taken direct action—it is waiting for internal turmoil in Cuba to put pressure on the government. As things stand, the U.S. is likely to improve relations with Cuba, bringing a more pro-American regime to this strategic hub at the crossroads of the Caribbean and the Atlantic, which would greatly help strengthen America’s geopolitical advantages. Incidentally, Trump’s “Trumpism” is gaining momentum, and anti-American sentiment among various Latin American governments may wane for some time. For example, the recent seven-day goodwill visit to Chile by China’s naval hospital ship, the Silk Road Ark, was not without its challenges. Chile has long maintained good relations with us, so why did the Chilean Ministry of Health refuse to approve these humanitarian medical services? Because the United States was pressuring Chile and imposed visa sanctions on three Chilean government officials, claiming that Chile was undermining security in the Western Hemisphere. It turns out they were involved in a submarine cable project connecting Hong Kong to Chile, which included Chinese companies in its construction. This is the first cable linking Asia and South America; once completed, electronic communications will no longer need to pass through the United States, thereby challenging U.S. monopoly over critical infrastructure in South America. Back in 2019, Chile was forced to cancel a project for a direct submarine cable to Shanghai due to U.S. pressure. This time, after weighing its options, Chile has put forward a compromise: it will allow the “Silk Road Ark” to dock for a friendly visit and conduct medical exchange activities, but it will prohibit the ship from providing medical services to local Chilean residents. Chile is currently in the midst of a transition of power, and the incoming right-wing government of Castor has already chosen sides; it will adopt a more overtly pro-U.S. stance in the future, which is part of Latin America’s collective shift to the right. Maduro’s kidnapping early this year arguably accelerated this process. So don’t be fooled by Trump’s unreliability—nine out of ten of his statements are just bluster—because most of the world’s true decision-makers aren’t even capable of pulling off such bluster.

South Korea Faces an Energy Crisis: The Pain and Helplessness of Being Held Hostage

Ladies and gentlemen, South Korea has recently found itself in a tight spot, struggling to catch its breath. With the threat of war looming over Iran, the Strait of Hormuz—a waterway less than 35 kilometers wide—has become a “strategic chokepoint,” and even South Korea, 3,500 nautical miles away, can no longer sit idly by. To cope with the energy crisis, they’ve had to cut their shower time to the minimum allowed, and even laundry must be piled up until the weekend to be done all at once. And that’s not all—South Korea’s industrial sector’s reliance on imported energy is truly jaw-dropping. The Persian Gulf supplies one-fifth of the world’s energy needs, and 84% of South Korea’s energy imports—particularly 70% of its oil and 20% of its liquefied natural gas—come from the Middle East. Although Japan is no slouch either, it has nuclear power and oil reserves to fall back on, so its energy diversification is better than South Korea’s—South Korea is truly at a critical juncture. South Korea’s energy shortage is a genuine crisis. Because it is a true “island,” it has no access to other countries’ power grids for emergency imports. Its industrial structure is also extremely energy-dependent, with heavy industry, petrochemicals, and advanced manufacturing all being energy-intensive sectors. Any crisis in energy supply would shake the very foundations of the nation. Currently, South Korea has approximately 200 days’ worth of oil reserves and 9 days’ worth of natural gas reserves, though actual reserves are far higher than the legal minimum. However, Qatar—the second-largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG)—is set to take 17% of its production capacity offline for 3 to 5 years, meaning South Korea must quickly find alternative suppliers. These are likely to be the United States or Australia. The energy shortage has directly led to soaring shipping and air freight costs, indirectly contributing to inflation. South Korea’s most pressing issue at the moment is the supply of naphtha, a core raw material for the petrochemical industry. Naphtha is a key ingredient in plastic production, and its price has surged by more than 120%, directly impacting the upstream supply chain for plastic products. Despite the South Korean economy appearing robust on the surface, plastic bags have been snapped up, and convenience stores have even run out of trash bags. The South Korean government has shifted into emergency mode, monitoring 23 key commodities—including rice, fertilizer, and school uniforms—and has established an emergency economic response mechanism to prevent prolonged tensions in the Middle East from triggering a crisis affecting people’s livelihoods and the economy. Experts estimate that this crisis could last 3 to 6 months. In the best-case scenario, South Korea’s GDP growth rate could drop from 1% to 0.7%; in the worst-case scenario, the crisis could persist for a year, resulting in zero economic growth for the country. For South Korea, the Middle East is not just about oil and gas; 41 strategic raw materials in its industrial supply chain—70 percent of which are imported from the Middle East—come from just three countries. For example, a certain mineral is sourced from Turkey, oil from Saudi Arabia, and iodine from Israel. Semiconductors are a vital pillar of South Korea’s economy. In recent years, the country has increasingly focused on AI and built its growth strategy around chips. Samsung and SK Hynix dominate the global memory chip market, underpinning the boom in AI and cloud computing. Not only does this consume vast amounts of energy, but the supply chain is also fundamentally reliant on the Middle East: cooling wafers in semiconductor manufacturing requires helium, and 65% of South Korea’s helium comes from Qatar; meanwhile, 98% of the xenon used in the production process comes from Israel. Fortunately, before the conflict in Iran began, there was a relative surplus of supply, and South Korea’s semiconductor industry maintained an average inventory of six months. AI is a highly globalized industry where a single change can have far-reaching consequences. South Korean-made HBM memory chips are primarily sold to TSMC, which manufactures them for NVIDIA. Since half of Taiwan’s electricity generation relies on liquefied natural gas (LNG), if LNG supplies are disrupted, TSMC will have to cut production—and even if Samsung manages to produce memory chips, it won’t be able to sell them. Compounding the problem is the fact that the Middle East, with its abundant energy resources, is home to a high concentration of AI data centers—and the war will inevitably force companies to reconsider their deployment strategies. South Korea’s economic miracle is inextricably linked to the U.S.-led international order. When a hegemonic power’s monopoly on the use of force is called into question or challenged, countries that have been riding on its coattails must consider how to address long-term risks.

Iran: A Labyrinth Swept Up by History

Everyone, what exactly is Iran? Simple: it’s the country sandwiched between Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, bordered by the Caspian Sea to the north, the Persian Gulf to the south, with an area of 1.65 million square kilometers—equivalent to Xinjiang—a population of 92 million, slightly less than Henan’s, and a GDP that exceeds Henan’s when calculated at purchasing power parity and is higher than Portugal’s at nominal exchange rates. But no matter how you calculate it, its per capita GDP is higher than India’s. This is merely the material Iran—not the eternal Iran that resides in the hearts of its people. The search for eternal identity is the challenge facing nations that have been “swimming naked”—as seen in the cases of Trump in the U.S., Putin in Russia, and Marx after his encounter with Confucius. Thus, Trump answered the question of what America is, and Putin answered the question of what Russia is. When Marx met Confucius, well, he ended up on the wrong channel. To understand the eternal Iran, one must return to the very beginning: the collision of the Arabian and Eurasian tectonic plates shaped Iran’s geographical reality. The Zagros Mountains stretch from Turkey to the Persian Gulf; the Alborz Mountains connect to the Caucasus Mountains, running eastward along the southern shore of the Caspian Sea to merge with the Khorasan region; and the Eastern Iranian Mountains link to the Suleiman Mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The mountains are Iran’s chisel, its ribs, and its breasts. The mountains create an intricate tapestry of the Iranian Plateau, ancient lands, oases, salt flats, and a few low-lying plains. They protect the heart of Persia and sustain the majority of Iran’s population. The mountains have fostered a diverse economy, yet have long posed transportation challenges, limiting internal trade; they have concealed natural treasures that were not mined until the advent of modern industry. Unlike other ancient civilizations, Iran lacks a major river running through its entire territory; the only non-core agricultural region lies west of the Zagros Mountains, where the ancient Elamite civilization flourished. The Elamite language is an isolating language, but the Elamites do not belong to the Iranian ethnic group. The Iranian people trace their origins to the Proto-Indo-Europeans; their descendants, the Aryans, arrived on the Iranian Plateau around 1000 BCE and became the Iranians. Iran is synonymous with the Aryans: I-R-A-N, A-R-A-N, A-R-Y-A-N—a circular argument. So what is “Persia”? The Aryans who ascended the plateau were divided into three branches: the Medes, the Persians, and the Parthians. The Pars people, a Persian tribe, settled in the southern Zagros Mountains—today’s Fars Province in Iran—which is also the birthplace of the Persian Empire. Facing the mountains, the Persians invented the qanat—a system of wells dug into the mountainside, connected by underground channels to the foothills—to transport groundwater over long distances. This boosted agricultural efficiency, supported the non-agricultural population, led to the emergence of cities and a complex division of labor, and transformed the tribe into a nation-state. By the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, the Achaemenid Dynasty—the First Persian Empire—was at the height of its power, with a territory three times the size of modern-day Iran, becoming the world’s first empire. The empire consisted of both the suzerain state and its conquered territories; power was decentralized, with local autonomy and multiple centers of authority, resembling a loose federation. The empire respected local customs, embraced various religions, and liberated the Jewish people; Cyrus the Great became the only non-Jewish Messiah in Judaism. However, when this pluralistic structure was weak, the centripetal force at the periphery was insufficient, making it difficult to maintain cohesion. As a result, today’s Iran consists of a Persian majority that accounts for just over half of the population, with a quarter being Azerbaijanis, and dozens of other ethnic groups, including Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Baloch. Israel and American neoconservatives have made regime change in Iran a strategic goal, seeking to sow discord among ethnic minorities, as many of Iran’s strategic locations are situated in areas where ethnic minorities reside. The main oil and natural gas production areas and export ports are all located in Khuzestan Province, where more than half the population consists of Arabs who year for autonomy, while the Chabahar Port—a joint venture between Russia, Iran, and India—is located in Baluchistan Province. Although Iran’s opposition consists of Persians, Persian nationalism is unwilling to relinquish its border regions; in the face of a major enemy, the nation can unite, but in the absence of such a threat, it may fracture. Iran’s unique power structure may, following a major upheaval in Khamenei’s government, fragment into hostile factions, leading to a “Balkanization” of Iran. Splitting Iran to create chaos offers limited benefits to the United States, but it alleviates geopolitical pressure on Israel’s expansion. Judaism reveres the Persian monarchs as prophets; after Israel’s founding in 1948, Iran was the second Muslim country to recognize it, and the two nations engaged in an “oil-for-arms” exchange until their relations broke down in 1979. When it comes to the Iranian issue, Britain calls the shots. In the 19th century, Britain and Russia vied for colonial expansion in Central Asia: Tsarist Russia occupied Persia and controlled the Caucasus, while Britain intervened in southern Persia, establishing a division of spheres of influence with Tsarist Russia. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company extracted Iranian oil, and Britain prioritized economic penetration, even bribing the Qajar kings to secure oil extraction rights. Before World War II, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was the British Empire’s leading enterprise. In 1941, the Soviet Union invaded Iran, turning it into a corridor through which the West supplied materials to the Soviet Union. Britain and the United States propped up the Pahlavi dynasty, but its regime was fragile; due to British and American interference, Iran called for the nationalization of oil companies. In 1951, Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Two years later, a joint British-American operation overthrew the government, bringing down the Mossadegh administration. Pahlavi became a dictatorial monarch who pursued a pro-American policy and, following the U.S., aligned with Israel—a situation the Iranian Islamic clergy could not tolerate. By the late 1970s, the Iranian working class and Muslim masses overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty. Anger sparked by a fire at a movie theater, coupled with the king’s attempts to shift the blame onto others, ultimately led 5 million people to take to the streets.

Iran: A Puzzle Forged by War

The war came too quickly, like a tornado—before we could even feel the heat, it had already hit the pause button. In just 12 days, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran, and the U.S. stepped in. Iran launched a symbolic retaliation, while the U.S. and Israel issued threats calling for regime change in Iran. Just as everyone was worried that the conflict would escalate, the pause button was pressed. Will this violent tornado subside, or is it brewing an even bigger storm? Will the course of the Middle East change as a result? Perhaps the answer is inevitable. When I last wrote “Iran and Israel,” the title was a question: “Will this trigger World War III?” That question was likely misguided. Back when the Soviet-German War was raging and the “Meat Grinder” DLC was about to launch, no one thought Western Europe’s “show war” was worthy of being called World War I. And although China’s War of Resistance was brutal, it wasn’t retroactively recognized as part of World War II until the Allies declared war on Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor. When future historians look at us, will they see us as a group of peaceful frogs facing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Gaza crisis, the India-Pakistan conflict, and the Iran-Iraq war—and say, “The water’s just right”? We must understand how the Middle East arrived at its current state in order to speculate on how the present will shape the future. We can take today as our starting point, exploring the world of news, tourism, and social media check-ins. But ultimately, we must step into the river of time to find the threads of history. Late on the night of June 21, the United States struck a sleeping Iran with a “midnight hammer,” deploying 125 aircraft—including intelligence, reconnaissance, refueling, and escort flights—and even staging a decoy operation in the Pacific. Seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers took off from Missouri, flew across the Atlantic, slipped into Iranian airspace, and dropped 14 GBU massive bunker-busting bombs on the Fordo and Natanz nuclear facilities, while another Navy nuclear submarine fired 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Natanz and Isfahan. Natanz was exposed in 2002, and Iran acknowledged its existence and agreed to inspections in 2003. Fordow was secretly constructed in 2006 and its existence was acknowledged after it was discovered in 2009. The U.S. attempted to sabotage the centrifuges using the Stuxnet virus spread via USB drives, but Fordow remained resilient and deployed air defense missiles. It is widely speculated that Isfahan is likely the third uranium enrichment site announced by Iran on June 12, with defenses even more robust than those at Fordo. While Israeli airstrikes have primarily targeted Natanz, and given that Isfahan’s defenses are even stronger, Fordo received special attention this time. The U.S. military claims that GBU munitions were not developed specifically for Fordow, but were designed with it as a hypothetical target; theoretically, they can penetrate 60 meters of soil. Fordow is constructed of carbon-fiber-reinforced concrete, steel plates, and solidified volcanic rock; it would require 2–4 bombs to penetrate from a single point in a "fish-head" formation to cause damage. However, satellite imagery shows that the U.S. military dropped 12 bombs, leaving three craters at each shaft—possibly due to electronic jamming causing GPS errors, which prevented precise, sequential strikes. Judging by Iran’s backfilling and repair progress, the damage to Fordo was limited. Nevertheless, Trump has declared the operation a “complete success,” claiming the facility was “thoroughly destroyed” and that Iran’s nuclear program has been set back by decades. U.S. intelligence agencies assess that the strike has caused a few months’ delay to Iran’s nuclear program. However, the White House was quick to dismiss these reports as “fake news,” and the Pentagon’s review was dismissed as an attempt to undermine the narrative of success. The CIA stepped in to smooth things over, saying that regardless of whether it’s “decades” or not, a setback of several years is certainly inevitable. On June 19, Iran had already transferred its nuclear materials; Iran explicitly admitted this, and satellite imagery confirmed it. Sixteen heavy-duty trucks were lined up at the entrance to Fordow, loading up. Even I know about this—the U.S. certainly knows, and Israel is very anxious. Look, they’re transferring the material. But Trump said he wouldn’t believe or spread rumors, claiming that transferring material isn’t that difficult and that they wouldn’t be able to move any of it. Israel is getting impatient; they’ve been itching to strike Iran for far too long. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has been speaking about Iran’s nuclear program for 30 years. After the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, it became a matter of survival for Iran. Iran does not wish to possess nuclear weapons, fearing it would provoke a full-scale strike from the U.S. and Israel; it only wants to maintain a credible breakthrough capability to avoid triggering military action. Starting in 2017, with Trump’s support, Israel began to align itself with Sunni Arab nations, normalizing diplomatic relations with countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Bahrain, and Morocco. Previously, Egypt and Jordan—which ignored the Palestinian issue and engaged with Israel—were viewed as “traitors to the Arab cause.” Now even Saudi Arabia, the “big brother” of the Gulf states, is on the verge of aligning with Israel. And that’s not all: in 2023, Saudi Arabia also restored diplomatic relations with Iran, effectively ending the “mini-Cold War” in the Middle East. Everyone’s getting along—so who’s in the worst position? Hamas. Hamas and Israel’s far-right are the only irreconcilable conflict in the region. These non-state actors are the backbone of resistance within the “Arc of Resistance,” while Iran is primarily responsible for funding, supplying equipment, and providing military advisors. Watching Palestine be forgotten, Hamas has developed existential anxiety and launched attacks against Israel. Iran supports this in principle but advises against rushing into action, as it can no longer afford to drag this out. Many netizens, driven by hatred for the U.S. and sympathy for the Palestinian people, feel frustrated with Iran—the “big brother”—expecting more from it. However, many within Iran believe that as long as the other side is willing to lift security threats and economic sanctions, there’s nothing that can’t be reconciled. However, this does not mean that everyone is open to reconciliation; the constitutional government that came to power through the Islamic Revolution would find it particularly difficult to do so. After the ceasefire, Khamenei stated in a speech that Iran had achieved three major victories: victory over Israel, victory over the U.S., and victory over itself, resulting in unprecedented unity. The U.S. and Israel are pinning their hopes on airstrikes and bombings to topple the regime in Tehran—isn’t that just a game of tit-for-tat? Iran has more missiles than Israel has anti-missile interceptors—who will be the first to crack? Only if a ground offensive is launched will Iran’s opposition forces have the chance to step forward and welcome the “imperial army.” Israel lacks this capability and can only rely on U.S. forces to conduct amphibious operations in Iran and overrun Tehran. Such a move would be political suicide, dooming the nation’s future; yet some, blinded by greed, will surely try to pull the trigger. The U.S. has made its position very clear, mentioning regime change. Since World War II, the U.S. has orchestrated regime change in other countries more than 90 times; in most cases, this has led to the collapse of the state, economic turmoil, and social division. Yet the U.S.’s self-reflection on this matter stops at acknowledging that “we can’t find any examples of countries flourishing after intervention—it’s been a failure.” But for imperialism, this isn’t a failure—it’s a massive success. The true goal of regime change has never been to deliver democracy; rather, it is to increase entropy and create chaos within small systems that contradict the grand order. The collapse of the Iranian regime will not be replaced by liberal democracy, nor is a restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty likely to result in an authoritarian military monarchy. The most probable outcome is a warlord-led civil war, with armed factions carving out their own territories, while Western corporations plunder the country’s resources. Iran, having lost its sovereignty, will descend into chaotic rule or become yet another fragmented nation on the periphery of the empire. Being forced to integrate into and submit to the empire’s division of labor and value chain aligns with the strategic interests of global hegemony. Trump is not a spokesperson for the global empire; regime change does not align with the goals and methodology he has publicly declared. After dropping a massive bomb, he endured Iran’s symbolic retaliation against U.S. military bases, actively sought a ceasefire, and promptly withdrew from a full-scale war with Iran. I believe he intended to make a grand show of force to curry favor with Israel; as for whether he actually achieved anything—if so, if so—he’s just toeing the official line. But such a calculating approach is dangerous. First, Trump has no genuine affection for Israel; he supports it because he needs the backing of American Jewish financial interests, and now that he’s fallen out with Ma, the richest man in China, he needs that support even more. But his rise to power wasn’t entirely about money; many Americans genuinely support him. During his campaign, he ran on an anti-war platform—not exactly as a peace lover, but at least on the premise that whoever wages war in the Middle East is a fool. Ending endless foreign wars is one of the core tenets of “Make America Great Again” (MAGA). Now that Trump is taking on Iran, a faction within the MAGA movement has defected to the establishment neoconservative camp on key issues, sparking concerns about internal division. But why continue to support the neoconservatives, who seek global hegemony? Because there is also a “China-first” faction within MAGA that believes the prerequisite for—and the outcome of—American greatness is the weakening of China. By using Israel to take down Iran, they aim to disrupt China’s partnerships in the Middle East and further squeeze China’s energy security as an industrial powerhouse. It’s very difficult to strike a balance here; if they can’t, they won’t be able to maintain the Republican Party’s facade and will be unable to hold off the Democrats to secure the U.S. presidency. Musk and the tech faction have already split, and as this division continues—whether through further polarization or compromise—the MAGA camp will undergo massive changes. The Next Generation Leadership Program may be launched ahead of schedule. Iran will become a watershed moment. Why do the U.S. and Israel seek to overthrow the Iranian regime? Why is the Iranian regime so difficult to topple? Is there truly a risk that it could be overthrown? We must answer the most fundamental question: What is Iran?

India: The Dream and Reality of Big Bang-Style Reforms

Everyone, let’s talk about India today. Did you know it’s actually hard to say exactly where India ranks in terms of GDP right now? That’s because it’s catching up to Japan—once it passes Japan, it’ll be fourth; and in a few more years, once it overtakes Germany, becoming the “third-largest” will be just around the corner. Well, since it’ll be the “third-largest,” it’ll have to learn from China and the U.S. How? Through comprehensive reform, of course! A spokesperson for the Indian People’s Party made a bold declaration: “Big Bang-style growth”—meaning explosive growth! The goal is to turn India into a developed nation by 2047, the centennial of the nation’s founding. How will they achieve this? GDP must jump from $4 trillion to $30 trillion, with an average annual growth rate of 8%. However, while they achieved that in the second quarter of this year, the full-year figure was dragged down by one percentage point. Folks, let’s not dwell on the past—let’s focus on the future! So what’s India going to do next? Domestically, it’s pushing for comprehensive reforms; internationally, it’s rolling out an “Indian version” of the Belt and Road Initiative. As for the reforms, they mainly involve simplifying the tax system and supporting small and micro enterprises; tariff exemptions on raw materials to support manufacturing; amending labor laws to benefit employers; and relaxing restrictions on foreign investment, allowing wholly foreign-owned enterprises in many sectors with automatic approval—but not for Chinese investors. The nuclear power market will be opened to private enterprises, with foreign investment also permitted—but not from China. As for Chinese investment, it remains subject to dual scrutiny and restrictions regarding trade and national security. Sino-Indian relations have warmed somewhat this year, but whether they can normalize next year hinges entirely on the United States. The U.S. trade war with China is aimed at finding a new manufacturing hub to replace China. India was overjoyed at the prospect and quickly raised its hand, shouting, “Pick me! Pick me!” But after several years, both the U.S. and India have realized it won’t work! If China were completely excluded from the supply chain, India’s manufacturing sector simply wouldn’t be able to obtain critical raw materials and intermediate products. For example, sectors such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and photovoltaics are highly dependent on China. So they still have to import from China. India aims to achieve its long-term goal of developing its manufacturing sector. But progress has been a bit slow so far. The plan was for manufacturing to account for 25% of GDP this year, but it currently stands at only 17%. The more manufacturing there is, the more indispensable China’s supply chains become. The U.S. pushed for “de-Chinaization”—and guess what? They still have to buy from China. It’s all been for nothing. Of course, some industries in India have indeed seen an increase in domestic production rates, such as the toy industry, as reported by Bloomberg. But exports remain problematic because much of the technology and supply chain infrastructure lags behind Vietnam’s. Instead of relocating to India, Chinese companies are moving to Vietnam. As a result, last year India’s toy exports to the U.S. totaled only $100 million, while Vietnam’s were $3 billion and China’s were $11 billion. During the Trump administration, tariffs were slashed across the board, with a 50% tariff rate directly imposed on India. Many foreign companies began diversifying their operations—no longer just “China Plus One,” but also “India Plus One.” India also faces challenges and urgently needs to deepen reforms, scale back the nationalist ideological maneuvers of recent years, and concentrate its resources on achieving explosive growth. On the international front, India has a major initiative called IMEC, or the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Starting from India’s west coast, it travels by sea and land to the United Arab Emirates, then continues overland to Israel, and finally crosses the Mediterranean to Europe. With strong U.S. backing—which spearheaded the Abraham Accords to improve relations between Israel and the Gulf states—the project is still moving forward, despite a slowdown caused by Israel’s military operations in Gaza. The U.S. needs this initiative; India is pursuing strategic autonomy; and the hub countries along the IMEC route each have their own agendas. The Gulf states maintain close economic and trade ties with India, restoring relations to their historical norm. Europe is also enthusiastic, particularly the countries of Southern Europe. However, some major players in the Middle East have adopted a nuanced stance; for example, Turkey is unhappy and plans to collaborate with Iraq to build a corridor. Iran has been completely excluded, and Egypt’s status regarding the Suez Canal has similarly been undermined. The geo-economic dynamics are complex, making it difficult for the IMEC to form a closed loop in the short term. To sum up, the Belt and Road Initiative can use this opportunity to deepen cooperation with the Middle East’s wealthy nations. Ladies and gentlemen, while India’s dreams are grand, the reality is fraught with challenges. Let’s keep a close eye on this!

The Glory and Embarrassment of India's AI: From the Second Tier to Third Place

Everyone, a video has recently gone viral in our group showing a high-ranking Indian official fiercely confronting the IMF Managing Director. It shows India’s Minister of Electronics and Information Technology taking on the IMF Managing Director at the Davos Forum, claiming that India’s AI capabilities are on par with those of China and the U.S., placing it in the top tier. The minister spoke at length, breaking down AI into five layers: applications, models, chips, infrastructure, and energy. But here’s the question, Mr. Minister: How many of these layers does India actually have? Has the power supply issue been resolved? Ultimately, what India takes the most pride in is still the superficial application layer—that is, what AI is used for, such as in agriculture, healthcare, and education. In fact, many of India’s AI projects are merely about integrating digital and real-world sectors—using AI to support traditional industries. Nevertheless, Indian officials like to emphasize that the country is the world’s largest provider of AI services. This claim sounds like they’re asking: “How many of these layers do we actually have? We haven’t even solved the power issue yet.” But the fact is, compared to the United States’ cutting-edge innovations in proprietary models and our industrial integration in the hardware sector, India is charting a unique course: serving small and medium-sized enterprises globally—especially in Europe and the United States—to boost efficiency. Software services are India’s forte, and using AI to replace manual labor is second nature here. In the first half of last year, it was revealed that the British unicorn BuilderAI was actually powered by 700 Indian software engineers writing code by hand. However, AI is sometimes misused in fraud schemes. Forty-seven percent of Indian adults—either personally or through someone they know—have fallen victim to scams, a figure twice the global average. This clearly illustrates the boom in the AI industry and the lag in regulation. Next, let’s talk about India’s large language models. India doesn’t compete in the race for large language models with hundreds of billions or more parameters; instead, it specializes in smaller models in the range of billions. This is because they’ve found that smaller models are sufficient for handling most use cases—a strategy that both saves costs and improves return on investment, representing a uniquely Indian approach to the AI industry. However, this argument is actually somewhat flawed. According to Stanford University’s Global AI Vitality Index report, the U.S. AI industry scored 78.6 points, establishing a commanding lead over the second-place country, while China scored 36.95 points. Behind China is a group of countries—including South Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, and Canada—all of which scored only in the teens. India was the only country to break the 20-point barrier, ranking third with a score of 21.59—a significant improvement over the previous year. So how were these scores calculated? The Stanford report breaks down the assessment into seven dimensions: R&D, AI responsibility, economy, talent, governance, public sentiment, and infrastructure. Each dimension is further subdivided into specific criteria. The United States ranked first in all dimensions except for talent and public opinion. China’s score came primarily from R&D, where it was on par with the U.S. and far surpassed all other countries. However, China’s talent score ranked relatively low among the top ten. In contrast, India scored highly in the talent category, ranking second among the top ten, second only to Singapore. Some have argued that the AI race is a competition between “Chinese in China” and “Chinese in the U.S.”—so how can India’s AI talent outperform both China and the U.S.? The answer lies in the fact that the five sub-indicators within the talent category—such as the number of AI jobs and the prevalence of AI skills—are all derived from LinkedIn data. However, LinkedIn withdrew from the mainland Chinese market back in 2021, so there are very few active users here. Since the Stanford report relies solely on LinkedIn data, it actually significantly underestimates China. In contrast, India’s IT sector is deeply embedded in the Western tech ecosystem, where LinkedIn penetration is high and the proportion of AI professionals among all users is substantial. Moreover, due to India’s massive labor force, it has a statistical advantage—which effectively overestimates India’s standing. Another scoring category in the Stanford report is public opinion, measured by the number of AI-related posts on social media and whether the overall sentiment is positive or negative. In this regard, India ranked second, with 72% of users expressing optimism toward AI; China ranked third, while South Korea took first place. U.S. internet users are generally skeptical of AI giants, and skepticism is quite prevalent. However, this skepticism has, to some extent, contributed to higher scores in another dimension: discussions and practices regarding AI responsibility and ethics in the United States. In this dimension, only China and the United States scored significantly, while other countries scored virtually nothing. In summary, the Stanford report should neither be blindly trusted nor dismissed outright. The author notes that the data on China does not fully reflect the depth and robustness of China’s AI ecosystem; it is wise to consider all perspectives, and there is no need to turn it into evidence for “winning-oriented thinking.” Finally, I would like to thank the group member who provided the lead, and I welcome professionals from all industries to join us so that the value of our group continues to rise.

The Indian Navy's Dream: A Weapon Against China or Just a Pile of Junk?

Listen up, everyone. Ten years ago, India poured $40 billion into its navy, and now we’re watching it flex its muscles. An in-depth report by the *Financial Times* tells us that India’s naval ship is setting sail at full speed, with the goal of rivaling China. We don’t deny that India is a formidable force, but it remains, after all, a sentinel of the Indian Ocean—as Modi himself said during his inspection of the “Vikrant.” This represents both an elevation of India’s self-perception and an adjustment to its strategic positioning. Since its founding, India’s wars have always been fought on land, but senior military officials believe that India is not only a continental power but also a maritime power—a “pioneer” of the Indian Ocean. During the India-Pakistan clash this past May, India deployed an aircraft carrier to exert maritime pressure. Although hostilities were ultimately averted, India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean is now an inevitable trend. The importance of this region goes without saying: two-thirds of the world’s oil and half of all container shipments—including 95% of India’s own merchandise trade—pass through here. The Indian Ocean is not only vital to India but equally vital to us; 60 percent of our trade also passes through this region, and our trade volume is five times that of India’s. Therefore, maritime competition with China seems inevitable. Since land-based expansion is blocked, the only option left is the maritime route. Consequently, India needs to build a blue-water navy to control the southern Indian Ocean, strengthen the defense of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and contain the Strait of Malacca. They claim this is a countermeasure against Chinese expansion, but in reality, it is intended to limit the Chinese Navy’s ability to enter the Indian Ocean. As for its own capabilities, India remains quite confident. Over the past decade, our navy’s tonnage has skyrocketed by 1.7 million metric tons—equivalent to adding four Royal Navies. Although India hasn’t expanded as rapidly as we have, it has still grown steadily by 300,000 metric tons, roughly equivalent to 0.8 times the size of the Royal Navy, which is already quite substantial. On the other hand, India believes that China will not deploy more than 35 percent of its military power to the Indian Ocean, reasoning that since China hasn’t yet cleared up the mess on its own doorstep, it won’t venture out to challenge others on their turf. Even if it did, India believes it has the capability to disrupt China’s military presence overseas. For example, some Indian maritime strategists have argued that in the event of a direct conflict, even if China were merely using its naval base in Djibouti to refuel, India could reduce Djibouti to rubble. Given this, the Indian Navy sees no need to strictly match China’s capabilities. Their internal assessments suggest that for every three warships China builds, India needs only to build one. Unfortunately, due to gaps in industrial infrastructure—such as steel shortages and a supply chain reliant on various international sources—India has not fully realized its plans. Initially, India proposed building 24 submarines over 30 years, but 25 years have passed, and only six have been delivered. This year, however, India has moved beyond “PPT shipbuilding” and significantly accelerated its pace, commissioning a new vessel on average every 40 days. Currently, 55 new ships are under construction, and another 64 have been approved. Furthermore, a domestically produced nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has been included in its strategic blueprint. According to the Indian Ministry of Defense’s plan, the country aims to have at least 200 vessels by 2035, which means that over the next 10 years, dedicated investment in military modernization will need to reach $40 to $50 billion. Currently, the largest portion of its military spending goes toward salaries and pensions—accounting for more than half of the budget—while less than 30% is allocated to equipment, though this is already significantly more than it was a decade ago. Of course, to become a naval power, hardware investment is only one aspect; improving the quality of personnel is also crucial. India has indeed had its share of absurd incidents, such as a fire breaking out during the maintenance of a frigate, which capsized after excessive water was pumped in to extinguish the blaze, and a nuclear submarine where the rear hatch was left open, allowing seawater to flood the propulsion compartment. In any case, the West has high expectations for the rapid rise of India’s military capabilities and, in order to nurture India, is sharing intelligence and providing technical support. U.S. strategic experts say that the interests of the West and India are highly aligned, and they hope for strong cooperation in the Indian Ocean. U.S.-India cooperation has already been enshrined in the United States’ latest National Security Strategy, which calls for continuously improving U.S.-India relations to encourage India to contribute to Indo-Pacific security. But why has the U.S. heaped praise on India even before it has demonstrated such contributions? Because the U.S. aims to draw India into an anti-China alliance and have it shoulder the burden of countering China. Just how alarmed is India? It is, after all, a major power with strategic autonomy—why should it work itself to the bone for the United States? Indian officials have privately told the *Financial Times* that should a conflict break out in the Taiwan Strait, whatever the West decides to do is none of India’s business—this is not a war India should be involved in. Senior Indian military officials have also stated that Sino-Indian relations are shifting from confrontation to competition, and ultimately toward coexistence. India isn’t falling for the U.S.’s ploy, yet the U.S. still courts it and continues to support its rise. This is because, in a zero-sum mindset, India’s very existence serves as a check on China, whereas a weakened India would lead to the Indian Ocean region falling under China’s control—something the U.S. is even less willing to accept. Therefore, while the U.S. is strategically retrenching, it is effectively granting India verbal control over the Indian Ocean, allowing it to hold the fort in its own backyard. For India’s development—especially its defense industry—this is undoubtedly a positive development.

The Reality and Illusion of the Indian Economy

Ladies and gentlemen, India’s economic data has always been baffling. According to official figures, with a GDP of $4 trillion, it maintains high growth—second only to China’s at its peak—and is reportedly on track to grow by 7.7 percent this year. But can these figures really be trusted? Think about it: if even the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) doesn’t buy into them, what does that tell us? Mr. Derek Scissors of the AEI—an expert with an in-depth understanding of China’s global investment strategy—wrote an article that directly debunks the inflated nature of India’s economic growth. He raised well-founded questions regarding statistics, employment, and policy. First, let’s look at the macroeconomy. Last year, India reported a real economic growth rate of 7.1%. This year, amid the tariff war, India has been complaining bitterly—yet despite the complaints, its reported growth rate has actually increased rather than decreased. The issue of inflation is even more of a headache. Nominal GDP growth stands at 8.9 percent—lower than last year’s 9.1 percent and the lowest since the end of the pandemic. The gap between real and nominal GDP requires adjusting for the GDP deflator. But the calculation method for this difference is nothing short of magic. In fact, India’s GDP calculation methods have fluctuated in recent years—shifting from first calculating real growth and then deriving the nominal value, to first calculating nominal growth and then using a deflator to derive real growth. This statistical approach misinterprets falling raw material prices as increased output. Furthermore, India lacks a Producer Price Index (PPI) and relies instead on the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). When international commodity prices fall, India’s WPI turns negative, which is interpreted as deflation. Consequently, prominent economists such as Arvind Subramanian argue that India has chronically underestimated inflation, leading to an overestimation of real growth by at least 2 percentage points. Even electricity generation figures show that growth in fiscal year 2026 was only 1 percent, falling below GDP growth for several consecutive years. Political motives behind this cannot be overlooked. To maintain its legitimacy in power, the Modi administration has no choice but to make empty promises, hyping India as a “cheaper alternative to China” to attract foreign investment. Yet the gap is undeniable. From 2012 to 2024, India’s GDP doubled, whereas China’s grew by 600% over the same 12-year period when per capita levels were comparable. When measured in rupees, the picture is even bleaker, given the currency’s long-term depreciation. Now, let’s talk about employment. India’s greatest source of pride is its so-called “demographic dividend.” As long as everyone has a job, there is hope for the future. Consequently, the official unemployment rate is very low: last year, the unemployment rate for those aged 15 and older was reported to be as low as 3.1 percent, and in rural areas, as low as 2.4 percent—a picture of a thriving job market. But the devil is in the details. The Indian government has redefined “employment”: anyone who works more than one hour on any single day of the week is considered employed. This statistical threshold is absurdly low—just a few dozen hours a year is enough to be counted as employed for the entire year. In fact, in 2024, Indian women worked an average of 71 minutes per day; by India’s standards, they are all considered employed. Yet this meager income is nowhere near enough to support themselves. During the pandemic, when people were theoretically unable to go to work, the unemployment rate should have risen—yet India’s actually fell. Many lost their formal sources of income and returned to rural areas, took on household chores, started their own small businesses, or set up street stalls—all of which were counted as employment. The World Bank estimates that last year, India’s agricultural population accounted for 42% of the total labor force—the same as in 2017, before the pandemic. In reality, this is a warning sign for India’s economy, as the country is unable to create 8 million non-agricultural jobs annually to absorb its growing young population. With large numbers of people unable to find work in cities, they are forced to return to rural areas. This should be seen as a setback for industrialization, yet in employment statistics, it is instead interpreted as a success. The demographic dividend has a limited timeframe; only by completing industrial upgrading before it disappears will India have a chance to achieve leapfrog development. India’s median age is projected to rise from 21.2 years in 2000 to 28.8 years in 2025—the ideal peak level. Over the next 25 years, as birth rates decline, the median age will rise to 38.3 years, essentially reaching U.S. levels. In other words, the window of opportunity for India to leverage its demographic dividend to boost productivity will gradually close. The problem now is that those who scrape by on odd jobs—lacking a steady salary and excluded from the social security system—will eventually grow old, creating a heavy burden. Why has this problem arisen? This brings us to the third point mentioned in the report: the challenges facing industrialization. India’s trade deficit is projected to reach its second-highest level on record in 2026, while the surplus in trade in services continues to expand—clearly indicating a major problem in trade in goods, specifically manufacturing. As a population superpower, India accounts for nearly 18% of the global population, yet its share of global manufacturing exports stands at only 1.8%. The depreciation of the rupee should have benefited exports, but India has failed to capitalize on this trade opportunity. Very few foreign companies have been newly registered—fewer than 150 in total over the past two years. A key reason for this is overly stringent labor regulations. The law mandates that 35% of low-income employees’ wages be set aside for social security contributions. Since their incomes are already meager, many prefer to receive cash payments and are therefore reluctant to become formally contracted employees. On the corporate side, the law requires large companies to obtain government approval before laying off employees, which lacks flexibility. Consequently, companies are clearly unwilling to expand and are content to remain modest in scale. Consequently, the report points out that India’s support for rural areas is also problematic. Eight hundred million people—primarily from rural areas—receive so-called welfare grain subsidies for the poor. India’s agricultural output is low, and a large number of farmers have little or no land, forcing them to rely on government grain distributions. To secure the votes of the lower classes, the Modi administration has no choice but to borrow money to distribute grain, placing immense fiscal pressure on the government. This high-deficit model has persisted for many years, resulting in a heavy interest burden. In fiscal year 2026, credit growth approached 16 percent; more than a quarter of government spending had to be financed through borrowing, and interest payments accounted for over one-fifth of the total—a situation comparable to the U.S. federal budget. But the United States is one kind of country, and India is another—it’s “Americanizing” prematurely before it has even become wealthy. In summary, India’s growth figures have been inflated, and a false illusion of success has been created through spin. In reality, the country hasn’t built much of a financial foundation, has spent heavily, and may remain trapped in the middle-income trap for the long term. Amid the chorus of Western voices touting India’s prospects, this view still strikes a relatively sober note. After all, hoping for India to succeed geopolitically does not mean it can actually succeed according to economic principles.

Has India's door finally opened?

Ladies and gentlemen, India recently revised its foreign investment approval policies for its landlocked neighbors, and the media has been interpreting this as a relaxation of restrictions on Chinese investment. At first glance, it sounds plausible, but if we think about it carefully, has India actually opened the door? Is it open, or not? India’s landlocked neighbors are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar—none of which sound like they’d be likely to invest in India. So many people assumed India was opening its doors to us in a sort of “proud yet coy” way. The very next day, however, the Indian government issued a clarification: the door hasn’t been opened; Chinese companies investing in India still require approval as before. Setting aside whether India has opened the door or not, would our companies even dare to go there? So, is the door open or not? Or is it just a token gesture? What if it’s just a crack wide open? Sorry, it’s not open. And that crack isn’t reserved for Chinese companies anyway. The original text of the Indian Cabinet notice reads: “Investors with non-controlling beneficial ownership of up to 10% shall be permitted on the automatic route.” In other words, investors with non-controlling beneficial ownership of up to 10% may proceed through the automatic approval channel. However, first of all, the subject here is “investors”—not a landlocked neighboring country, nor investors from a landlocked neighboring country. Second, “beneficial ownership” is defined in relation to “direct ownership”; it refers to multi-tiered, penetrative shareholding structures. If a company is registered in China and controlled by Chinese entities, that constitutes direct ownership, and it must still go through the manual approval process. The entities eligible for India’s relaxed approval process are those in which China holds an indirect beneficial ownership interest of less than 10 percent—and such entities cannot be registered in China. Therefore, this new policy is actually aimed at Western investors and global funds, not Chinese enterprises. At this point, we must go back to 2020. Many people believe that India’s crackdown on Chinese investment began with the border clashes between the two countries, but that is not the case. On April 17, 2020, India’s third press release announced foreign investment scrutiny for its landlocked neighbors, while the Galwan Valley clash occurred on June 15. There were also some minor skirmishes in May, but all of these took place in late April. India’s decision to scrutinize foreign investment was largely driven by the impact of the pandemic. At the time, valuations of Indian companies were falling, and to prevent foreign investors from buying at rock-bottom prices, India tightened government controls. In the first quarter of 2020, the People’s Bank of China increased its stake in HDFC, India’s largest private mortgage lender, a move that put India on high alert. During the same period, a global wave of investment protectionism was sweeping the world, with the European Union urging member states to protect critical assets from foreign takeovers. Within a month, many countries tightened their FDI review policies. Tensions between China and India have indeed prompted India to strengthen protectionist measures, particularly in strategically important sectors such as technology, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing. On the other hand, China is indeed the largest and most promising investor and was once very active in venture capital investments in Indian tech startups. Therefore, as the political climate shifted abruptly, India had to use foreign investment reviews as a pretext to build an economic shield against Chinese control of strategic assets. What do you call this? It’s wise to be on guard—we’re on guard too. We also have security review measures for foreign investment, but ours are more neutral, with higher trigger thresholds, greater transparency, and clearly defined procedural rules. But India? Its precautions are excessive. It’s essentially a “wall of confusion”—extremely opaque. Many projects are met with neither approval nor rejection, leaving investors unsure how to proceed. Moreover, the regulations are overly broad. Out of fear of penetration by Chinese state-owned capital, India is particularly wary of equity tracing and simply blocks such investments outright. Any investment fund with even a 1% stake from a Chinese institution in its capital structure is barred from entry. This applies even to Western asset management firms like BlackRock and Carlyle, which, due to their global operations, inevitably have Chinese limited partners. To invest in India, they have no choice but to hold their noses and wait for approval. As a result, over the course of several years, out of more than 600 projects submitted for review, only about 100 were approved. Global capital realized, “India is really hard to get into, isn’t it? If it’s that hard, we’ll just stay out.” Therefore, India’s policy adjustments were primarily aimed at eliminating indirect friction for Western investors, rather than directly opening the doors to Chinese investors. That said, who should India be attracting to invest? Not all capital is created equal—even if the amount is the same, the source of the funds, where they’re directed, and the ultimate economic impact can vary significantly. Since the end of the pandemic, the global landscape of foreign direct investment has undergone a dramatic shift, with growth concentrated almost exclusively in the developed economies of the U.S. and Europe. Developing countries generally face pressure from capital outflows, and while India’s performance in attracting foreign investment has been somewhat volatile, it has been quite good overall. However, the capital it has attracted comes from the United States, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the Netherlands—primarily in the financial and service sectors—while manufacturing investment has flowed heavily into Southeast Asia. China’s outbound investment has poured into the region, establishing production bases and shaping the manufacturing landscape of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This has left India feeling rather uneasy, as its government’s plans clearly prioritize manufacturing over financial services—the latter being merely supplementary, while the former, particularly in sectors such as electronic components, semiconductors, and solar energy, must take center stage. Consequently, India’s new policy specifically includes a provision stating that investment approvals for certain sectors—including capital goods for manufacturing, electronic components, and finance—must be expedited, with the approval process shortened to 60 days. India still aspires to be a manufacturing powerhouse, but as long as it pursues manufacturing, it cannot avoid China—this is not my opinion, but that of our consulting firm, Asia Group. The current situation is that India does indeed have some plans for manufacturing and has eased restrictions on capital that indirectly benefits China. Since last year, relations between China and India have indeed improved—for example, visas have been reinstated, direct flights have resumed, and Modi paid a visit last year. However, major Chinese companies, such as BYD and Great Wall, have still been turned down when seeking to invest in India. This isn’t good news for the Indian public—they love BYD—but import quotas are completely off-limits, so now they have no choice but to consider local knock-down assembly. If that works out, it would be a positive development: it would avoid tariffs on complete vehicles and meet India’s requirements for increasing the localization rate in manufacturing. Overall, there are some positive signs now, but India is still falling far short—we need to make them more dependent on us. A couple of days ago, I saw a report saying India hopes we’ll ease restrictions on urea exports. With the Middle East in total chaos, India’s LNG imports have been disrupted, forcing fertilizer plants to shut down and causing urea prices to skyrocket by 21% in just one week. Although Indian officials are making a big show of claiming there’s no supply shortage, the rating agency ICRA has pointed out that domestic production capacity in this largest importer of urea is highly problematic. Well, duh—if there weren’t problems, why would they be turning to China? The monsoon season is coming in June, and the busy farming season is about to begin. With 46% of the population being farmers, a shortage of fertilizer could be quite deadly. I think we could lend a hand here, but we shouldn’t do it for nothing—you agree, right?

UK Nuclear Power Project: 700 Million Pounds to Save 0.083 Fish—That’s Absolutely Ridiculous!

Folks, a recent news story really had me laughing: the UK’s national nuclear power project, Hinkley Point C, actually spent 700 million pounds to protect fish—which works out to saving just 0.083 Atlantic salmon and 0.028 sea trout per year. This is just ridiculous! I looked into it, and these figures come from the UK’s 2025 Nuclear Regulatory Review Report, authored by Fingleton, a former Cabinet Office official. He complained to *The Times* that protecting fish isn’t even the most absurd part—our nuclear power project would have to shut down if even a single Arctic tern showed up. This remark has drawn widespread ridicule from netizens around the world. Hinkley Point C is the UK’s largest infrastructure project. Ten years ago, during the golden age of Sino-British relations, China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) joined the project as a minority shareholder alongside EDF. Later, the political climate in the UK shifted toward decoupling; political risks turned into economic risks, and costs spiraled out of control. In 2016, the project budget was 18 billion pounds; now, the actual cost has ballooned to 48 billion—exceeding the warning threshold. In 2023, CGN announced it would not cover any further cost overruns. For EDF, the project is “too big to fail”; neither the British nor the French government will allow it to be abandoned, so they have no choice but to grit their teeth and press on. The project is also severely behind schedule: it was originally slated to begin generating power in 2025, but this year the civil engineering work has only just been completed, and as they prepare to enter the fit-out phase—laying out various pipelines—the first units won’t start generating power until at least 2030. The investigation team concluded that the UK’s nuclear regulatory system is overly complex, rife with bureaucracy, and plagued by redundant procedures, resulting in the world’s highest costs. But can 700 million pounds really only save 0.083 fish? Let’s dig into this. First, why save the fish? Hinkley Point C is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) that draws massive amounts of seawater to cool the reactor core and generate steam—the equivalent of 12 swimming pools every second. Large fish are fine, but small fish are in for a rough time. The original plan called for only a basic filter screen; while fish large enough wouldn’t get sucked in, small fish would essentially be doomed. So how many fish would die each year? EDF estimates 44 metric tons—less than what a single fishing boat catches in a day; Environmental groups objected, arguing that EDF was using commercial fishing data, which only accounted for the density of catchable large fish, while completely ignoring fry and eggs. They calculated based on egg density—assuming all those eggs would survive—which would amount to 182 million lives. So the plan was revised to include a fish recovery and return system, which sends the sucked-in fish back out—but this involves a complex piping system, driving up costs. Environmental groups continued to question this: “If small fish are sucked in, they may already be injured or even dead—what’s the point of sending them back?” So the much-criticized sonar fish deterrent system was rolled out; it disrupts the fish’s hearing, causing them to stay away and avoid being sucked in. So where did that 700 million pounds figure come from? In fact, the fish recovery system itself does not cost 700 million pounds; that figure represents the total cost of the entire cooling water system. The water intake structure alone accounts for 70% of the cost, fish recovery for 20%, and the sonar deterrent and miscellaneous expenses for just 5%—or 35 million pounds. However, EDF is unwilling to pay even this 35 million, dragging its feet time and again on the grounds that installation and maintenance costs are too high—they can’t even find divers to carry out the work, as the waters in that area are both fast-moving and murky. However, installing this system was a mandatory requirement under the 2013 Development Consent Order. The developer attempted to have it waived, but repeated appeals were consistently rejected; alternative solutions were also deemed unacceptable. Consequently, the project has been delayed until today, and the developer has now accepted the reality and ceased resisting. But if you crunch the numbers now, it’s no longer 35 million but 50 million—because the initial 700 million pound budget was based on 2015 prices, and with a cumulative inflation rate of nearly 40% over the past decade, 35 million naturally becomes 50 million. So how did they arrive at that figure of “zero point something” fish? The total population of Atlantic salmon and sea trout in that area is already very small, and since they are migratory species, they only pass through during a very short window each year. The reason the report’s authors highlighted these two species was precisely to underscore the absurdity, creating the impression that spending 50 million on animal welfare is a complete waste of money. Environmental protection is inherently a highly politicized issue in the Western left-right divide, and the media, in order to drive up click-through rates fueled by emotional reactions, is adept at amplifying controversies—omitting the 50 million figure and reporting only the total amount of 700 million. As for the Arctic terns, that relates to another now-abandoned nuclear power project called the Welfa Nuclear Power Plant. The proposed site was near an ecological reserve that serves as a crucial breeding ground for Arctic terns, which are protected under EU law. Environmental organizations argued that construction noise would scare away these unpredictable seabirds, deterring them from laying eggs and thereby causing irreversible harm to the species. The report’s authors primarily sought to argue that cumbersome environmental assessments and approval processes slow down projects and hinder national strategy. However, the project’s cancellation was not actually due to environmental concerns; rather, it stemmed from a failure to finalize the financing model between the contractor, Hitachi, and the British government—they could not reach an agreement on funding. It was not a matter of the birds. Fingleton’s decision to highlight the absurdities of regulation to the media is consistent with his long-standing stance as a neoliberal economist—he has consistently advocated for deregulation, increased efficiency, and economic growth. His report also calls for a fundamental overhaul of the regulatory system to prioritize economic development. That said, could this problem truly have been avoided? It would have been very difficult. Back then, environmental awareness and relevant laws were inadequate; now that both have become increasingly robust, it is inevitable that massive sums will be spent to address issues that should have been resolved or avoided at the time of site selection. The situation in the United States is similar to that in the UK: site selection there also prioritizes the use of existing facilities, resulting in complex trade-offs. In France, a major nuclear power, site selection is a matter of national strategy, involving rigorous scrutiny and the rapid implementation of environmental protection measures. China, in particular, follows a highly structured planning process; site selection strictly adheres to safety standards regarding geology, hydrology, population, and seismic activity, while also meeting the stringent requirements of environmental protection authorities. From the outset, sites are chosen to avoid nature reserves and core habitats of endangered species, and once a site is finalized, it remains subject to strict, ongoing environmental oversight. In contrast, the United States and the United Kingdom entrust nuclear power projects to the private sector or pursue public-private partnerships. For investors, minimizing economic costs is the absolute top priority; they seek to utilize existing facilities as much as possible and use legal means to navigate regulatory challenges. As for social and environmental costs, they prefer to avoid bearing them if at all possible. On the government side, the lack of central authority and a decentralized regulatory system make it difficult to integrate energy, economic, and environmental objectives into a unified national strategy during the planning phase. In contrast, in countries like China and France, where nuclear power projects involve national energy security, the state is inevitably involved from the outset. All parties must coordinate efficiently, adhere to standards, and reduce systemic disorder—thereby preventing massive waste. Therefore, the situation in the UK is not merely a joke or a case of foolishness, but a case with multiple layers: private-sector dominance, fragmented regulation, risk aversion, and redundant processes—all of which ultimately resulted in the world’s most expensive nuclear power. What truly warrants reflection is the regulatory system itself, rather than making a mockery of the 0.083 fish.

The "Crack in the Defenses" of UK STEM Education and the Educational Rivalry Between China and the UK

Everyone, today let’s talk about the awkward situation facing STEM education in the UK—and to understand this, we need to start by looking at why the UK helps China train scientists. First, let’s talk about the UK’s international student market. The UK has long been a paradise for international students. In the past, business and management programs were the top choices for international students, but in recent years, STEM disciplines have become the new favorites. Let’s look at the data: from 2019 to 2024, the number and proportion of Chinese students at the UK’s top five STEM universities—Cambridge, Oxford, Imperial College London, UCL, and Edinburgh—have risen significantly. This has led to a noticeable decline in the number of local British students. In STEM programs, the ratio of Chinese students to local British students has reached 5 to 4—and in mathematics and engineering, this ratio is even more striking, at 2 to 1. The reason behind the surge of Chinese students in STEM fields is simple: there is a very strong demand for STEM talent in China. But the situation isn’t quite that simple. Some have questioned whether certain majors pursued by British students are “watered down”—is “Hairdressing and Beauty Science” really considered a STEM field? Still, it’s unlikely that Chinese students would choose such programs. What’s even more intriguing is that Indian students make up only 4% of engineering graduate students at these top universities—just one-tenth the proportion of Chinese students. Yet India is currently the country sending the most international students abroad; it’s just that the majority pursue business studies, with a portion going into computer science, and the concentration on engineering is nowhere near as pronounced as in China. The UK education sector is now alarmed: without a solid foundation in basic education, how can students excel in STEM fields? Based on PISA scores and population estimates, by 2050, China may have 10 times more STEM talent than the United States—and even exceed the combined total of all other countries worldwide. The UK is well aware of this gap, but it is more concerned with the commercialization of education, which has further widened the gap in talent quality between China and the UK. British universities are shrewd: it costs less for UK citizens to study the humanities, but international students pay full tuition. Since the teaching costs for STEM are high, universities earn less from these programs. Consequently, STEM has become a cash cow for international students. British universities are delighted; they rely on this revenue to stay afloat, and losing even a single student makes it difficult to balance the books. But the reality is that the gap is widening: there is a shortage of 173,000 professionals in the UK’s STEM fields, 40 percent of job openings in manufacturing, telecommunications, and construction remain unfilled, and the tech industry also struggles to recruit suitably qualified employees. The British aren’t stupid either; some question how students who can’t even recite the 99 times table are expected to study STEM. While basic education is indeed important, the UK places even greater emphasis on commercialization. They’ve realized that training high-end STEM talent requires extensive and expensive experiments, whereas the humanities are much cheaper to teach. So, it’s best to have the “cheaper” students study the humanities, while STEM students foot the bill. The British smile and say, “Fewer humanities students, more doctors and scientists,” but the vested interests in the higher education industry are peddling useless degrees. The UK is also brewing reforms, preparing to cut some dead-end majors and reduce government funding for them. An even harsher statement is: “Don’t sell these useless courses to British children, and stop exporting top scientists and engineers to ‘enemy nations.’” In their eyes, Chinese international students and the transfer of knowledge and technology constitute a national security threat—especially technologies with dual-use applications or any potential for defense applications. Consequently, the UK now deeply regrets the “golden honeymoon” period in Sino-British relations a decade ago, believing that scientific exchanges at the time were too in-depth—to the point where research projects at British universities directly served China’s military modernization. Since 2019, Sino-British cooperation has been subject to strict scrutiny, and formal collaboration has noticeably decreased. However, many in the UK still question the effectiveness of security vetting—arguing that it focuses only on students’ pinyin names without verifying Party membership or checking their domestic records. While the UK seeks to build defenses, it is also learning from China—studying its investment in higher education, as well as the government’s efforts and methods for recruiting talent, with even united front work and the “Thousand Talents Program” falling within the scope of its research. However, they also understand that it took China two decades of steady, unrelenting effort to reverse the adverse trend of brain drain—a feat that cannot be replicated overnight. Today, with the global environment deteriorating, science and engineering contribute more directly to building a nation’s hard power and are more closely linked to security and prosperity. Consequently, countries are placing greater emphasis on talent development and the construction of evaluation systems. The UK is also reflecting on the fact that political vetting and restrictions cannot make all Chinese people reject Shakespeare; if that is the case, it may well end up closing the door even tighter. China’s own talent development and evaluation systems have also gained momentum. While we still evaluate ourselves using foreign standards, these standards also reflect the progress of China’s academic standards. For example, in the 2010 QS World University Rankings, only one Chinese university made it into the top 50; by 2025, that number had risen to five. This rise in rankings is primarily driven by increased research output, which stems from China’s investment in higher education—an investment rooted in the nation’s strategic planning for talent development and industrial growth. The West sees China’s strengths clearly; while attempting to weaken us, they are also striving to replicate this capability.

The Technology War: The Debate Over “The Science of Winning” and “The Science of Losing” in the United States

Everyone, today let’s talk about how the U.S. views the Sino-American tech race. It turns out there are differing viewpoints within the U.S. itself: one camp is the “Win School,” and the other is the “Lose School.” The so-called “Win School” refers to those in the U.S. who constantly tout their country’s technological strength and innovative capabilities. They believe that as long as the U.S. continues to innovate and make breakthroughs, it will naturally gain an advantage in economic, military, and cultural spheres. As for the “Loser School,” their views are similar to those of some netizens in China: given that China’s industrial chain and manufacturing capabilities are already so strong, what’s the point of competing? Let China expand—the U.S. might as well just sit back and do nothing. In a lengthy article, former U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan put forward a theory of a “protracted battle for technological high ground.” He criticized the “Winner School,” arguing that the simplistic view—that China can only imitate and cannot innovate—is far too simplistic. The notion that the U.S. advances rapidly in technology while China takes small, incremental steps—and the U.S. takes giant leaps—is incorrect. Technology has no endpoint; a technical breakthrough does not equate to victory. Competition will not only continue but will also expand in scope, as it involves production, application, and comparisons of supply chains and production capacity. Sullivan himself was the architect of the technology war during the Biden administration; he was the mastermind behind the “small courtyard, high walls” strategy and “de-risking” initiatives. He is highly regarded domestically as a smart and cool-headed adversary. He criticized the “Win School” for simplistically assuming that China only imitates, overlooking China’s strategic positioning in key inputs. For example, in technologies such as rare earths, active pharmaceutical ingredients, batteries, and robotics, China controls critical nodes, preventing the economies and militaries of developed nations from functioning normally. To put it bluntly, manufacturing dominance does not require comprehensive leadership; it only requires controlling critical nodes—which is, in fact, precisely the United States’ own competitive logic. Sullivan believes that China’s system is different: the state can coordinate resources to achieve its goals, with state-owned banks, industrial policies, and procurement regulations all working in concert. The United States used to view China’s system as rigid and detrimental to innovation, but the reality is that China has made progress in key areas by mobilizing the entire nation. Take battery technology as an example: China not only leads in production capacity but also holds a commanding lead in technology. Therefore, the United States must focus its efforts on production, controlling key inputs, and advancing the development of cutting-edge technologies and the economic-defense industrial complex. China has established four strategic high grounds in the three major fields of computing, biotechnology, and new energy, giving it a structural advantage over the United States. Sullivan proposed four countermeasures: first, revitalize the scientific and technological industrial base—requiring not only cutting-edge laboratories but also production lines to achieve scale; second, rapidly innovate and deploy military technology to deter adversaries; third, lead the digital order among all democratic nations; and fourth, maintain a stable foundation between China and the United States, with competition in some areas and cooperation in others. To achieve these goals, the United States needs a comprehensive industrial strategy, with the government stepping in to promote the development of manufacturing. Interestingly, as a longtime Biden administration official, Sullivan also praised the political support the Trump administration provided to mobilize vaccine research, development, and distribution, arguing that the government should increase investment in cutting-edge technologies to help strategic industries attract private investment. At the same time, the United States also needs to adopt a “small courtyard, high walls” strategy—blocking at the core while cooperating at the periphery—and continue to use tariffs as a weapon, but only against strategic industries, allowing cheap Chinese goods to enter while keeping high-tech products out. The United States’ goal is not self-sufficiency, but rather diversified development within its alliance system. In summary, Sullivan believes that U.S.-China technological competition is a marathon, not a sprint. The United States needs to view this protracted struggle rationally and will not pursue a quick victory. While American culture harbors a romanticized notion of quick victories, such thinking is unrealistic. Faced with long-term national competition, the United States cannot pursue a quick victory.

Trump’s “Greenland Dream”: Is It the End of the American Dream or a European Nightmare?

Ladies and gentlemen, Trump’s speech at Davos was like a carefully choreographed circus act—one moment he was playing the fool and acting crazy, the next he was putting on airs, spouting nonsense left and right. He said Denmark was ungrateful, mistook Greenland for Iceland, and made a mockery of the governor of California. Finally, he suddenly backtracked, saying he wanted to work out a future agreement with Greenland, shifting the focus to military bases and mining rights. U.S. media reported that China hopes Trump will score some points on the Greenland issue; the more the U.S. and Europe clash, the more advantageous it is for China. The Russians weren’t about to be outdone either. Kremlin spokesperson Peskov stated bluntly that if Trump “swallowed” Greenland, it would be a sign of disrespect toward Russia. Trump’s nominee for ambassador to Iceland even joked that he might end up serving as the governor of the 52nd state. The atmosphere suddenly lightened, and everyone felt that the U.S. and Europe could play nicely together again. However, that was far from the truth. Trump’s obsession with Greenland hasn’t gone away; he’s shifted to a “British-Cyprus model,” seeking full sovereignty over military bases and planning to build more of them. Although Denmark has veto power over site selection, Trump doesn’t really care. So, what exactly makes Greenland so appealing? First, resources. As early as 2019, Australian geologists recommended the idea of purchasing the island to Trump. With global warming, the Arctic is rich in resources, and U.S. companies could secure priority mining rights through pressure, lobbying, and other means. As for national security, the Thule Air Base, established by the U.S. in northwestern Greenland, can monitor Russian aircraft. Although the Russian Navy’s overall strength is not what it was during the Cold War, it does not need Greenland to the extent that the U.S. does. China is also very interested in the Arctic but has no territorial claims there. Even if Trump were to acquire Greenland, China could still obtain resources through other channels. The key lies with Denmark, which is the U.S.’s most steadfast ally in NATO; whatever the U.S. wishes to do in Greenland, Denmark will allow. Denmark is willing to shoulder the costs of expanding and maintaining U.S. military bases in Greenland. Trump aims to use Greenland to control the Arctic shipping lanes and prevent China from gaining a foothold there. That said, Denmark is one of the U.S.’s most loyal allies in NATO. Located close to the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, it has strong security needs. Whether the U.S. wants to reactivate old bases, expand existing ones, or even build new ones in Greenland, Denmark is willing to cooperate—and is even willing to foot the bill. Yet the U.S. has instead scaled back its troop presence; the Pitufik base is much smaller than the former Thule Air Base. Since there is nothing the U.S. cannot achieve within the existing alliance system, only one possibility remains: the U.S. increasingly views the alliance system itself as obsolete and intends to destroy NATO from within. Throughout his speech at Davos, Trump made clear his core philosophy: a complete disregard for the post-World War II world order. He criticized Europe’s steadily declining share of global GDP, warning that if this trend continues, Europe will be unrecognizable. He did not say the U.S. would withdraw from Europe; on the contrary, he said he wanted to help Europe revive. Yet vast amounts of capital are fleeing Europe, with much of it flowing to the U.S. The United States’ NATO allies have long been a losing proposition. During the Cold War, Europe served as a geopolitical asset for containing the Soviet Union, but today, with its stagnant economy, heavy welfare burden, lack of high-tech growth drivers, and dependence on the United States, the situation has changed. Maintaining the NATO system is a bad debt costing the U.S. hundreds of billions of dollars annually. If Europe remains prosperous and stable, a U.S. troop withdrawal would be seen as a betrayal; if Europe descends into chaos, both domestic U.S. public opinion and the international community would conclude that the U.S. has done all it can. Thus, chaos allows the U.S. to transform from a betrayer into a rational actor forced to cut its losses. Europe’s diplomatic circles have already recognized that a major, perhaps irreversible, rift has emerged between Europe and the United States. Fukuyama, writing in the U.S. online magazine *Persuasion*, advised Europe not to back down. But Europe’s military strength is insufficient to support Fukuyama’s fantasy. Although some countries have increased their defense spending, the proportion of joint procurement remains inadequate, and the lack of military integration is Europe’s greatest weakness. Trump’s “Greenland dream” is not about controlling maritime trade routes, but rather about securing a strategic location to prevent China from controlling Arctic shipping lanes and to facilitate shipping between Asia and North America. Overall, Trump wants to dismantle NATO from within and shift more defense responsibilities onto Europe. But this is merely a tactic; his true goal is to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe and shift its focus to Asia.

A median age at death of 67.7—is that really so alarming?

Everyone, there’s been a rumor circulating online recently claiming that the median age of death for Chinese men is only 67.7 years—and that half of Chinese men don’t live past that age. At first glance, that’s truly startling. It makes me wonder: how much longer do I have to live? However, we need to take a rational look at this and ask: Is this data actually reliable? First of all, the figure of 67.7 years simply doesn’t hold water. The article circulating online claims that the United Nations’ *World Population Prospects 2024* reports China’s median age at death for men in 2023 as 73 years, and it also states that this aligns with data from the National Bureau of Statistics. But I pored over that table for a long time and couldn’t find a column labeled “median age at death”; I asked all sorts of AI models and crunched the numbers on my calculator, but I still couldn’t arrive at the figure of 73. We need to understand that the median age at death is not the same thing as average life expectancy. The median age at death reflects the age distribution of people who have already passed away; it has nothing to do with the average lifespan of those currently alive. It is merely a retrospective statistic and is heavily influenced by the age structure of the population. In a society with a severely aging population, the average age of those who die is naturally higher, but this does not mean that the life expectancy of people living today is shorter. Now let’s talk about life expectancy at birth. This is a more reliable indicator. It predicts how many years a newborn is expected to live, assuming current age-specific mortality rates remain unchanged. According to 2023 data from the United Nations, China’s per capita life expectancy at birth is 78.0 years—75.2 years for men and 80.9 years for women. The National Health Commission’s statistics, however, put it at 78.6 years; we’ll use the Commission’s figures as our reference. The projection for 2025 is 79.25 years. What about the data for the United States? In 2023, life expectancy at birth in the U.S. was 79.3 years—76.9 years for men and 81.8 years for women. The U.S. figures are slightly higher than China’s. Now let’s look at mortality rates before age 60. In 2023, China’s mortality rate before age 60 was 117 per thousand for men and 64 per thousand for women, for an overall rate of 91 per thousand. In the United States, the rates were 142 per thousand for men and 84 per thousand for women, for an overall rate of 114 per thousand. It is clear that China’s mortality rate before age 60 is indeed lower than that of the United States. If you want to know how many good years you have left, you can consult a United Nations report. For example, when I was born in 1985, life expectancy was 64.2 years; by the time I turned 15, my remaining life expectancy was 58.2 years, for a total of 73.2 years. Another example: when my father was born in 1957, his life expectancy was 46.6 years; by the time he turned 15—in 1972—his remaining life expectancy was 49.8 years, which was higher than his total life expectancy at birth. By the time he turned 65—in 2022—his remaining life expectancy was 15.8 years, bringing the total to 80.8 years—even higher than the life expectancy of a newborn, which is 78.2 years. What do these figures tell us? They show that advances in economic conditions, nutrition, medical care, and health awareness have enabled us to live longer. Therefore, figures like “67.7 years” are pure alarmism and completely unreliable. Let’s take another look at those self-media articles and videos. They often highlight that the average life expectancy for Chinese men is significantly shorter than that for women, creating gender-based divisions. They also frequently add the claim that the average life expectancy for those in the “system” is over 90 years. What’s really going on here? These exaggerated figures likely stem from AI hallucinations. AI is not a reservoir of objective truth, but rather a repository of public information. If this repository is contaminated, the more viral a rumor becomes, the higher its weighting—creating a self-perpetuating cycle. AI may adjust its predictions, but if it favors authoritative media sources, it will still accept them as fact. Therefore, we must approach this information rationally. Aside from AI, we have no better tools for acquiring knowledge. So, we have no choice but to choose whom to trust. But are these “authorities” truly worthy of our trust? Between AI and humans, who holds greater authority?

The Magic of Fertilizer: From Food Security to Geopolitics

Listen up, everyone. This conflict between Israel and Iran has not only thrown the Strait of Hormuz into chaos but has also left Western strategic analysts completely baffled. At first, I thought they were worried about the layout of green energy infrastructure, but later I realized that what they truly fear is China catching on and treating chemical fertilizers as a strategic weapon, just like rare earth elements. Is this a simple matter? Not at all! Oil was originally meant to be burned, but as it turns out, the four pillars of modern civilization—cement, steel, plastic, and ammonia—all depend on it; not a single one can do without it! Nitrogen fertilizer, in particular, may seem ordinary, but it actually underpins global food security. Ladies and gentlemen, what exactly is synthetic ammonia? It’s actually the work of the Haber-Bosch process, which synthesizes ammonia from natural gas and air under high temperature and pressure. This ammonia is then converted into urea—the fertilizer we use every day. Scientists say that without industrial nitrogen fertilizers, global agriculture couldn’t feed 4 billion people; essentially, half the world’s population would go hungry. The Middle East, particularly the Gulf states, accounts for half of global urea exports and 30% of ammonia exports. When Iran disrupts the situation, not only is oil and gas production affected, but the entire fertilizer industry chain is thrown into disarray as well. The attack on the South Pars gas field in Iran, coupled with the strike on Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial complex, has directly shut down 17% of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capacity. Repairing this damage won’t take just a few days—it will take three to five years! Therefore, even after a ceasefire, natural gas supplies will be difficult to restore. In addition to urea, the Middle East also exports significant amounts of phosphate fertilizers. Saudi Arabia is the leading supplier of phosphate fertilizers, providing 20% of the global supply, and it exports 30% of the world’s sulfur. While potassium fertilizers—used for disease prevention—are less prevalent, Jordan and Israel together account for about 10% of global production. The role of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman in the global fertilizer trade cannot be underestimated. However, because these countries are so well-known, and the oil crisis of the 1970s made the world aware of the importance of strategic reserves, many countries maintain strategic oil reserves but lack fertilizer reserves. This means that when global fertilizer supplies fall short, emergency measures are completely inadequate. With the spring planting season in the Northern Hemisphere about to begin, fertilizer shortages will leave agricultural production in a bind in countries with insufficient reserves, limited production capacity, and high dependence on imports. Take India, for example, with its population of 1.4 billion: it relies heavily on the Middle East for nitrogen fertilizers. Brazil, as an agricultural powerhouse, is a vulnerable link in the global food supply chain, heavily reliant on phosphate and nitrogen fertilizers from Saudi Arabia and Oman. Should supplies be cut off, its soybean and corn yields would plummet. Southeast Asia is a major rice-producing region with high demand for nitrogen fertilizers, forcing it to choose between industry, power generation, and fertilizer production. In Africa, five of the top ten countries most dependent on Middle Eastern fertilizers are located there, four of which are recognized by the United Nations as least developed countries. Sudan is already experiencing one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises, while China stands out for its remarkable stability amid the widespread distress. Just how large is China’s fertilizer industry? It produces approximately 44% of the world’s phosphate fertilizers, 30% of nitrogen fertilizers, 23% of sulfur fertilizers, and 13% of potash fertilizers. With such massive nitrogen fertilizer production in particular, China has become a key supplier to numerous countries. Nearly half of Southeast Asia’s nitrogen fertilizer—and over 80% of Indonesia’s—comes from China. African countries, such as Nigeria, also rely on China for more than 80% of their nitrogen fertilizer. Although India has its own production capacity, it was previously reluctant to purchase fertilizer from China, so China’s market share there has been minimal. However, India’s excessive reliance on Gulf countries has left it in a bind, prompting it to begin sourcing urea from China. We will certainly prioritize securing our own domestic supply—food security is of the utmost importance. Domestic agricultural use of urea peaked in 2015 and has been declining for the past 10 years. Yet new urea plants continue to be built, and production capacity keeps expanding. Why? The goal is to sustain the chemical industry’s demand for coal. Instead of using this coal for power generation, it can be used to produce coal-based urea, thereby protecting jobs and GDP in the coal industry. The new urea production capacity is primarily being used in the furniture, building materials, and chimney filter industries. This year, China is expected to add 5.07 million metric tons of urea production capacity, bringing total output to 76.5 million metric tons, so supply is certainly ample. The only bottleneck is sulfur, which is used in the production of phosphate fertilizers; about half of our supply relies on imports. Therefore, we have suspended phosphate fertilizer exports until August 31, activated the strategic fertilizer reserve, intensified sulfur recovery efforts in petroleum refining and coal chemical industries, and diversified import channels. Since sulfur is also a byproduct of copper and cobalt mines in Africa, with these multiple safeguards in place, the phosphate fertilizer situation should not pose a major problem. The Chinese adopt a strategic approach and emphasize bottom-line thinking. The United States, on the other hand, does not stockpile fertilizer, so it faces difficulties in resolving supply disruptions in the short term. For example, on the 13th, they announced plans to import fertilizer from Venezuela to support “great American farmers.” However, Venezuela’s fertilizer industry has declined alongside its crude oil sector, making a last-minute increase in production simply impossible. China is exceptionally determined to ensure food security; even when we are already well-protected, we still seek to add an extra layer of safeguards. In the long run, however, with the population trend on the decline, pressure on arable land will ease. Consequently, U.S. strategic analysts believe that if China’s grain output remains at such high levels, it will likely become a major grain exporter in the future. At that point, the strategic thinking of China’s decision-makers may shift from defense to offense—from securing their own food supply to determining who will be able to put food on the table. In that case, the current Middle East crisis might make China realize that if Iran can turn oil into a weapon, might China use fertilizer to control its adversaries’ lifelines in future conflicts? If so, it wouldn’t just be high-tech products being choked off by rare earths—even our belts would be tightened by fertilizer.

"Capital" and the "996" Work Schedule: Historical Echoes and Contemporary Challenges

Everyone, there’s certainly been a lot of discussion lately about *Capital* and the crisis of capitalism—especially on the Chinese internet, where many people have begun to reexamine Marx’s ideas. I’ve noticed that over in the U.S., they’re desperately trying to save capitalism by replacing human labor with AI and automation, which is a bit absurd. But in reality, the root cause here may be that technology has failed to break through the limitations of the laws of physics. The physical world remains stuck in the Einstein era, with no fundamental paradigm shifts in fields like quantum mechanics. As a result, the only way to exploit workers is through the “996” work schedule—which combines “intensive” and “extensive” approaches. The prevalence of the “996” work schedule actually reflects the lag in technological development. If technology could make a breakthrough, labor relations might ease somewhat. However, the “996” schedule has indeed become a microcosm of the tense labor-management relations in the current economic environment. I remember when I was in graduate school, I had a classmate who worked for a government agency. Once, when he heard that we were still studying *Capital*, he blurted out, “You’re still studying *Capital*? That’s so reactionary!” At that moment, I sensed there were deeper underlying reasons behind this issue. The word “reactionary” left a deep impression on me because, at the time, we were all studying Marxism and political economy, and *Capital* was, of course, a critical revolutionary theory. But why do some people now call it reactionary? There have indeed been changes in the historical and contemporary context. Beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s, our country shifted toward a market economy, whereas *Capital* argues that there are inherent contradictions within the market economy and therefore socialism should pursue planned, proportionate development. The introduction of the market economy did indeed create a cognitive dissonance for many people. At the time, many people found it difficult to use *Capital* to explain why the planned economy had been abandoned. We had no choice but to turn to studying Western neoclassical economics. Yet those who truly study Marxism can still appreciate the practical significance of *Capital* from a historical perspective. This is because Marx identified the issue of surplus value throughout history, from primitive society to modern industrial society. After 1978, peace and development became the themes of the era, but at the time, people did not place much emphasis on these theories. However, looking at these issues again after 2018, we find that they remain highly significant. Those veteran revolutionaries who have lived through historical upheavals have not been completely misled by superficial trends; rather, they are able to step back and see the essence of the issues. Today, we see that Trump’s policies, the situation in Iran, and even China’s reform and opening-up all reflect the practical significance of these theories. The “996” phenomenon, in particular, falls precisely into the category of what Marx termed “absolute surplus value production”—the extraction of surplus through the extension of working hours. Marx argued that after the Industrial Revolution, the production of relative surplus value became dominant—meaning that the production of surplus increasingly relied on technological progress rather than extending working hours. Marx maintained that following the Industrial Revolution, the production of relative surplus value became the primary mode of production, with surplus generated mainly through technological progress rather than by extending labor time. The methods used by feudal lords and slave owners—forcing people to work long hours while eating little and taking all the surplus for themselves—belong to the “absolute” category, just like the “996” practice in some companies today. As history progresses, the role of technology becomes increasingly significant, while the reliance on sheer sweat and toil diminishes. This trend is indeed evident throughout history. Marx’s theory does indeed provide a profound understanding of capitalism’s internal contradictions, but he also emphasized that relations of production not only adapt to the development of productive forces but can also hinder that development. Lenin further developed this idea, pointing out that capitalism exacerbates its internal contradictions, ultimately leading to the emergence of a new mode of production. During the era of the Third International, the contradictions between capitalism and colonial and Third World countries were further emphasized. Therefore, the Chinese Revolution and the revolutions in other underdeveloped countries are all concrete manifestations of this theory. In short, the current increased attention on *Capital* indicates that we still need to gain a deeper understanding of the significance behind this theory. The “996” phenomenon is merely a concrete manifestation of this theory in the contemporary era.

"Bird" Stories in Scientific Papers

Ladies and gentlemen, in recent days, Chinese scholars published a study in *Science* on the impact of photovoltaic expansion policies on bird diversity, and the findings have sparked intense controversy. Some have criticized the study, claiming it provides ammunition for foreign critics to attack China’s photovoltaic industry; however, in my view, we should focus on the paper itself and examine its actual value. This paper is indeed groundbreaking. It examines the relationship between photovoltaics and ecology on a national scale, with the core conclusion being that for every one standard deviation increase in the intensity of photovoltaic policies, the local Shannon diversity index for birds decreases by 2.1%. However, this very pioneering nature has also compromised the paper’s rigor. Let’s take a look at its line of reasoning. First, the researchers collected photovoltaic industry policy documents from governments at all levels across the country. Based on their administrative enforceability scores, they constructed a county-level Policy Stringency Index (PSI). Then, using data collected by birdwatchers—also at the county level—they quantified bird diversity using the Shannon index. Through regression analysis, they found a correlation between an increase in the PSI and a decrease in the Shannon index. This impact was primarily concentrated in economically developed regions, rather than in the “Three North” regions where PV deployment is densest. However, there are some issues underlying this conclusion. First, the PV industry and related policies have undergone constant changes over the past decade. Between 2021 and 2023, PV site selection shifted toward the Greater Northwest, and environmental regulations have also tightened. The researchers did not specifically analyze which policies impacted the ecosystem; instead, they broadly attributed the blame to “policies,” a conclusion that is overly simplistic. Second, the choice of the Shannon index is flawed. It has two dimensions: species richness and evenness. For example, if a location originally had five rare bird species—20 of each—and they all became extinct, only to be uniformly replaced by five common bird species, the Shannon index would show no change. However, if one dominant species occupies the ecological niche, causing the populations of the other four to decline, the Shannon index would decrease. This index cannot clearly indicate whether the number of bird species has decreased or whether a particular species has become more concentrated. Therefore, these findings should be reported separately. Furthermore, the paper chose to use birds to assess biodiversity. While there are many birdwatchers in the West and a wealth of accumulated data, the data from China’s Bird Watching Records Center is relatively limited. The distribution of observational data is uneven, with first-tier and new first-tier cities accounting for the top ten locations. Factors such as economic levels and transportation accessibility influence data distribution, yet these have no direct relationship with the level of avian diversity. Additionally, the impact of fixed effects on the model’s explanatory power poses a problem. The researchers did not effectively control for confounding factors such as time and location. Although including fixed effects improved the model’s coefficient of determination (R²), this does not indicate the strength of the explanatory power of the photovoltaic policy itself. To eliminate the inflated effect of fixed effects, the model should examine the within R². Finally, the researchers were unable to determine whether ecological degradation in a given location was caused by the photovoltaic industry or other human activities. Take the example of Zhejiang: while photovoltaic policies there were robust, the Shannon index declined and the number of birdwatchers surged—how can one be certain that photovoltaics were the cause? Although the paper’s logical chain is not flawless, it introduces a valuable concept—“substandard greening”: from a satellite perspective, photovoltaic sites appear green and ecologically healthy, but in reality, they are often planted with a single, fast-growing grass species, and the complex ecosystem has actually been destroyed. Therefore, the recommendation that photovoltaic development must more strictly protect biodiversity is quite reasonable. In summary, although this paper has some shortcomings, it raises important research questions. It has sparked a broad public debate, drawing attention to the ecological impacts of the energy transition. Even though the research sample is large enough to be somewhat general, the fact that it has stimulated rational discussion is a positive outcome. I hope that in the future, more ordinary people will participate in this kind of public academic discussion, making the production of knowledge more democratic. Don’t be intimidated by titles; present facts and reason logically—that is the attitude we should adopt in the internet age.

The Absurdity and Truth of Overcapacity

Everyone, today I’d like to talk about an article titled “China’s Economy Is Ruining Everyone.” The author uses the topic of overcapacity to explore China’s impact on the global economy. The logic of this article is like that of a drunk boxer—even though he can barely stand, he insists on throwing punches. But the more absurd something is, the more we love to read it. This article is the kind of drivel I’ll swallow for you—and let your blood pressure rise on my account. First, the author criticizes China’s manufacturing subsidies, claiming they’re taking away people’s jobs and causing unemployment among Western workers. This is nothing short of a joke. Subsidies are meant to support vulnerable industries and jobs in the first place. Besides, China’s manufacturing competitiveness isn’t built on subsidies, but on technology, quality, and service. Subsidies are merely a supplementary measure; Western unemployment is largely the result of their own industrial restructuring. As for the outflow of industries, that’s simply the market at work—a natural byproduct of globalization. Second, the claim that China prioritizes production over consumption—and subsidizes producers to secure industrial leadership—is a complete fallacy. To put it bluntly, it’s as if Chinese consumers were subsidizing consumers worldwide. But while foreigners say Chinese goods are cheap, why don’t we feel that way ourselves? In reality, China’s subsidies are primarily aimed at maintaining social stability and promoting industrial upgrading. Moreover, Chinese consumers are far more savvy than their foreign counterparts; they know how to appreciate products that are both affordable and of good quality. Finally, the author suggests imposing trade barriers on Chinese goods, arguing that losing the market would cripple China’s industrial system. This is nothing short of courting disaster. Let me ask: Who could tolerate such treatment? Western countries simply can’t afford it—without cheap consumer goods, the cost of living would skyrocket, and angry voters would quickly bring down their governments. This is likely a strategy that kills 500 enemies but inflicts 1,000 wounds on oneself. As for Jostan Haug’s critique of overcapacity, it’s truly a gem. He argues that China does not suffer from overcapacity because it has 1.4 billion people—17% of the world’s population—who account for 14% of global trade, with a per capita trade surplus of just over $800, which is far lower than that of export-oriented countries like Germany. Yet no one accuses Germany of overcapacity, while China is—the reason is simple: China’s total volume is massive, and that volume is driven by its large population. Does having a large population mean we shouldn’t develop? This is a common starting point we share. On a global scale, all people are equal; who is superior and who is inferior is merely a fleeting illusion. If one agrees with this premise, one should support China’s industrial upgrading and fair competition. But when Chinese industries compete directly with Western ones, the West uses the rhetoric of “fairness” to mask tariff barriers—what a sly ploy. In reality, China isn’t forcing anyone to buy its products; most consumers and manufacturers are willing to purchase Chinese goods. They’re affordable, high-quality, and eco-friendly—why wouldn’t anyone buy them? In the field of green energy, China is particularly strong. It not only saves people money but also saves the planet. Yet Western critics claim that China undermines the competitiveness of other countries, thereby affecting employment. But China isn’t doing this on purpose; rather, it is charting a path of resurgence for industrialized nations. This is precisely the historical path that developing countries must take—China has simply navigated it efficiently. Haug’s article, “Why Developing Countries Cannot Skip Industrialization,” offers even deeper insight. He argues that China’s development has not followed the principles of free trade but has, in fact, defied them. This is because free trade itself is unfair—it is an asymmetrical structure established to serve Western interests. Through state intervention, China has successfully shed its subordinate status in the global economy. China has not rejected globalization; it has merely rejected liberalization. Although this approach runs counter to neoliberal dogma, it has helped Chinese enterprises rise to the top of the food chain, causing unease in the West. Ladies and gentlemen, China’s development speaks for itself. We may critique what Haug says, but we cannot deny it. China has achieved success in its own way and shattered the existing economic hierarchy. This is precisely why the West considers it illegitimate. Therefore, rather than making excuses, we should cooperate with China to jointly address global challenges.

Lenovo's Layoff Wave: From Shanghai to Bangalore

Everyone, it’s the weekend today, and we’ve got a live stream coming up shortly, so let’s just keep this brief. I recently saw the news about Lenovo’s “two-minute layoff storm,” and it was pretty shocking. The entire ISG—the Infrastructure Solutions Group—in Shanghai saw over a hundred employees laid off all at once. Lenovo is scaling back operations in China while expanding into India; from a geo-industrial perspective, it’s quite complex. On December 1, Lenovo issued a last-minute notice for a 15-minute online meeting, but the executive leading the meeting was 13 minutes late. With only two minutes left, a pre-recorded message was played, unilaterally informing everyone that the company’s decision was that everyone present had been “optimized”—and the meeting was adjourned. Employees complained that, even though it was clearly Lenovo, the company used the “art of language” to package it as a “special bonus” for the team—when in reality, it was severance pay. Everyone had to rely on their own skills to negotiate an “N+2” or “N+3” package; those who were lucky might even get “N+6.” Lenovo had just released its second-quarter financial report at the end of last month, and the numbers were solid: the group’s total revenue grew by 15%, while ISG’s revenue grew by 24%—truly impressive results. So many people were surprised that the ISG division was actually shut down. ISG is one of Lenovo’s three major business segments; the other two are Intelligent Devices (IDG) and Solutions & Services (SSG). ISG focuses on stability, while SSG generates high profits. ISG had the highest revenue growth, but its profitability was highly unstable. It originated from IBM’s server business and later evolved into the Data Center Group (DCG). After being reorganized into ISG in 2021, it came to include cloud services and AI infrastructure. Its hardware operations compete with Dell and HPE, with price wars driving industry profit margins to rock-bottom levels. Cloud services also generate solid revenue and high shipment volumes, but their gross margin remains below the industry average. The ISG segment was profitable in 2023–2024, but as Lenovo approaches its 40th anniversary, Yang Yuanqing has stated that the next decade will focus on accelerating the AI transformation. Consequently, the company has made massive investments in R&D, particularly in cutting-edge fields such as high-performance computing and liquid cooling technology. These strategic investments have incurred significant upfront costs, resulting in a loss of over $30 million in this quarterly report. The profitability of the legacy businesses is insufficient to support the new cost structure, making the entire segment seem somewhat redundant. Lenovo’s latest moves have been extremely decisive—even aggressive. It’s not just the ISG in Shanghai; R&D teams elsewhere that support it—including those working on software, firmware, and operating systems—have also been affected. Layoffs weren’t limited to China; in July, the company also laid off more than 100 employees in the United States. But it’s not just about layoffs—there’s also expansion. Lenovo has identified India as a key platform for the future, positioning it as a hub for AI development, semiconductor manufacturing, and digital infrastructure. It has established an AI center in Bangalore and plans to rapidly expand its workforce there from 400 to 1,400 employees. This includes a factory in Coimbatore that will produce AI servers and GPU units. The plan is to double revenue in India over the next three years. Why the shift from China to India? Behind the group-level resource optimization and strategic adjustments lie market dynamics, talent, and geopolitics. The Indian market is growing rapidly, with AI solutions in demand across all industries. It also boasts a large pool of affordable, young IT talent. The government’s “Make in India” initiative and fiscal incentives are in place, helping to lower operating costs. Another key consideration is supply chain diversification to avoid potential tariff risks. The current global supply chain trend is “China Plus One”—selecting an alternative location outside of China, typically India, Vietnam, or Mexico, as a production base. This approach enhances supply chain resilience and reduces risk exposure. This is something every multinational corporation must consider. Lenovo began addressing this issue relatively early and has developed a well-thought-out strategy. Before it turned 20, the company was known as “Legend”; it later changed its name to “Lenovo” to facilitate registration when expanding overseas. It’s fair to say that from the very beginning, Lenovo has approached its strategic planning from a global perspective. Everyone, it’s the weekend today—let’s chat about these topics. See you in the livestream at 9:30.

Ukraine's Dream of Peace, America's Business Strategy

Everyone, I need to talk to you about how this “dream” of peace in Ukraine and America’s “business tactics” are playing off each other. Zelenskyy originally wanted to take a “middle path,” only to discover that such a path doesn’t exist at all. The U.S. “peace plan” for Ukraine has been revised time and again, pared down from 28 points to 19. The nine points that were removed were clearly intended to “save face” for Ukraine—they were the provisions regarding territory and military size. Now Zelenskyy has come to realize that the U.S. has no genuine intention of allowing him to retain territorial integrity or a sufficiently strong military. These nine points represent the fundamental points of contention between Russia and Ukraine, and it remains to be seen whether Russia will even agree to the remaining 19. If Russia deems the new peace plan to contradict the spirit of the Anchorage summit between Putin and Trump, the entire process will have to start over from scratch. Russia continues its expansion, while Trump is once again forcing Ukraine to jump into the “fire.” Courtney, a former U.S. diplomat to Kazakhstan and Georgia, wrote in articles for the RAND Corporation and The Hill that Ukrainians are resilient, more confident, and determined to continue fighting—they do not want a ceasefire. The Ukrainian leadership believes Russia lacks the military strength to secure victory, while Ukraine is at the forefront of a military revolution; the eastern front can be held without expensive weapons. Hearing this, it seems as though Ukraine has already gained the upper hand and will likely capture Moscow in a few years. But take a closer look at Georgia, where she is stationed. Like Ukraine, Georgia is a target for NATO’s eastward expansion. Many scholars of international affairs believe that, at its core, the Russia-Ukraine conflict boils down to the U.S. desire to establish military bases deep within Russia’s heartland. Russia has drawn a red line, but the U.S., in its wilfulness, pays no heed. In fact, the most reckless actors are the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the so-called “deep state” within the intelligence community. For them, might makes right, and they hold normal, equal diplomacy in utter contempt. They treat normal diplomacy as a tool for “regime change” and “covert subversion.” In 2010, Ukrainian President Yanukovych sought to maintain neutrality between Russia and the West, but in 2014, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nuland made a phone call designating Ukraine’s next government. This call was later posted online by Russia, yet the U.S. continued to deny it. This kind of “open secret subversion” has in fact become a standard modus operandi for the United States; during the Cold War alone, it carried out 64 covert operations and 6 overt ones. From 1946 to 2000, the United States intervened in 81 foreign elections. Over the long term, the U.S. has fomented conflicts and fostered security dependence around the globe, giving rise to a massive interest group known as the “military-industrial complex.” Today’s military-industrial complex has, in fact, “grown old,” and new interest groups are not interested in endless wars—which is why a president like Trump goes around saying, “I am not belligerent by nature; I only seek to resolve conflicts.” However, there remains a massive opposition force within the country that prevents Trump from softening his stance and blocks the radical changes he seeks to bring about. For example, the original 28-point peace plan—though some claim it was a “wish list” for Russia—did not actually harm U.S. interests; it merely opposed NATO’s eastward expansion. Consequently, it faced widespread criticism in U.S. political circles, with the establishment offering the most vehement opposition. Under pressure from Ukraine and Europe, the plan has now been revised to 19 points. It no longer restricts NATO’s eastward expansion and thus fails to address the root cause of Russia’s military action; consequently, it has quickly gained widespread support from the establishment. Next week, Witkiewicz, the special envoy for Russia-Ukraine affairs, will lead a delegation to Moscow to discuss the matter with Putin; I am pessimistic about this. One part of the agreement that Trump cares deeply about is the “money-grabbing clause”—investing $10 billion in frozen Russian assets into Ukraine’s reconstruction, with the U.S. taking half of the dividends. This money is a figment of the imagination; in reality, only about $5 billion in Russian assets are held by the Americans, while the bulk is held by the G7, the EU, and the European Clearing Bank. Trump is simply too eager to extort money. But even more frightening are those who chant “Glory to Ukraine.” Both types of people are bad, but the latter are worse.

Seeing Through the "Multipolarity" Gimmick: The U.S. and China Remain in a Bipolar World

Everyone, let’s talk today about a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*. The author, Jennifer Lind from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, what did she say? Let’s break it down first. ### The Illusion of Multipolarity The article argues that the world isn’t as multipolar as people think—it’s still dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and China. Doesn’t that sound a bit familiar? After all, during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were also the two superpowers. However, the author argues that while competition between the U.S. and China is intense today—and each has its own allies helping to carve out spheres of influence—this situation is more stable than a multipolar order, since a multi-power scenario would inevitably descend into chaos. ### The Threshold for Great Power Status She then goes on to explain in detail the threshold for “great power” status, stating that a country qualifies if its GDP exceeds that of the top power by 17%–45%, or if its composite measure of economic scale and wealth (GDP multiplied by per capita GDP) reaches 8%–28% of the top power’s level. By these standards, both China’s GDP and its composite indicators far exceed the historical levels typical of great powers. In other words, China isn’t seeking hegemony; it simply doesn’t want to be ignored. ### The U.S. “Defensive” Strategy So the question arises: what is the United States doing? The U.S. is “defending its stronghold”—that is, protecting its interests in Latin America from erosion. Recently, the U.S. released a National Security Strategy that explicitly emphasizes a focus on the Western Hemisphere, involving interference in Brazil, aid to Argentina, and taking a hard line against Venezuela and Panama. Isn’t this precisely a response to China’s growing influence in its “backyard”? ### China’s “Monroe Doctrine”? Of course, China might also pursue its own version of the Monroe Doctrine—that is, establishing its own sphere of influence in East Asia, forcing neighboring countries to decouple from the U.S., and even attempting to drive the U.S. out of East Asia. This naturally brings to mind the tricks of imperialism. ### Concerns About a Two-Superpower Rivalry The author expresses regret and concern over this. She believes that without a peace fully dominated by the United States—the so-called Pax Americana—the world will revert to the tensions of the Cold War era. German Chancellor Mertz recently made similar remarks. ### The World After the Unipolar Era So, what will the world look like after the unipolar era? Their perspective has reverted to the pre-Cold War era. Will China become that kind of superpower? Will medium-sized and even small countries completely lose their agency? These questions remain to be seen. ### Uncertainty in the World Order Currently, the international order is highly unstable. Take India, for example: it has once again begun talking about “Chicken Hill”—a truly deep-seated obsession. A report by Australia’s Lowy Institute is also optimistic about India, but it gave the country a score of only 40, placing it in the same category as Singapore, North Korea, and Brunei. It is still too early to say exactly what kind of multipolar world this will become. In short, this *Foreign Affairs* article reminds us that the world may not be as complex as we imagine. The United States and China still dominate the bipolar landscape, but competition and geopolitical tensions will not disappear as a result.

My Life as a Chinese-American: A Cross-Cultural Adventure

Hello, everyone. My name is Yu Zhongmei—that’s right, Zhongmei, Yu Zhongmei, Zhongmei Zhongmei. My name is a living, breathing bridge between China and the U.S. I’m an American woman born in Dalian and raised in the U.S. My dad was a former White House correspondent for *The New York Times*, and my mom is an English teacher. They hoped I would become a bridge between China and the U.S. But what about me? I was actually more drawn to the arts. In the 1980s, my parents came from the U.S. to Dalian, China, and that’s where I was born. When I was six, our whole family moved back to the U.S.—just as China’s Reform and Opening-Up was getting underway. My parents didn’t want me to forget Chinese, so I became a regular at Chinese cultural events. After returning to the U.S., my parents posted notices at bus stops in Madison to reach out to family members of visiting scholars from China, asking them to come teach me Chinese. My older sister was born in the U.S. but came back to Dalian with us to attend school. They named her “Dalian,” saying it was a beautiful name in English. As for me, they felt I should lead a different kind of life, so they named me “Zhongmei.” After returning to the U.S. at age six, I attended school there all the way through my senior year of high school. My parents thought it was time to settle down, but I wanted to go back to China to make my mark. I was captivated by Beijing’s skyscrapers and the Forbidden City’s red walls and blue tiles. But having grown up in the U.S., I realized that returning to China to study Chinese was the most natural thing for me to do. Before I became an adult, I’d visited China once or twice—not to study, but to travel. I especially loved Beijing and that feeling of familiarity mixed with strangeness. So I decided to study in Beijing, though my parents worried I wouldn’t be content with the status quo. But I thought that in China, I could communicate in Chinese more naturally. Why go to the U.S. to learn Chinese, then? It’s just too much trouble. I earned my bachelor’s degree at Beijing Normal University, where I studied Chinese classical dance. With 56 ethnic groups and seven or eight major dynasties—each with its own distinct dances and costumes—it was this diversity that captivated me most. Later, I began to consider studying broadcasting at the Communication University of China. The reason was simple: I learned Chinese by watching *Xinwen Lianbo* (the national news broadcast), and I was so impressed by the anchors’ eloquence. When I asked around, I found out they were all graduates of the Communication University of China. I realized that studying there would allow me to gain a deeper understanding of China—not just through dance, but also through history and culture. In college, I participated in the “Chinese Bridge” competition. That competition changed the course of my life. From then on, I began expressing myself through social media. I watch my videos every day, constantly making adjustments in the hope of improving. But honestly, I’m never quite good enough. When I look at other people’s work, I always feel like something is missing. After graduating from the Communication University, I first worked in children’s English content before gradually transitioning to becoming a social media blogger. Every day, I ask myself: What exactly do I want to say? I’ve discovered that the comment sections on social media are like a stage filled with a mix of emotions. I’ve started collecting others’ comments and analyzing them. Perhaps this holds more value than my own expressions. Now, every day I think about how I can bridge the cultural gap between China and the U.S. through my social media content. I hope to become the link that connects these two worlds. Although it’s not easy, I’m willing to give it a try. After all, life is an adventure, isn’t it?

Northeast China, and My Curious Heart

Everyone, let’s talk about China. Specifically, the place I most want to visit is Northeast China. Why? The history and culture of the Northeast are just so fascinating. Speaking of which, let me tell you a bit about my parents. They’re from the Northeast, but I’ve never been back there myself. I’ve traveled all over China, but I haven’t really been to the Northeast. Dalian is the place I’d most like to visit and study in. Why? Because Dalian is different from other cities in the Northeast. It has its own unique history and stories. But let’s get back to the Northeast. The Northeast—especially Liaoning—with port cities like Dalian, is steeped in countless tales of war. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, along with various conflicts with neighboring countries, have imbued the region with a rich historical atmosphere. My parents really loved it back then—why? Because of the warmth and humanity of the people there. They say Northeasterners are warm-hearted, have many friends, and are always willing to help one another. Isn’t that exactly the kind of story my parents used to tell me when I was a kid? Next, let’s talk about the different layers of Chinese culture. Traditional practices, like making dumplings, are what China hopes the outside world will understand; the “Chinese Bridge” events showcase a modern, open image. Then there’s grassroots culture and all the online phenomena—fresh and interesting. When I engage with these things, I feel right at home. My parents taught me that China is all about making dumplings. That’s true—people in Northeast China do make dumplings. But that’s just my parents’ perspective, since they’ve lived their whole lives in the Northeast. The things I saw growing up are my most authentic impressions of China. However, with the internet’s growth, I’ve been able to experience so much more. No one from any one place is “authentic”—the same goes for the United States. Recently, a fan asked me on TikTok where in China is the most fun to visit in the summer. I asked him back: “China is so big—where do you want to go?” Northeast China has snow and ice in the winter, while Hainan and Fujian are great year-round—there are fun places everywhere. But I’m genuinely concerned that labeling China in any way limits its diversity. For example, saying you absolutely have to go to the Northeast to eat dumplings—isn’t that too narrow a view? The traditional Chinese culture I was exposed to as a child—such as the phrase “plan thoroughly before taking action” from *The Art of War*—makes China seem particularly fascinating to me. It’s translated into English as “think before you act,” but the Chinese phrase “plan thoroughly before acting” carries such solemnity—it feels like the words of a wise person. Lately, I’ve been wondering if I should conduct my research in both languages to examine these issues from different perspectives. This might be my advantage as an observer, since I’m deeply interested in this kind of research. Next, let’s talk about “woke” culture. I didn’t really understand this term before, but later realized it simply refers to some people conducting their own investigations and proposing new ideas. Some feel it goes too far, while others worry it threatens free speech. This reminds me that, in fact, my parents’ generation had a similar “woke” mindset. They were open to new experiences, like traveling to India or China. Wasn’t that their generation’s version of “woke”? As they grew older, their perspectives settled down. The “culture wars” people talk about today seem to be just another cycle. As the Daoists say, everything goes in cycles. Ladies and gentlemen, let’s now turn to the “culture wars” in the United States. Some say the U.S. is heading toward civil war, but I believe the country has always been caught up in various conflicts. This is the very foundation of our nation. Through conflict, we’ve learned how to coexist peacefully. These are my observations on Chinese and American culture—and my unique perspective as an observer.

Americans are incredibly competitive, and so are we.

Hey everyone, I’ve been taking care of the kids all day, so I wasn’t planning on writing anything. But just now, while flipping through a book, I came across a passage that struck me as pretty interesting, so I thought I’d share it with you all. These days, the competition in our country is off the charts—everyone’s acting like the “King of Cutthroat Competition,” and it’s gotten so intense that even the air feels tense. Actually, if we look back at history, Americans were also the “kings of competition” during the heyday of their manufacturing industry. In the eyes of Europeans, Americans were terrifyingly competitive. And what about the British? They’d wake up in the morning and still be enjoying a hearty English breakfast, completely baffled by how Americans could have invented such an inhumane concept as the “breakfast meeting.” Not only did they have meetings over breakfast, but they even had meetings over lunch and dinner? Americans must be crazy—always using meetings to fill their stomachs. What’s even more off-putting is that they focused solely on devouring their food as quickly as possible, with no regard for flavor. They’d wolf it down in a flash, fill their bellies, and then rush back to work—that’s what really mattered. In 1820, Europeans staying at a hotel in Boston found the facilities to be first-rate and resplendent with gold and splendor. But the people were truly a sight to behold—they’d eat a meal in just five to ten minutes, and once finished, chaos would ensue, creating a stark contrast to the hotel’s elegant atmosphere. Americans have long been this way; everyone consciously sacrifices taste for speed. As a result, they have no true gourmet cuisine—only fast food. It’s essentially an industrialized version of “egg drop soup”—a product of half-hearted effort. The book also notes that Americans have elevated this culture of rushing to a value system, linking it to the Protestant work ethic. People compare themselves to one another—who appears to be the most dedicated to work—and in turn look down on hedonists. Eating an extra hour or sleeping an extra hour means working an hour less and serving God an hour less. It’s not just about eating; Americans pursue speed in everything they do—they walk as if jogging and drive as if their lives depended on it. To meet this demand, automakers invest far more in pursuing speed than in safety or fuel efficiency. The same goes for other products; the market has grown accustomed to saving time and being efficient, and this mindset has become deeply ingrained. Consequently, businesses are forced to prioritize speed and efficiency. The products they create must be easy to use and operate seamlessly; there’s no room for even the slightest flaw that might slow down the user’s pace. At the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition, the British were stunned by America’s rapid development, marveling that Americans were the fastest people in the world—unmatched in the speed of both living and procreating. Alright, let’s just lay it all out there today. The book is called *A Century of Assembly Lines*—check it out if you’re interested. These days, we’re all working on assembly lines, tightening screws, eating prepackaged meals, and putting in unpaid overtime—all blessings for us wage earners. We’ve already tried just about everything the Americans have to offer, and thankfully, prepackaged meals are on their way—they’re the tastiest of all. Pushing our kids to excel is really exhausting, though.

From the Sava River to Mihailo Street: A Stroll Through the Streets of Belgrade

Everyone, today I’m going to take a stroll through Belgrade’s Old Town. This place is truly magical—just cross the bridge from the hotel, and you’re right by the Sava River. Once across the bridge, gasoline at the 194DNR gas station sells for nine. Serbian currency is pretty easy to figure out—basically, divide by 100 to get the equivalent in US dollars, and it’s even easier to convert to Chinese yuan. Cross the bridge from here, and you’re in the new city; walk another half hour, and you’ll reach the Old Town. I hopped on my little Blue Knight “Walt” and set off! Just after crossing the Sava River Bridge, I spotted a run-down office building teeming with mosquitoes. A tram was circling around there, and I couldn’t help but wonder: why do people love trams so much? Oh, the French Embassy—it’s just a short distance away. Across the river is the Belgrade Fortress, and that’s where I’m headed. Outside the fortress, a crowd was watching the World Cup—Portugal had tied with another team. I stopped to watch the game for a bit, then walked into the fortress. Serbian flags were still hanging on the fortress walls; I wonder if they were put up for some international exhibition. I spotted a strange piece of graffiti that read “Trig Love,” which reminded me of a game I used to play as a kid called Trig Love—I think it had something to do with Slavic fairy tales and myths, though I can’t quite remember now. That graffiti was really crude; I’m starting to dislike this kind of graffiti more and more. I asked my friend if this was the place we’d just passed. My friend said, “That’s exactly the bridge I just crossed.” Kids’ imaginations really are a bit strange—I suspect that graffiti might have been drawn by an adult. Oh, right—my friends are from Montenegro, or “Monte Negro.” When I said hello to them, their little brother even waved back at me. Hmm, I told them I was from Shanghai, and the two little boys greeted me in Chinese. As I walked along, the Danube and the Sava rivers converged here—the Danube flows eastward, while the Sava runs north to south. Belgrade’s Old Town is on this side of the confluence, and the New Town is over there. The Xiaomi apartment I was staying in was right there, with the hotel right behind it. Over there is the Fontana Hotel, right next to the site of the former Chinese Embassy to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It’s pretty safe to walk around there at night. I crossed the Sava River Bridge and saw a sign for a military museum. Strange—is there really a military museum here? But I didn’t think much of it and kept walking. I came across a street interview show; they were filming a segment, and it looked pretty professional. Next to it was a store with a sign reading “Red Star Belgrade,” and I also spotted the Gazprom logo—that sponsor really goes all out! Back on the Sava River Bridge, I saw a banner that read “Katsvojska na Kosopo Vrati,” meaning “The Serbian Army Must Return to Kosovo.” It sounded quite patriotic. The banner in the middle stood out in particular—both the NATO and EU logos had been crossed out. Hmm, that banner was definitely quite jarring. So, folks, that was my stroll through the streets of Belgrade. This place is truly full of all sorts of strange things—and it’s pretty interesting, too.

The Decline of the U.S. Auto Industry and the U.S.-China Electric Vehicle Rivalry

Folks, that ITIF think tank is really in a panic. They’ve churned out a lengthy three-part report, but I’ll break it down for you in just five minutes. With the U.S. auto industry in decline, ITIF is naturally worried. The first part of the report alone is 20,000 characters long—if it were up to me, I’d have whittled it down to a few thousand characters by now. These think tank folks watch day in and day out as American cars struggle while Chinese cars rise, and it’s driving them crazy. The very first sentence of the report reads, “The automotive industry is not just about vehicles themselves; it’s also tied to national power.” That makes sense, but the key is how it’s applied. From an economic perspective, the automotive industry’s supply chain is incredibly long, encompassing eyewear, machine tools, plastics, rubber, electronics, and semiconductors—all of which can drive overall prosperity. More importantly, national power is a continuum, with national defense and military industries at one end and everyday consumer goods like underwear and T-shirts at the other. The middle ground consists of dual-use industries like aviation and semiconductors, as well as “enabling industries” such as the automotive sector. Even if the U.S. auto industry stopped building cars, arms manufacturers would still operate, but the auto industry involves technology development, process innovation, and skills training—all of which serve as “industrial construction sites” shared by the manufacturing sector. The U.S. auto industry has already lost a significant number of supporting “energy-negative industries,” leaving the entire industrial system severely lacking in resilience—which is why the ITIF is so concerned. The U.S. auto industry contributes 5% of GDP and 5% of jobs annually, creating $591 billion in intermediate value for upstream industries. At the peak of the manufacturing era in the 1950s, seven or eight out of every ten cars worldwide were American. Today, that figure has dropped to 11%, with Chinese cars accounting for 34% of that share. The three major U.S. automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler—had a combined market share of 92% in the 1960s, but by 2024, that figure had fallen to 38 percent—with General Motors dropping from 51 percent to 17 percent, Ford from 29 percent to 14 percent, and Chrysler, now renamed Stellantis, proving more resilient due to its smaller scale. Japanese cars’ market share has risen to 37%, tying with American cars, while Korean cars account for 11% and European cars 10%. Over the past 60 years, the American auto industry can be divided into several periods. From 1965 to around 2000 was a period of decline lasting more than 30 years, with Japan, Europe, and South Korea as competitors. After 2000, the industry gradually improved and was even once seen as the hope for driving economic recovery. After 2015, outsourcing to Mexico and the rise of electric vehicles from China posed even greater challenges. The U.S. auto industry’s first decline came when it was defeated by Japanese automakers. Against the backdrop of the two oil crises, consumers shifted toward fuel-efficient compact cars, but the U.S. auto industry remained fixated on large-displacement vehicles and reacted too slowly. The key issue lay in an outdated management system; it took the Big Three 10 to 15 years to learn Japan’s lean manufacturing methods. Their lagging production efficiency allowed foreign automakers to gain an advantage in the U.S. market. As for the challenge posed by electric vehicles, the U.S. auto industry is even more reluctant to accept defeat, given that it was the pioneer in inventing both electric vehicles and batteries. In the early 20th century, before the widespread adoption of the power grid, one-third of the vehicles on American streets were electric. Today’s mainstream battery technology—lithium iron phosphate—was originally developed at the University of Texas and commercialized by the startup A123. However, due to inadequate manufacturing fundamentals, A123 went bankrupt and was acquired by a Chinese company, resulting in a transfer of technology. The report acknowledges that China’s lead in battery technology is entirely attributable to related innovations. Currently, China accounts for 85 percent of global battery production capacity—12 times that of the United States. In terms of EV battery patents, China holds 74 percent of the global total, followed by Japan with 9 percent and the United States with 6 percent. How does ITIF explain the success of China’s electric vehicles? First, technological innovation; second, government intervention—or “innovation mercantilism.” This implies that strategic national considerations have been at play from the very beginning. First, developing electric vehicles can enhance energy security and reduce dependence on oil imports. Second, since breakthroughs in internal combustion engine technology are difficult to achieve, developing electric vehicles can break free from technological dependence on foreign automakers. Third, it protects the environment and promotes sustainable development. Having decided to develop electric vehicles, the priority is to foster globally competitive automakers. Support measures include policy support, financial subsidies, and so-called “IP theft.” In 2020, the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center identified electric vehicles and aircraft as China’s priority areas for technology acquisition. The ITIF acknowledges that the competitiveness of Chinese automakers stems from unfair practices, as if the U.S. government could simply step in to resolve the issue—but this actually underestimates the real threat posed by China’s automotive industry. There are three driving forces behind electric vehicles: autonomous driving, software-defined vehicles, and electrification. The U.S. leads in the first, is on par in the second, and lags in the third. In any case, the U.S. automotive industry has already lost its absolute leadership in advanced automotive technology. The current situation facing the U.S. auto industry is somewhat similar to when it faced competition from Japan in the past, but the difference lies in the fact that Japan’s competitiveness stemmed from efficiency optimization. China’s electric vehicles, however, represent a comprehensive disruption, posing a higher risk and potentially causing the U.S. to miss out on an entire era. This era has already lasted five years.

China’s Perspective on the Political Landscape in Latin America: The Rise of the Right and the U.S.-China Rivalry

Everyone, let’s talk about the latest developments in Latin America today. To be honest, this is quite a spectacle. Traditionally, Latin America has been divided between the left, which is pro-China, and the right, which is pro-U.S. Recently, the U.S. has been meddling in Latin America as if it were its own backyard, and Trump has once again become the leader of the global right wing. What does this mean for us in China? We responded swiftly to the strategy put forward by the U.S. by releasing the “Policy Document on Latin America and the Caribbean.” The document states that major shifts are accelerating, the international balance of power is undergoing profound adjustments, and unilateral bullying undermines international peace and security. Just a few days later, a seemingly routine report on CCTV mentioned a pilot observation and exchange activity on the deployment of military equipment across the entire armed forces. A map depicting the military exercises caught the attention of international media because it was focused on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Isn’t this exactly like “Hearing Thunder in the Silence”? What does this indicate? We’ve made thorough preparations in the military sphere—we’re not to be taken lightly. The political landscape in Latin America has recently undergone a major shift, with right-wing forces clearly on the rise. The proportion of the population supporting the right has reached an all-time high. Chávez had just ushered in the first “pink wave,” but now Maduro’s regime faces U.S. attempts at subversion. Many right-wing governments, on the other hand, are unconcerned by U.S. hegemonic actions and are even offering support. Left-wing opponents may find themselves struggling to survive this year, which means that Latin America’s second “pink wave” is receding, and a right-wing conservative “blue wave” is making a comeback. Last October, Argentina held midterm elections—seen as a referendum on Milei’s radical reforms—and the result was a landslide victory for Milei. This year, he aims to establish himself as a leader of the right-wing alliance by organizing a Latin American right-wing summit. Chile’s new president, Castells—an admirer of Pinochet—immediately traveled to Argentina to align with Milei following his election victory. In Bolivia, Paz defeated the socialist left, which had been in power for 20 years; in Ecuador, Novoa is pursuing a pro-U.S. policy; and in Honduras, the new president, Asfora, a right-wing politician, may fulfill his campaign promise to sever diplomatic ties with us and reestablish relations with Taiwan; and El Salvador’s President Bukele, whose domestic approval rating ranks among the highest in the world, remains firmly in power. The remaining Latin American countries will all hold general elections this year—Costa Rica, Colombia, Peru, Haiti, and Brazil—and the outcomes of these elections may ultimately drive the region further to the right. With the collective decline of the Latin American left and the rise of pro-U.S. right-wing governments on one hand, and the U.S. tightening its grip on the Western Hemisphere on the other—does this signal a mutual convergence leading to the demise of the CP? No—convergence is possible, but its demise is not inevitable. In reality, Latin America faces many intractable political and governance issues. Voters, driven by disappointment, swing back and forth between left and right, believing that it makes no difference who takes office. On the U.S. side, the Trump administration has explicitly stated its intent to restore American dominance in the Western Hemisphere and block competitors from outside the region—a blatantly aggressive stance that essentially amounts to a “cut each other down to size” strategy. Many interpret this as a strategy of “advancing to retreat,” but since the U.S. has shown no intention of withdrawing from Asia, we cannot afford to be blindly optimistic. Consequently, the policy document on Latin America and the Caribbean released by China has been viewed by many regional policy analysts as an effort to extend the struggle to the U.S.’s doorstep, and the contest for regional influence between China and the U.S. is likely to escalate further. On the economic and trade front, we have been continuously deepening our ties with Latin America. We are now the top trading partner for most Latin American countries, with more than 20 countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, and our economies are highly complementary. Latin America provides natural resources—such as donkey meat and beef from Argentina, and iron ore and soybeans from Brazil—while China supplies industrial manufactured goods, such as electric vehicles, and invests in infrastructure projects, such as the subway system in Mexico and hydroelectric power plants in Ecuador. China-Latin America economic and trade relations have shifted from basic commodity trade to technical cooperation in areas such as power, telecommunications, and aerospace—something the United States views with great apprehension. Our deep-space station in Argentina has been repeatedly obstructed by Milei, as the U.S. considers it a quasi-military facility. Similarly, regarding the Qiankai Deep-Water Port in Peru—where COSCO Shipping holds a 60% stake and exclusive operating rights—the U.S. fears it could become a supply station for the Chinese Navy. On the issue of Venezuela, even when China offers only diplomatic support, there are significant differences of opinion within U.S. strategic circles. One view holds that China’s support is merely lip service, which will cause Latin American countries to weigh the potential security risks of drawing closer to China; another view holds that U.S. bullying will backfire, pushing Latin America toward China. In reality, the U.S. fears losing control of Panama even more, which is why it is currently engaged in a power struggle with us over terminal operating rights—because this is not only a trade corridor but also a vital passage for the U.S. Navy connecting the two oceans. U.S. scholars have even listed numerous scenarios in which China could blockade Panama—ranging from orchestrating various accidents or sabotaging ships to block the passage, to even having anti-U.S. forces lay mines. Overall, the U.S. is extremely sensitive to the security situation in the Caribbean region of Latin America. Any assertive move on our part can make them restless. CCTV’s report on the wargame simulations is, in fact, sending a strong signal. On December 19, 20 units from military forces and academies across the armed forces conducted wargame demonstrations on various subjects in Xuchang. The focus was actually on the independently developed intelligent wargame system, but some of the footage set people’s nerves on edge. The demonstrations featured the waters near Taiwan, Russia, and Japan, but what unnerved the U.S. most were the computer screens of experts from the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences. One screen displayed a map of the Americas dotted with blue and red markers: the Red Force was locked in a standoff with the Blue Force in the Caribbean, while the Blue Force was establishing a second line of defense in Texas. Many international media outlets picked up on this image, interpreting it as a sign that the Chinese military’s strategic outlook is shifting. Although China’s relations with Latin America are primarily economic and trade-based—with virtually no military involvement—why would China’s wargame maps target the U.S. “backyard” and simulate a conflict there? Does this indicate that China harbors ambitions for global hegemony? There are various speculations internationally, but this actually appears more like a step forward in strategic understanding. After all, the U.S. has conducted countless war games simulating a conflict across the Taiwan Strait—it hasn’t explicitly stated that war is inevitable, but in reality, it is piling geopolitical pressure around China’s periphery. Including the regions surrounding the United States in our war games indicates that these areas have entered our long-term strategic perspective as objects of strategic study. This essentially reflects China’s ongoing development of a strategic understanding commensurate with its status as a major power. The U.S. will have to get used to this, just as we have gotten used to the Pentagon’s war games. So I think Australia’s ABC News summed it up well; although its stance differs from ours, it noted that China is not actively seeking war, but is demonstrating to the world that it is fully prepared.

Let's talk about the war and food at the Shangyi Long Restaurant.

As soon as I stepped out of the Dragon Restaurant, I took a quick look around. What is the “Dragon Restaurant”? For viewers of *The Great Food Empire*, that’s crystal clear. Behind all the diverse cuisines lies a simple message: “Eat well”—this embodies the Chinese way of life and the worldview that underpins it. There’s no preaching, nor any condescending judgment. However, some netizens took issue with this, saying that this anti-war film didn’t deliver a harsh blow to imperialism or harshly criticize the aggressors—instead, it seemed to gloss over the issues. But I think that’s actually a good thing. The chef isn’t “Wolf Warrior”; he’s just a speck of dust in the flow of time. Caught in the conflict zone between Western and Middle Eastern civilizations, he does his best to navigate the waters with tact and flexibility. Although he finds himself on the brink of death, he maintains a distinctly Chinese approach—bringing small moments of joy to those around him by treating them to good food. This warmth for the stomach may only cast a faint glow upon those around him, yet it wards off the most brutal alienation that war inflicts upon the human heart and preserves the very essence of what it means to be human. And that is enough. As for the bigger question—how we defend peace—that’s something we should ponder beyond the confines of the film. Overall, I think it’s fantastic and highly recommend it—especially to those with some understanding of contemporary Middle Eastern history, Western intervention, and the rise of extremist organizations. Much of what’s depicted in the film is based on real events; it tells the story of the Iraq War and the American occupation following Saddam’s downfall. At that time, there were more than a few Chinese-run restaurants and farms operating in Baghdad. Some did business with American soldiers, while others provided shelter to innocent local civilians. This story is largely based on real-life events. On the Iraqi side, Old Zha was a Ba’ath Party cadre under Saddam’s father. At the time, the entire state apparatus was dismantled by the U.S., and a large number of military-trained individuals, still armed, took up the path of resistance. U.S. prisons carried out indiscriminate arrests, resulting in numerous miscarriages of justice. It was precisely in these dark dungeons that religious zeal and democratic resistance converged. The future leader of ISIS, al-Baghdadi, was released from Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad. This prison was indeed the scene of a prison break, just like in the movies, with at least 500 inmates escaping. ISIS also did train children to become so-called “indoctrinators” for the caliphate, participating in terrorist attacks. It can be said that, aside from the bright spot of Chinese cuisine, the entire film is very somber. But what I’d like to focus on is the simple value China has exported: “Eat Well.” Our ancestors taught that agriculture is the foundation of the nation and that food is the cornerstone of governance; only by safeguarding the food supply can a regime remain stable. As the saying goes, “A ruler regards the people as heaven, and the people regard food as heaven.” Only those who truly understand this principle can succeed. Any political order must prioritize and adapt to the fundamental issue of food. The Saddam Hussein regime, having been subject to long-term sanctions, relied heavily on a food rationing system. While this system severely harmed agriculture, it was nonetheless an efficient distribution mechanism. However, after U.S. forces entered the country, they implemented market-oriented reforms on this planned-economy-style rationing system, which quickly led to chaotic looting and systemic collapse. Consequently, large-scale imports of cheap relief grain were introduced, further devastating local agriculture. Furthermore, during the decade from 2003 to 2013, the U.S. implemented seed patent laws in Iraq, allowing international seed companies to apply for seed patents locally while prohibiting farmers from saving and reproducing seeds. This created business opportunities for agribusinesses like Monsanto and Cargill. Iraqi farmers had no choice but to purchase seeds from these companies. These patented seeds, however, were bred to yield decreasing harvests year after year; once the patent term expired, farmers were forced to purchase new seeds, or else face legal action for growing unpatented crops. This dealt a significant blow to Iraqi agriculture. Iraqi agriculture has undergone a series of transformations—from the land distribution to landlords during the British colonial era, to the establishment of intensive farms under Saddam Hussein, to the impact of shock therapy during the U.S. occupation—compounded by neighboring countries’ construction of large dams upstream in the Mesopotamian River basin. These factors have continuously led to rural decline and land degradation. Not only has Iraq transformed from a self-sufficient nation into a food-importing country, but urban population concentration has also trapped it in a vicious cycle of resource scarcity. Who, exactly, is stepping up to help Iraq? It is this farm-to-table restaurant that ensures you have a proper meal. A couple of days ago, I read an article by an Iraqi scholar arguing that we must learn from China’s rural revitalization model and not neglect agriculture, rural areas, and farmers. This is because many parts of the Middle East face issues of uneven development, with major cities effectively becoming quasi-states that absorb a disproportionate share of public resources, placing immense pressure on people’s livelihoods. So what should be done? We must learn from China’s green rural revitalization model. Indeed, in recent years, Iraqi officials, scientists, and engineers have been coming to China to study agriculture—especially in the northwest—to learn from China’s experience in land management, saline-alkali land remediation, desertification control, water conservation and irrigation, rural poverty alleviation, and other aspects of sustainable development. Moreover, China’s approach—which combines smallholder farming cooperatives with modern technology—is better suited to Iraq’s national conditions than the Western model of mechanized large-scale farms. Two years ago, Iraq temporarily banned rice cultivation due to water shortages, but now they have begun growing a hybrid rice variety called “Giri,” which is a cross between the local “Hupo” rice and Asian “Jasmine” rice. The development of this drought-resistant new variety draws heavily on the scientific approach pioneered by Yuan Longping’s team, which harnesses hybrid vigor. Furthermore, while Iraq previously relied on flood irrigation for rice cultivation, it has now not only adopted the principles of water-saving irrigation but also introduced drought-resistant, high-yield crops, thereby stabilizing the supply of staple grains and vegetables. Furthermore, through seawater nitrogenation projects and the use of kelp to remove nitrogen from industrial wastewater, China has helped Iraq conserve its precious freshwater resources for public welfare and agriculture. In China’s international cooperation efforts, Iraq is by no means a unique case. In fact, many developing countries threatened by climate change have established in-depth agricultural partnerships with us, spanning Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. For example, our “Green Super Rice” is an agricultural project specifically designed for promotion in resource-poor regions. which was previously focused mainly on Asia but has now expanded into African countries, helping populous nations like Nigeria safeguard food security. We introduced the “2-1” rice variety—a high-yielding, disease-resistant strain that thrives in any soil—which has tripled yields per mu under the same growing conditions and has been warmly welcomed by local farmers. Our agricultural experts not only conduct research and development on the ground but also carry out extension work. They have crossed the thresholds of government offices and the boundaries of village fields countless times to achieve the results we see today. China’s growing international influence in the agricultural sector has made the United States increasingly uneasy. Consequently, the U.S. is also ramping up its efforts in Southern countries, though it places greater emphasis on free-market competition in agriculture, improving agricultural technology and financing channels, and ensuring the smooth flow of trade in cash crops. In short, they treat agriculture as a business. But once business becomes market fundamentalism, it pays no heed to the basic needs of ordinary people—whether you can put food on the table is none of its concern. Haven’t the U.S. been in an uproar recently, claiming that college students can barely afford to eat, with a single “Barriso” taco selling for $20? Instead of addressing rising prices or asking why the cost of living is so high, America’s so-called “honorable officials” ask why you don’t just eat instant noodles. If you complain about prices, they claim you’re pushing for “precise planning,” "Drag the communists out!" Meanwhile, China’s cooperation with them is less about controlling the market and more about increasing production and boosting food self-sufficiency—this is almost a contest of civilizations. Whether rich or poor, no matter where in the world you go, there is one simple notion: whether you’re American or Iraqi, as long as you’re a human being, you should strive for a modest life and eat well.

Democracy and the Republic in Garbage Time

Folks, the U.S. presidential election has long since entered garbage time—there’s nothing left to say. Think about it: I’ve done so many episodes—have I ever mentioned Harris? Not once. She’s not worth mentioning; it’s as if she doesn’t even exist. Maybe her luck really is just that bad. The Democratic Party’s problem isn’t just a national issue—it’s a global one. It’s like the U.S. election: there used to be some suspense—you didn’t know whether Dong Wang or Sleep King had the better game—but after just one debate, the suspense vanished, leaving only a kindergarten-style competition. “You did great; you know all the answers.” ” That kind of praise really sounds like the verbal encouragement a kindergarten teacher gives a student. In this contest, it seems there are only “reverse winners” and no losers. But the contest has now entered garbage time. No matter how fierce Dong Wang is, don’t count on him beating a zombie. Now, the pressure has shifted to within the party. There are deep divisions within the Democratic Party; big donors and the media are exerting pressure behind the scenes to push Harris onto the stage. They used to say, “The nation has a prison, and San Francisco has a treasure.” Now, however, they’re saying that the best way for Biden to serve the country is to retire—some have even publicly suggested making arrangements for his final affairs. If he’s elected but can’t actually serve, why not just switch leaders? In my opinion, it doesn’t matter who they choose—they won’t win anyway. Given the Democratic Party’s current state, if Biden weren’t senile, he’d already be their best candidate. With just this handful of people—including that “Ha-ha-Harris”—being pushed into the spotlight, do you really think he can win? He can’t. He doesn’t have what it takes. The Republicans are breaking through on the right with populism—it’s a bit ugly, but it works. At least they still speak like normal people. The Democrats, on the other hand, are terminally ill, obsessed with a bizarre, hypocritical ideology that ordinary Americans can’t even understand. They’re completely out of touch with the people; the only way they can stay in the game is by cheating. Either they erase the sidelines and let immigrants take the field, or they rig the referees to give the opponent a stroke. How is this game even played? Trump’s choice of Vance was a blunder—Vance is even more qualified than Trump himself and can only serve to solidify the base. But I actually think this is an adaptation to the times. Look at Harris: even though she clearly had the chance to attract voters with a centrist approach, she still chose a running mate who’s even further to the left than she is. It’s become difficult to win over new voters, so she must mobilize her existing base and unite her own camp. But you can’t unite people with rational policies—it all comes down to who’s better at incitement. When it comes to “Agetprop,” the U.S. and indeed the entire Western world—where capitalism reigns supreme—are blind spots for the left. I simply can’t wrap my head around it. That’s why left-wing populists like Sanders face a glass ceiling; until they shatter it, they’ll always remain little more than mascots. Consequently, in all Western nations, only the right wing is truly capable of uniting various factions and consolidating overall strength through populism. The right-wing worldview is simple: the strong prey on the weak, and there are no hidden agendas in the open. Those who adhere to this terrifying logic are bound to clash. Vance’s strategy aligns more closely with America’s inevitable choice: pulling back from Ukraine and the Middle East, setting sights on China, and striking hard. The results of the U.S. presidential election will be revealed in two months. Where America heads afterward will fundamentally reshape the global landscape of the 21st century. The answer for this era isn’t important; what matters is how we seek that answer. The first clue is that photograph of Trump, blood trickling from the corner of his mouth, shouting defiantly after the assassination attempt. What I see is the death throes of the old system. Imagine an unsustainable system: under militarism, the elite constantly engage in “outward spiral”—plundering resources, bringing in immigrants, and driving down labor costs—which leads to “inward spiral” among the common people. A traitor from the ranks of the privileged elite, who became the voice of the common people, was assassinated by the elite. I’m not referring to the fortunate Dong Wang, but to the ill-fated Caesar. History does not repeat itself, but it does follow a similar trajectory. At this very moment, the situation mirrors that of Bishbik two thousand years ago. The strategy articulated by Vance is the inevitable choice for the United States: to withdraw its forces from Ukraine and the Middle East, aim at China, and strike hard. Faced with figures like Dong Wang, Vance, Bannon, Yaven, Rand, and Thiel, the establishment within the “cathedral of globalization” would label them all as fascists. Just as, in the eyes of the Zhao Song dynasty, figures like Zhao Gai, Song Jiang, Gongsun Sheng, and Cai Jin were all deemed rebels. The rebels argue: “Your emperor bears the surname Song, and so does my brother. But while you can be emperor, my brother cannot—we rebel only against the royal family, not against the imperial system itself.” Therefore, the order we seek to establish is one of external conquest and internal oppression, with a rigid hierarchical structure. What exactly is the future of human civilization? Does breaking the old order mean establishing a new one, or returning to an even older one? At least in the eyes of some, it means absolutizing and organically integrating political units. Externally, they envision a community where the lines between factions in the game are blurred; internally, they maintain a rigid hierarchy with a clear division of labor, ready at any moment to purge what they find undesirable. For here, they are the Brahmins who possess the highest wisdom, guiding the power-holding aristocracy and ruling over the ignorant masses.

From Matchmaking Bloggers to the Robot Tax: The Tug-of-War Between Romance, Childbearing, and Capital

Hey everyone, I’ve been checking out The Diplomat website lately, and I can’t believe they’ve been secretly watching our intranet’s live-streamed matchmaking events. From pulling all-nighters to stay online, to heated arguments over live chats, to binge-watching *Wukong*—they know every detail like the back of their hand. You claim to understand diplomacy, but let me ask you: is this what a proper diplomat does? Come to think of it, I’m not exactly a “proper” director either—I enjoy watching it too. But when I heard comments like “a ‘6-point’ cutie can’t even get a trial pass from A9,” I started pondering the meaning behind this rhetoric. It’s not that these talking points feel like a business—it’s that our entire society’s desire to date and have children relies on the industry to step up. We can’t just rely on the government to make a little push; the industry needs to lend a hand, too. Over the past couple of years, the influencer scene has spawned a wave of “Matchmaker” bloggers—essentially, cold, ruthless machines. You enter your personal information, and they use algorithms to calculate your “marital returns.” To lower your expectations for a partner, they offer harsh critiques: “Ordinary women shouldn’t fantasize about using marriage to climb the social ladder. A9 men can afford pets, but they won’t scavenge for scrap—you can reach for the stars, but don’t expect to fly.” For male viewers, solid financial assets are a prerequisite, and a government job carries added value; those who are short, unattractive, poor, or bald can only settle for someone below their level. These humiliating comments make me feel quite uncomfortable. These bloggers are frequently reported, yet their core audience isn’t bothered by it. That’s because it gives them an opportunity to quantify their own “bargaining chips,” recognize what resources they can offer, and determine what they can get in return. The so-called “resources” women possess often have nothing to do with knowledge or skills; they mainly revolve around appearance, fertility window, and job stability. What they’re assessing is whether you’re suitable for raising children in a high-net-worth household. A few years ago, there was a so-called “relationship coach” named Ayawawa, who mainly taught women how to charm men—both by exuding sexual appeal and by alleviating men’s insecurities. She taught women to suppress their true selves, curry favor with their partners, and secure a long-term financial provider. Back then, the mainstream approach was teaching women how to “marry up”; now, the logic has shifted to helping them find their rightful place. I believe this shift reflects a slowdown in social mobility. To protect their wealth, high-net-worth individuals have become more cautious in their choice of partners, so the room for exploiting blind spots through tactics has shrunk. With information overload making it hard to distinguish fact from fiction, risk management requirements for marriage negotiations have increased, and the success rate has dropped. Social media algorithms act like bubbles, creating the illusion that one is highly sought after and leading to a miscalculation of one’s social capital. A new wave of bloggers has moved away from “success philosophy” and instead focuses more on due diligence and compliance, treating people as commodities in a transparent marketplace to facilitate transactions. This effectively strips away the romantic veneer of dating and marriage, laying bare its utilitarian nature. When you dig deep, the truth is far from beautiful. I used to listen to some podcasts on gender issues, and one perspective they explored was evolutionary psychology. David Buss’s *The Evolution of Desire* explains that men’s and women’s mate-selection strategies are biological instincts formed through a long evolutionary process. Men produce more sperm and have lower reproductive costs, so they tend to cast a wide net and place particular emphasis on physical appearance; women, on the other hand, have fewer eggs, higher reproductive costs, and a shorter fertile window; they need to find a partner who can provide resources and a good environment, so they must screen for socioeconomic status. This structure is very stable. Setting aside the predicament of men at the bottom of the wealth ladder who struggle to find wives, there is another huge problem with this traditional model: increasing wealth is far more difficult than improving one’s appearance. During periods of high economic growth, wealth may accumulate rapidly, but once growth slows, high-net-worth men become scarce. Improvements in nutrition, universal access to education, and advances in cosmetic medicine have created greater opportunities for physical transformation. So, if physical appearance were considered a currency, it has been subject to constant inflation. This asymmetry in scarcity gives men at the top absolute leverage. If desired, one could send “Xiao Mei” a trial membership, which would put pressure on the entire market and drive men at the bottom of the economic ladder into incel status—involuntary celibacy. These young men, disillusioned in the dating scene, have already proven to be excellent fuel for Western right-wing politics. The “male awakening” often attributes these problems to feminism and the establishment forces that support it. It can only identify the immediate causes, while taking the ultimate sources—wealth and the right to choose a mate—for granted. There are some signs of this emerging domestically, but they’re all just leftovers from the so-called “men’s circles.” Blogger “Red Pill” teaches you how to make money, work out, boost your testosterone, stop being a “suck-up,” and increase your “market value”—ultimately becoming a “winner in life” like them and living a polygamous lifestyle. If all else fails, use your passport to engage in cross-border “arbitrage” by seeking partners in low-income countries or those with more lenient standards. There’s a whole group of so-called “Passport Bros” online who do exactly that. This approach actually reinforces the law of the jungle regarding wealth and power: sex equals power. If this principle is put into practice, the path for most people will only grow narrower and narrower. The core of the problem lies in hypergamy, which creates an asymmetry of resources. This animal instinct is difficult to eradicate, but we must not succumb entirely to biological determinism. If we are to reshape mate-selection expectations, we must transform the economic structure, reduce the necessity of hypergamy, improve the external living conditions for young people, and ensure that mate selection ceases to be a survival defense mechanism. Only then can men and women be freed from their roles as providers and “breeding machines.” However, this will not happen naturally; it requires intervention through social mechanisms. We know that the marriage and dating crisis, the gender divide, and the declining birth rate are three interlinked crises spreading across the globe. To a large extent, they stem from modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. However, not all countries that have undergone these three processes face the crisis with the same severity; the Nordic countries are a notable exception. Through a social system characterized by high taxes and generous welfare, they have forcefully narrowed class disparities by providing paternity leave, public childcare, and equal rights for children born out of wedlock. They have also eliminated employment discrimination against women, reduced the costs of child-rearing, and provided equitable public goods. This has led to an almost complete decoupling of marriage, childbearing, and career development. It is no longer possible to achieve social mobility by marrying into wealth, and marriage is no longer the sole source of economic security. Parenting is guaranteed as a fundamental reproductive right and does not penalize women’s career advancement. As a result, the concept of gender equality is deeply ingrained in society, and no one scores you based on your assets during matchmaking. However, this inevitably leads to atomization, indifference, and isolation. The total fertility rate has remained stable at around 1.5 for a long time, showing remarkable resilience, and the female labor force participation rate is also high, which helps mitigate the impact of an aging population. Yet, high taxes come at the cost of economic vitality. Our stage of development and the path we’ve taken differ greatly from those of the Nordic countries. We’ve kept social security costs low and encouraged competition and intensive labor to build industrial strength. While this has created an economic miracle, core public goods—such as housing in prime school districts, quality education, and elderly care—have become highly commodified and marketized. Families and individuals must manage their finances meticulously. Children are no longer viewed as part of the labor force but rather as risky assets requiring concentrated resources for long-term investment, with uncertain returns. To avoid falling down the social ladder, every marriage has become a carefully calculated transaction. This micro-level rationality clashes sharply with macro-level societal needs, and over the long term, it will erode the foundation of the nation’s competitiveness. We have indeed explored many solutions: the “Double Reduction” policy, the “Housing for Living, Not for Speculation” initiative, childbirth subsidies, extended maternity leave, and tax deductions for childcare—among other pro-birth policies—have been rolled out in rapid succession, but their effectiveness has been limited. Young people’s expectations regarding marriage have shifted. As long as the fundamental rules of the game remain highly materialistic—prioritizing the reproduction of material assets over the reproduction of people—they cannot escape the calculations of asset gains and losses. Consequently, choosing not to marry or have children has become a means of risk mitigation. The population size and per capita capital stock of Nordic countries are not comparable to ours; we cannot simply replicate their high-tax, high-welfare model. But could we moderately increase capital’s contribution to public goods to restore the demographic foundation? I believe it is possible. Although capital flows freely, China’s supply chain integrity, exceptionally high coordination efficiency, and the productive capacity network formed by knowledge, technology, and a skilled workforce have reduced enterprises’ hidden costs. There are no viable alternatives globally, especially for advanced manufacturing industries that are highly dependent on R&D collaboration, rapid response, and industrial support systems. Essentially, this is an industrial stronghold that does not rely entirely on low tax rates. Therefore, moderately increasing the social responsibility of enterprises in high-value-added, high-end manufacturing, and highly automated sectors—and using some form of “robot tax” to reduce working hours in exchange for human leisure time—could create a certain amount of fiscal transfer payment capacity, thereby achieving a balance between retaining industrial chains and ensuring the sustainable evolution of the population.

What makes the U.S. so great? Because it attracts the brightest minds from around the world.

Listen up, everyone. Why is the U.S. so powerful? It’s because the smartest people in the world—especially scientists—have all been drawn there. In English, this is called “brain drain.” It sounds simple enough, but what can someone whose brain has been drained actually do? They’re just left to follow orders, aren’t they? Technology determines the global division of labor, so the U.S. has to dominate the technological high ground. It’s not because the U.S. loves learning, but because it loves sharing the benefits. But things are changing. China has now begun to draw American talent back in the opposite direction. Many of these American minds are actually Chinese scholars. As the political environment in the U.S. continues to deteriorate and research conditions in China continue to improve, they are choosing to return home in droves. In 2010, only 900 scientists returned to China from the U.S.; by 2021, that number had tripled, exceeding 2,600. Since 2018, the number of Chinese or ethnic Chinese scientists leaving the U.S. has increased by 75%, with two-thirds of them returning to China. In response, U.S. media outlets have expressed great concern, calling this a “mass exodus” and describing it as the “most dangerous loss” caused by “Great China.” However, it’s hard to say how much of this Trump would actually take to heart. Recently, Dr. Qian Hong, a leading biophysicist, returned to China from the U.S. and joined West Lake University as Professor Jiang Qi at the Center for Interdisciplinary Sciences within the School of Science. My first reaction to this news was: “It’s the ‘Qian’ era all over again.” This family holds a prominent place in China’s modern history, particularly in the history of science. I needn’t say more—everyone knows Qian Xuesen, Qian Weichang, and Qian Sanqiang. But what you may not know is that, aside from them, the entire family has produced a wealth of talent. For example, Qian Hong’s grandfather, Qian Baojun, was a founder of China’s chemical industry and the former dean of Donghua Institute of Chemical Engineering (now Donghua University), while his father, Qian Min, was one of the founders of the Department of Mechanics at Peking University. What many may be even less aware of is that this family’s talents are spread across more than 50 countries worldwide, with over 100 of its members serving as academicians in national academies of sciences. Although two of the “Three Qians”—Qian Xuesen, Qian Weichang, and Qian Sanqiang—were in the United States and one was in France, and all chose to return to serve their homeland, there are actually many more top scientists who did not return. Take Qian Xueju, for example—Qian Xuesen’s cousin and also an aerodynamicist. His family is even more distinguished: his eldest son, Qian Yongyou, is a neurobiologist; his third son, Qian Yongjian, won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry; and his wife, Li Jia, along with her in-law Lin Jia, all belong to prominent Chinese scientific families that remained in the United States. Although they have all contributed to humanity in their respective fields, when it comes down to practical applications, their work remains inextricably linked to the nation. In the past, people often said that science knows no borders, but scientists have a homeland. However, since Trump took office, science, too, has had to recognize borders. In 2018, the U.S. launched the “China Initiative,” specifically targeting Chinese spies. Although it was halted in 2022, it had already led to numerous wrongful convictions, such as those of Fields Medalist Tao Zexuan, Raoyi’s ex-wife, the late Wu Ying, and others. The overall political climate has shown no sign of diminishing hostility toward Chinese scientists. Now let’s turn to Qian Hong. He graduated from Peking University in 1982 with a bachelor’s degree in astrophysics and subsequently moved to the United States, where he first earned a Ph.D. in biochemistry. He then conducted research on the thermodynamics and kinetics of protein folding at the University of Oregon and the California Institute of Technology before joining the Department of Applied Mathematics at the University of Washington, where he taught bioengineering at the medical school. In 2010, he was elected a Fellow of the American Physical Society; his primary research interests are mathematical stochastic modeling of biological systems and non-equilibrium statistical thermodynamics. As you can see, his academic scope is extremely broad. He put it this way: “Over the past 350 years, the soul of modern science has been physics, and its form has been mathematics. Perhaps in the coming century, the ideas of physics and the methods of mathematics will be integrated into biology.” In addition to Qian Hong, Westlake University recently welcomed world-class materials chemist Lin Wenbin as a Distinguished Professor of Chemistry in the School of Science. Lin Wenbin chose to retire early from the University of Chicago and arrived in Hangzhou dragging a suitcase he hadn’t used in a long time—one so worn that the wheels had even fallen off. What makes him so remarkable? The only two metal-organic frameworks (MOFs) in the world to have reached the clinical development stage—not iron frameworks, but “rice-grain-sized” porous polymers—were developed by this year’s Nobel Prize in Chemistry laureate. One application improves radiation therapy by making it safer, while the other enhances immunotherapy by using MOFs to activate photodynamic agents with infrared light, generating reactive oxygen species to kill cancer cells. His return to China is aimed at developing medical materials tailored to the country’s social and industrial context—such as using MOFs to create anti-tumor vaccines. What do anti-tumor vaccines mean? China is not only attracting these accomplished senior scholars but also young scientists in their prime, such as materials scientist Fang Lei, who stepped down as chair of the chemistry department at Texas A&M University to return to China and join the Yongjiang Laboratory as a chair researcher. Another example is Xie Zhenfei, a key figure in Harvard’s research on an mRNA vaccine for HIV, who joined the Wuhan Institute of Virology—a P4-level facility, representing the world’s highest level of biosafety. Both of these individuals are top-tier scientists born in the 1980s. There are far too many stories like these to recount in full. Yet they reflect broader changes in the overall research environments of China and the United States. In March of this year, *Nature* magazine surveyed 1,600 researchers in the United States. Of those, more than 1,200—or 75 percent—were not limited to Chinese Americans but spanned all ethnic groups. Seventy-five percent are considering leaving the U.S. due to a lack of national support, cuts to research funding, and obstacles to education, among other factors. Consequently, while most researchers from other ethnic groups choose to move to Europe or Canada, the Chinese community has an additional strong support system: everyone can clearly see the level of importance China places on scientific talent, the resources it allocates, and the benefits it offers. Therefore, in competition among nations, talent is the foundation. Paying attention to talent mobility is also a way to anticipate industry trends. That’s all for today. I’ll share more next time. Bye!

Pentecostalism: Cult or Religious Revolution?

Everyone, today let’s talk about a pretty interesting religious phenomenon—the Pentecostal movement. These folks are pulling off all sorts of bizarre stunts around the world, from “resurrecting” corpses to drinking rat poison—all kinds of absurd antics that make us “normal” people just shake our heads in disbelief. First, let’s talk about this “resurrecting corpses” stunt. In 2019, a South African pastor named Lukau actually pretended to be dead inside a coffin and then suddenly “came back to life.” People couldn’t believe their eyes and started imitating him, turning “resurrection” into an overnight internet sensation. The scene was beyond awkward. The Pentecostal movement wields considerable influence worldwide. In many countries, it has become a powerful weapon in electoral politics. For example, in the United States, Pentecostals have become Trump’s staunchest supporters. In Brazil, Catholic believers have been co-opted by Pentecostal pastors through various protests and incitement—so much so that even WhatsApp had to change its rules. In the Philippines, the Pentecostal movement provided the spiritual backing for Duterte’s war on drugs. Even on the Korean Peninsula, the influence of traditional Christianity is being gradually eroded by the Pentecostals. Why do Pentecostals hold such immense appeal? Because they emphasize direct communication between the individual and God, as well as the gifts of the Holy Spirit. They believe that as long as you believe in Jesus, the Holy Spirit will descend upon you, granting you supernatural abilities—such as speaking in tongues, healing the sick, or drinking poison without dying. These “miracles” directly heighten the frequency of believers’ interactions with God, making everyone feel that God is right by their side. However, the funniest part is that they’ve actually developed a whole system of “interactive design.” For example, they often have believers “speak in tongues” in church, but these “tongues” are usually made up on the spot. Sometimes, to prove they’ve received “grace,” believers will do absurd things, like drinking rat poison. It’s nothing more than a massive theatrical performance. In 1906, the Azusa Street Revival marked the beginning of the Pentecostal movement. In that dilapidated warehouse—a small, run-down 220-square-meter building—believers packed the space, praising God loudly and rolling on the floor, regardless of race, gender, or age. It was nothing short of a carnival—a carnival of faith. The two most famous figures were Seymour and his mentor, Parham. Seymour brought together believers of different races and even allowed female pastors to preach from the pulpit. This was truly big news at the time. As a result, Parham, feeling ashamed and outraged that white people were imitating Black people, ended up joining the Ku Klux Klan. In short, the Pentecostal movement was a religious revolution of this kind—though somewhat unorthodox, its influence cannot be underestimated. From raising the dead to drinking poison and surviving, their “miracles” thrilled the faithful. Behind these “miracles,” however, lay the powerful force of faith and community.

The Battery War: How the West Is Struggling to Survive Amid Geopolitical Tensions

Ladies and gentlemen, the battery war is no ordinary battle. This tiny energy storage device encapsulates the shifting dynamics of the great power rivalry. China excels at every stage of this industrial chain—from upstream to downstream. The U.S. is eyeing this “prized asset,” and some experts have suggested “surrendering proactively”—letting Chinese companies take over the entire market so we can march toward a low-carbon future together with high efficiency. But advocates of self-reliance and control aren’t having it. They argue that this would amount to entrusting our economic, military, and energy security to China—something absolutely unacceptable. Instead, we should keep China out, shut the door, and pour massive investments and hard work into building our own battery industry. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released a report titled “The Geopolitics of Batteries,” suggesting a third path: neither conceding defeat to China nor going head-to-head with it alone, but instead rallying OECD partners—the U.S., Europe, Japan, and South Korea—to form a united front, coordinate policies, and cooperate vigorously, while simultaneously making tactical openings to China in key areas. In exchange for high-value markets, we could acquire intellectual property from China and leverage its production capacity to scale up, thereby gradually achieving a strategic balance in industrial strength. Let’s take a look at the battery supply chain. There are four key raw material categories: cathode active materials, anode active materials, separators, and electrolytes. For anode materials—whether natural or synthetic graphite—China holds the top spot, accounting for over 95% of shipments. China also absolutely dominates downstream battery cell manufacturing capacity, which is the core segment with the highest added value in the entire supply chain. Over the next five years, the global supply landscape will remain highly concentrated in the hands of Chinese companies. So what can the West do? First, they must court South Korea. South Korea, along with other countries and Japan, has long-standing expertise in high-energy-density ternary lithium-ion batteries; in fact, three South Korean companies and one Japanese firm are among the top ten in terms of installed capacity. The West needs to further open its markets to South Korea and Japan and integrate R&D with production capacity; otherwise, they risk falling behind. Second, the West cannot bet everything on a single technological path. Since 2021, nearly all Western battery investments have focused on ternary lithium-ion batteries to meet the range requirements of electric vehicles, but these batteries are costly and have relatively poor thermal stability. Meanwhile, China has successfully commercialized lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. What was once a technology viewed with skepticism now boasts high safety, long lifespan, and low cost, accounting for half of the global lithium-ion battery market—and 98% of that half is produced in China, with a technological lead of approximately four years. The West must correct its industrial policy by encouraging the use of South Korean lithium iron phosphate batteries while also expanding its own domestic battery cell factories. Europe is also pursuing supply chain localization and encouraging Chinese and South Korean companies to set up operations there. Non-Chinese production capacity is slowly emerging, and the U.S. and Europe need to focus on R&D, prioritize support for South Korean companies, and leverage this to expand non-Chinese production capacity. Introducing some Chinese production capacity is a delicate balancing act. If you ask Chinese companies to set up operations in the U.S. and expect them to share intellectual property, it might not work out. You could end up with China locking you into low-end technology while retaining advanced technology for itself—wouldn’t that be a loss? In addition to lithium iron phosphate batteries, there are also sodium-ion batteries, silicon anodes, and lithium-metal anode batteries. Sodium-ion batteries offer excellent thermal stability and can operate in both extremely cold and hot environments, addressing the safety requirements of stationary energy storage systems such as data centers. Furthermore, sodium is abundant and inexpensive, and—even better—the production equipment is compatible, allowing for plug-and-play integration with existing production lines. The U.S. and Europe must take the rise of sodium-ion batteries seriously and collaborate with South Korea and Japan on joint R&D. If they do not act quickly, China’s lead in lithium iron phosphate batteries will be repeated in the sodium-ion battery sector. Regarding silicon anodes, China, the U.S., Europe, and South Korea are all ramping up efforts. China is developing pure silicon anodes with a solid-state architecture, while the U.S., Europe, and South Korea are focusing on composite materials. The West holds an advantage in patents and has not fallen entirely behind in production capacity; by 2030, this field will become increasingly diversified. Lithium-metal anode batteries are at an earlier stage of development but offer broader prospects. With extremely high theoretical energy density, resolving safety and cost issues will make them the next-generation disruptive technology. However, with overall investment in clean energy declining, achieving these goals remains a challenge. Lithium-metal batteries are divided into liquid and solid-state types. All-solid-state batteries require new processes and equipment, whereas hybrid liquid-solid structures can be partially adapted to existing production lines, making them the optimal solution at present with significant application potential. Therefore, the report recommends that U.S. policymakers foster an ecosystem for lithium-metal anode batteries, prioritizing hybrid liquid-solid structures as a strategic transition. Overall, the report proposes a third path—“neither inviting the wolf into the house nor forcibly severing ties”—in which the U.S., Europe, South Korea, and Japan identify their respective market positions, avoid competition, and enhance cooperation. This approach aims to establish a closed-loop system integrating U.S. and European startups with South Korean and Japanese mass production and economic cooperation markets, while selectively introducing Chinese production capacity in areas where alternatives are lacking. This approach will ensure they continue to hold a competitive position in the future and maintain a balance of industrial strength in the new energy era. Ladies and gentlemen, we must navigate this “battery war” with caution to avoid being left in a vulnerable position.

A Chinese Phenomenon: The Utopia and Reality of Education

Hello, everyone, and welcome to “The Phenomenon of China.” I’m Chris. Today, let’s talk about education in China and take a look at just how bumpy the road to “success” really is for our young people. Parents in China often say that the number of students taking the college entrance exam surges every year—from 1997 to 2022, the number of students enrolled in Chinese universities has multiplied several times over. Doesn’t that sound a bit far-fetched? But that’s the reality we face. In my parents’ generation, China’s economy had come to a standstill for a time, and then the country went through the Cultural Revolution—school spots were hard to come by. By the time I started school, the economy had plummeted, and every ambitious young person wanted to join an investment firm or a tech company—following the money. Back then, even becoming a small-time media professional was considered a decent option. To be honest, though, I was pretty lucky back then. After graduating, I returned from studying abroad, and now I have the opportunity to interact with more people in the education sector. They are all dedicated and hardworking teachers—truly admirable. However, economic hardship hasn’t stopped the construction of factories, and occasionally, when there’s a holiday, the company even organizes some perks. Looking at recent news, many stories revolve around the career choices of students or doctors. For example, one student chose to sell barbecue on the street, and there are even foreigners setting up barbecue stalls on the streets. They originally thought they could secure a good job through their education, but ended up hitting a wall in the real world. Young people have three options. First, they can compete with one another to see whose labor is in higher demand; second, they can go back to school and hope the market improves—which is what many college students chose to do last year; third, they can simply follow the established ladder of advancement. The ladder of advancement? Just hearing that phrase is enough to make one feel melancholy. In China, merit and the cultivation of ability are given equal weight, but the West seems to place greater emphasis on rules. This is likely why merit is the hope of the Chinese people, while in the West, it has become synonymous with oppression. Both China and the United States place great importance on merit, but we seem to have different ways of analyzing it in the world. In China, it’s meritocracy—or, to put it another way, capacity building; in the United States, it’s meritocracy—or, to put it another way, rules. In ancient China, the selection of the meritorious was carried out through the imperial examination system. Emperor Zhenzong of the Song Dynasty wrote a poem titled “Poem Encouraging Study” to encourage students to read, saying that books contained golden mansions, beautiful women, and wealth. I didn’t quite understand those terms, but the education he was referring to was essentially about securing the opportunity to take the exams. Almost all parents tell their children that they must study hard in school. I remember a teacher of ours who passed away while studying in China. In his diary, he wrote: “Studying is just for money; it means giving up better opportunities.” At the time, that statement struck a nerve. Articles of this kind have been circulating in China for several years now, attempting to shape a particular mindset and influence professors’ thinking. This is not only meant to make things difficult for us, but also to make us shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding the nation’s future. But if you feel this mindset isn’t suitable for this group of young people, you might actually agree with it. It’s undeniable that professors are in an unfair position, but it’s not an absolute one. You can shape a group of people in the healthiest way possible. How are his remarks any different from what your parents or Emperor Zhenzong of Song might have said? Most importantly, in an unfair society, we need to maintain the social mobility pathway and give everyone equal opportunities. This is the mission of education. Society must be prepared to pursue new dreams; otherwise, people will destroy society out of disappointment. American psychologist Jordan Peterson makes a very important point: the most crucial thing for society is to maintain pathways for upward mobility. He believes that the education system generates more possibilities than society can absorb, and those who are left behind will have a negative impact on society. In the fields of law, language, and academics, this situation is no longer as evident in the United States. We must constantly ask ourselves: What exactly is the purpose of education? We will have our own answers, but hopes tend to become increasingly materialistic and self-centered. People say that if you have no ideals when you’re young, you have no heart; but if you’re still full of ideals as an adult, you have no brain. Society simply uses various means to fulfill our hopes, so even the most idealistic person may, in the end, be left with nothing but money, power, and the pursuit of power. Now, I’d like to tell another story. Last year, Chinese high school students were preparing for their exams. This young woman, from a mountain village, was chosen by her school to voice her opinions. Trembling, she said, “Don’t be lazy. Our lives are hard, but we can be strong. No one suffers forever. One day, you’ll thank yourself for studying every day, because even if the room grows dark, the high scores on your exam papers will light it up.” Her school released a video in the hope of drawing attention. But the result only sparked more outrage. The comments section was flooded with negative remarks. Combining personal opinions with a distinctive style can make people less receptive. Yet these comments actually reveal important issues regarding education. They believe education will give them a small “ticket home,” allowing them to climb their way from school to the big city. But once that hope is realized, they become the very people who question the promises made. They want to win, but no one can win. If education can’t help them win, why study? Why admit to mistakes? I don’t agree with their conclusions, but they are certainly taking action. If education itself is a critique of social injustice and the unequal distribution of resources, might our solutions be more balanced? We must find new answers. I believe education needs to balance practicality with deeper values. Practicality shouldn’t be the sole goal of education—such as teaching people how to make clothes. China is also beginning to learn in this regard. Last year, Chinese students won 20 gold medals in 63 technical competitions—in fields such as steel, cosmetology, woodworking, electronics, and more. At the same time, greater emphasis is being placed on helping students understand the role of other values—for example, who is your customer? Why are they willing to pay more? Where is the money? How do you take responsibility? The best part is awareness—encouraging awareness. Awareness helps us overcome fear and empowers people to strive for everything they deserve. In a healthy society, everyone can find their true selves and bring unique experiences to others. I hope my five-year-old son will become an aerial motorcycle rider or a racer zipping through space. I hope that when he grows up, he’ll pursue his dreams—whether in the sky or on the road—and never be disappointed. I know that this will turn the world into a place of dreams. Thank you all for watching. Feel free to leave a message at the email address below.

Today's Eel Feast: A Remarkable Achievement by Chinese Scientists

Everyone, today I’m treating myself to a rare bowl of eel rice to celebrate. As for eels, wild ones have long since disappeared from our plates, and farmed ones are entirely at the mercy of the weather. That’s because they can only be raised—not bred—and there are a whole host of breeding issues. Even an agricultural Cthulhu like China can’t get the better of a tiny little eel. But recently, our aquaculture scientists have made a major breakthrough. The story begins in the depths of the Mariana Trench. Those larvae, as transparent as cicada wings, traverse vast expanses of azure waves toward the coast of East Asia, arriving there by the time they’ve grown into translucent, tender willow leaves. Then they swim upstream along inland rivers; the gray willow twigs gradually take on golden edges weathered by wind and rain, and they lie dormant in lakes and rivers like hermits, and ten years later, they transform into gleaming silver swords, piercing through mud, sand, and churning waves to return to the very sea where they were born, to spawn—and then die, exhausted. This is the life story of the eel. But if it is caught, that is another story altogether. There are records of the Chinese eating eels dating back at least 2,000 years. Known as the “king of raw fish slices,” Han Xizai—in his painting *The Night Banquet*—was too reluctant to serve it to guests, yet privately craved it with a passion; his chef described it as the grand finale of the banquet. As late as the Qing Dynasty, the famous food connoisseur Yuan Mei was still expounding on the culinary theory of eel in his *Suiyuan Shidan*. However, Japan remains the true powerhouse of eel consumption. The Japanese believe eel to be a powerful tonic; they insist on eating it even in summer when it is not at its most plump, resulting in robust consumption year-round. With just 1.5% of the world’s population, they consumed 150,000 metric tons annually at their peak—accounting for 70% of global production. Wild eels simply couldn’t withstand such consumption. Consequently, Japan began aquaculture as early as 1879. While wild catches have steadily declined, even at reduced levels, the species was still on the brink of extinction. In 2014, the eel was listed on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, at one point facing an even more precarious situation than the giant panda. The fact that we can still enjoy this endangered species today is thanks to China’s aquaculture industry stepping in to fill the gap. We introduced Japanese technology in the 1970s, began exporting it back to Japan in the 1980s, and now 75 percent of global production comes from China. However, there is a long-standing bottleneck that has yet to be overcome: the inability to breed eels in captivity. In the past, aquaculture still relied on wild-caught fry; all humans could do was raise them to maturity—ultimately, we were still at the mercy of nature. What’s worse is that humans haven’t actually increased the eel population—we’ve merely redistributed the mortality rate. Fewer fry are escaping those destructive gillnets, so even fewer are able to migrate back to spawn. Just a few days ago, Xinhua News Agency broke the news that a team led by Zhao Feng from the East China Sea Institute of the Chinese Academy of Fisheries Sciences successfully achieved artificial breeding at an experimental base at Jimei University in Fujian. More than 3,000 high-quality broodstock produced over 3 million fry, some of which have already begun feeding normally. So how was this achieved? Previous approaches to artificial breeding relied on hormone-induced artificial insemination to produce fertilized eggs; however, due to the inconsistent quality of the gametes, both fertilization and survival rates were generally low. Zhao Feng’s team took the route of environmental simulation. In the early stages, they used satellite tracking technology to analyze the eels’ needs and feeding patterns under natural deep-sea conditions. They then transformed the indoor ponds into a replica of the Mariana Trench, simulating an environment with high pressure, low temperature, and no light. Combined with nutritional enrichment, this made the eels feel at home and secure, allowing their gonads to develop. As a result, they naturally began courting, chasing one another, spawning, and fertilizing their eggs. It sounds simple when I describe it, but it’s actually incredibly difficult. This is because male and female eels reach sexual maturity at different rates; by the time the females are ready to ovulate, the quality of the males’ sperm has already deteriorated. Therefore, within the same system, hormone levels must be controlled with extreme precision to induce synchronized development toward sexual maturity. Now that we’ve successfully hatched the eggs and the juvenile eels have begun feeding, we’ve overcome a major bottleneck in artificial breeding. The next milestone is ensuring their survival on a large scale and successful metamorphosis. This, too, places extremely high demands on both the environment and nutrition. Once this path is successfully navigated, it will mean that in the future, fry will no longer need to be sourced from wild catches, offering hope for a complete reversal of the precarious situation facing the eel species. Ancient people had never witnessed eels spawning and believed they clung to the backs of black fish, relying on sensory perception to overcome reproductive isolation. Later, when people understood the principle, they were still powerless to reverse the laws of nature. Seafood Watch, which compiles a list of sustainable seafood in the United States, could only advise people not to eat them in order to protect the species. Eel consumption in Japan has been cut in half compared to 20 years ago. So what about China now? There’s a saying about the “rise of the national eel”—we must not only unravel the secrets of nature but also achieve artificial reproduction. If we succeed, the day when foodies can once again enjoy eel freely may not be far off.

Seeing Through the Western Conspiracy: A Carefully Orchestrated Anti-China Drama

Ladies and gentlemen, this has truly been quite a spectacle. From start to finish, we’ve witnessed a meticulously orchestrated anti-China drama. The director of this play is the U.S. government, and the screenwriters are the European nations. Starting ten years ago, this play has been slowly unfolding in Washington, D.C. First, they presented China with “success stories,” portraying globalization as the great enemy. Then Trump took office and imposed tariffs on China; Biden took the baton and launched a full-scale economic war against China. All of this is intended to psychologically prepare the public to accept the “historic mission” of confronting China. This drama has reached even greater heights in Europe. Over the past two or three years, the U.S. government has been exerting external pressure, attempting to get European nations to accept this anti-China narrative. For example, German Chancellor Scholz visited China a month ago with the original intention of promoting economic and trade cooperation; yet European Commission President von der Leyen took a confrontational stance on issues related to the Chinese currency—and electric vehicles in particular—which ran completely counter to Scholz’s policy—a rare occurrence in European history. Today’s European Commission is almost completely in lockstep with the United States—it practically acts like an employee of the U.S. What is even more absurd is that Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Prime Minister of Estonia, has gone so far as to advocate for the division of Russia and take a confrontational stance against Putin, even going so far as to threaten nuclear war. These individuals are pulling the strings behind the scenes in Europe, pushing anti-China policies under the guise of so-called “European interests,” but in reality, they are sacrificing Europe’s interests in the midst of the growing economic confrontation between China and Europe. Just yesterday, I read in *The Guardian* that they published three articles about Chinese people in a single day, one of which was about Chinese immigrants to Europe. I am very concerned that this narrative is gradually pushing the situation toward confrontation. In fact, this is really a carefully orchestrated “Taiwan card.” The U.S. government is constantly using the Taiwan issue to create military confrontation between China and the U.S., rather than resolving global crises. We, as humankind, should unite to jointly address global crises, rather than engaging in such a confrontation. A series of international speeches I’ve delivered in France, Germany, the United States, and even most recently in Australia have been widely well-received. I’ve criticized the attitude of blindly following the United States and taking a confrontational stance against China, and I’ve called on all nations not to be dragged into the abyss of military confrontation. In international forums, my goal is not to confront China, but to put an end to the narrative of confrontation with China. Ultimately, this narrative—which portrays China as the enemy—is leading all of humanity toward a mindset of confrontation with China. Yet what we truly need to do is sit down together to solve the problems that are causing the world to fall apart.

China's Agricultural Cthulhu: "Superpowers" from the Desert to the Deep Sea

Hey everyone, let’s talk about “China’s Agricultural Cthulhu” today—it’s truly a living miracle. Did you know that China doesn’t just have an “Industrial Cthulhu,” but an “Agricultural Cthulhu” as well? Let’s start with the “Industrial Cthulhu”—it can show you the sheer power of China’s production capacity in the blink of an eye. Take those Bluetooth earbuds, for example: one fen each, free shipping, no ads, and zero cashback. It’s truly baffling, but Cthulhu is Cthulhu—you don’t need to understand it, just revere it. But today we’re here to talk about the “Agricultural Cthulhu,” whose power is even more jaw-dropping. China’s arable land accounts for less than 10 percent of the world’s total, yet it produces nearly a quarter of the world’s grain, feeds nearly one-fifth of the world’s population, and boasts a total agricultural output of over 2 billion metric tons, with a value of 20 trillion yuan. These numbers might sound too abstract, so let’s put it another way: China ranks first in fish, poultry, meat, and eggs. As for vegetables and fruits—excluding tropical and cold-climate specialties—China essentially ranks first in all categories. You say that’s not enough? Then let’s compare it to India. The two countries have similar populations, but India has 30% more arable land than China. So what’s the result? China produces twice as much staple grain as India, four times as many vegetables, three times as many fruits, four times as many eggs, and a staggering ten times as much meat. You say that’s not even a fair comparison? Then let’s look at global seafood consumption: out of 150 million metric tons of seafood, the Chinese consume 70 million metric tons—a 45% market share. Doesn’t that seem a bit outrageous? After all, in most countries, if you want to eat seafood, you have to go out to sea to catch it, right? How much you catch depends on the whims of nature. In China, however, most seafood is farmed in marine aquaculture facilities—you can harvest as much as you want. Since 1983, China’s aquaculture output has exceeded its catch, leading the world by a full 30 years. In terms of agricultural practices, a Cambridge PhD in computer science wrote an article titled “How the Appetites of 1.4 Billion People Are Satisfied,” which details technologies such as cage aquaculture, solar-powered fish ponds, and vegetable greenhouses. Now, the “Agricultural Cthulhu” has evolved to incorporate AI-driven intelligence. Take marine aquaculture, for example: there are over 200 national-level marine ranches stretching from the Bohai Sea to the South China Sea, with Shandong having the most—Qingdao alone boasts 22, living up to the reputation of Gala Ha beer. Today’s consumers are no longer satisfied with aquaculture in nearshore tidal flats; they now demand deep-sea and offshore aquaculture specifically for high-value species such as salmon, yellow croaker, and grouper. Deep-sea and offshore aquaculture involves complex environments and requires extremely high technical expertise. It integrates technologies from marine engineering, biotechnology, materials science, new energy, underwater robotics, and remote monitoring systems. Last year, with the support of the Central Government’s Document No. 1, more than a dozen large-scale deep-sea aquaculture platforms were launched, delivered, and put into operation. Take Zhuhai’s “Geshen No. 1,” for example: its overall frame is as large as seven basketball courts and as tall as a five-story building, with a water capacity of 30,000 cubic meters. It operates entirely on AI, with temperature and oxygen levels automatically monitored and regulated; feed is delivered by drones, and the entire system is powered by photovoltaic energy. As technology evolves and the industrial chain integrates further, fully unmanned fish farms will undoubtedly emerge. If you want to eat fish, you can simply “fish from the seabed”—processed and delivered via cold chain right to your door. You won’t even know how it was done; you’ll just sign for the package. To be honest, though, marine fish farming has yet to push the boundaries of human imagination. Some of the practices currently being carried out in China are truly outrageous—take desert fish farming, for instance, which exports seafood from Xinjiang to Singapore and Malaysia, showing a complete lack of basic respect for natural endowments. In Tibet, where fish consumption is only one-sixtieth that of Zhejiang, they’ve actually converted saline-alkali land on the edge of the desert into fish ponds. They filter and adjust the mineral content of highly saline groundwater, dilute it with melted snowmelt from the mountains, then add microbial cultures. Combined with aerators, recirculating water systems, electric heaters, automatic feeders, and ultraviolet lights that simulate ocean lighting, they’re able to specifically farm high-value seafood. Examples like this are countless—there’s nothing that can’t be done if you can imagine it. A Financial Times reporter interviewed an Iranian businessman in Midu County, Yunnan, who was growing cherries there—a place where cherries don’t naturally grow because it’s too dry and too hot. So what happened? The government built industrial cold storage facilities to simulate winter conditions and laid pipes from the mountains to provide irrigation water—and the cherries actually grew, leaving the business owner completely dumbfounded. This is the kind of achievement a centralized state can deliver. Nowadays, many foreigners come to China to dine out or browse the farmers’ markets and are utterly shocked—I hardly ever watch those kinds of videos. There are also quite a few serious educational videos exploring the modernization of Chinese agriculture, where people try to understand this phenomenon—and the country itself—as technology continuously upgrades and output keeps climbing, yet we’ve gone from being largely self-sufficient in agriculture 25 years ago to now having to import more than 20 percent of our agricultural products. What kind of situation is this, where even “agricultural Cthulhu” has to give it one more push? Actually, there’s no “Cthulhu” at play here. All these seemingly inexplicable innovations stem from the advantages of the system and institutional mechanisms, combined with the collective creativity of hundreds of millions of people in the sector—including farmers, entrepreneurs, and researchers. Their ability to adapt flexibly and continuously optimize processes is the key to driving the transformation of traditional agriculture into a precise and efficient system.

The Outsourcing Craze: Your Future Might Be "Dumber" Than You Think

Business owners, here’s an outsourcing opportunity: offload those low-skill tasks to places with lower labor costs to save money. Does that sound appealing? Don’t be too quick to call this a fool’s errand, because a report from the National Bureau of Economic Research points out that if you outsource for too long, you might end up “unable to innovate”! We all know that the core logic of outsourcing is this: let cheap labor handle low-skill tasks so you can focus your efforts on conquering the high ground of innovation. That’s exactly how Western companies used to think, but this report reveals a counterintuitive phenomenon: even though they’re saving money, they’re not investing in R&D. There are two sides to this: saving money and spending money. The logic behind saving money is clear: production costs go down, but selling prices stay the same, so the more you manufacture, the more you save. But what about spending? Previously, no one had thoroughly studied this; people simply assumed that R&D funding came from profits, and that as profit margins increased, R&D investment would naturally follow. Business schools consequently promoted the concept of “complementary innovation outsourcing,” encouraging companies to outsource low-end work. However, a decade-long study of 6,024 Canadian companies showed that after outsourcing took off, R&D spending decreased by 15 percent, and companies that had previously invested little in R&D stopped launching new projects altogether. If this trend continues through 2022, total R&D investment will decline by 28 percent. Why? Because in actual production, innovation is not just a slogan. When decisions are made using rational models, the purpose of innovation is to update and upgrade products—provided there are excess profits—which is what incentivizes companies to invest in R&D. Once intermediate goods are outsourced, the supply chain matures. Intermediate goods “Made in China” used in older products become increasingly high-quality and cost-effective, boosting competitiveness. At this point, both the risks and returns of developing new products are significantly reduced—to the extent that they may not even cover fixed costs. So why not continue producing and optimizing existing products? Because relative costs act as a deterrent to innovation. Only a very small number of large enterprises—due to significant economies of scale, where investment yields substantial profits—choose to pursue R&D. However, the vast majority of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), lacking market share expansion to offset the diminished returns on innovation, opt to maintain the status quo. This leads to a dual suppression of R&D by outsourcing: it reduces existing R&D budgets and lowers the likelihood of investment in new projects. Although this report is two decades old, its logic and conclusions remain entirely relevant today. Many in the West are now deeply concerned about so-called “industrial hollowing-out” because of a lack of shared foundations—particularly in R&D investment. Outsourcing, however, replaces these potential gains and locks companies into existing technological pathways. Consequently, amid the outsourcing craze, your company may be gradually losing its ability to innovate. Today, many companies are also adopting outsourcing, but the contractors are no longer foreign firms—they are “small hardware companies” with lower labor costs, which boost profitability by cutting social security benefits and other mandatory contributions. This employment model is, in essence, a negative subsidy on innovation, trapping companies in a “comfort zone” of low-level repetition and making them reluctant to invest in high fixed costs for R&D to pursue future incremental profits. Business owners, if you’re having a great time with flexible employment models, you might want to start thinking about your own future.

Investment Competition: The Gap and Opportunities Between China and the West

Ladies and gentlemen, we are currently in the midst of a major global competition, but at the end of the day, what exactly is competitiveness? The World Bank has listed 1,200 influencing factors, but McKinsey puts it simply: the key lies in productive investment. This isn’t financial investment in stocks or bonds, but rather fixed investment in tangible and intangible assets—such as infrastructure, factories, equipment, R&D, and intellectual property. Data shows that productive investment accounts for 80% of labor productivity growth. The greater the value created by labor, the more investment it drives in turn, creating a virtuous cycle. Let’s look at the differences in productive investment among the world’s major economies: China reached $5.9 trillion in 2024, accounting for 31% of its GDP; the U.S. stood at $5.1 trillion; and the EU was at $3.1 trillion. However, when accounting for price differences and measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s productive investment more than doubles to $11.9 trillion. The U.S. remains at $5.1 trillion, while the EU’s figure converts to $4.5 trillion. China’s total is exactly equal to the combined total of the EU, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, the U.K., and India. Even India, often overlooked, invested $1 trillion, which is equivalent to $4.6 trillion in purchasing power terms; however, after accounting for the replacement of obsolete assets, its net investment amounts to only $1.6 trillion. Most of Europe’s investment is directed toward asset maintenance, with new productive investment totaling only 400 billion; even when calculated using MPP, it amounts to just 700 billion. The U.S.’s net investment is 1.1 trillion, while China’s is 4.4 trillion; after MPP conversion, this amounts to 8.8 trillion—exactly eight times that of the U.S. and 1.8 times the combined total of Europe, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, the U.K., and India. Let’s now take a look at how each economy allocates its productive investment across different industries. The magenta portion represents China; compared to the dark blue United States and light blue European Union, our investment proportion in machinery, electronics, and basic manufacturing is significantly higher. Overall, a substantial portion of global manufacturing investment has flowed into China, while investment in information and communications technology and financial services has been much lower. Data from 2025 shows that while China’s total productive investment remained flat, investment in specific sectors that directly challenge developed economies—such as automobiles, railways, aviation, aerospace, and shipping—grew by 15 percent. The composition of investors has also shifted, with the source of investment growth moving from private enterprises to state-owned enterprises, focusing on strategic industries that may not yield high profits in the short term. So, in fact, we are currently adjusting our investment structure. While the value of our productive assets is 70% higher than the average in Europe and the United States, the direct rates of return on these assets are typically low due to heavy investment in infrastructure and construction. Consequently, economic efficiency—that is, the return on capital—is 40% lower than the average in Europe and the United States. What about investment trends in the United States? There is a shift toward high-return intangible assets, such as software, patents, and R&D—that is, intellectual property-related products. The U.S. is also the most enthusiastic nation in building AI data centers, with investment in this area having grown by 200% since the launch of ChatGPT. However, the boom in AI investment has not driven a broader recovery in investment outside the technology sector. In fact, the share of GDP accounted for by investments unrelated to technology, software, and R&D has actually been declining. This divergence in investment patterns also signals a reshaping of the global economic landscape. It’s clear to see who is building future production capacity in which sectors. For example, the United States holds a competitive edge in the service sector, particularly in finance and information and communications technology—that is, Wall Street and Silicon Valley. China, meanwhile, is consolidating its position in mechanical and electronic industries while catching up in the automotive and pharmaceutical sectors. McKinsey has identified ten strategically significant priority industries, including nuclear power, solar energy, electric arc furnace steel, polyethylene, pharmaceuticals, batteries, data centers, semiconductors, biopharmaceutical R&D, and automotive R&D. If you examine the costs in these industries and make a standardized comparison, you’ll find that, with the exception of polyethyleneterephthalate (PET), China’s costs are among the lowest in nearly all of them. Differences in capital expenditures for equipment and facilities, labor costs, industrial energy and raw material prices, as well as the speed of project approvals vary from country to country, leading to cost disparities. With the exception of natural gas, China holds a competitive advantage in nearly all areas, particularly in labor costs. In R&D-intensive sectors, the cost gap between Europe, the United States, and China can be as high as threefold, while labor costs for blue-collar workers are as much as ten times higher. In response to the cost disadvantages and severe underinvestment in Western developed economies, McKinsey has proposed a seven-pronged strategy. Regarding capital expenditures, infrastructure restrictions should be lifted. In the labor sector, AI and automation should be leveraged to boost productivity. Ensure an adequate supply of clean energy near industrial hubs, streamline regulatory processes to accelerate project timelines, maintain price premiums through innovation and differentiation, and focus on key industries with low cost sensitivity. Finally, utilize industrial policies to foster a level playing field. These recommendations are primarily aimed at helping the West address its weaknesses. The challenges facing Chinese companies lie in low returns on capital, homogenized production capacity, and price wars. It is time for us to make the leap toward intangible assets such as software, brands, algorithms, and intellectual property. This sector represents the most lucrative segment; by increasing the proportion of investment in these areas, we can enhance the added value of our products and break free from the low ceiling imposed by pure hardware sales. Currently, Europe and the United States are aggressively implementing industrial policies—through subsidies, tariffs, and localized procurement—to narrow their cost gaps. It is time for us to go with the flow, exporting our efficient experience in industrial chain coordination overseas and transitioning from pure trade to localized operations. To break through the stagnant competition in the domestic mid-to-low-end market, we must concentrate our efforts on areas where Europe and the U.S. face high costs and slow response times. By leveraging China’s unique advantages in supply chain clusters and project execution capabilities, we can fully master high-end semiconductor equipment, critical materials, industrial automation, and high-end medical devices—hard technologies—we will secure the strategic high ground in both technology and economics.

China Shock 2.0: The Monster Is Unleashed

Everyone, today let’s talk about that “China Shock 2.0” monster that’s been repeatedly hyped by foreign media. Just yesterday, this monster was nothing more than a legend, but now it’s made its way into the Federal Reserve’s statements and the European Commission’s agenda—it’s really gaining traction. What was the “China Shock 1.0”? Back then, after China joined the WTO, a flood of cheap goods poured in, and Western workers lost their jobs. So what about this “2.0” version? China’s industries have upgraded, and its high-tech sectors are now directly competing with the West—which has the West in a panic, scrambling to respond. Last year, a pioneer of Version 1.0 published an article in *The New York Times* warning that an even greater disaster was looming. China used industrial policies to “prop up stocks.” With the central government prioritizing economic sovereignty and strategic interests, local governments piled on additional pressure, forcing companies to expand production capacity and cut costs—even at the expense of profitability. This pushed every link in the supply chain to its absolute limit. Thus, the “unbelievably cutthroat competitors” emerged—they had the best products but could only sell them at rock-bottom prices. With production capacity exceeding domestic demand, they had no choice but to export. The trade surplus grew ever larger, and once they entered overseas markets, they were unbeatable. Local companies were simply unable to compete, forcing host-country governments to implement industrial policies to protect their domestic enterprises. Spain and Hungary welcome Chinese investment in factory construction, while France emphasizes that Europe must remain strong, imposing restrictions on Chinese investment regarding local hiring, equity stakes, intellectual property, and sourcing—especially technology transfer—to ensure Europe does not become merely an assembly line but remains a complete industrial base. Germany, which maintains close economic and trade ties with China, has its own agenda. The Center for European Reform, an EU think tank, issued a report admonishing Germany, stating that it should not envy China’s manufacturing sector nor constantly blame EU bureaucrats for its problems. Instead, Germany must learn to identify the primary contradiction: the root cause lies in the strength of China’s manufacturing sector, which is taking business away from German exporters. Overall, Chinese exports are facing significant headwinds. Many countries label China’s industrial policies as unfair trade practices, and their response has been to provide policy preferences for high-tech manufacturing while restricting foreign competition. So just how strong are these headwinds facing Chinese exports? Many countries label China’s industrial policies as unfair trade practices; in response, they are also tilting policies toward high-tech manufacturing and restricting foreign competition. This trend affects not only developed nations in Europe and the United States but also many developing countries, which are feeling the so-called “Chinese squeeze.” In the past, global development followed a proven model: upgrade your economy, and you become the leader. However, China’s internal diversity and industrial completeness have enabled us to compete on all fronts—not merely by following the playbook of the older generation of leaders, but by charting a completely new course on our own. This poses a groundbreaking challenge to the global economy. The dialogue between Justin Yifu Lin and Furman is very enlightening. Justin Yifu Lin’s New Structural Economics emphasizes the necessity of industrial policy, arguing that it is an inevitable means for late-developing countries to achieve economic catch-up; historically, no country has ever caught up without relying on industrial policy. Furman, former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers and deputy director of the National Economic Council during the Obama administration, is generally a market advocate. He believes that industrial policy offers little benefit from an economic standpoint but is a necessary cost that must be borne for the sake of national security. The U.S. government’s current support for high-tech industries such as semiconductors and drones is a necessary evil—understandable given the current historical context—but political support for industries is easily distorted by interest groups. Furman believes that the U.S. opposition to China’s industrial policy is fundamentally misguided, as America’s problems are not caused by the so-called “China shock.” The slowdown in wage growth and the widening wealth gap began in the 1970s, when there was virtually no trade between China and the U.S. By the 1980s and 1990s, although the scale of trade was still small, the problems had already begun to worsen. In fact, after China joined the WTO, U.S. economic problems actually eased because cheaper imported goods indirectly raised Americans’ real wages, with middle-income households seeing greater wage increases than high-income households. Many people think that cheaper consumer goods just mean buying a few more T-shirts—which isn’t much of a benefit—but in reality, industrial intermediate goods account for more than half of U.S. imports. These help the U.S. manufacturing sector reduce costs and increase export volumes. As a result, after China joined the WTO, the U.S. unemployment rate actually fell to a 50-year low. China has been more of a help than a hindrance to the U.S. economy; 85% to 95% of Americans have benefited from it. As for the remaining 5% to 15% who have suffered, that is due to problems with U.S. labor policies and the social security system. Furman believes that the economy can result in a win-win or a lose-lose situation, but there is no such thing as a one-sided win. In today’s global landscape, politics has spilled over into the economic sphere, and competition between nations through industrial policy is inevitable. Europe’s efforts to prevent industrial hollowing-out are also aimed at closing off opportunities for the far right to exploit the issue—this is part of their internal political maneuvering. It is true that China’s economy is so massive that even the slightest shift has far-reaching implications for the global economic landscape, triggering power struggles both between nations and within them. What does this mean? It means that if China’s economy places too much emphasis on exports, it will be at a significant disadvantage in international politics. However, I believe there are still two issues here. First, industrial policy has shifted from being a fringe concept to becoming mainstream in today’s world. Second, his perspective remains too static; he views it as useful only during the catch-up phase. Once a country achieves comprehensive leadership, it cannot afford to hoard resources to plan and subsidize every industry. The key lies in the government maintaining an active, rather than a passive, role—a principle that holds true for any country. In fact, the very originator of the “China shock” concept—who is now even suggesting that the U.S. should attract Chinese investment to spur American companies and enhance their competitiveness—argues that the government must draw on the Chinese model to build a high-tech ecosystem, maintain long-term, stable investment in key industries, and ensure job security. This is a classic example of an active government; the only question is whether it can actually pull it off.

The Zhunde Coalfield: Our “Zhunde Middle East”

Hey everyone, did you know? Lately, our local coalfield—called Zhundong—has been making just as much of a splash as the “Middle East.” Right now, the Middle East is in complete chaos; as soon as the straits are closed off, energy supplies to many countries are cut off, and they’re all crying foul. As a major industrial nation, can’t we have our own “Middle East”? The Zhundong Coalfield is located in the southeastern corner of the Junggar Basin in Xinjiang, east of Urumqi and north of Turpan. It doesn’t produce oil, but it does produce coal. Its estimated reserves alone total 390 billion metric tons—more than the combined reserves of the Powder Valley Basin in the United States and the Kuzbass region in Russia. Currently, proven reserves exceed 250 billion metric tons; with shallow, thick coal seams, the potential for extraction is naturally enormous. These figures may sound somewhat abstract, but in terms of calorific value, the energy content of 390 billion metric tons of coal is equivalent to 117 billion metric tons of Middle Eastern crude oil. Does that mean we’ll switch entirely to coal? Not exactly. Modern industry requires raw materials with a high hydrocarbon-to-carbon ratio, and crude oil holds an advantage in this regard. Therefore, coal chemical processes must undergo hydrogenation to reduce carbon content, which is energy-intensive, water-intensive, and results in high carbon emissions. The initial investment in fixed assets alone requires a massive outlay, and transportation costs are high—road transport is more expensive than sea transport. As a result, the world has developed a path dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil. Now that geopolitics has thrown a wrench into the works, the oil and gas, petrochemical, and coal energy sectors are facing unprecedented opportunities. Global demand for coal may reach a new high this year. During the oil crisis of the 1970s, the coal industry—especially coal-fired power generation—boomed; this time, it’s the turn of coal chemical industry. Originally intended as a strategic alternative to the petrochemical industry, today China is virtually the only country still investing heavily in coal chemical industries. The conflict in Iran has taught countries a lesson: once chemical production grinds to a halt, even manufacturing items like plastic wrap and trash bags becomes difficult—yet China remains unfazed, precisely because of its coal chemical industries. Countries like India want to emulate China, but it’s not something you can just pick up overnight. India’s coal has a high volatile matter content, and its technology has stagnated. In contrast, China has been refining the core technology of modern coal chemical industry—the Fischer-Tropsch process—for decades. When India proposed developing coal chemical industries in 2020, companies paid it no mind. It wasn’t until strategic necessity compelled the government to act that the project finally got off the ground—after the government quadrupled its financial support and agreed to cover 20% of the construction costs. China’s energy technology revolution has proceeded in an orderly and systematic manner. The South China Morning Post published an in-depth report on the Zhundong Coalfield, detailing how China is using cutting-edge technology to unlock its resource endowments and reshape the foundation of national energy security. The Zhunde Coalfield is divided into five mining areas, covering a total area of 42,000 square kilometers, with a core area of 15,000 square kilometers. It is a national-level economic and technological development zone that integrates six sectors: mining, coal-fired power generation, chemical processing, metallurgy, new materials, and new energy. Development of the coalfield began in 2006, and the development zone was officially approved in 2012, but its rapid growth has only truly accelerated in recent years. As heavy industry has moved in, the once-barren land has rapidly urbanized, giving rise to shops, residential areas, and airports—among which the Wucaiwan General Aviation Airport is set to begin operations soon. Advanced technologies are widely used in the coal mines. For example, there are unmanned mining trucks that operate automatically around the clock. While the scene appears bustling with trucks, they are all driverless electric vehicles that navigate automatically and can have their batteries swapped in just six minutes; a fleet of over a hundred vehicles requires only four people to manage. The coal mines aim to achieve 90% electrification by the end of the year—but where does the electricity come from? It comes from the mine’s own power plant. Many large mines in the Zhundong Development Zone are both electrified and automated. Simply selling coal directly isn’t a profitable business—at 400 yuan per metric ton, transporting a single railcar load doesn’t yield much profit. Therefore, the region has integrated the entire process—from mining to power generation, chemical processing, and advanced materials manufacturing—to form a high-value-added industrial cycle. First comes power generation; the industry’s leading companies are all concentrated here. After coal-fired power is generated, it passes through the Changji Converter Station, where it is bundled with wind and solar power, transmitted via a ±1,000-float ultra-high-voltage line, and transmitted in 0.01 seconds to Anhui, 3,000 kilometers away. This is the world’s supergrid with the highest voltage level, the largest transmission capacity, and the longest transmission distance; the electricity it carries can meet the annual electricity needs of 133 million households. Large quantities of coal are used directly to produce chemical products—specifically, coal-to-liquid (CTL) and coal-to-gas (CTG), which serve as the most direct substitutes for imported oil and natural gas. The coal-to-liquid facility is located in Hami, where the world’s most advanced CTL technology converts coal into liquid fuels, which are then refined into gasoline and diesel. Three major coal-to-gas projects are currently under construction, each with an annual production capacity of 21 cubic meters. Upon completion, Xinjiang will become the nation’s largest coal-to-gas production base. The coal-based chemicals and new materials industries produce, for example, basic raw materials for plastics and absorbents; urea and melamine for fertilizers; coal-to-methanol; and biodegradable coal-based POE, among others. Finally, there is the integration of new energy sources: Xinjiang has abundant wind and solar power, which can be used to produce hydrogen. This hydrogen is then incorporated as a feedstock into the coal chemical process, helping to overcome the issues of high energy consumption and high emissions associated with coal chemical production. This synergy among industries is a prerequisite for efficient energy utilization, sustainable project development, and long-term industrial profitability. Centered on self-reliant and controllable coal-based energy, the Zhundong Economic Development Zone has established a vast modern industrial system ranging from basic fuels to high-end new materials. With long-term development, this system will resolve the constraints posed by limited water resources and become a strategic industrial base for China’s self-reliant and controllable chemical industry.

Take a Look at the South China Sea "Junk Data": Is China Really Flexing Its Muscles?

Ladies and gentlemen, the South China Sea—this vast expanse of 3.5 million square kilometers—is divided among seven parties from six countries. Each country claims it as its own “backyard,” but what is the state of that “backyard”? Is it littered with mountains of trash, or is it clean and tidy? This is a matter that concerns no one but China. I must say, data recently released by Chinese marine scientists indicates that there are 92.75 million pieces of debris floating in the South China Sea—an average of 26.5 pieces per square kilometer. Of this, 93 percent is plastic, and there are an average of 0.67 microplastic particles per cubic meter. As soon as these figures were released, the *South China Morning Post* began claiming that China was flexing its muscles. Indeed, this monitoring effort was undertaken specifically to protect the South China Sea’s ecological environment and safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests. So where exactly did this report come from? It was jointly released by the National Marine Environmental Monitoring Center and seven other institutions in May and June of last year, covering the central and southern waters of the South China Sea—the area where Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all jostle for position. A total of 26 monitoring stations were established, and using a combination of fixed-point sampling, ship-based surveys, and satellite remote sensing, a comprehensive assessment was conducted of seawater quality, marine debris, microplastics, and greenhouse gases. The results showed that the western waters near Vietnam had the highest concentration of debris, averaging 26.5 pieces per square kilometer—which translates to an estimated 92.75 million pieces. Plastic debris accounted for 93% of the total, consisting of microplastic particles—white or translucent films and fragments—primarily made of polypropylene and polyethylene. How does this level of 0.67 microplastic particles per cubic meter compare? Simply put, the global average is 2.76 particles per cubic meter, with the Mediterranean Sea being the worst affected, followed by the Atlantic Ocean. The South China Sea is relatively better off, with levels slightly lower than those found in coastal estuaries. In the Philippine archipelago, pollution is also lighter due to the short and scattered nature of its rivers. In Vietnam, since it is a coastal region, all monitoring points are located along the shore, and there is no systematic monitoring of the open sea; therefore, the trash problem is not as pronounced. In addition to the trash issue, the report also published water quality data on pH levels, heavy metals, chemicals, and radioactivity, as well as data on greenhouse gases. The conclusion is that the water quality test results meet the highest standards. As for the ecology of the islands and reefs, 108 were monitored, revealing 10 square kilometers of vegetation cover. Detailed statistics were compiled on specific vegetation, coral, and fish species. This report is truly groundbreaking. Previously, reports were either localized surveys near Huangyan Island, water quality reports for coastal areas, or national-level bulletins. This is the first monitoring report specifically focused on the South China Sea, with an emphasis on disputed waters. What about other neighboring countries? Vietnam has primarily focused on coastal areas and has not conducted much monitoring of the open sea. The Philippines’ monitoring is concentrated on the coast and nearshore waters. Although Malaysia has conducted microplastic monitoring in rivers flowing into the sea, there has not been much policy support at the government level. Constrained by funding, technology, or priorities, these countries have not established systematic monitoring efforts. China’s initiative this time can be considered a good start.

China’s Solar Industry: From Internal Competition to Technological Leadership

Everyone, today let’s talk about China’s solar industry. After undergoing a major shakeup, this industry seems to have found a new path forward. In the past, domestic companies were all crowding into the same market, and as a result, they all ended up losing money. JinkoSolar, Trina Solar, JA Solar, LONGi, and Tongwei—these five giants cut their workforces by more than 30% in 2020, while over 40 smaller companies filed for bankruptcy, were acquired, or exited the market. This isn’t simply a matter of internal competition; we should also consider what the U.S. think tank CSIS has to say. The CSIS report states that foreign solar companies not only have no hope of catching up but will actually be left even further behind. Why? Because China’s solar industry has formed a core with sufficient resilience, which will give it an advantage in future technological races. Behind this, our government has implemented a major consolidation drive to phase out outdated production capacity. Think about it: in 2004, China’s solar patents accounted for only 13% of the global total, while Japan held 43%. By 2009, with government support, companies borrowed money to expand, and most of their production was exported to Europe and the United States. In 2012, U.S. anti-dumping duties and EU trade investigations prompted Chinese companies to shift their focus to the domestic market. Shortly thereafter, in 2013, a period of technological catch-up and large-scale expansion began. Starting with the earliest aluminum-backed field (BSF) cell technology—where China was initially a follower but continuously improved—China’s market share in N-type cell technology soared from 8% to 70% in less than three years. In 2020, as China made its “Dual Carbon” commitments, the industry had already become highly concentrated, and under state leadership, new winners emerged. However, the government was not satisfied. Companies faced significant barriers to expanding overseas, access to high-value markets was blocked, and intense domestic price wars led the industry into its third phase: market expansion, technological leaps, and proactive global expansion. Since 2023, prices across all links in the industrial chain have plummeted; module prices were halved that year, dropping to 25% of their previous levels in 2024. In 2025, prices of photovoltaic products fluctuated wildly, with wafer, cell, and module prices remaining at persistently low levels. Meanwhile, regulatory restrictions in the EU and the U.S. have intensified, leading to a de facto decoupling of supply chains. At this juncture, our industry has adjusted its export strategy by shifting toward intermediate products and targeting the Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern markets, reducing its reliance on the EU, increasing overseas investment, expanding local manufacturing ecosystems, and integrating into regional markets. The government has acted in accordance with these trends: amid the wave of N-type technological transformation, it has phased out P-type cells, tolerated the bankruptcy of some enterprises, and concentrated resources on building a resilient industrial core. By 2024, our share of global solar patents reached 65%, five times the level of 20 years ago. We are at the forefront of third-generation solar technology, having set two new world records earlier this year: LONGi’s perovskite-crystalline silicon tandem cell achieved an efficiency of 30.85%, while Nanjing University and Renshuo Solar’s all-perovskite tandem cell reached 30.1%. The consolidated photovoltaic industry now stands at the forefront of technology. Why have we been able to secure this technological high ground? Because China’s distinctive approach to technological innovation involves three interconnected components: the central government provides strategic R&D funding and incentive funds; local governments strengthen strategic implementation through land and tax innovation funds; and at the market level, policy banks, industrial funds, and leading enterprises invest to drive scientific research—together forming a self-reinforcing system. Starting in 2025, the state launched a nationwide investigation into “internal competition” within the photovoltaic industry, guiding companies to shift focus and compete on value and technology. Ladies and gentlemen, this is not a victory for “internal competition,” but rather the core driving force behind the technology race. Faced with market volatility, companies have no choice but to throw themselves into the technology race, which has become the key to innovation in the photovoltaic sector. Private enterprises have filed 75% of technology patents, and the survival of the fittest is reshaping the competitive landscape of the global solar market. From the perspective of strategic competition, the report by the U.S. think tank CSIS is quite incisive: while market volatility is painful for companies, it serves as a form of encouraged “involution”—Darwinian competition—for national strategy. The United States must also learn to adopt this realistic and clear national orientation. The free market emphasizes spontaneous competition among enterprises, while state intervention represents “creative destruction.” The economy is like a secular religion; it is normal for different schools of thought to hold differing beliefs. However, the United States still tends to pass value judgments, with policymakers viewing China’s actions as malicious. In fact, the U.S. itself wants to “overtake on a curve” by using state intervention to protect its domestic supply chains. This stance is also consistent with CSIS’s long-standing mindset on strategic competition. In short, China’s solar industry has already found a new path, and its future global dominance is firmly in its grasp.

Rare Earths and Helium: China’s Double-Edged Sword in Science and Technology

Everyone, do you remember Trump’s first term? Back then, he started imposing chip export controls on us, but why didn’t we retaliate with rare earths at the time? Because everyone understood that rare earths are our trump card. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping said as early as 1992: “The Middle East has oil; China has rare earths.” But the problem is, while this trump card has always been in our hands, we’ve been afraid to play it lightly because there’s one resource from the U.S. that we’re extremely dependent on—helium. Our demand for helium is truly substantial. Over the past 15 years, it has grown by an average of about 10% annually. Yet domestic supply has long been insufficient, leaving us highly dependent on imports—and that’s a real problem. Helium is crucial in high-tech fields such as cryogenic superconductivity, aerospace, fiber-optic manufacturing, and semiconductor production. Yet, we happen to be particularly dependent on imports in this area—at one point, our reliance even reached 95 percent. Why is helium so scarce? Global helium reserves are naturally limited and are primarily concentrated in four countries: the United States, Qatar, Algeria, and Russia. The United States alone accounts for 40% of the world’s reserves, while China is a helium-poor country with only 2% of the world’s reserves, and extraction is even more difficult. Among the world’s top ten helium producers, four are U.S. companies, and the other six rely on U.S. technology. Therefore, if the U.S. so chooses, it could completely cut off the supply. Consequently, the U.S. began reducing production in 2012, leading to a shift in the helium market landscape. The market shifted from being dominated solely by the United States to being split between the United States and Qatar. After the trade war began in 2018, supply chain risks from the United States increased, so we began reducing our imports from there. In 2019, our dependence on the United States fell from 33% to 23%, while Qatar’s share rose to 65%. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted in 2022, Russia emerged as a new major source of supply. From January through August of last year, 65% of our imports came from Qatar and 42% from Russia, while the U.S.’s share dwindled to a meager 2%. The U.S. has absolutely no chance of using helium export controls to strangle us anymore. If the U.S. were to opt for Qatar’s technology, it would actually jeopardize its own supply and risk alienating a key military and diplomatic ally. Therefore, diversifying our supply sources is essential. We are also working to increase domestic production, but the challenge lies in the low grade of our reserves and the difficulty of extraction. However, in 2024, the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Annual Science and Technology Achievement Award was presented to the Institute of Physics and Chemistry of the Chinese Academy of Sciences for its large-scale cryogenic refrigeration unit and helium extraction demonstration project. They developed a helium separation membrane that acts like a sieve, filtering out the small helium molecules to produce high-purity helium at low temperatures. This technology has undergone demonstration operations in Ningxia, Yanchang, Chongqing, Fuling, and other locations, significantly increasing the domestic production rate and reducing reliance on imports. Most of the world’s helium is a byproduct of natural gas extraction. However, the majority of domestic natural gas fields have low helium content and are not commercially viable for extraction. The U.S. industry sets 0.3% as the threshold for helium content to be considered a byproduct, while China has set the threshold at 0.1%. Even at 0.1%, helium is considered a byproduct, but such cases are rare and mostly concentrated in small and medium-sized gas fields. However, in recent years, we have discovered the Hotan River gas field in the Tarim Basin of Xinjiang. Initially regarded as a conventional gas field with 61.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas, it began supplying gas in 2004. In 2019, against the backdrop of the trade war, researchers discovered an ultra-large associated helium reserve in the Hotan River gas field, with proven reserves of 200 million cubic meters. Although its scale is far smaller than that of large U.S. gas fields, it is currently the only high-quality helium resource in China with a helium content exceeding 0.3%. Research on the Hotan River gas field is ongoing. A recent paper points out that, unlike most helium-rich gas fields worldwide, the Hotan River gas field is characterized as “shallow and low-pressure.” What does this mean? It refers to a geological configuration where the deposit lies shallowly, has low pressure, and is highly uplifted—a very rare geological arrangement. This discovery immediately caught the attention of geologists and strategists worldwide, as it opened up new avenues for thinking, allowing them to view such factors as key elements for future helium exploration. Other papers suggest that many basins in central and western China feature similar geological structures, which should become the main focus of future exploration. Therefore, there is still significant untapped potential in China’s domestic helium reserves. Ladies and gentlemen, this is why rare earths can play a strategic role as a trade weapon. Although we will still need to import 60% of our helium over the next two to three years, at least it will be somewhat difficult for the United States to strangle us again. Therefore, only through coordinated scientific and technological development—strengthening both domestic and international capabilities—can we truly seize the initiative.

The Overseas Expansion of Chinese Capital: A Source of Anxiety for the United States

Ladies and gentlemen, the U.S. is incredibly nervous about Chinese companies’ overseas expansion, as if every step they take were a challenge to American global hegemony. But if you take a closer look at the official data, there’s really nothing to be afraid of. In 2017, our Chinese companies’ foreign direct investment (FDI) peaked, and they voluntarily put an end to the notion of so-called “irrational investment.” That said, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the U.S. has released a major report claiming that China’s growing overseas investment isn’t driven by profit, but rather by using corporate ownership to have overseas research teams generate knowledge for China. We all know that the overseas footprint of Chinese capital is far greater than what appears on the books, but who really knows the exact figures? The report’s authors sifted through complex equity structures in vast databases to trace the sources of capital and found that from 2012 to 2021, foreign assets owned by China increased from $551 billion to $2.5 trillion, with an annual growth rate of 20 percent. Assets under control rose from $364 billion to $2.1 trillion. If we include Hong Kong and Macao, the foreign assets controlled by the Greater China region total as much as $3.3 trillion, second only to the United States’ $9.3 trillion. This truly defies common sense. While the general perception is that Chinese investment is concentrated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the data reveals that these assets are concentrated in developed economies—42% in Europe and 38% in North America. Meanwhile, the share of assets in Asia, Africa, South America, and Oceania has shown a downward trend over the past decade. More than a decade ago, China embarked on a massive wave of overseas investment, scaring the West into thinking it would buy up everything, and began emulating the “new rich” by going door-to-door to buy technology. But as you can see, the U.S. has CFIUS, which specializes in reviewing the risks of foreign investment, and the EU has its own FDI screening framework—so even with money in hand, China couldn’t smoothly complete mergers and acquisitions. So why, in 2021, did China’s holdings of Western assets continue to grow, while its balance sheets appeared increasingly robust? Tax havens are at work behind the scenes. Chinese capital first launders itself beyond recognition before acquiring assets from Western companies; this way, the transactions aren’t counted in FDI statistics and avoid triggering political alarms. The Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands are all registration locations particularly favored by Chinese capital. In 2021, Chinese-controlled enterprises accounted for 58%, 41%, and 15% of the total assets in these three major tax havens, respectively, with the Cayman Islands having the highest concentration. In addition to these three, transit hubs also include Portugal and Singapore. Through this method, Chinese capital has made a massive inroads into European and American markets. While there are specialized databases that record ownership at this level—such as OBIS’s Global Economic Ownership 25 (GEO25) index, which tracks equity holdings above a 25% threshold—these cannot capture many of the actual dynamics occurring within corporate boards. Equity structures in European and American capital markets are often highly fragmented; a 10% stake—not 25%—is sufficient to participate in the management decisions of a target company and exert significant influence. When researchers used algorithms to reconstruct the database and lowered the threshold to 10% or more, they found that Chinese entities held ultimate ownership of 6,242 companies, 38% of which were structured through at least one tax haven. Take the British mining giant Rio Tinto, for example. Based on the 25% ownership threshold, it appears to have no connection to China, but when the threshold is lowered to 10%, it becomes evident that the Singapore-based company Shining Prospect holds a 14% stake, with China Aluminum Corporation as the ultimate owner. The same is true for the Danish consumer electronics company Bang & Olufsen: only by lowering the threshold can one uncover the Bermudian major shareholder holding a 15.1% stake—and the Chinese owner behind it. Chinese capital is quietly making its way into these markets—but what does it do once it gets there? First, a large portion of investment is concentrated in strategic industries in the target countries, such as advanced manufacturing, information and communications technology, and natural resources. Manufacturing ranks first in investment volume at $393 billion, followed by professional and scientific activities at $260 billion, and energy and utilities at $195 billion. Once in these sectors, Chinese capital does one thing with the acquired companies: it injects more money into research and development. On average, capital stock increases by 7.3%, and R&D spending rises by 6.6%; this trend is even more pronounced when the acquirer is a state-owned enterprise. Ironically, despite all the R&D efforts by local companies, they neither generate more patents nor earn more revenue; on the contrary, their return on capital actually decreases by 1.1%. Is this due to inefficient resource allocation, or are local companies simply spinning their wheels with the money? The report concludes that neither is the case. Local companies’ R&D teams work at full capacity to serve Chinese capital; while their own patent portfolios do not grow, the number of patent grants obtained by their parent companies in China surges dramatically. The net revenue from these patents is primarily attributed to China rather than the countries where the R&D teams are based—which is precisely why Chinese capital favors investing in developed nations. Only developed economies that possess advanced technology can generate what is known as the “spillover effect”—where innovation by downstream enterprises feeds back into the source of capital. The report found that Chinese enterprises prioritizing technology acquisition over profit generation are often state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These firms have clear strategic objectives and strict investment discipline, and are willing to accept short-term declines in profits. In reality, however, private enterprises remain the driving force behind China’s overseas corporate asset expansion. In addition to R&D, they primarily drive supply chain integration, transforming acquired overseas companies into suppliers for Chinese enterprises. This vertical supply chain integration is an area that SOEs tend to overlook; it is mainly carried out by private enterprises, while SOEs focus specifically on R&D. Consequently, the number of patent grants obtained by SOEs and private enterprises differs significantly. On average, in the year an acquisition is completed, private enterprises see their patent applications triple, while SOEs see a 4.4-fold increase—a truly explosive surge. But here’s another curious phenomenon: logically, given how much Chinese capital prioritizes R&D, one would expect it to skew the local market culture—after all, if you invest heavily, wouldn’t other companies have to follow suit? On the contrary, other local companies not only fail to increase their R&D spending but actually reduce it. The report found that the overall levels of innovation and profitability in local industries remained unchanged following Chinese investment, indicating that the intensity of innovation activities among individual firms had shifted: as one firm strengthens, another weakens; as one firm’s profits decline, another’s rise. The practical effect of this is that local firms—which were originally market-driven—have now realigned their R&D and innovation activities due to China’s state-led technology acquisition strategy. The report argues that this represents a new mechanism through which national industrial policy exerts influence abroad; by leveraging equity investments between companies, it reshapes global business networks, transforming them into tools for its own geo-economic strategy. In contrast to China’s investment strategy—which prioritizes long-term R&D at the expense of short-term profits—the approaches taken by the United States, Japan, and India are not unique. The United States tends to expand corporate scale and increase investment in fixed assets, which has a limited impact on R&D and patent output—this is simply standard market-oriented practice. Japan’s overseas investment is similar in nature to China’s, but first, it is on a smaller scale, and second, it is not state-driven but often the result of private enterprises’ own initiatives. India, on the other hand, takes a conservative approach, seeking only to maintain a market presence rather than pursuing technological upgrades or asset accumulation. So, ladies and gentlemen, China’s approach is actually not unique either. What truly frightens the United States is that a nation can execute such a strategy on such a massive scale, in such a covert manner, and with such strict discipline.

Cutting-Edge Lithium-Ion Battery Technology: Offering Soda to Haters?

Everyone, there’s been another wave of cutting-edge developments in domestic lithium-ion battery technology research recently. Speaking of which, the material extracted from dismantled used lithium-ion batteries is called “black powder”—and what about that drink? Water with carbonation—that’s soda water. It really is a brilliant idea: recovering 95% of the lithium through something we drink. Our country has placed a major bet on meeting lithium resource demands in the new energy era. Lithium is known as “white oil” and is a strategic mineral for the nation. Although we’ve discovered large deposits in recent years, demand is simply too high, with imports accounting for 50% of our needs. In these uncertain times, the recycling and reuse of lithium resources are of great significance. Especially during this window period when power batteries are being decommissioned on a massive scale, recycling volumes and market share are rising rapidly. There are three methods for recycling lithium-ion batteries. The first is direct recycling—mechanical disassembly, crushing, and sorting—which has low energy consumption and minimal pollution. However, in practice, the high purity requirements for raw materials mean this method isn’t always suitable. The second method involves high-temperature smelting, which can recover nickel and copper but has a low lithium recovery rate, high energy consumption, and emits exhaust gases. The third method involves leaching valuable metals using acids and alkalis. While it achieves high recovery rates, the resulting waste liquid is difficult to treat and places a heavy environmental burden. Consequently, foreign media and environmental organizations have begun to criticize battery recycling as “pseudo-environmental.” Is it possible to balance efficiency and environmental protection? Scientists have found a new solution: giving “black powder” a glass of soda. Doesn’t that sound pretty cool? How exactly does it work? First, a controlled mechanochemical treatment is performed. This involves grinding the battery black powder in a ball mill, which disrupts the arrangement of lithium and other metals, creating a structurally disordered material with a lithium-rich surface. This makes it easier for lithium to react with carbon dioxide and water. Next, carbon dioxide and water are used to gently dissolve the lithium from the battery—and carbon dioxide mixed with water is, after all, soda! This method recovers over 95% of the lithium, with an efficiency comparable to high-temperature smelting. The remaining metals—such as cobalt, nickel, and manganese—are not discarded but are upcycled for other industrial applications, such as catalysts. The entire process requires only water and carbon dioxide—the most common industrial raw materials—and needs no abrasives or chemical reagents. It operates at room temperature, making it safe and economical, while also capturing carbon dioxide. How wonderful! Of course, existing recycling processes can’t be completely overhauled overnight, but once this method is successfully scaled up, it will have significant implications for the development of electric vehicles, grid energy storage, and the green energy supply chain. Folks, our scientists are truly brilliant—recycling lithium batteries simply by “drinking” them is nothing short of astonishing!

Why Does Chinese Scientific Research Inspire Both Hatred and Fear in the West?

Ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen! A new phenomenon has emerged in the world. Tell me, why does China always seem to have the upper hand in the global race for innovation? Western elites simply cannot fathom it. The Financial Times has provided the answer: China has transformed from the “world’s factory” into the “world’s laboratory.” The data speaks for itself: in 2007, China’s R&D spending was only one-third of that of the United States. By 2023, China had poured $781 billion into R&D, nearly matching the U.S.’s $823 billion. When cost advantages are factored in, the actual intensity of investment has already surpassed that of the United States. R&D relies on the government, businesses, and universities. If we look solely at government spending, China’s investment had already surpassed that of the U.S. a decade ago. Now that Trump is cutting research funding, the gap is widening even further. Businesses and universities are also narrowing the gap. When it comes to technology, it ultimately boils down to human capital. China produces 50,000 doctoral graduates in science and engineering each year, compared to 34,000 in the United States. China can devote nearly 50% more top-tier talent to scientific research than the United States. Therefore, as long as you do not believe that the Chinese people are inherently unintelligent, this quantitative change will inevitably lead to a qualitative change. Building on this foundation is the guidance of national strategy. China’s scientific research rarely involves the kind of free-wheeling, purely theoretical work; instead, it focuses on two areas: first, serving industrial transformation; and second, reducing external dependence and pursuing self-reliance and control. Applications in the real economy that lie at the intersection of these two areas are given the highest priority. Examples include advanced materials, alternative fuels, and power equipment, among others. A few days ago, I mentioned that the U.S. wants to adopt a “nationwide system” for scientific research—but in fact, China has been doing this for a long time. Geopolitical pressures have forced China to sharpen its strategic focus. To put it simply, the will of the state has determined that China must defeat the U.S. Therefore, even if it means cutting welfare benefits for one or two generations, the country is committed to funding scientific research in strategic fields. Government, business, and academia are working together to achieve technological autonomy and control, thereby reducing vulnerability. They are collaborating to address the challenges faced by the real economy and to pursue a dominant position in global supply chains. The next phase will be completely different from the decentralized model of the past. Capital investment will be more concentrated and tilted toward key industries, reducing spending on local industrial expansion and minimizing opportunities for industrial waste and corruption. The first tranche of 51.4 billion yuan from the Special Fund for the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries in Central State-Owned Enterprises, launched in late October, clearly illustrates this trend. The 15th Five-Year Plan states very clearly that the technological revolution and great-power rivalry are intertwined, and competition in new technologies and emerging sectors is becoming increasingly fierce. Therefore, we must fully leverage the advantages of the national mobilization system for emerging industries to gain strategic initiative in intense international competition. These are the exact words. Thus, we have long-term policy guidance, stable funding, a comprehensive industrial ecosystem, an extremely rapid pace of commercialization, and a steady pipeline of talent. To Western political elites, this is a terrifying Eastern scientific behemoth. But for Western business elites, it’s a different story. In the past, foreign companies flocked to set up factories in China because our labor was cheap and environmental damage went unchecked. Now they are scrambling to establish R&D centers here because China is not only a hub for manufacturing products in emerging fields but also a center for knowledge production. There are 150,000 corporate research institutions, 5 million researchers, and an explosive growth in patent strength. Of course, many criticize the quality of China’s scientific research, claiming that patents are inflated and designed solely to raise capital. I recall an expert in the electronics and information technology sector once saying that 90% of domestic patents are junk. But you have to “follow the money,” right? Capital is willing to put real money on the line to build R&D centers. The number of foreign-funded R&D centers in Shanghai has risen from 440 in 2018 to 631 this year, while Beijing has 279. Many foreign companies also believe they must collaborate with China on R&D to survive. Take automakers, for example: to transition to new energy vehicles and integrate autonomous driving technology, they have to come to China. Even a company like France’s Renault—even if it doesn’t sell cars here and is solely focused on R&D—still has to come. Capital understands very clearly that without the responsiveness of China’s supply chain, their technology is essentially just a lab specimen—it cannot be mass-produced. Take Volkswagen, for example: it developed driver-assistance technology in Hefei in just a year and a half—a project that would take at least four years in Germany. Another example is Sweden’s Scania, which is developing autonomous driving technology for trucks. Previously, they spent a long time trying to get it right in Sweden and the U.S. without success, but now, with R&D in China, it’s been implemented within a year. So even though the West is divided into several camps—debating whether to compete with, cooperate with, or coexist with China—and even though most of them still have reservations, wondering whether this state-led development model is truly effective, it does seem to be working. Conversely, they’re also worried about whether the traditional American approach—where innovation is led by research institutions and safeguarded by a democratic system—still works. If it doesn’t, can it be replaced by China’s “whole-of-nation” model? But that would mean defeating China on its own turf—is that really feasible?

The U.S.'s Governance Capabilities: From Road Construction to Record-Keeping—How Good Can It Really Be?

Everyone, I recently came across a report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that questions the United States’ state capacity—arguing that governing a country is just like building roads: both are forms of infrastructure development. If the tangible aspects are in such a state of disrepair, how well can the abstract aspects possibly be? The report offers a very simple definition of state capacity: whether the government can do what its citizens ask it to do. In our country, scholars such as Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang define it more as “the capacity to realize the will of the state.” They began emphasizing the importance of state capacity back in the 1990s, at a time when many were idolizing the Western model of the separation of powers. At that time, the intellectual sphere was flooded with narratives advocating for the “complete Westernization of politics.” While liberals believed the state was too powerful, these two argued that the state was too weak—particularly that its fiscal revenue-raising capacity needed to be strengthened, as this is the foundation of all state capacity. About a decade ago, we had a collaborative project with the Berggruen Institute, and I helped Professor Hu translate his article into English for publication in the U.S. edition of *The Huffington Post*. I recall that he particularly emphasized how the Five-Year Plan embodies state capacity over a temporal span. Time really does fly—it hasn’t even taken the proverbial “30 years for the tide to turn”; in just a few short years, the United States has already begun to reflect on state capacity and governance effectiveness. I suspect that in a few years, the debate will shift from “democracy versus authoritarianism” to “good governance versus bad governance.” Returning to the Carnegie report, it states that in governments with strong state capacity, citizens don’t need to prod the government—it will formulate plans and make preparations on its own. Officials are more at ease, policy options are plentiful, and laws and regulations are enforced smoothly. I wonder who they had in mind when they wrote that. Then the report launches into self-criticism, lambasting everything from disaster relief to health insurance—all the usual complaints. However, there’s one story that’s quite interesting—did you know? The approval process for U.S. federal employees applying for retirement benefits takes a month. You submit a paper form to your agency’s HR department, and then all agencies across the country mail them to a disused limestone mine in Pennsylvania—a mine that was converted into an archives center 60 years ago, containing 26,000 filing cabinets and 400 million sheets of paper. With so many documents, everything is processed manually by a dedicated team of 600 people. How long an application form spends in circulation there may even depend on the speed of the mine’s elevator. This antiquated system is merely a microcosm—not an exception. Take, for example, the dreaded Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which began upgrading its IT systems in the 1990s. Thirty-five years later, it is still using architecture from the 1960s. Or consider the Biden administration’s push for electric vehicles and its promise to build charging stations—in four years, they’ve built a total of seven, which is less than what’s available in our own neighborhood. If you were to ask our Dean Zhang, he’d say that the U.S. presidential administration’s governance capabilities don’t even measure up to those of the elderly residents on our neighborhood committee. When Trump took office, he made a key promise to voters: to dismantle the “deep state.” The “Dark Enlightenment” faction refers to this as “demolishing the cathedral”—a goal conservatives had actually set long ago. In Musk’s hands, this means wielding a sledgehammer and scrawling “Demolish” everywhere, cutting agencies, streamlining processes, and centralizing power in the name of modernization and lean governance. However, in Carnegie’s view, this approach has not only failed to improve government efficiency but has actually exacerbated the original problems—thereby further hollowing out the body of the nation and leaving the U.S. even less capable, so that many things remain mere talk and cannot be accomplished. Many people think the U.S. is being underhanded by saying one thing and doing another, but in reality, sometimes it’s purely a matter of capability—it simply doesn’t have the capacity, you see? The report identifies this as the true problem facing the U.S.: it’s not that its military might is insufficient, nor that it lacks financial resources, but rather that the government is unable to carry out the actions it decides to take. The report divides the decline of U.S. national capacity into three parts: “invisibility,” “neglect,” and “deconstruction.” “Invisibility” refers to the government acting as a hands-off administrator, avoiding direct responsibility for public projects and relying on contractors for everything—essentially “outsourcing governance.” Why has it come to this? The report provides a chart showing that from the 1960s to the present, U.S. federal real spending (represented by the dark blue line) has increased by 500%, and the workload has grown fivefold; however, the number of federal civilian employees has risen by only 26%. Logically, the workforce should have numbered in the tens of millions, but it rose only from 2.3 million to 2.9 million last year; after a year of turmoil under Trump, this year’s figure has fallen to its lowest level in 60 years. The government has a great many public duties but does not employ civil servants—which means the federal government delegates the work to contractors. Consequently, the scope of government officials’ responsibilities has shifted: they are no longer accountable for the execution of specific tasks, but only for verifying whether contractors are in compliance. An obsessive focus on “compliance” is a terrifying phenomenon; it can lead to the creation of countless redundant metrics—all hard indicators that are easy to quantify and evaluate—which is far simpler than actually assessing whether a project is effective. So government agencies focus on this, and the compliance system grows ever larger—it’s not just compliance, but compliance for compliance’s sake. The people Musk and others want to lay off are, in fact, this very group. Speaking of which, I’m reminded of another scholar, Paul Light, who has long studied this outsourcing system. He says there are nine times as many government contract workers as there are civil servants, forming a massive “shadow workforce”—which may be viewed as the “deep state,” leading to their jobs being cut. The second aspect is called “neglect,” which essentially means that bureaucrats have become disconnected from the people. The government does not deal directly with the public but relies on contractors, resulting in highly fragmented public services—forget about “one-stop online services”; it’s a victory just to get anything done at all. That’s why everyone blames the government for being inefficient. In such an opaque environment, if the government seeks to allocate budget funds to strengthen capacity-building, and the public has no idea where the money will go, they naturally won’t support it. However, support isn’t necessarily guaranteed even within the government itself, especially when the two parties are evenly matched and constantly undermining each other—if the ruling party wants to strengthen its capacity, the opposition will look down on it. What if the government becomes more capable and its approval ratings rise? Do I still want to rise to power? Furthermore, some areas are actually in dire need of capacity building, but the public isn’t aware of it—take diplomacy, for example: The U.S. State Department has long been in a state where it lacks both funding and personnel, and Trump even slashed its budget by 20%. Diplomats need to work on long-term efforts to do their jobs well, so the public tends to feel that no matter how much money is poured in, there are no visible results—might as well just scrap the whole thing. If the problems can’t be solved, at least get rid of some of the people who can’t solve them. Finally, there’s the “deconstruction” coming from within the political elite itself. As an establishment think tank, Carnegie has been relatively polite in criticizing populists for rolling back progress and causing disruption: people like Bannon have been plotting to dismantle government institutions for a long time, and with Trump’s second term, they were finally able to carry out their plans. From foreign aid to financial regulation, from diplomacy to education, these sectors are all undergoing drastic staff cuts. It would be one thing if the U.S. were simply playing by itself behind closed doors, but the key issue is that its diplomatic sector is being treated the same way—among the 25 major government agencies facing cuts, five are directly related to foreign affairs. For example, USAID was completely dismantled: 95% of its staff was laid off, its office buildings were shut down, its servers were removed, and its office systems were locked down. The result of this approach is, first, a weakening of the U.S.’s own analytical and planning capabilities, and second, a disruption of its relations with other countries. The U.S. is now playing by itself behind closed doors; at the diplomatic level, many international cooperation projects have seen participants drop off mid-conversation, and processes have ground to a halt—international issues are inherently complex, and staff cuts only slow them down further, causing constant delays. The report concludes: We must still prioritize the civil service. We need to safeguard the rights of public employees through laws and regulations, ensuring their job security so they can focus on professional duties—rather than living in constant fear for their livelihoods and constantly thinking about changing careers. Reduce the burden: Civil servants must focus on practical, substantive work—not waste resources and energy on internal red tape just to prove they’re being productive. The current compliance burden is simply too heavy. Data is essential: Government agencies must regularly publish clear and reliable data so that the public can understand the connection between the state’s capabilities and the results it delivers. Transparency is key: Outsourcing, after all, lacks transparency. Single-bid contracts are very common, and with little competition among contractors, the results may not necessarily be better than if the government had handled them itself—and it also makes the public feel that the government is absent. These are sound recommendations, but they’re phrased in a neutral and measured tone. Might the private owners of so many contractors with vested interests take offense? How serious could the consequences be? I simply don’t know.

Spending Reports: Are We Even Poorer Than Mexico?

Everyone, let’s talk about consumer spending this time. A colleague told me, “Did you know? Our per capita GDP is on par with Mexico’s, but our consumption is less than half of theirs.” I was taken aback—are Mexicans really that wealthy? I looked it up when I got home, and it’s true. In 2023, China’s per capita final consumption was $4,936, while Mexico’s was $9,688—it really is exactly half. And don’t even get me started on comparisons with developed countries: France at $24,000, Germany at $27,000, and the U.S., where per capita consumption tops out at over $56,000. Ten times what we spend—what does “ten times” even mean? Are we really that poor? So I recalculated using purchasing power parity (PPP): China’s per capita consumption came out to $9,586, while the U.S. remained at $56,000. This shows that our goods are sold cheaply, leading to an underestimation of our consumption. After the PPP adjustment, Mexico’s consumption actually rose to 16,000—still a good deal higher than ours. This isn’t about catching up to or surpassing the UK or the U.S.; it’s about catching up to Mexico first. But when I looked at it this way, it still didn’t quite match my personal experience. I then came across a report from the China Financial 40 Forum that offered an interesting perspective: consumption shouldn’t be measured by how much money is spent, but by how much is acquired—how much one eats, how much one wears, what kind of cell phone one uses, what kind of car one drives, and how big one’s house is. We should select key indicators across all aspects of daily life—food, clothing, housing, and transportation—to make a side-by-side comparison. Let’s start with food. Dietary habits vary greatly from country to country, so how do we compare them? Two metrics: per capita calorie intake and protein intake—that is, energy and nutrition, or simply put, whether people are well-fed or well-nourished. We can directly compare the results. In terms of calories, China’s per capita daily intake rose from 1,400 kcal in 1961 to 3,453 kcal in 2022. It surpassed Mexico as early as 2013 and is now actually on par with developed countries. France stands at 3,500, Germany at 3,600, and the U.S. eats a bit more at 3,900; as for the Japanese, they really do eat very little—not even 2,700. In terms of protein, China’s per capita intake rose from 40 grams per day in 1961 to 128.5 grams in 2022. This level far outpaces all other countries—even those we typically think of as heavy consumers of meat, eggs, and dairy: Germany at 107.4 grams, the United States at 121.6 grams, and Japan at less than 100 grams. How was this achieved? China is an agricultural powerhouse; food prices are inherently low, and the diet is relatively balanced, with a significant portion of plant-based protein coming from soy products. In other words, when it comes to diet, there’s actually no significant gap between China and developed countries. Now let’s compare clothing purchases. The average Chinese person buys about 22 pieces of clothing per year (I suspect socks are included in that count—I certainly haven’t bought 22 pairs myself), and two pairs of shoes annually. This is roughly on par with Mexico, where the figures are 26.2 pieces of clothing and 1.8 pairs of shoes. The U.S. figures are rather extreme, at 90 garments and 6 pairs of shoes per year. France, Germany, and Japan all have higher figures than China but lower than the U.S., falling somewhere between the two—let’s take the average. As for cars, China’s 2023 consumption rate was equivalent to 22 cars per 1,000 people—twice that of Mexico, roughly 60% of Europe’s, and less than half of the U.S.’s. We lag a bit in this area. Housing is divided into two categories: per capita floor area and per capita number of housing units. Official statistics only track per capita floor area; for the urban population, it stands at 38.8 square meters, which is essentially the same as Mexico’s 39.6 square meters. Japan’s figure is higher at 45.8 square meters, while the U.S. stands at 62.9 square meters. However, these figures compare urban populations only; if rural housing area were included, the gap would be somewhat smaller. The number of housing units per capita can be estimated from commercial real estate transaction data, standing at 0.387 units per person. France has the highest figure at 0.591 units, followed by the United States at 0.428 units; China has reached approximately 90% of the U.S. level. Of course, this count treats any space with a ceiling as a separate unit, so comparing large houses to small apartments is somewhat of a forced comparison. Beyond basic living needs, in terms of service consumption—including education, entertainment, healthcare, and tourism—China’s gap with developed countries is not significant when measured by quantitative indicators. Our average years of education stand at 15.2 years, which is comparable to Japan’s and higher than the U.S.’s 14.5 years, though still two years short of Germany’s 17.3 years. When it comes to healthcare, life expectancy per capita is a good indicator of the quality of medical services. Our upward trend is converging with that of developed countries—our life expectancy is 78.37 years, compared to 79.61 years in the U.S. and 85 years in Japan. With some effort, we can catch up; after all, Hong Kong ranks first globally at 85.77 years. In terms of travel, domestic travel averages four trips per person per year, compared to about seven in the U.S.; for international travel, our rate is 0.14—meaning only one out of every 10 people travels abroad once a year. While this is lower than the U.S. rate of 0.5, the gap is narrowing compared to the Japanese, who used to be particularly fond of traveling abroad—their rate is 0.16. To summarize: if we compare total spending amounts, we are indeed quite low; but when comparing actual consumption—which is more outcome-oriented—our per capita consumption level is far higher than Mexico’s, not half of it. This indicates that internationally accepted statistical methods systematically underestimate consumption due to factors such as price levels and exchange rates, so we need to find more scientific methods. Our consumption levels aren’t low in terms of quantity, and the range of consumption is fairly comprehensive, but there is still room for improvement in terms of quality. One final point is particularly crucial: our consumption levels are an objective reality; no matter how the statistics are calculated, they will not alter the fact that increased exports lead to a trade surplus. Therefore, stimulating domestic demand is not about arbitrarily inventing new consumption drivers, but rather about improving quality and raising the standard of living for ordinary people. This will also help alleviate structural imbalances in global trade and improve our external environment. I’m so hungry—I’m going to start eating now and make a small contribution toward catching up with Mexico.

United States: Unable to obtain tungsten ore, they have no choice but to rack their brains

Everyone, let’s not talk about the 1260H list today. Let’s change the subject and talk about tungsten ore. As we all know, rare earths are all the rage right now, but tungsten is actually just as hot. Tungsten ore is yet another mineral battle being waged between our country and the United States. This isn’t some under-the-table deal—it’s out in the open, a head-on showdown. Ladies and gentlemen, as a think tank, our job is to let you know what tricks the foreigners are playing—we’re just calling them out, so please don’t go reporting us. Tungsten is highly heat-resistant (melting point of 3,422°C, compared to just over 1,000°C for steel) and extremely hard (nearly as hard as diamond). These two properties make it incredibly versatile in industrial applications. The majority is used in cemented carbides, machine tool cutting tools, and mining drill bits. In recent years, the high-tech sector has also begun utilizing tungsten—for example, in the cutting of photovoltaic silicon wafers and chip manufacturing. Tungsten is even found in everyday consumer goods. However, the United States places the greatest value on its military applications: rocket engines, missile tail fins, and armor-piercing projectile cores, among others, all rely on this specialty alloy steel. I recall mentioning a CSIS report in previous episodes that highlighted some challenges faced by U.S. defense contractors in missile manufacturing, one of which was tungsten. Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, U.S. companies had not stockpiled large quantities of tungsten ore; inventories were already low, and the pressure is now immense. Take a look at the global tungsten supply chain: global reserves total approximately 4.7 million metric tons, with China alone holding 2.5 million metric tons—about 53 percent. Australia ranks second at 12 percent, and Russia third at 8 percent. As with many critical metals, China’s advantage lies not only in its reserves but also in its absolute dominance of the midstream processing sector. China accounts for 80% of global tungsten metal production and an even higher proportion of ammonium paratungstate (APT), a critical intermediate product used in cutting tools and artillery shells. All of the United States’ downstream defense industries rely on China for raw materials. China accounts for approximately 30% of the global APT supply, and such a critical supply chain is a real headache for the United States. Moreover, China implemented export quota controls last year. In February of last year, the Ministry of Commerce, in conjunction with the General Administration of Customs, issued an announcement regarding export controls on tungsten, antimony, molybdenum, and other related items, with tungsten ranked first. The purpose was to safeguard national security and interests by strictly controlling dual-use items—that is, raw materials with military applications. This year, the export control list for dual-use items was updated again to establish systematic, long-term controls specifically targeting military and specialty materials; any item deemed likely to flow into the military supply chain will not be approved. This has infuriated the U.S. military, as a procurement crisis looms. Due to China’s export controls, a dual-track pricing system has emerged internationally: prices in the domestic Chinese manufacturing sector reflect procurement costs and are protected by national macroeconomic controls; prices on the international market, however, reflect a scarcity premium for non-Chinese tungsten. Over the past year, APT prices have skyrocketed by 800% to 900%, far outpacing the increases in gold and crude oil. This is because the U.S. has issued a strict order to completely eliminate Chinese tungsten from its military supply chain in the short term, yet with zero domestic production, it is scrambling to secure every available source on the international market. But while the U.S. boasts loudly, it faces trouble on its own doorstep. With zero domestic production, it can only rely on scrap—yet recyclers have found they cannot secure the supply. It turns out that suppliers say it’s not that they don’t want to sell to the U.S., but rather that Chinese buyers have offered terms that are impossible to refuse: no matter what price U.S. recyclers pay, we’ll pay a higher price—sometimes as much as five times higher—and we’ll buy whatever quantity is available. Some of these Chinese recyclers conduct private transactions, while others transport the material back to China via third-party companies through Canada and Dubai. Are they executing some kind of strategy—deliberately buying up all the tungsten scrap to cut off the U.S. supply chain? The *Financial Times* says that’s not the case. It’s more likely that output from China’s aging tungsten mines is declining, forcing the country to seek new tungsten resources from farther afield, and China itself needs to recycle tungsten. In 2024, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued industry standards for recycled raw materials to address the challenges posed by China’s heavy consumption of tungsten ore and declining reserves. The goal is to raise the secondary recycling rate of tungsten scrap from 20% to the 50% level seen in Europe and the United States. However, directly importing tungsten scrap does not comply with China’s environmental protection standards. Therefore, the only option now is to source alloy drill bits—which, due to differing regulatory policies, are permitted for import. Our American counterparts in the tungsten recycling industry have found that this business is no longer as lucrative as it once was. There are no legal restrictions on tungsten scrap in the U.S., so selling it to China is a legitimate business. Congress is trying to pass legislation to restrict exports to China, but will this really work? That’s questionable. Although the U.S. can recycle the scrap—crushing it into powder—it lacks the capabilities for pressing, sintering, and high-precision manufacturing, so it cannot be turned into finished products. From a commercial supply-and-demand perspective, if the U.S. government were to forcibly impose a ban and require that scrap tungsten not be exported: first, the scrap would go unsold and remain stuck with the recycling plants; second, with supply exceeding demand, prices would fall, profits would shrink, and business owners would lose the incentive to recycle—further undermining the recycling ecosystem. To prevent such aggressive acquisitions by Chinese businesses from further strengthening China’s dominance in the industrial chain, the U.S. devised a strategy of “spreading its bets”—turning to Kazakhstan, a hidden resource powerhouse. Since Kazakhstan does not wish to rely on China, the U.S. aims to mine and process tungsten into APT locally. Tungsten mining and APT refining are highly polluting and energy-intensive industries that are difficult to establish within the United States. APT is shipped to Europe, the United States, and Japan for further processing; these nations all recognize the strategic value of tungsten and view it as a critical mineral requiring political safeguards, given the concentrated risks associated with China’s current dominance of the supply chain. Through the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the International Finance Corporation, the U.S. government supported a joint venture between a U.S. capital firm and Kazakhstan’s national mining company. Trump’s two sons also indirectly acquired shares in preparation for an initial public offering, and “tungsten-themed” stocks on the U.S. market were riding a wave of political momentum. However, from a rational perspective, this U.S. “de-China-ization” of the tungsten supply chain is a classic case of trading efficiency for security: cross-border logistics are cumbersome, capital expenditures are high, and cross-industry coordination capabilities are lacking, resulting in costs significantly higher than those in China. It can only serve as a fallback strategy for the military and national defense sectors; for civilian industries, the costs are too high, which will weaken competitiveness. Project Blue, a British supply intelligence agency, analyzes that from now until 2030, China’s dominance over the global tungsten supply chain will not weaken; rather, it will evolve from a monopoly on resources and primary raw materials to absolute dominance in high-value-added downstream end products. China’s market share in primary tungsten ore mining and APT refining may shrink from 80% to around 70%, but this will not constitute a major setback, as Western production lines are small-scale and costly, unable to alter the reality of pricing in the global commodities market. China will export more finished components and capture the market for end-use products in the broader civilian manufacturing sector. The industrial chain advantages we have accumulated over decades cannot be undone by a few bans or the opening of a few new mines.

China's Unlimited Nuclear Energy: From Dream to Reality

Listen up, everyone. Today, let’s talk about the latest developments in China’s unlimited nuclear energy. The South China Morning Post reports that the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has, for the first time, achieved thorium-to-uranium conversion inside its 2-megawatt thorium-based molten salt experimental reactor in Wuwei, Gansu—and that’s truly astonishing news. A thorium-based molten salt reactor is a type of small-scale fourth-generation nuclear reactor that uses thorium instead of uranium as fuel, with liquid molten salt serving as both the fuel carrier and coolant. What’s remarkable is that only a small amount of uranium is needed to trigger a chain reaction, causing thorium-232—which is not easily fissionable—to absorb neutrons and transform into thorium-233, which then decays into americium-233. which then decays into uranium-233. The newly converted uranium-233 releases heat and neutrons to sustain the reaction, allowing thorium-232 to produce more uranium-233, thereby achieving fuel breeding. It’s like a furnace: if you put a piece of coal inside and then add a stone, the coal can turn the stone into coal; then, by continuously adding stones, you can keep producing coal and keep the fire burning. Our country is poor in uranium, but we have plenty of thorium. as I’ve mentioned before, thorium is found in rare earths, phosphates, minerals, and monazite. These industries are all interconnected. In the Baiyunebu mining area of Inner Mongolia, the thorium reserves in the tailings from past mining operations alone are sufficient to power the entire country for over 1,000 years. If the entire mine were fully exploited, it could supply power for the next 60,000 years. Furthermore, this technology does not require fuel rods to be fabricated outside the reactor core, and fuel can be replaced without interrupting reactor operation—eliminating a complex step, improving fuel utilization, and reducing nuclear waste. Furthermore, it requires absolutely no water. Traditional nuclear power plants are generally built near the coast or along major rivers precisely because they require large amounts of water for cooling. Molten salt reactors, however, can be built in water-scarce inland regions—for example, the Wuwei plant is located right in the Gobi Desert. In the future, they can be built virtually anywhere, offering tremendous flexibility in deployment. Therefore, in theory, this is a nearly perfect ultimate energy solution. Our experimental reactor has successfully achieved a series of key milestones—including the world’s first criticality, full-power operation, and the first addition of thorium to a molten salt reactor—making us the leaders in this field. With such an excellent technology, why aren’t nuclear power plants around the world using it? This is truly a huge joke played by history. The United States was originally a pioneer in this technology; the molten salt experimental reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s operated very successfully. The only difference between their work and ours is that they processed thorium into uranium in a separate reactor before adding the uranium to the molten salt reactor. Thus, they only achieved fuel conversion but failed to establish a closed fuel cycle involving online fuel loading and waste removal. The project was then forcibly shut down by the U.S. government in the 1970s for three main reasons. First, there was a dispute over the technical approach; at the time, the Atomic Energy Commission chose liquid-metal fast reactors over molten-salt reactors. Consequently, the molten-salt reactor budget was cut to zero, and the entire program was abandoned—a decision driven in large part by political maneuvering. Second, there were military considerations and path dependence: liquid-metal fast reactors could produce plutonium-239, a key material for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In contrast, the uranium-233 produced by molten salt reactors was difficult to weaponize. For the United States during the Cold War, a nuclear cycle unsuitable for weapons production was naturally far less appealing. Finally, there was commercial inertia: at the time, the commercial nuclear power industry relied on light-water reactors used in nuclear submarines, which were already established in the market, so there was no incentive to support a new technology that could potentially supplant their own. It is precisely because the United States shelved this technology for half a century that China has now revived this approach, constructing what is currently the world’s only operational thorium-based molten salt reactor—and has even taken it a step further by directly feeding thorium fuel into the reactor to verify in-reactor breeding. Interestingly, while the U.S. once dismissed it as unsuitable for military applications, today this is precisely its immense advantage in the civilian nuclear sector: it serves as a naturally non-proliferative fuel. If successfully commercialized, it will not only solve China’s power generation needs but also lead the world toward a more sustainable nuclear energy future, as it simultaneously addresses the dual challenges of energy security and nuclear safety. Yesterday, I listened to a colleague’s report on a clean energy study tour. He mentioned that in both July and August of this year, our monthly electricity consumption exceeded one trillion kilowatt-hours—more than double that of the United States, the world’s second-largest electricity consumer, and equal to the total annual electricity consumption of all ten ASEAN countries combined. It seems our power generation capacity is struggling to keep up. The contribution of thermal power has dropped to less than half, with wind and solar power filling the gap. Nuclear power still plays a relatively minor role, contributing only 5 percent. Just imagine: once thorium-based small modular reactor technology becomes widespread and energy becomes vastly more abundant, what stage of development will civilization reach? For now, we can only imagine. Alright, that’s all for today. Next time I come across material that sparks the imagination, I’ll share it with you again. Bye for now.

The Reality of China: An Unreal Dream

Hello everyone, and welcome to “The Reality of China.” I’m Chris. In this episode, let’s talk about what’s going on in China. Have you ever heard about just how strict the laws are in China? Take, for example, a former singer from the 1990s named Han, who was arrested by police in 2009 for drug use. He was sent to a drug rehabilitation center for three years and later even became an anti-drug awareness ambassador for the Beijing Municipal Government. After his release, he changed his name to Han Pujun and used some of his money to establish a charitable foundation. This past year, he returned to his former career in the entertainment industry, appearing in quite a few TV dramas. There wouldn’t have been a problem with that, but this time his acting was a disaster, causing quite a stir. Our country’s anti-drug policies are truly strict; for drug users to return to the entertainment industry is an incredibly difficult task. It seems Han’s acting career is now over, but a discussion about whether “artists with a history of drug use deserve a second chance” has quietly begun—and quickly fizzled out. The public’s stance can be summed up in one phrase: No. As for drug testing, China has strict legal provisions. Once caught using drugs, it’s extremely difficult to reintegrate into society. For example, China’s highest media regulatory body has outright banned all drug-related television programs and media broadcasts. Legal scholars believe this regulation should apply to all platforms, including live streaming and commercial performances. Therefore, once someone is implicated in drug use, their career is over—not because the law is lenient, but because it is even stricter. The imprint of history also influences China. The Opium War during the Qing Dynasty led to conflict between China and Britain, triggering what became known as the “Second Opium War.” This was not merely a war; it was a shameful chapter in history. Today, on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, the Monument to the People’s Heroes commemorates this history. On its pedestal, you’ll see reliefs depicting eight large-scale revolutionary events, symbolizing a new beginning for China. The very first scene depicts the Opium War of 1839. As for whether the United States would deal with drugs the same way China does—or the way DEA agents hunted down Pablo Escobar—that is another matter entirely. Next, let’s talk about morality and culture. In China, the power of the state far exceeds that of the church. Stalin once referred to cultural workers as “engineers of the human soul,” a concept that has deeply influenced China. Music, film, literature… these cultural products are all shaping the moral values of the Chinese people. Conversely, if the government wants to guide these cultural products, it must crack down on immoral behavior. Money is also a major issue. In China’s entertainment industry, the environment for idols is quite harsh. If a scandal breaks out, not only will they face public outrage, but their entire career may be ruined. This is essentially another form of “cancel culture.” For the sake of money, idols may abandon all moral boundaries. As a result, moral standards in Chinese society are becoming increasingly blurred. Of course, China’s stance on drugs is extremely strict. In Chinese, “drug” is translated as “毒品” (duopin), clearly distinguished from “药物” (yàowu, medicine); all prohibited substances used for non-medical purposes are classified as “毒品.” Even a single encounter with them could be “fatal.” In comparison, actual poisons are actually quite honest—we know they’re toxic, and we know they’re medicine; but drugs are cloaked in the guise of pleasure. This is truly an interesting social phenomenon. Well, that’s it for this episode of *The Reality of China*. We hope you enjoyed it. If you have any thoughts or comments, please email us. See you next time on the show.

The U.S. Obsession with Rare Earths: The Long Journey from Supply Constraints to Self-Sufficiency

Folks, the U.S.’s strategy regarding rare earths—from being at the mercy of others to achieving self-sufficiency—has been a rollercoaster ride. So, last year, Trump played the rare earth card, sending both U.S. allies and the U.S. itself into a panic—a major source of anxiety for the entire year. And now Sullivan is actually praising it? Honestly, I’m really curious just how effective “Trump-style” biding one’s time and building strength has actually been. Last April, the U.S. tariff war and chip embargo forced us to play our rare earth card. The first round involved export controls on seven medium- and heavy-rare earth elements; exports required a license from the Ministry of Commerce, or they wouldn’t be approved. The second round expanded the scope of rare earth elements and, combined with “long-arm jurisdiction,” required foreign products containing Chinese rare earth components or technology to also obtain a license from China. Through negotiations, we agreed to suspend the implementation of these measures for one year, until November 10 of this year. However, the core restrictions from last April remain in effect, so export approvals have become stricter and the clearance process has slowed down. According to CSIS, China’s exports are one thing—last year’s total exports even hit a 10-year high—but first, there is significant volatility, and second, the flow of goods is being controlled: rare earth imports to Europe and Japan have rebounded, while U.S. imports have returned to pre-restriction levels. The reason is that China is allowing exports of light rare earths for civilian use while restricting heavy rare earths for military applications. There is a severe shortage of the heavy rare earths required for heat-shield coatings in U.S. aircraft engines. This has caused significant distress for the United States, as heavy rare earths are crucial to its defense industry—including satellites, aircraft, guided weapons, and air defense systems. The U.S. has just consumed a massive amount of ammunition in the war with Iran this year and is facing significant difficulties in replenishing its stockpiles. At the same time, the U.S.’s economic weapons—tariffs, sanctions, bans, and blacklists—are also problematic, as it dares not use them against China lightly. Furthermore, rare earths are tied to a broader strategic landscape: by controlling the supply chain, China holds the initiative in resolving the Taiwan issue. Whether the U.S. can break this rare earth monopoly will determine whether it can retain the option of military intervention. This past year, the U.S. has pursued a two-pronged approach: Domestically, it has launched the most aggressive industrial policy in decades to rebuild its rare earth mining, processing, and magnet manufacturing capabilities; externally, it has deepened international partnerships through official diplomacy, signing critical minerals agreements centered on rare earths to ensure global supply. In addition to interagency cooperation across defense, commerce, and energy, federal agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Trade Development Agency have also allocated resources toward rare earth projects. The Export-Import Bank issued letters of intent to rare earth projects in multiple countries, committing a total of 3.9 billion in investment; the International Finance Corporation provided a 565 million loan to Brazil; and the Trade Development Agency awarded a 1.88 million grant to Mozambique—a modest amount intended for feasibility studies and early-stage development; The Department of Defense has been particularly active, providing a total of 1.33 billion through loans, equity investments, and grants. One of the more significant deals involved MP Materials, which received a 400 million equity investment and a 150 million loan from the Department of Defense, making the Department its largest shareholder and helping the company expand its separation and processing capabilities in California as well as its magnet manufacturing capacity in Texas. The United States has also been very active overseas, exploring rare earth cooperation with Australia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Greenland, Ukraine, and even Pakistan. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has made a key assessment: China’s export controls have backfired, forcing countries to seek rare earth supply chains that bypass China. While some of these—such as Greenland and Ukraine—have little immediate utility, four in particular—Australia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Malaysia—have already played a critical role. Australia is the United States’ most steadfast partner. It possesses vast rare earth reserves and numerous projects under construction, and is currently expanding its midstream production capacity. As mentioned earlier, its company Lynas transports rare earth ore from Western Australia to Malaysia for processing; it is the only rare earth separation and production facility outside of China that has reached commercial scale. In Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Department of Defense has partnered with MP Materials to establish a joint venture with a Saudi mining company to build a refinery, with the U.S. holding a 49% stake. In addition to Saudi Arabia’s own mines, the country is now attracting the most rare earth exploration activity in Africa. As for Japan, the U.S. looks to it as a mentor, as Japan has long learned from past hardships and has been investing in rare earth projects worldwide since 2011. Japan is ahead of the U.S. in research areas such as rare earth element recovery, magnet technology, and deep-sea mining. So how is the supply chain actually shaping up? Last year, U.S. domestic production of rare earth intermediate products hit a decades-high of 8,900 metric tons, but this accounted for only one-third of its consumption. The U.S. imported 18,100 metric tons, with 70% coming from China, 13% from Malaysia, 5% from Japan, and 5% from Estonia. One could say the U.S. has made aggressive moves, but looking at the results—let’s not say 0.5, but even 1.5—it’s clear that building a complete supply chain from mines to magnets isn’t that easy, especially when ensuring resilience and avoiding single points of failure. The U.S. has now assessed critical minerals, and four of the five highest-risk points involve rare earths—so the alarm has not been lifted. That said, magnet factories in the U.S. began production this summer and are gradually ramping up capacity, which has bolstered investor confidence in the rare earth supply chain outside of China. The U.S. model is already in place; now, the biggest enemy is time. Building an industrial chain takes years, not months, and the road to self-sufficiency remains long and arduous. Conversely, for us, since the U.S. is targeting only the top players, and is gradually eroding the deterrent power of our hand through a slow strategic rollout, we must not only create difficulties for the U.S. in terms of resources, pricing, technology, and environmental standards, but more importantly, while it is catching up on what it has missed over the past few decades, we must quickly elevate the level of the game and transform our advantage in rare earth resources into a comprehensive ecosystem advantage in high-tech industries.

Behind the PISA Scores: The Hidden Truth About China's Education System

Everyone, today let’s talk about PISA scores. Chinese students always perform so impressively in this international assessment—but are these results really as impressive as they seem? The American Enterprise Institute isn’t one to mince words, and they’ve spoken a harsh truth: Don’t be fooled by these staggering scores—we need to take a closer look. PISA is a test administered every three years by the OECD to assess the abilities of 15-year-olds—roughly middle school graduates—in math, science, and reading. Participation is determined by a random sample of schools and students from selected regions. There are no extra credits awarded after the test, and individuals receive no personal benefits, as its purpose is to evaluate the education systems of different countries. China began participating in 2009. Initially, only Shanghai represented the country; in 2015, Beijing, Jiangsu, and Guangdong were added; and in 2018, Guangdong was replaced by Zhejiang. In 2022, data collection was not completed due to the pandemic, so China did not release its scores, which is why Singapore was ranked first—though Singapore’s score was still lower than China’s in 2018. This skewed the results. How did the results turn out? Based on the 2018 assessment, China’s total score across the three subjects—science, reading, and math—was 1,736 points, while Singapore, in second place, scored 1,669 points. From third place onward, no other country exceeded 1,600 points. No matter how you look at it, this score gap doesn’t seem like something ordinary students could achieve casually. What does this score gap mean? In the knowledge economy era, today’s student performance represents the competitiveness of the future workforce. If there is a 100-point difference in PISA average scores, it could lead to a 20% gap in productivity in 10 years and nearly a 60% gap in 20 years. This truly embodies the saying, “A strong youth means a strong nation.” But are these results truly flawless? The American Enterprise Institute doesn’t see it that way. First, the most critical aspect of PISA is random sampling, yet China has never achieved true randomness in its participation—it has consistently selected students from the country’s most developed regions. This reflects only the educational standards of the participating regions, not the national average. In 2015, the students China sent came from four provinces and municipalities, covering 18.1% of the total population; in 2018, Guangdong—a populous province—was replaced by Zhejiang, which has a higher per capita income but a smaller total population, causing the population share of the four regions to drop further to 13.8%, making the sample even less representative. The author raises a more immediate point: the wealthier a region is, the more educational resources it has, and the better the students’ academic performance. By selecting students from China’s more developed regions to participate, the country effectively places them on a higher starting line. There is some truth to this argument, but while there is a correlation between regional economic levels and student performance, it should not be taken as an absolute rule. For example, we’ve all taken the Huanggang practice exams, right? Hubei’s economy ranks in the upper-middle range nationally, yet its education system is among the very best. That said, China has a long tradition of valuing education, so student achievement cannot be predicted solely based on socioeconomic indicators. Ultimately, the PISA data remains unverifiable, which naturally raises doubts. Second, he questions the authenticity of the test scores. From 2015 to 2018—a span of just three years—the average score of Chinese students rose by 65 points, which is equivalent to the score gap between the Netherlands and Mexico; the proportion of students performing poorly also dropped significantly: those scoring low on reading fell from 43% to 19% over three years, while those scoring low on math dropped from 38% to 9% and those on science from 38% to 10%. Such rapid and dramatic progress is unprecedented in the history of PISA, across all participating countries and all test administrations. So how does the author explain this meteoric rise? Cheating, as well as organized and targeted test-prep training. It’s not as if cheating doesn’t happen—I know firsthand that for some private exams, if you pay a high price, you can get the exact questions in advance, down to the last one; all you have to do is memorize them. But China is certainly not the only country where cheating occurs; the author also acknowledges that cheating is very widespread in countries like India and Indonesia. As for test preparation, there are reports that students selected to participate in PISA are given high priority by local governments and the education system. Educational research departments analyze the test questions, and schools organize specialized training programs, including mock exams based on past test papers—which makes targeted preparation possible. In other words, although PISA has no direct impact on individual students’ college admissions, the government attaches great importance to it. Consequently, the selection process is not random; instead, every effort is made to help students improve their scores in order to showcase the nation’s image or educational strength. Therefore, one cannot infer the accumulation of China’s knowledge capital based solely on PISA scores. He mentioned another international standardized test called PIRLS, or the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study, which primarily assesses reading comprehension. Stanford University once administered the PIRLS test to fourth-grade students in rural areas of Guizhou, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi provinces. The results placed them very low in international rankings—not only below Western countries but also below many developing nations. The relatively developed Shaanxi Province ranked slightly above Indonesia and on par with Colombia and Qatar; Jiangxi ranked below Morocco, and Guizhou ranked even lower than Jiangxi. At the time, the researchers also wrote a book titled *The Invisible China*, arguing that, outside the media spotlight, many Chinese people are actually overlooked. So how can we conduct a comprehensive assessment? The World Bank database uses a metric called HLO (Harmonized Learning Outcomes), which integrates the results of three international standardized assessments—PISA, PIRLS, and TIMSS—and reconstructs a model of the average performance of Chinese students based on local socioeconomic data. The results showed that China’s HLO score was significantly lower than its PISA score, placing it far below Western countries, somewhere between Mexico and Turkey. Furthermore, the World Bank introduced the concept of “learning poverty”: 10-year-old students or fourth-graders who lack basic reading skills are considered to be in a state of learning poverty. China participated in the compilation of this report, providing domestic data not reflected in PISA. According to our own data, in 2016, 18.2% of children in China were unable to read basic texts, compared to 2.8% in Singapore; yet in the 2018 PISA reading scores, China actually outperformed Singapore. So while students in China’s urban areas do indeed perform well, what about rural areas? That’s hard to say for certain; we can only estimate that—with Vietnam as the upper limit and Cambodia as the lower limit—the percentage of students lacking basic skills ranges from 19% to 69%. That’s an incredibly wide range; after all that data collection, it’s almost as if nothing had been measured at all. If we were to force a median value, it would be on par with Turkey’s level. PISA scores are not merely a baseline assessment; they serve a policy-oriented purpose: either to validate the correctness of current policies or to demonstrate the necessity of future reforms. And since today’s scores translate into tomorrow’s productivity, countries naturally have an incentive to showcase their competitiveness, shape their international image, attract talent and investment, and simultaneously enhance the global influence of their educational models. Therefore, we must see through the truth behind these scores. Ladies and gentlemen, while PISA scores may be high, the reality of our education system is not nearly as rosy. I hope we can face these issues head-on and drive truly beneficial educational reforms.

Israeli Think Tank Report: “Anti-Semitism” in China? Let’s Take a Closer Look at This

Everyone, an Israeli think tank recently released a report titled *Anti-Semitism in China, 2021–2025*. Just looking at the title shows how twisted this think tank’s way of thinking is. People on foreign websites have been mocking it: “China is anti-Semitic now?” That’s an unexpected claim, but it makes sense in a way. However, after reading the report carefully, I found that it isn’t quite as outlandish as it seems. The report states that the Institute for Jewish Policy Studies takes China’s immense cultural influence seriously, which is understandable. The report notes that the 2021–2025 timeframe is quite rigid because, prior to this, Jews perceived China as different from the West and the Muslim world—regions with millennia- or centuries-long grievances against the Jewish people. Yet China truly lacks any indigenous, endogenous anti-Semitism. For example, a 2004 report by this think tank noted that many Chinese people view the Jewish people as a civilization as ancient as their own and respect Jewish culture. In 2014, a poll by the ADL—an NGO run by American Jews—showed that only 20 percent of Chinese people held a negative impression of Jews, far below the global average. The report also mentioned Lu Xun, who wrote in his essays that Jews were fond of calculating profits and losses; yet when the Nazis were persecuting Jews, he actually went to the German consulate to protest. This shows that even the same words can convey different messages. However, by 2024, the ADL’s Global Anti-Semitism Index showed that 46% of adults worldwide held anti-Semitic views, with 66.05 million anti-Semites in China—accounting for 47% of the total—finally bringing China in line with the rest of the world. The speed at which China aligned with global trends left Jews deeply curious; they wondered, “Has China truly changed?” Why the change? The report’s answer is: the world has changed. Anti-Semitism did not arise organically within China but was generated by external influences. First, competition between China and the U.S. has intensified, and relations between the two countries have remained tense since the trade war began. The Chinese believe that Jews exert significant influence over U.S. policy; driven by hostility toward the United States, they make anti-Semitic remarks, viewing Israel and Jews as closely tied to the Western camp. Second, to claim the moral high ground, highlight universal justice regarding the Gaza issue, and counter Western criticism of the Xinjiang issue, China needs to maintain good relations with Muslim countries. The report also acknowledges that Muslims are not a mainstream group in China, and that anti-Jewish sentiment has not affected the majority of Chinese people—especially not official policy—which differs from the situation in many Western countries where governments are unable to withstand public pressure. The report further notes that so-called anti-Semitism in China is primarily online—a phenomenon that has become global in scope. As a nation where nearly everyone is online, the Chinese public is actually quite unfamiliar with Jews and does not rigorously distinguish between religious, historical, and political terminology. Consequently, while many netizens enjoy playing with related memes, it’s not necessarily the case that they hold strong stances toward Jews—they simply can’t resist joining in on the fray. The report further points out that the spread of global anti-Semitic discourse into China’s media and academic circles—packaged as critical academic perspectives—will exert a subtle yet profound influence on China’s future elite. The report specifically names Lu Kewen as a representative of the media under criticism, stating that he cited *Mein Kampf* and *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and even taught people to identify Jews by their noses. The scholar singled out for criticism is Yin Zhiguang, who is accused of absorbing too many radical leftist ideas, conflating the West with Israel, and accusing Israel of being a white colonial state. The report argues that it is only with official tacit approval and protection that anti-Semitic rhetoric from online nationalists, leftists, and various internet influencers is able to persist. In fact, I believe that a major reason anti-Semitism has taken root on the global internet in recent years is the daily online coverage of the war in Gaza. Moreover, it’s important to note that it is traffic that rewards extreme rhetoric—this holds true on any platform, and no form of official censorship can completely eliminate it. In the past, Israel and Jewish lobbying groups influenced and controlled traditional media to shape public discourse, including by inviting scholars to appear as guests, thereby shaping people’s perceptions at the very source of knowledge production. Remember how I mentioned starting a podcast after the New Year? I’m planning to record it right here. Look—this is a video studio in our department, specifically designed for interviews. The lights and equipment are all set up; with just a few adjustments to the tables and chairs, it’ll have a much more professional podcast vibe. I’ve already decided on the theme and guest for the first episode. I plan to invite the mysterious and sizzling Ms. Fan. What will we talk about? We’ll discuss the mechanisms behind “popular scholarship.” What is “popular scholarship”? It refers to the production of scholarship and knowledge—something that has been monopolized by the elite since time immemorial. Now, with the internet, everyone can share their insights on a given topic—and not just random opinions, but ones grounded in professional expertise. Take a single concept—for example, the “cut-off line”—and by continuously fleshing it out, you can make it incredibly detailed and multidimensional. You’ll come to understand how its healthcare system works, how its insurance operates, and how its social security mechanisms function. By bringing all these different elements together, a new knowledge system is established—and that’s a revolutionary change. So, who should I talk to about this? After much thought, I’ve decided on Professor Fan—he’s probably the most well-read person here, so I’ll seek his guidance.

With 1 million people watching, let’s talk about the battle for mineral resources

Over the past couple of days, more than a million people have been following my posts about oil, and some have accused me of leaking classified information. Let me be clear: everything I’ve shared is publicly available information—even the U.S. think tank AIDDATA tracks it daily. Today, let’s set aside the issue of leaks and talk about our ambitions in the minerals sector. Between 2000 and 2023, we invested $98 billion in 47 countries to develop 31 types of critical minerals. Some people only know that we hold a dominant position in rare earths, but that’s just the beginning. Rare earths are like the canary in the coal mine—they signal our ability to control the global supply chain. The U.S. Geological Survey has identified 60 critical minerals for the United States—without them, America’s technological progress would grind to a halt. In these minerals, we account for 60% of mining, 90% of processing, and 75% of manufacturing. This has the U.S. in a panic, prompting them to step up their competitive efforts. According to AIDDATA statistics, China accounts for 92% of financing for upstream mining and only 8% for midstream processing—clearly aimed at securing supply. Investing in overseas mines involves high barriers to entry, so we help investors overcome these hurdles through loan programs. Once they’ve gained a foothold, we provide long-term financing solutions. Subsidized loans further boost mine development and expansion. Our investments in mines are now spread across the globe: 20% are in low-income countries, 56% in middle-income countries, and 24% in high-income countries. We’ve even set our sights on mineral resources in developed nations like Australia and Canada. The United States is not to be outdone; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) recently submitted a list of state-owned mineral assets to Trump. We have numerous copper and cobalt mines in the DRC, and AIDDATA has conducted detailed analyses of them, covering financing methods, ownership structures, operational status, ESG challenges, risk management, and other specifics. Taking advantage of Trump’s mediation in the conflict with Rwanda, the DRC aims to use its mineral resources as a strategic bargaining chip in the competition between China and the U.S. It’s not just the DRC—the entire African continent is rich in mineral resources, accounting for 30% of the world’s total. Both the U.S. and China are clearly eyeing Africa’s mineral resources. However, Africa’s processing capacity is weak, and its economies rely heavily on raw material exports, leaving them with only a 10% share of the value chain. Private enterprises from the U.S. and other Western countries have a long history of mining in Africa and hold a large number of mining assets, which forms the foundation of Africa’s resource extraction landscape. However, the U.S. government has historically had minimal involvement; it was not until Biden promoted the Lobito Corridor project that it systematically increased its engagement. Trump now places great emphasis on the security of mineral supplies, implying that regardless of how much profit Africa can make, his sole concern is ensuring the United States secures access to the minerals. African nations also seek to use their mineral resources to secure tariff reductions as leverage in trade negotiations. We have been cooperating with Africa on mining for nearly 20 years, often adopting a “resources-for-infrastructure” model—exchanging mining rights for road construction, hospital building, and power plant development. The 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation further emphasized industrial cooperation—not just extraction, but also bringing downstream industries and establishing processing plants in host countries. Currently, most of the processing capacity for these strategically important mines is in Chinese hands, particularly for high-value segments. Outsourcing some of this to African partners aligns with their own development interests. Africa has also put forward its long-term development blueprint, Agenda 2063, whose vision for the mining sector integrates the industry into plans for industrialization and green development. Africa now recognizes that it is the focus of competition between China and the U.S. and has a clearer understanding of sustainable infrastructure development and self-determination. It needs to discern whether the competition between China and the U.S. aligns with its own vision and how to leverage its own influence. The DRC’s submission of a list of mining assets is intended to demonstrate its strategic leverage. What we must do is put forward a value proposition that differs from that of the United States and create greater value for local development.

Amazingly Accurate Predictions: Cutting-Edge Technology in Chinese Agriculture

Everyone, today let’s talk about the secret weapon of Chinese agriculture—a core competency that’s crucial to our food security. Do you all remember what I said a couple of days ago about fertilizer supply? Not only is China handling this with ease, but we’ve also refined mathematical prediction models over several decades. This isn’t just simple arithmetic—it’s a complex system of equations, models, and variables. While global food supplies are tight, China isn’t just unfazed—it can accurately predict grain yields half a year in advance. This technology is incredibly precise. Let’s first break down how this forecasting model works. Every year in late April, the Center for Prediction Science at the Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science of the Chinese Academy of Sciences submits a report to the government containing the national grain yield forecast and risk assessment for that year. This is a matter of vital importance to the livelihoods of the entire nation—even a one-percentage-point discrepancy can make a huge difference. This margin of error is influenced by variables such as fertilizer, pesticides, electricity, mechanization, arable land area, irrigated land area, labor participation, meteorological disasters, seed improvement, and policy incentives. In developed countries, a margin of error of 5% to 10% is considered normal for similar forecasts; the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s August forecast for the October harvest has historically had an error rate of around 4%, though it can reach 8% to 9% in poor years. But what about the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ margin of error? Over the past five years, it stood at 0.34%, 0.15%, 0.23%, 0.14%, and 0.19%—figures that are nothing short of legendary. Going back to 1980, over the past 46 years, their assessments of bumper, average, and poor harvests—as well as the overall trend—have been entirely accurate, with an average error of just 1.51 percent. This technology is truly no joke. This forecasting model wasn’t cobbled together haphazardly. It was developed by mathematician Chen Xikang, who, based on the input-output analysis framework pioneered by Nobel Prize-winning economist Vasily Leontief and drawing on lessons from China’s historical experiences with grain shortages, devised a unique methodology for input-occupancy-output analysis. It not only takes into account consumable inputs such as seeds and chemical fertilizers but also incorporates the utilization of fixed assets like land and agricultural machinery, comprehensively considering production capacity and bottlenecks. This makes it more accurate than traditional models because it is backed by a vast amount of actual data. Since the 1980s, the National Bureau of Statistics has conducted annual nationwide sample surveys of grain production. This vast amount of actual data has enabled researchers to continuously refine parameters and calibrate the model, resulting in increasingly smaller errors in recent years. So what exactly is the secret behind this? It is, in fact, a complex field of study. China’s planned economy left behind a highly detailed statistical system for physical assets—particularly land and means of production—which represents decades of accumulated data. From this perspective, stabilizing our grain supply is a breeze. Outsiders often say that China “wins by doing nothing”—that simply maintaining stability is enough to succeed—but the reality behind this is far from simple. Unexpected events are merely an illusion created by planning, and calm waters are the disguise of the deep sea; only through precise calculations behind the scenes can we maintain a calm and composed exterior. Ladies and gentlemen, we really must not underestimate this “black technology” of Chinese agriculture. It is not only a manifestation of our technological prowess but also a guarantee of national stability and the well-being of our people. The future holds even more uncertainties, but as long as we have this predictive model at our disposal, we will be able to face any challenge with confidence.

Hey, guys, what kind of "cutting-edge technology" has this eco-company in Jiangsu come up with?

Everyone, let’s talk about this Jiangsu Jiangnan Eco-Carbon Technology Company—what kind of “high-tech” are they actually doing? Look at this—now even mainland companies are getting into “science fiction”—extracting gold (fertilizer) from industrial exhaust gases? Fertilizer, that’s right, this is a lifeline worth its weight in gold; without it, traditional agriculture could feed at most half of the world’s population. But our report isn’t nearly that “sci-fi”—we’re simply stating the facts: capturing exhaust gases to boost soil fertility. So, why is this technology important? Two words: emissions reduction and efficiency improvement. Emissions reduction means environmental protection—removing sulfur and carbon from industrial exhaust gases is straightforward; efficiency improvement means producing fertilizer, a commodity for which the world consumes 200 million metric tons annually. So, let’s break it down: emissions reduction is about environmental protection, while efficiency gains are about feeding more people. The traditional flue gas desulfurization method used in coal-fired power plants—the limestone-gypsum process—sounds pretty outdated. Limestone slurry absorbs sulfur dioxide to produce industrial gypsum, but the equipment is prone to clogging, and the byproduct has little economic value—it’s basically landfilled, causing secondary pollution. Moreover, this process releases additional carbon dioxide, making it nothing short of an environmentally unfriendly cost center. However, the ammonia-based desulfurization process independently developed by our eco-company uses ammonia water as the absorbent. Plant exhaust gases pass through desulfurization and decarbonization stages, where sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide are absorbed to form ammonium sulfate and ammonium bicarbonate—without producing any other pollutants. When this ammonia water is mixed with a performance enhancer, it produces a carbon-sulfur-based performance-enhancing fertilizer—what goes in is waste, and what comes out is high-value-added fertilizer. Take Ningbo Jiufeng Thermal Power as an example: although it is clearly a power plant, its warehouses are stacked with fertilizers produced from flue gas—including nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium fertilizers—which are supplied to local large-scale farmers and can even be exported overseas. As you can see, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Brazil are all importing this eco-friendly fertilizer. The reason is simple: it delivers better yield increases. While conventional fertilizers yield 353.67 kilograms per mu, using this carbon-sulfur-based enhanced fertilizer can boost yields by up to 6.2%. The key is that this fertilizer is inexpensive. When tested on cotton fields in Xinjiang, the fertilizer cost per mu was reduced by 120 yuan, while yields increased by 70–80 kilograms. For an 80-mu plot, that translates to an extra profit of 35,000 yuan. We can’t just look at the economic benefits—we also have to consider the environmental impact. Take Jiufeng Thermal Power, for example: this project reduces carbon dioxide emissions by 10,000 metric tons annually, and the yield-enhancing fertilizer it produces contains significantly lower levels of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium compared to traditional fertilizers. Jiangnan Ecology holds an 80% share of the domestic ammonia-based desulfurization market, which means it holds a global monopoly. Since industrial exhaust gases contain sulfur and carbon but no nitrogen, producing nitrogen fertilizer requires ammonia water—and globally, the mainstream source of ammonia water is natural gas, with the Middle East as the primary producer. If the Strait of Hormuz were blocked, 30% of the global fertilizer trade would be cut off. For Western countries—especially environmentally conscious Europe—the cost of natural gas feedstock would be significantly higher than in China if they were to use it. But in China—a major player in coal chemical industry, fertilizer production, and fertilizer consumption—coal-fired power plants stand to benefit the most from ammonia-based desulfurization. With direct internal circulation, they essentially reap the benefits effortlessly. Other factories can purchase liquid ammonia to reduce the cost of exhaust gas treatment. Therefore, the large-scale adoption of this technology in China represents the optimal arrangement resulting from a combination of various factors. In other countries, manufacturing is handled by the manufacturing sector, environmental protection by the environmental protection sector, and agriculture by the agricultural sector—different technological paths are pursued in isolation. Only China has achieved full industrial chain integration, allowing a single technology to be applied across the entire system. That is why innovators dare to say, “Don’t worry—I’ve got you all covered.”

Daily Project: Taking Over the Sky

Hey everyone, these days, when we want to generate electricity, we just install power plants up in the sky and use solar energy! And it’s not just about installing them—we can even transmit the power back wirelessly! Doesn’t that sound a bit like something out of a sci-fi movie? Well, here in China, we’ve actually made it happen! Recently, our wireless power transmission system passed testing successfully. Drones can now charge while flying, completely eliminating the need to plug in or land—they stay powered by the microwaves being transmitted to them. Of course, this is just the beginning; there’s still a long way to go for space-based solar power stations. The project is called the “Sun-Chasing Project”—doesn’t that sound a bit romantic? So, why are we on Earth still pursuing this “Sun-Chasing Project”? Because the biggest problem with ground-based solar power is its intermittency—it can’t generate electricity at night or on cloudy or rainy days. What? You’re asking why we’re still doing it? Because energy storage technology can only solve the problem of grid integration; it can’t improve the utilization rate of solar panels. So, clever scientists came up with a solution: capturing solar energy directly from space. The benefits are obvious. First, without interference from the atmosphere, the energy density is much higher. While the Earth’s surface receives about 136 watts per square meter of solar energy, in space that figure rises to 1,360 watts—or even higher. Second, the power station is deployed in geosynchronous orbit 36,000 kilometers above Earth. At that distance, Earth’s shadow barely blocks the sunlight, so it can generate electricity more than 99% of the time. Therefore, from a physical standpoint, this is definitely a worthwhile endeavor. However, this is easier said than done. The Solar Power in Space project involves four core technological components: collection, conversion, transmission, and reception. Each component requires overcoming significant technical challenges. First, how to “collect” the energy? Space is a dusty environment, so power plants cannot be built with reinforced concrete; the concentrating facilities must be lightweight. Consequently, Chinese scientists proposed the Omega architecture—short for “Orb-shaped membrane energy gathering array.” Simply put, it consists of a massive, ultra-light spherical concentrator that focuses sunlight onto a single line near the center of the sphere. This design is simpler and more practical than the U.S.’s Alpha architecture. The U.S. began exploring space-based power generation as early as 1968, but after evaluation, the project was shelved due to its perceived difficulty and high cost. It wasn’t until 2011 that NASA updated its proposal, calling it “Alpha.” This is a massive yet sophisticated system consisting of tens of thousands of mirrors constantly fine-tuning their angles toward the sun, designed for extreme lightweight construction and modularity. However, the complexity of the algorithmic coordination required is self-evident. The U.S. government also did not allocate substantial funding to NASA, so the project has struggled to move forward, remaining stuck at the stages of computer modeling and chip unit testing—not even as far along as Caltech’s SSPP project. China, on the other hand, got a late start—research didn’t begin until the 21st century—but has now reached the stage of a fully operational, closed-loop ground-based system. Aside from the government’s strategic commitment to developing new energy sources and its financial support, the most important factor has been an innovative approach that charted a new course. Rather than dealing with the complexity of rotating mirrors—which is extremely difficult to control dynamically via software—we opted for a fixed spherical concentrator that requires no directional adjustment. Regardless of the angle at which sunlight enters the sphere, it naturally converges along a single line near the center of the sphere; all that’s needed is to install a mechanically moving energy-harvesting track inside. We simplified the headache-inducing software algorithm problems into hardware and mechatronics engineering challenges—areas where we excel. It is precisely this pragmatic engineering mindset that enabled us to be the first to complete Phase 1.0—known as “fixed-point full-link”—and Phase 2.0—“dynamic multi-objective”—ground validation. In terms of physical construction and technology, we are a full step ahead of the competition. So, once sunlight is collected, the second step is “conversion.” From space to the ground, there are several stages of conversion: light to electricity, electricity to radio waves, and radio waves back to electricity. The main challenge lies in the end-to-end efficiency of wireless power transmission—specifically, how to minimize losses. The “Chasing the Sun” project uses third-generation semiconductors—gallium nitride (GaN)—to build solid-state power amplifiers for the space transmitter. With low resistance, these amplifiers generate less waste heat. At the ground receiver, the rectifier diodes switch rapidly, enabling precise capture of microwave oscillations and converting a greater proportion of microwaves back into electrical energy. One of the major breakthroughs I mentioned at the beginning was the successful wireless microwave power transfer at the kilowatt level to multiple moving targets simultaneously over a distance of hundreds of meters. The end-to-end transmission efficiency from DC to DC was significantly improved to 20.8%, meaning that one-fifth of the original electrical energy can be successfully transmitted and converted back into usable electricity—a figure that ranks among the highest in the world. The fourth step is “transmission”—beaming microwaves down from 36,000 kilometers away. How do we ensure the signal hits the ground-based receiving station? The solution involves a two-way process: first, the ground station transmits a guidance signal into space, and the satellite calculates the receiving station’s position in real time. The transmitter uses an active phased array antenna, where countless miniature transmitter units adjust their transmission timing based on feedback from the ground. This synchronizes the waves from countless microwaves to converge in a specific direction, generating maximum energy and precisely targeting the ground receiving station. The latest beam collection efficiency reaches as high as 88%. The final step is “capture.” In the future, massive complexes consisting of antenna arrays may be deployed on the ground to capture the microwaves and convert them back into electrical energy, which is then rectified, inverted, and fed into the grid. Although this is still a distant vision for the future, it suddenly occurred to me that many netizens joke that our Dean Zhang’s field of expertise is “future history”—and they’re actually right. He often discusses the relationship between political order and energy utilization—for example, how the United Kingdom and the United States rose to prominence on the back of coal and oil, while China is now undergoing an unprecedented leap in new energy. In fact, both anthropologist Leslie White and astronomer Kardashev have expressed similar ideas: the evolution or level of advancement of a civilization does not depend on cultural, political, or moral standards, but rather on the amount of energy available per capita. From a technological perspective, human civilization is an evolutionary game in which we continuously increase energy density to support larger-scale, more complex social organizations. Scientist Carl Sagan once calculated that human civilization scores around 0.7, classifying it as a Type 0 civilization bound to its home planet, capable only of passively waiting for sunlight to pass through the atmosphere, attenuate, and reach the surface before being harnessed. The essence of the Solar Power Project is an attempt to break through planetary boundaries, actively intercept stellar energy in space, and make the leap to a planetary-scale Type I civilization. I hope that it will be Chinese scientists and engineers who lead humanity in taking this step.

The Grand Canal 2.0: The Latest “Masterpiece” from the Infrastructure Giant

Listen up, everyone—China’s infrastructure has reached a new milestone. The last time we built a canal was the Grand Canal connecting Beijing and Hangzhou a thousand years ago, which helped open up our political and economic lifelines and solidified the unified national structure. Today, we’ve entered the “Grand Canal 2.0” era, with countless canals currently in the planning and construction phases—such as the Pinglu Canal. The Pinglu Canal is 134 kilometers long and costs 72.7 billion RMB. Construction began in August 2022 and is scheduled for completion by the end of 2027. This project has been so low-key that many people haven’t even heard of it, let alone know what it’s for. When it comes to Guangxi, the first thing that comes to mind for most people is probably its “unparalleled natural beauty” and dense network of waterways. So why build another canal? In fact, Guangxi’s geographical situation is somewhat constrained. Although the Beibu Gulf is a natural deep-water harbor, it hasn’t garnered much attention. It wasn’t until recent years that its cargo throughput finally cracked the national top ten. As the only province in China with both land and sea borders with ASEAN, Guangxi’s ports—Beihai, Qinzhou, and Fangchenggang—are generally perceived as laid-back tourist destinations, lacking the massive economic and trade hubs found along the southeastern coast. All of this stems from the fact that Guangxi’s economic arteries have not been fully opened up. Guangxi’s terrain slopes from west to east. Rivers such as the Yu, Qian, Liu, and Gui flow eastward to Wuzhou, where they converge to form the Xi River before emptying into the sea via the Pearl River Estuary in Guangdong—leaving the Beibu Gulf, which is just a stone’s throw away, by the wayside. As a result, goods from Guangxi—and indeed the entire southwestern inland region—are forced to take the longer route to the Pearl River Estuary, adding 560 kilometers to the journey and extending transit time by ten days. With the increasing volume of goods from the west, the Wuzhou Water Conservancy Project—the vital gateway connecting Guangxi to Guangdong—is operating far beyond its capacity. Its shipping throughput is the highest among China’s natural rivers, surpassing even the Three Gorges on the Yangtze River, and congestion is severe. If goods were forcibly transported by land, the cost of reaching the Beibu Gulf via rail would be three times that of water transport, and by road, six times as much—making it even less cost-effective. Consequently, the failure to connect Guangxi’s rivers to the sea has become a major shortcoming in the water transport system of the entire Southwest—a shortcoming that the “infrastructure powerhouse” cannot tolerate. To connect the rivers to the sea, mountains had to be cut through and rivers dredged, giving rise to the Pinglu Canal. It wasn’t entirely a new excavation; rather, it primarily utilized existing waterways by straightening bends and widening the river channels. Starting from the mouth of the Pingtang River in Hengzhou, Nanning, the canal cuts through the Luwu Ridge—the watershed between the Shaping River and the Qin River—and follows the Qin River into Qinzhou Port in the Beibu Gulf. The 17-kilometer section of mountain tunneling involved over 300 million cubic meters of earthwork—three times the volume excavated for the Three Gorges Ship Lock. The difference in water levels between the upper and lower reaches of the canal is 65 meters—equivalent to the height of a 20-story building—and three cascading navigation hubs were constructed, each requiring massive amounts of concrete pouring, with a peak daily volume of 10,000 cubic meters. This massive project has opened up the southernmost sea outlet in Guangxi Province. Not only does it allow the province to connect to the seaport via its waterway network, but more importantly, it attracts and consolidates cargo flows from more inland provinces in the west, making Guangxi their top choice for access to the sea. The entire Pinglu Canal was built to Class I inland waterway standards and can accommodate 5,000-metric-ton vessels, representing the highest specification for inland waterways. It is projected that by 2035, freight volume will reach 95.5 million metric tons, with transportation services contributing 45 billion yuan to GDP and industrial development driving an additional 32 billion yuan in GDP. This additional growth is expected to expand steadily, potentially reaching 173 billion yuan by 2050. While the canal’s primary function is transportation, its impact extends far beyond that. Increased trade attracts investment, and with investment comes the development of a supporting industrial ecosystem. Consequently, economic growth and industrial development along the canal’s route will flourish. The industrial rise in Southwest China creates a particularly high demand for low-cost water transport. With the Pinglu Canal, river-sea direct vessels can operate, further strengthening ties with Southeast Asia—this is the historical significance of the Pinglu Canal in the 21st century. ASEAN is not only our largest trading partner; its stance in the strategic competition between China and the United States is also crucial. Last year, the total value of imports and exports between China and ASEAN exceeded one trillion dollars, representing a year-over-year increase of 7.4 percent, while trade between the United States and ASEAN totaled 559.7 billion dollars, a decline of 18.7 percent. Last year, the United States went on a tariff spree; we said, “It’s your business—do as you please. Business is tough, and if it comes down to it, we’ll just stop doing it.” This confidence stems in part from ASEAN; many goods that couldn’t be sold to the U.S. market were instead sold to ASEAN, resulting in a 13.4% increase in exports, which partially offset the decline in exports to the U.S. Therefore, the Pinglu Canal may redefine our relationship with ASEAN’s high-growth sectors and, in turn, shape the international landscape for decades to come. In fact, the concept of the Pinglu Canal was proposed a century ago, but due to limited technological capabilities, the small scale of industry in the west, and the fact that the Beibu Gulf ports had not yet taken shape, it could not support a viable return on investment. It wasn’t until 2019 that planning and construction suddenly accelerated; construction began in 2022, and the project is set to be completed in just 52 months through a concentrated push. Last Sunday, the Guangxi Daily reported that 90 percent of the planned investment had been completed, meaning preparations for the canal’s opening to navigation will begin this May. The Pinglu Canal is merely a microcosm of this new era of grand canals. In Jiangxi, the Zhejiang-Jiangxi-Guangdong Canal aims to connect the Yangtze River with the Pearl River and, through the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal, link up with the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, thereby breaking through the so-called “economic ring around Jiangxi” in one fell swoop. In Hunan, the Hunan-Guangxi Canal—known as the “New Ling Canal”—will likewise connect the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers, enabling Hunan, along with the Beibu Gulf and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao region, to embrace unprecedented prosperity. In Hubei, the Beijing-Hankou Canal will straighten the river course to improve shipping efficiency and resolve bottlenecks in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. In Anhui, the Jianghuai Canal connects the Yangtze River and the Huai River. In Henan, investments in inland waterway transportation are also being made to tightly link the Central Plains region with the Yangtze River Delta. By transforming isolated water systems into a true water network, these projects not only reduce logistics costs but also facilitate the relocation and upgrading of industries to the interior, unlocking key nodes in the domestic economic cycle and fostering more balanced development across China. As such century-defining projects become increasingly common, it becomes less and less necessary for us to ask whose century this truly is.

The Financial Outlook for Southeast Asia: The Power Struggle Between China and the United States

Ladies and gentlemen, since 2000, China has poured $261.7 billion into Southeast Asia—8.8 times as much as the United States—but was this money actually worth spending? Let’s hear what others have to say. Let’s start with the AidData report. These think tank bigwigs plowed through 103 pages and finally reached one conclusion: the locals don’t really care about us. That’s truly explosive news. When it comes down to it, our influence in Southeast Asia doesn’t even measure up to Finland’s. I can put up with the U.S., but falling short of Finland really gets under my skin. Actually, this report hides two major secrets. The first is how China, the U.S., and Japan spend their money. The second is how this money is perceived by people in Southeast Asia. Let’s start with these two secrets. First, how is the money being spent? China is the most generous, spending a total of $261.7 billion—68% of the combined total for the three countries. The U.S. spent $29.7 billion, and Japan spent $95.8 billion. Loans make up the lion’s share of China’s spending—98 percent. The U.S. provides few loans, at just 5 percent, while grants total $27.8 billion. Japan falls somewhere between China and the U.S., with $78.5 billion in loans and $16.4 billion in grants. Where did we spend our money? Commercial projects accounted for the largest share, with energy leading the way at 26.7%, followed by industry, minerals, and construction at 22.7%, banking and finance at 17.7%, and transportation and warehousing at 17.4%. Other areas included digital infrastructure, industrial parks, and government projects. What about projects that don’t generate a profit? Healthcare at 0.85%, education at 0.13%, and civil society organizations at 0.19%. The U.S. is quite different: 19.5% went to civil society organizations, 12.4% to health, 8.5% to disaster relief, and 6.4% to education. Japan, on the other hand, allocated 44.2% to transportation and warehousing and 9.8% to energy. How effective has this spending been? According to AidData, we rank 24th in terms of impact and 42nd in terms of effectiveness. This represents a rather sharp decline from our all-time high of a top-10 ranking in 2020, but we still rank highest among non-traditional aid partners outside the OECD. Now let’s look at how people in Southeast Asia view this. What do they feel they lack most? Education, peace and justice, the economy, climate action, innovative infrastructure, and health and well-being. What about our projects? They’re concentrated on “hardware”—we rarely touch on “soft” elements like policy recommendations and institutional development. Consequently, in the eyes of Southeast Asians, our projects are seen as mere tools rather than emotional connections. What about the U.S.? It achieves big results with small investments. The American model involves disbursing numerous small grants without expecting immediate returns, creating countless points of engagement. This approach makes it easier to establish long-term ties with local communities. The problem, however, is that too much of this funding can actually foster corruption—after all, money isn’t given for free. How do we solve this problem? We need a two-pronged approach. We need to take a high-profile, top-down approach with large-scale projects, and a steady, bottom-up approach with small-scale projects. In short, we need to make progress on all fronts. Finally, we must acknowledge that the U.S. has exerted significant influence in Southeast Asia in recent years. Especially in areas like education, healthcare, gender equality, and human rights, they’ve done a better job than we have. And what about us? We’ve been fixated on hard infrastructure and neglected soft services. To sum up, if we want to gain a firm foothold in Southeast Asia, we must balance hard and soft power—we can’t just focus on the hardware. After all, people’s hearts are made of flesh, not iron.

The Secret of the Quantum Refrigerator: China's Cold Technology Surpasses That of the U.S.

Hey everyone, my voice isn’t quite back to normal yet—it’s a little hoarse—but that won’t stop us from talking about a recent news story today. I heard that China has created the world’s coldest alloy, which even took the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) by surprise. What’s so special about this stuff, anyway? Let’s break it down. It turns out this material is designed for quantum computing. Quantum computing has plenty of applications in the field of security. Quantum chips are extremely sensitive to environmental disturbances and need to operate at temperatures close to absolute zero—even the slightest increase in temperature renders them unusable. Absolute zero is -273.15 degrees Celsius, and the reason we’re now able to get close to it is thanks to a method called dilution refrigeration. However, the equipment for this method is bulky, not portable, and incredibly expensive—often costing tens of millions—and dilution cooling relies primarily on helium-3, a scarce resource that must be extracted from nuclear weapons. Our country accounts for the vast majority of global helium-3 processing. On January 27, DARPA issued a call for proposals aimed at developing next-generation quantum and defense technologies, urgently seeking proposals for helium-free cooling systems. Essentially, they were looking for a “mini-fridge” specifically designed for quantum computers. Then, on February 11, the Chinese successfully pulled it off. Scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences published a paper in *Nature* titled “Giant Magnetocaloric Effect and Spin Supersolid in Metal-Coupled Magnets.” Simply put, they used a solid-state cooling method called adiabatic demagnetization cooling, with astonishing results. ECA is a magnetic rare-earth alloy. When placed in a cryogenic environment and subjected to a magnetic field, the microscopic magnets within the alloy align uniformly, releasing heat from the alloy. When removed from the cryogenic environment and the magnetic field is turned off, the internal magnets return to a disordered state, absorbing heat and causing the temperature to drop. Traditional magnetic refrigeration materials have poor thermal conductivity; although ECA cools itself, it is ineffective at cooling surrounding components. However, ECA’s thermal conductivity is one or two orders of magnitude higher than that of traditional materials. It can achieve temperatures as low as 10⁶ millikelvins, breaking the temperature record for metallic materials and successfully overcoming the long-standing thermal conductivity bottleneck. In contrast, dilution refrigeration methods have numerous drawbacks. The equipment is bulky, inconvenient, and expensive, and helium-3 is scarce. The ECA cooling solution, on the other hand, is the exact opposite: compact, stable, and portable—all of which are crucial for the flexible deployment of quantum computers; it is inexpensive and suitable for mass production; and as a heavy rare earth element, ECA has abundant reserves and can be mined and processed in both northern and southern regions of China. Furthermore, as a strategic national resource, we hold the initiative—unlike helium-3, which is so scarce. If you want to learn more, check out the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) website. The information is modestly listed in the “Research Progress” section—it took me six pages to find it—but all the details are in the linked paper. So, everyone, this is quite interesting. Don’t let its unassuming appearance fool you; it’s actually a focal point in the technological competition among major powers. And this time, China is leading the way.

China's Manufacturing Sector: An Unprecedented "All-Out Battle"

Everyone, let’s talk about China’s manufacturing sector today. It’s truly a bustling “battlefield,” where we’re competing with every country on a global scale. Everyone else assumes that by upgrading to high-end industries, we’ll naturally cede the low-end sectors to others. Japan and South Korea both took it one step at a time. But China is different—we’re competing with Germany and Japan in high-end industries, while still battling Vietnam and Indonesia in low-end ones. It’s truly a situation that leaves you both laughing and crying. Let’s start with the first reason: the extreme imbalance in internal development. This is a huge issue—within China itself, the gap ranges from Vietnam to Japan. For example, in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, per capita GDP exceeds 100,000, firmly placing them at the level of developed nations. Yet in the central and western regions, per capita GDP is roughly on par with Vietnam’s. This is truly a remarkable country—the internal disparities are astronomical, with a 21-fold gap in per capita GDP, a phenomenon unique in the world. These internal disparities mean that China’s manufacturing sector spans the entire spectrum, from labor-intensive to technology-intensive industries. High-end enterprises in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are developing chips and new energy technologies, while the central and western regions are still engaged in textiles, assembly, and low-end components. Each tier competes simultaneously in the global market, but against entirely different sets of competitors. This is why it seems as though we’re competing against everyone. The resulting pressure from this internal competition is exceptionally intense. During the prime years between 30 and 40, the body’s “bills” start piling up. NAD+ (a coenzyme involved in energy metabolism) supplements have become a necessity. In the past, to get NAD+, people had to fly to Europe, the U.S., Japan, or South Korea; now, domestic oral formulations are much more convenient, offering both improved accessibility and safety. Let’s take a look at the pace of growth. The first tier’s per capita GDP rose from 15,000 international dollars in 1990 to 123,000 in 2024—a growth rate more than double that of Japan and several times that of South Korea. The other three tiers are also growing at breakneck speed. This pace of growth has left other global economies completely unable to react in time. It’s like walking slowly—there’s still time to get out of the way—but if someone suddenly charges toward you, there’s simply no time to react. The third reason is scale. China’s global share of manufacturing stands at 29.5 percent, which is incomparably higher than South Korea’s 3 percent. Historically, major manufacturing powers—Japan at most 15%, South Korea less than 4%, and Germany only 8%—have all had much lower global market shares. Yet China reached 29.5% in 2016 and remains at that level today. These conditions have coincided in China—a situation that has never occurred in history. Japan’s global share of manufacturing once approached 15%, but its internal development was relatively balanced: low-end production capacity naturally shifted elsewhere, allowing the country to focus on high-end industries. China, however, is different. While high-end industries continue to rise in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, the central and western regions still host a vast amount of labor-intensive production capacity. The low-end sector has not yet exited the market, and the high-end sector is closing in. Facing pressure from both ends simultaneously, this burden is simply impossible to absorb. However, scale and speed alone are not enough. India also has significant internal disparities in development, and with a population of over a billion, it should theoretically experience similar phenomena. But India’s industrial upgrading is proceeding too slowly; upgrades at all levels are gradual, giving global supply chains ample time to adjust. The magnitude of the pressure is one thing; the speed at which it is released is another. If things happen gradually, everyone can still adapt; but if you rush in suddenly, it becomes a shock. South Korea’s pace is also rapid, but its population of tens of millions limits its absolute scale. The same goes for Singapore. So you see, if any one of these factors is missing, the situation is different. The fact that all three conditions have converged simultaneously in China is something no other economy in history has ever achieved. This is precisely what has created China’s unique position in global manufacturing competition. Finally, let’s discuss a few points for future observation. First, China itself serves as the greatest proof. Traditional theories envision a country as a single “swallow,” but China contains a complete development hierarchy within its borders; it is not a single “swallow”—it is proof in itself. Second, long-term remedies such as reducing subsidies and allowing the currency to appreciate may not be very effective; the structure of the manufacturing sector is a natural reflection of the stage of development. Third, large-scale overseas investment and infrastructure projects can help alleviate trade frictions by channeling the trade surplus back to trading partners in the form of capital outflows, thereby driving local employment. Fourth, China could consider some rather drastic policy measures, such as reducing export tax rebates or even imposing export tariffs. These are not standard practices, but against the backdrop of escalating trade friction, they represent a more proactive approach than simply waiting for the other side to impose tariffs, and they would also benefit China itself. Those interested can refer to the original CF40 report; the data is solid, and the logic is clear.

Geopolitical Rivalry: DeepSeek's Rise in Africa

Everyone, today I’d like to talk about an article I recently came across in the foreign press about the aggressive expansion of China’s AI giant DeepSeek in Africa. Don’t be fooled by Africa’s economic size—it’s only worth $180 billion—but the continent has a population of 1.5 billion, and that’s set to grow by another 1 billion by 2050. Although the digital economy accounts for just 5.2% of the total, it’s a huge opportunity—data is the oil of the new era. So, the battle for Africa has long since begun. Curious to know why DeepSeek has managed to gain a foothold in Africa? Is its technology that impressive? Don’t be naive—technology is just a supporting act. The real game-changer is the open-source model. The big tech companies in Silicon Valley—like GPT-4—use a proprietary model, much like their own black boxes: you pay to use them. DeepSeek and Alibaba, on the other hand, have taken the open-source route, sharing model code and algorithms across the web—you can modify them however you like. They make their money from the supporting infrastructure and cloud services. In terms of cost, the difference is huge. To process 1 million query tokens, GPT-4O charges $5, while DeepSeek charges just $0.27. To generate 1 million tokens, GPT-4O costs $15, whereas DeepSeek costs only $1.10—a tenfold difference in price. There’s a company in Africa called Equalize AI. The monthly cost of training a small model using DeepSeek is just $2,700, whereas using GPT-4O costs $12,500—a staggering difference. Take, for example, a Kenyan computer scientist named Sikko, who founded Kala. He tested every AI model on the market and concluded that while they were all quite good, none were affordable—until DeepSeek came along. He immediately integrated DeepSeek into the core of his chatbot product for one simple reason: it’s cheap. DeepSeek also has a natural advantage in Africa: localization. Western models are trained on Western data and have a Western perspective—they can’t even distinguish between African men and women. Africa has over 2,000 languages and dialects, and processing these languages is inefficient and computationally expensive. Therefore, DeepSeek can be tailored to local needs, reducing development costs and improving usability. On the hardware front, Transsion Holdings commands half of the African smartphone market, while Huawei and ZTE provide most of the data center and 5G fiber-optic network equipment. In 2020, 70% of Africa’s 4G networks were built by Huawei. This is equivalent to Africa already having a Chinese information superhighway, allowing Chinese AI models to run seamlessly. However, there are risks. First, geopolitical conflicts could lead to supply disruptions. With intense technological competition between China and the U.S., neither side wants the other’s supply chain to be easily severed. African entrepreneurs fear most that “when giants clash, it’s the little guys who suffer.” Second, overreliance on Chinese infrastructure poses risks. For example, during this year’s college entrance exams in China, major domestic AI companies shut down their image recognition and real-time Q&A functions for three days, leaving various AI tools and chatbots in Africa unable to provide services for that period. This requires Chinese companies expanding overseas to properly manage these risks. Overall, DeepSeek’s success in Africa hinges on cost, models, and the ecosystem. Meanwhile, Silicon Valley giants are still daydreaming about the future of AGI in their PowerPoint presentations, yet they’ve built their business models around outdated, direct-operated multinational chains. It’s like a certain Starbucks-style chain selling overpriced American-style coffee in Africa—extremely expensive and offering poor value for money. DeepSeek, on the other hand, operates like a franchise model: it provides you with the core framework, and you develop solutions tailored to local needs, training the most suitable models using local data—it’s both affordable and user-friendly. Folks, that’s what we’re discussing today. I hope you’ll follow and recommend this little star so you don’t miss the next episode. See you next time! Bye-bye.

The EU's Double-Edged Sword: Is a Trade War Between China and the EU Imminent?

Ladies and gentlemen, recent news reports all seem to point to one major development—a trade war between China and the EU appears inevitable. The EU-China Relations Forum held in early May was intended to serve as a bridge for communication between the two sides, but instead, sparks flew as each side accused the other of protectionism. In late May, the European Commission began discussing “China Shock 2.0,” attributing the massive trade imbalance between China and the EU to overcapacity resulting from Chinese subsidies. They asserted that this trade relationship is unsustainable and that the EU must take a tougher stance. Germany and France have subsequently declared their intent to go head-to-head with China. Now, the EU is preparing to model its approach after the U.S. Section 301, creating a set of economic and trade tools specifically targeting China. For example, the “overcapacity instrument” would restrict Chinese companies’ exports to the European market once their production is deemed to be in excess. There is also the “anti-coercion instrument”: if a country uses economic and trade relations to negotiate policy conditions, that constitutes coercion and triggers EU countermeasures. Furthermore, the EU even plans to further tighten cybersecurity regulations to restrict Chinese companies from providing digital infrastructure. Let’s look at the data. Since 2020, the EU’s trade surplus has expanded significantly, rising from over 100 billion euros in 2020 to 360 billion euros. In the first quarter of this year, the surplus reached 98 billion euros, and for the full year, it is likely to approach 398 billion euros—exceeding even that of the United States. Sessourne predicts that this figure will reach 500 billion euros next year. So, is this trade surplus a serious problem? Forman, an economist who served under President Obama, argues that goods sold at rock-bottom prices effectively amount to an indirect wage increase and also drive down the cost of industrial intermediate goods. However, this logic does not apply well to Europe, as its economy relies heavily on traditional manufacturing sectors that are in direct competition with China. The EU naturally argues that this competition is unfair, citing an OECD report that states subsidies to Chinese enterprises account for 2.5% of their annual revenue—three to eight times that of Western firms. The report specifically mentions key industries such as photovoltaics, shipbuilding, steel, and aluminum. From 2005 to 2024, China’s share of global revenue rose from 14% to 87% in photovoltaics, from 34% to 50% in shipbuilding, from 22% to 49% in steel, and in aluminum, from 8% to 40%. Although the OECD states that subsidies have not boosted productivity or profit margins, they have objectively enabled Chinese companies to outcompete Western rivals in global markets. This touches on the definition of fairness: when the Chinese manufacture shirts and basins, trade is complementary and perfectly fair; but when they produce cars and airplanes, the balance is disrupted. China’s general stance on this is to deny the allegations, arguing that subsidies are normal because the world is shifting toward industrial policy, and governments are increasingly intervening in the economy. The EU, meanwhile, hopes China will acknowledge that its policies are no different from those the EU has pursued for decades—it is simply a different way of competing. But China clearly isn’t buying it, viewing the EU as a puppet of the United States, merely carrying out the task of suppressing China. Now, China is prepared to respond. The “Regulations on the Security of Industrial Chains and Supply Chains,” announced in April, have officially taken effect. Like the U.S., the EU is highly dependent on critical minerals and raw materials. If China were to cut off supplies of rare earths and other critical materials for a year, the global economy would suffer losses of 4.4 trillion euros, with Germany bearing the brunt of the impact as many of its production lines would grind to a halt. Consequently, the EU has already begun stockpiling 34 types of critical materials to address potential shortages. Behind the EU’s tough stance lie two decades of strategic missteps and inertia in the digital economy, artificial intelligence, and the energy transition. European companies have enjoyed high profits from traditional industries but have been slow to respond in research and development; now, however, they must compete with China. The EU’s “fairness” card is nothing more than a political stunt, but it is unlikely to convince China. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi warned that if the EU cannot match the economic competitiveness of China and the U.S., it will slowly decline and ultimately lose its reason for existence. Now, the EU finds itself in an awkward position: it had originally planned to coordinate with Biden to counter China, but when Trump took office and refused to treat Europe as an ally, Europe had no choice but to ease tensions with China. Now that Trump has stopped stirring up trouble, Europe feels it must stand on its own two feet. It has learned a lesson from the U.S.-China trade war: only by closing its markets to Chinese goods can it exert pressure, and only by escalating tensions can it minimize its losses. Ladies and gentlemen, a trade war between China and the EU is on the verge of breaking out. The EU’s blade is already at our throats, and we need to be prepared.

The Art of "Stewing Feathers" in Modern Economic Warfare: The U.S.-China Rivalry and Global Supply Chains

Everyone, let’s make it a point to set aside some time every day to record videos. Why? Because this war without gunfire is well worth documenting. Decades of globalization have bound the world together through supply chains, but today, nations are competing to see who can lock down or dismantle those supply chains—and whoever succeeds will gain the upper hand. This is the “stewed feathers” of economic warfare—a silent contest that can silently destroy the opponent. Last year, American economist Adam Posen noted that in the U.S.-China economic war, China holds the advantage in escalation; no matter what weapons the U.S. deploys, China can always outdo them because it holds a strategic advantage in key materials. Bosen suggested that the U.S. should take the initiative to de-escalate and reduce its dependence on China. U.S. officials have cited Deng Xiaoping’s words, stating that it is time for the U.S. to “hide its capabilities and bide its time” and avoid confrontation with China. However, another economist, Edward Fisher, pointed out that defeatism is unacceptable. He pointed out that the U.S. must not underestimate its own leverage; the dollar, AI, semiconductors, jet engines, and other assets constitute “chokepoints” that are difficult to breach—and are harder to counter than China’s rare earths. Fisher’s research is intriguing; he points out that the U.S. approach to economic warfare is flawed. The world has become multipolar; everyone holds some leverage, and the advantages of major powers are not absolute. He emphasizes that the first step is to accurately identify all the chokepoints. Once identified, one must not act hastily or rashly pursue decoupling. One must carefully determine whether a particular constraint is truly within one’s own control. He points out that a constraint must possess three characteristics: concentrated market share, no short-term substitutes, and the fact that cutting it off would cause the other party significant harm while having no real impact on oneself. Let’s evaluate the respective hands of China and the U.S. based on these criteria. The U.S. dollar, semiconductors, and rare earths all hold dominant or even monopolistic positions in their respective fields, whereas tariffs do not. No matter how large the U.S. import market is, it accounts for only 13% of the global total; if other countries refuse to sell to the U.S., there remains a vast 87% of the market. Take rare earths as another example: if China were to withhold sales, it would lose only a few billion. However, if the U.S. were to stop buying, a 30% reduction in rare earth supplies would cause U.S. GDP to drop by 2.2%, resulting in losses exceeding 600 billion. This is the nature of asymmetry. Only after evaluating these three factors can the U.S. clearly discern which cards are genuine bargaining chips and which are not even good enough to bluff with. Once this is clear, strategic objectives must be defined; we absolutely cannot adopt a reactive, “one battle at a time” approach. Doing so would allow the noose around the opponent’s neck to tighten gradually, giving them ample time to adjust, find ways to circumvent restrictions, develop alternative supply chains, and invest in independent production capacity. There are indeed two factions within the U.S. government. Traditional hawks, such as Secretary of State Rubio, advocate for tighter restrictions to block China’s development of AI. Commerce Secretary Lutnick, on the other hand, advocates for deregulation, aiming to make China addicted to U.S. chips so that it cannot break free. The report concludes that both approaches are viable, but a choice must be made and implemented decisively—we cannot let China be “boiled like a frog in gradually heating water.” The report cites a counterexample: the SIPs (Secure Infrastructure for Payments). In 2014, the U.S. imposed financial sanctions on Russia, and China took note. The very next year, China launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), the digital yuan, and the cross-border payment and foreign exchange platform Embridge. None of these directly challenge the U.S. dollar or compete with the U.S. clearing system; instead, they built a parallel highway. In the event of an economic war, this provides a safety net, thereby weakening the U.S.’s bargaining power. The U.S. still doesn’t realize the dangers of revealing its hand; it spends all its time sanctioning this and that. Since the beginning of the 21st century, every U.S. president has imposed sanctions at twice the rate of their predecessor. The problem with this abuse is that many countries have come to realize the U.S. uses the economy as a weapon, so they are de-risking and reducing their exposure to the U.S. Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Oracle account for more than 70% of the global market share. Not only China but even Europe is wary; everyone is investing in building their own domestic technology ecosystems, de-Americanizing the hardware and software of sensitive institutions, and establishing sovereign clouds that are free from U.S. influence. On the offensive front, while it is unrealistic for the U.S. to completely surpass China in new energy, simply diversifying appropriately and breaking up monopolies would be enough to weaken China’s influence. On the defensive front, the report argues that although China has made significant strides in new energy, the U.S. cannot simply sit idly by or surrender the entire market. Trump vigorously promoted traditional energy sources, emphasizing the abundance of U.S. fossil fuels. He only considered that the U.S. economy could function on oil and gas alone, but failed to take into account the situation in the rest of the world. After the incident in the Strait of Holmes, everyone feared a disruption in oil and gas supplies and began developing renewable energy. Therefore, the U.S. cannot remain oblivious to this trend. Finally, the report returns to the traditional alliance system to conceptualize economic warfare. The author argues that the United States cannot insist on reducing vulnerability with everyone; it is acceptable to be slightly more vulnerable and dependent on its allies. Otherwise, if allies pursue self-sufficiency and adopt protectionist policies within their own borders for the sake of economic security, efficiency will plummet, and economic prosperity will be impossible. Consequently, he advocates that Western nations establish trusted supply chains among themselves and coordinate sanctions and industrial policies. In this way, an economic security alliance can both maintain economic scale and weaken the power of rivals such as China and Russia. If the U.S. fails to do this and continues to abuse its economic advantages, its current edge will be difficult to sustain in the long term in a fragmented world. I think his analysis is fairly objective; the U.S. does indeed abuse its economic leverage, and if it cracks down too often and too harshly, it becomes ineffective. Objectively speaking, China should actually thank the United States for helping us make up our minds; his advice is, after all, well-founded. But it’s just very difficult to implement—strategic restraint is inherently incompatible with the performative governance of the social media era, and the legitimacy of nativism is incompatible with the overall coordination of the Western bloc. Therefore, without strategic resolve, it is impossible to achieve economic hegemony.

ASPI's "Key Technology Tracker": Another Slap in the Face for China's Technological Rise

Everyone, when we hear “ASPI,” we know it’s that think tank that loves to peddle the “China threat theory.” This time, it’s come up with something new: an annual “Key Technology Tracking” report. This report specifically tracks which countries are leading the way in key technology fields. This year, they analyzed 74 key areas—10 more than last year—including some technologies that sound incredibly cutting-edge, such as digital software, generative AI, neural networks, and Earth factories. I’m particularly curious about the scores they gave China. Last year, they claimed China led in 57 technologies, while the U.S. led in only 7. Keep in mind that at the beginning of this century, China trailed the U.S. by a ratio of 3 to 60. In some fields, we’ve achieved what could be called a “2000s-era leapfrog”—for example, in advanced materials, where we’ve now become the dominant player; and in optics and wireless communications, our research output is three to five times that of the U.S. In recent years, we’ve made the most significant strides in synthetic biology, but the U.S. still holds the lead in quantum computing, vaccines, radiation therapy, microsatellites, atomic physics, genetic engineering, and natural language processing. This report has not yet been officially released, but some related analyses and data have already emerged. One noteworthy finding is that, after analyzing more than 7 million research papers, they discovered that Sino-U.S. collaboration in the field of scientific research has been declining steadily since 2019 and has now fallen to its lowest level in 20 years. Previously, academic collaboration between China and the U.S. was extensive and yielded abundant results, but now only a quarter of China’s research collaboration projects still involve U.S. researchers. The trend toward decoupling in Sino-U.S. scientific research is very clear. Three consecutive U.S. administrations have restricted Sino-U.S. scientific research collaboration, citing the need to prevent China from exploiting their research findings and to mitigate so-called national security risks. The previous “China Initiative” involved the FBI arresting academic spies and prosecuting many scholars with ties to China, which naturally led to a reduction in collaboration. Under U.S. leadership, its allies—such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Australia—have also scaled back their scientific research collaboration with China. However, we cannot focus solely on these negative aspects. The scale of our scientific research is expanding day by day, and our share of global output has surged from 13% in 2005 to nearly 40% today. As we have moved from the periphery to the center of scientific research and innovation, international cooperation has naturally increased—it’s just that some of our partners have changed. In the past, our main partners were developed Western countries, but over the past decade or so, our international collaboration has become more diversified—a trend driven both by Western restrictions and our own proactive expansion. Our largest research partner is now Singapore, and many people might be surprised to find Pakistan and Saudi Arabia among the top ten. Before 2005, our cooperation with Pakistan was virtually nonexistent, but by 2019, it had become our seventh-largest research partner—particularly in the field of nanomaterials—which helped propel Pakistan’s high-impact research to eighth place globally, ahead of Germany and the United Kingdom. Last month, we also announced that, in addition to our existing areas of cooperation, we would deepen scientific research collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Belarus, Russia, and Iran. Science and technology are the cornerstone of a nation’s hard and soft power. In an effort to defend its technological leadership, the West has proactively adopted a strategy of decoupling, ushering in an era of technological nationalism. As a result, however, it has drifted further and further from the forefront of innovation. Maintaining the momentum of innovation may become a key challenge for us in the future.

China's Overseas Investment: The U.S. Wants to Tie Us Down, but We Have Our Own Strategies

Ladies and gentlemen, recently the U.S. has been trying to lure our manufacturing companies to set up factories there, claiming to help them “soar,” but in reality, they’re on guard at every turn and treat us like thieves. So, do we really have no choice but to go to the U.S.? Of course not! When it comes to “going global,” Chinese companies not only have plenty of options, but they’re also thriving. According to data I found in the *US-China Two-Way Flow* report released by the U.S. think tank Rhodium Group, the total value of new outbound direct investment by Chinese enterprises reached $124 billion the year before last, an 18% year-over-year increase—the highest level since 2018. After emerging from the pandemic slump, investment has begun to rebound. Hearing this, I became curious: aside from ByteDance’s $37.7 billion data center in Brazil, where else have our companies invested, and in what sectors? Drawing on this report, I’ll break down last year’s trends for you. First, Chinese companies’ overseas investments are increasingly shifting toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In 2016, 70% of China’s outbound investment went to mature markets in Europe, North America, and Oceania, primarily in the form of large-scale acquisitions. Now, however, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become the main targets, accounting for over 80% of investments. In Asia, investments are primarily directed toward manufacturing, data centers, and the extraction and processing of raw materials; in Africa, they focus mainly on energy and materials—such as iron, hydrogen, ammonia, and helium; and in Latin America, they center on mining and infrastructure. This approach is much more low-key than previous investment strategies. Second, our investment projects fall into two categories: greenfield and brownfield. Greenfield projects refer to those built from the ground up, while brownfield projects involve the acquisition of existing enterprises. Prior to 2022, our annual greenfield investment hovered around $100 billion, dominating the landscape for the past five years, with investments primarily focused on capital-intensive sectors such as mining, data centers, and energy. Transactions involving the acquisition of existing enterprises peaked in 2016 and have gradually declined since then. After 2022, there were an average of only three acquisitions per year exceeding $1.1 billion, but last year saw nine such deals, with the total transaction value doubling compared to the low point in 2022—indicating that Chinese capital has become active again. A closer look at individual sectors reveals that the automotive industry remains the primary driver of investment, accounting for 13% of total investment. However, this share is at its lowest level in five years, indicating that the growth rate of the electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing value chain is slowing, and opportunities for value creation across various segments have narrowed. In particular, investment in battery materials has leveled off, with virtually no new battery-related investments last year. As for data centers and consumer goods, these are the main areas attracting investment from Chinese companies. The growth in data centers stems from the explosive development of the AI ecosystem in Southeast Asia, while investments in consumer goods are primarily driven by mergers and acquisitions of established European brands. The remaining major categories—energy and basic materials—accounted for nearly half of the total overseas investment by Chinese companies. In the energy sector, growth in wind power offset the decline in solar investment, while the high level of investment in basic materials was primarily driven by capital-intensive projects, such as the Simandou mine in Guinea. This resembles the strategic asset acquisition model of a decade ago, except that this time, corporate capital is flowing toward raw materials and data centers, reflecting a greater emphasis on strategic positioning. Judging by the record-high Chinese exports in 2022, our overall globalization strategy remains export-oriented. Over the past few years, the pace of domestic capacity expansion has far outstripped that of overseas production, raising genuine concerns that domestic technology might flow out through investment—or even fall into the hands of unfriendly nations. On the other hand, however, the number of manufacturing facilities China invested in overseas was much smaller before the pandemic and has now increased significantly. This indicates that more companies are beginning to shift part of their production overseas to achieve localization—which is why large greenfield projects by companies like BYD are attracting so much attention, as they represent a growing trend. The United States has long been a major capital power and a global investment powerhouse, but it is now pulling back and even forcing others to invest there. In the eyes of many, China is seen as merely a diligent manufacturer, incapable of effectively managing capital. However, driven by surplus funds and the need to expand our markets, we now have no choice but to devote more energy and resources to building overseas production bases to pave the way for new revenue streams. Chinese companies won’t be easily tied down to any one place—if the U.S. tries to tie us down, we’ve got our own clever strategies!

The "Great Leap Forward" in Japanese Investment: The China-Japan Standoff Amid Foreign Investment Trends

Everyone, I recently heard that investment in China has climbed to 3 million—which came as quite a surprise to me. Given how much attention everyone is paying to foreign investment, do you feel that the rumors don’t quite match reality? Next, let’s talk about investment by Japanese companies. Even though the year isn’t over yet, Japanese investment in China has already hit a record high, with a year-over-year increase of 55.5% in the first three quarters. The total investment for the year is expected to return to 2022 levels, or around $5 billion. Faced with these figures, we first need to understand why this year’s numbers are so high while last year’s were so low. At the end of last year, investment hit a historic low, primarily due to escalating geopolitical risks. Japanese companies were pressured by the U.S. to take sides and were forced to implement the so-called “China Plus One” policy. Compounding this, last year coincided with the U.S. presidential election, when wait-and-see sentiment peaked. With the yen’s collapse causing the book value of investments to shrink, many Japanese companies simply froze their budgets, waiting for the political winds to shift. This year, the U.S. is sending a chill in the air with highly uncertain tariff policies, while we’re sending a warm breeze by improving the business environment and strengthening efforts to attract foreign investment. In the past, Japanese companies followed an investment model of “small steps and quick moves,” but a new trend has emerged this year: a group of industry giants has begun implementing capital-intensive projects. For example, Toyota is investing 14.6 billion RMB to build a plant in Jinshan, Shanghai—the second wholly foreign-owned automobile manufacturing plant after Tesla’s—which is scheduled to begin production in 2027 with an annual output of 100,000 high-end all-electric Lexus vehicles. Additionally, both Toyota and Mazda are scaling back production capacity for gasoline-powered vehicles, yet this year they have invested heavily in expanding their new energy vehicle operations and R&D. They have officially established Sony’s Open Innovation Center in Pudong, Shanghai. In the future, Sony’s presence in China will go beyond simply selling products; the company will relocate its investment decision-making headquarters to China to directly incubate startups, particularly in the fields of autonomous driving and so-called immersive entertainment software. Panasonic is also making significant moves, shifting its entire strategic focus toward China. Rather than merely manufacturing products, the company is establishing a complete business chain—from design to integrated sales—and plans to roll out this highly efficient Chinese model to overseas markets once it is fully operational. Overall, Japanese companies are first streamlining their operations by cutting back on areas where they’ve lost competitiveness. Take gasoline-powered cars, for example—I drive a Japanese car myself, but I see fewer and fewer of them on the road; many mobile phone models have been discontinued; as for home appliances, that’s certainly true—but domestic brands have made tough cuts, redirecting the savings to increase investment in electric vehicles, software, high-end machinery, and medical devices. So high-quality Japanese investment hasn’t withdrawn; low-end operations are leaving, while high-end ones are flowing in—which is perfectly normal. After all, who wouldn’t want to survive? Another trend is that Japanese companies are now promoting a “In China for China” strategy, using local supply chains to specifically serve the Chinese market, while Southeast Asia and India serve other markets. This requires moving the entire production and R&D infrastructure to China, which increases investment. Losing China—or complete decoupling—would be an unbearable cost for them. But speaking of which, did you notice? What I just described refers to the situation in the first three quarters. As recently as the end of August, the Japan Chamber of Commerce in China reported that Japanese companies’ willingness to make additional investments and their satisfaction with the business environment were still relatively high. Even when Sanae Takaichi first took office, China was still extending goodwill toward Japan—for example, by unilaterally extending the visa-free policy for Japanese citizens, which was originally set to end at the end of this year but was announced in early November to be extended through the end of next year. This is a tremendous convenience for technical staff and managers who need to travel frequently between China and Japan. However, over the past two months, Sino-Japanese relations have taken a sharp turn for the worse due to Sanae Takaichi’s misguided remarks. Will Japanese companies be affected? In reality, Japanese companies have long been desensitized to politics. Sino-Japanese relations have frequently been marked by friction in the past, and fluctuations between warmth and coldness are commonplace. Therefore, Japanese firms generally maintain strict risk controls and remain completely insulated from politics. For now, diplomatic tensions have not yet spilled over into the economic sphere, and Japanese companies’ operations have not been disrupted; their primary concerns remain business issues such as weak demand, rising costs, and intense competition. However, a Reuters survey shows that an increasing number of Japanese companies now view Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations as their greatest risk in 2026—a concern that has surpassed their worries about U.S. trade policy. As a result, while they could have continued to manage their operations carefully and prosper, their path forward has now been severely disrupted by their own leadership.

The Invisible Killer of Carbon Emissions: The Double Dilemma of Code and Chips

Hello, everyone. I’m Ian. Today, let’s talk about semiconductor chips and low-power code. This topic might sound a bit high-tech, but it’s actually closely tied to every aspect of our daily lives. First of all, if we use our chips every day, they’d have to run 24 hours a day for testing. In our country, chips tend to degrade within two years of continuous use because the heat generated from running nonstop is too intense. So, if we could use low-carbon solutions to reduce power consumption, we might be able to extend their lifespan. This isn’t just about physically prolonging the chip’s life—it also involves practical applications. If we follow this line of thinking, we’ll be able to conduct more experiments in the future, right? Of course, the issues we face now aren’t limited to chips—we also need to consider code. Code runs on computers, and every line of code consumes electricity. That electricity ultimately comes from power plants, which burn coal and oil, emitting carbon that ultimately contributes to climate change. So, should we reduce data traffic to minimize code execution? Actually, no—code logic itself can be low-carbon. For example, optimizing code and reducing redundancy can lower carbon emissions. Our company is researching exactly this kind of code to see how much we can optimize it. Take ChatGPT, for instance: developing its model consumes as much electricity as a small town. The volume of data and energy consumption behind it are truly staggering. Research by the Mozilla Foundation found that carbon emissions from communication technologies are actually on par with those of the aviation industry, ranking fourth globally. This reveals a fact: the internet’s impact on the environment is far greater than we imagine. In the past, people thought data was invisible and intangible, but in reality, every step of its production, transmission, and processing is accompanied by carbon emissions. For example, receiving a single email results in 5 grams of carbon dioxide emissions. Sending a single advertising email may result in 50 grams of carbon dioxide emissions—and that doesn’t even include images and videos, which could add even more. According to statistics, the number of emails sent globally each year may exceed 1 trillion, many of which are advertising emails. For individuals, the proportion of advertising emails far exceeds that of emails they actually need to read. This is not just a personal issue; it is a challenge for the entire industry. Returning to chips: if our country’s chips are used daily, they’ll likely need to be replaced within about two years. If we adopt a low-carbon solution—such as reducing energy consumption—the chips could last longer. However, such solutions are costly and time-consuming, so we must first find a temporary solution—for example, using “low-carbon bags” to reduce the chips’ thermal effects through low-carbon methods and extend their lifespan. This is a solution at the physical level. Now let’s turn our attention to code. Logical coding practices also contribute to low-carbon solutions—for example, reducing redundant code and optimizing algorithms can both lower carbon emissions. It’s like a weight-loss pill: it can be used in certain areas, but not everywhere. Our company’s Greenewab platform is like such a “weight-loss pill.” It can reduce data volume by 97.25%, thereby cutting electricity consumption by 45%. The reason behind this is that much of the code in these systems was written thirty years ago without considering the future. Every time a new person joins or a new outsourcing firm takes over, they pile more code on top, resulting in a massive chunk of “legacy code” that’s difficult to clean up. We start by transforming large systems, optimizing them bit by bit. If the risk is low and the impact on the company’s core business is minimal, then it’s worth a try. Most companies won’t let us directly modify core code, but we can teach their programmers how to optimize it. For example, we helped an oceanography company optimize its intranet, which had been in use for decades. After our optimization, we found that we could remove a lot of unnecessary data, improve logical performance, and reduce energy consumption. This process is time-consuming, but the results are significant. Therefore, future development is not just a technical issue—it’s also a matter of sustainable development. Both code and chips are calling for new solutions, and we’re working hard to provide answers to this challenge.

Returning to the Yangtze: Ryo Takeuchi’s Affection for Japan and His Cultural Exploration

Hey everyone, today I want to talk about Japanese director Ryo Takeuchi’s documentary *Return to the Yangtze*. I’m not trying to hype it up on purpose—you all know that calling it a “bridge for Sino-Japanese friendship” is way too much of a stretch. I just wanted to check it out. Actually, Director Ryo Takeuchi’s latest film, *Back to the Yangtze*, has left me with a flood of emotions. I didn’t make this film for the sake of Sino-Japanese friendship—I simply wanted to see it, shoot it, and learn more about it. Yes, it’s really that simple. Director Ryo Takeuchi said this project was primarily driven by a regret from 10 years ago: back then, he didn’t manage to capture the very first drop of water at the source of the Yangtze River. For this project, he set out directly from the Tongtian River and traveled through cities and rural areas across China. So why not just go straight to the Tongtian River? The reason is simple: he wanted to retrace his steps and make up for that past regret. Also, when he filmed 10 years ago, he couldn’t speak Chinese, so he was unable to conduct many in-depth interviews. Now that he’s learned Chinese, he can communicate on a much deeper level. So, this filming project can be seen as both making up for the past and exploring the future. Speaking of the filming style, Director Ryo Takeuchi said he wanted to shatter people’s traditional perceptions of documentaries—making them less serious and instead lighthearted, humorous, and touching. This philosophy really resonates with me; after all, a child described this film as a comedy, and that comment moved me deeply. Indeed, documentaries can be lighthearted and fun—and that’s a positive trend. So why make *Return to the Yangtze*? Director Ryo Takeuchi explained that when he filmed the Yangtze River 10 years ago, he wasn’t yet familiar with some Chinese customs. By returning now, he can better communicate with the locals and gain a deeper understanding of their lives and perspectives. Behind this lies his passion for *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, and especially his special connection to the Yangtze River. He said that every time he sees a scene related to the Yellow River, he feels a strong urge to film the Yellow River himself. This reminded me that every region has its own “mother river”—China has the Yangtze, and while Japan also has rivers, it lacks the concept of a “mother river.” The cultural differences behind this are quite interesting. Director Ryo Takeuchi said that as a child, he was very interested in traditional Chinese culture, but he came from an ordinary family with no special background. However, his passion for film began at the age of 15. Watching the movie *Rise of the Planet of the Apes* completely transformed his perception of film, and from then on, he embarked on the path of documentary filmmaking. He said that his primary motivation for making documentaries is to satisfy his own curiosity and understand the world. While making documentaries, Director Ryo Takeuchi discovered that Japanese audiences harbor many misconceptions about China. He believes that making documentaries is not only about showcasing China’s beauty but also about breaking down prejudices and revealing the truth. Having lived in China for over a decade, he has gained a deeper understanding of the country. He noted that while China is developing rapidly, its educational system remains very strict. He sent his children to school in Japan, hoping they could grow up in a more relaxed environment. Director Ryo Takeuchi also mentioned that the motivations of Chinese people visiting Japan vary by generation: those born in the 1950s and 1960s came to earn money; those born in the 1970s and 1980s came to learn technical skills; and those born in the 1990s came to pursue their dreams. Nowadays, those born in the 2000s come to Japan primarily for fun. These changes have allowed him to witness the evolution of Chinese society. He noted that Chinese audiences are also very interested in Japanese culture, but he is somewhat concerned that Japan’s tourism market is becoming increasingly closed off. Finally, Director Ryo Takeuchi stated that his documentary stems from curiosity and personal interest, and he hopes to bring authentic and engaging content to viewers. He explained that this is not merely a bridge for Sino-Japanese friendship, but rather a reflection of his personal curiosity and exploration of the world. He hopes to continue documenting the world through his lens and sharing his experiences and observations. Ladies and gentlemen, this is the story of Director Ryo Takeuchi and his documentary *Return to the Yangtze*. We hope to see more works like this in the future, helping us better understand the world.

Bamboo Punk: A New Era of Ocean-Based Green Energy

Hey everyone, we’ve recently come up with a new idea in the waters off Yantai—a bamboo-based offshore solar platform. To put it simply, it’s solar panels mounted on bamboo, floating in the ocean to generate electricity. This kind of innovation in China is truly simple and straightforward. Forget steampunk and cyberpunk—we’re going straight for “bamboo-punk,” and it’s truly a breath of fresh air. Most traditional offshore solar platforms use steel frames or plastic. The former is prone to corrosion, while the latter requires UV protection. Not only do they entail high maintenance costs, but they also easily generate microplastics, causing secondary pollution to the marine environment. This time, we’re using bamboo—a material that combines strength with flexibility, is lightweight, and withstands rough seas. It’s truly a brilliant idea. Plus, bamboo is a green resource passed down from our ancestors; it’s both eco-friendly and low-carbon—truly killing two birds with one stone. Let’s take a closer look at the specifics of this bamboo platform. The Jilin No. 2 platform was jointly developed by Zhongji Group and Beijing Forestry University. With a capacity of 100 kilowatts—a tenfold increase—it’s significantly larger than the Jilin No. 1 prototype. Standing 7 to 8 meters tall and covering an area of over 20 square meters, it can accommodate more than 200 solar panels. In the future, we plan to scale up to the megawatt class—that’s another tenfold increase—and we expect this to happen within the next couple of years. The most significant difference between this second-generation technology and the first is the innovation in materials. The first generation tested whether bamboo could remain stable and resistant to corrosion in the ocean, while the second generation involves the large-scale application of bamboo-wrapped tubes and marine bamboo tubes. Bamboo-wound pipes are bio-based composite materials produced by mechanically winding bamboo fibers around a core membrane, using bamboo branches as an adhesive, and then heat-curing the assembly. This material is lightweight yet high-strength, water-resistant, and long-lasting; its density is only one-ninth that of steel, yet its tensile strength reaches half that of steel. It remains stable under acid and alkali corrosion as well as extreme temperatures, with a service life of fifty years for piping applications. Its compressive strength exceeds that of concrete pipes, and its seismic resistance is superior to that of steel pipes. This material has already been widely adopted in industry—it can be found in underground pipelines, building materials, and high-speed rail carriages. Using bamboo to replace wood and steel is truly a prime example of its application in high-end equipment. The marine bamboo pipe was specifically developed by the School of Materials Science and Engineering at Beijing Forestry University for marine engineering. It utilizes prestressed continuous fiber reinforcement, which overcomes the weaknesses of bamboo in certain directions and elevates the pipe’s strength to the levels required for marine applications. The pipes are prestressed before deployment, allowing them to remain taut even in rough seas, which extends their service life and maximizes the tensile strength of the bamboo fibers. Among these two materials, “Zhonghe” stands out for its mechanical properties—it is impact-resistant, bend-resistant, and fatigue-resistant. It remains stable in environments with high salt fog, high humidity, high UV exposure, and high corrosion, and does not release metal ions or microplastic particles that pollute the ocean. Currently, the Jilin No. 2 is already in operation, supplying power to an offshore purification platform located five kilometers away, achieving energy self-sufficiency. This project not only converts wastewater into anhydrous methane for storage but also generates clean energy during idle operation—truly a green, circular ecosystem. In the future, if this technology is applied on a large scale globally, our competitive edge will be even greater. We are the country with the world’s richest bamboo resources, accounting for more than half of the world’s bamboo species, with a planting area of 7.5 million hectares, an annual bamboo production of 150 million metric tons, 15,000 product varieties, and an annual industrial output value of 520 billion yuan. Whether in terms of scale, variety, or the completeness of the industrial chain, we rank first in the world. So, “Bamboo Punk” is certainly not just empty talk. China’s green technology is not only environmentally friendly but can also form a harmonious, symbiotic system—and this is the true path to sustainable development in the future. Ladies and gentlemen, our “Bamboo Punk” concept is truly a brilliant idea—both eco-friendly and innovative. The future lies in this approach, not in pursuing a utopia disconnected from our current way of life. Our technology is truly taking one step at a time toward true green harmony.

The Remarkable Transformation of Ansteel’s Tailings Pond: From an Internet-Famous Photo Spot to a Green Treasure

Ladies and gentlemen, Ansteel, our country’s historic industrial hub, boasts a century of history. It’s a place dotted with tailings ponds. In the past, these tailings ponds looked like a romantic painting—truly spectacular when viewed from the air. Some say they are the “blood of the earth,” the pain of Northeast China’s old industrial base, and a fantastical land awaiting rebirth. But in the future, this “filter” will likely be removed by new technologies. Those past wonders that we once cherished may truly disappear from view. Just look—our Science News has just published a major story. Over in Anshan, Liaoning, they’re carrying out the world’s largest magnetized roasting project for iron ore, and it’s quite the spectacle. In the future, tailings will no longer be industrial waste; instead, they’ll be transformed into high-quality assets. How exactly does this turn waste into treasure? It all starts with iron ore processing. The globally accepted process is known as the long process: iron is smelted in a blast furnace, and steel is produced in a converter. In the blast furnace stage, carbon dioxide generated by burning coke is used to reduce the iron oxide in the ore, turning it into liquid pig iron, which is then sent to the converter for refining. Blast furnaces are extremely energy-intensive. If the raw ore has a low grade—with more rock than iron—burning it for a long time yields no results, making the process economically unfeasible. China’s iron ore has an average grade of only about 30 percent—it’s essentially “junk ore.” In contrast, iron ore from Australia and Brazil has a much higher grade and can be fed directly into the furnace after being crushed. This is the crux of China’s resource dilemma. Although the country has vast territory and a full range of natural resources, the quality of these resources remains a major headache. The geological structure is complex, with small-scale deposits, low grades, and complex compositions. Iron ore is a prime example: while reserves total 20 billion metric tons, mining is expensive, beneficiation is difficult, and energy consumption is high. Consequently, China must import 1.2 billion metric tons of high-grade iron ore annually, with Australia and Brazil serving as the primary suppliers. We have long been engaged in a tug-of-war with these giants; although we have mastered some technologies, our reliance on foreign sources remains as high as 80 percent. Against this backdrop, it becomes particularly important to fully tap the potential of domestic iron ore. The vast majority of China’s iron ore consists of hematite, limonite, and siderite. These ores have complex compositions and require magnetic roasting and high-temperature reduction. Mr. Guo Musun, a veteran of China’s chemical industry, made foundational contributions to fluidized-bed technology early in his career. After returning to China, he proposed an innovative approach combining fluidized-bed technology with magnetic roasting. Easier said than done, however: the ore powder tends to clump and agglomerate, and gas control poses another major challenge. It wasn’t until the 21st century that a real breakthrough was achieved. Postdoctoral researcher Dr. Zhu Qingshan took on this niche project, and after 20 years of effort, finally achieved stable full-capacity operation on September 1 of this year. Dr. Zhu’s technology can process extremely low-grade iron tailings into iron concentrate with a 65% iron content, achieving a magnetic conversion rate as high as 98%, reducing overall energy consumption by 35%, significantly cutting carbon emissions, and markedly lowering production costs. The commercialization of this technology has unlocked nearly 30 billion metric tons of hard-to-process iron ore and 10 billion metric tons of existing tailings. In addition to Ansteel, many other long-established steel and mining bases have large amounts of tailings, so this technology is sure to gain momentum and be widely adopted in the future. Dr. Zhu has already signed eight technology licensing agreements, and last year the technology was introduced to an iron ore project in Laos, where two 2-million-metric-ton-capacity production lines are planned. This technology is not only capable of making a significant impact domestically but also has the potential to expand overseas. Many countries around the world—such as Mongolia, Central Asia, and Iran—possess vast deposits of low- to medium-grade, complex, and difficult-to-process iron ore that have long lacked the technology for development. If Chinese technology is introduced, these low-grade ores can be transformed into high-grade iron concentrate on-site, enabling the development of previously untapped resources and generating additional foreign exchange earnings. This is not only a great business opportunity but also ensures a stable supply of resources. In the future, we must pay attention to geopolitical and political stability and select countries with a high degree of integration into the “Belt and Road” Initiative to establish mining partnerships. Having this safety net to prevent overseas iron ore supply bottlenecks is of the utmost importance. Don’t forget that this technology can also be applied to other metals. Possessing such technology truly is a blessing for China.

Musk's $1 Trillion Dream

Hey everyone, let’s talk today about Tesla’s CEO and his “luxury compensation package.” A daily salary of $275 million—that’s equivalent to the sum of 20 “small goals”! Earn $1 trillion in ten years? I’m laughing so hard my teeth are falling out. That’s more than Gates and Zuckerberg combined—what on earth is he up to? Mind you, this compensation plan has to meet four conditions—A, B, C, and D—but let’s be honest: this kind of dream is reserved for Musk alone. On November 6, Tesla shareholders overwhelmingly approved this ultimate compensation plan—the most extraordinary solo challenge ever to appear in the history of business. With a net worth already exceeding 500 billion, Musk now stands at the very pinnacle of the world. So, how exactly will Musk go it alone to unlock a trillion dollars? Tesla’s board has set up 12 main story levels. For each level cleared, Musk’s progress toward the goal increases by 1%, earning him 35 million shares of Tesla stock. If he clears all 12 stages over the next 10 years—raising Tesla’s market capitalization from its current $1.5 trillion to $8.5 trillion—he’ll trigger the maximum payout and claim the ultimate prize: 424 million shares of Tesla stock, valued at $1 trillion. But simply increasing the market cap isn’t enough—Musk must possess two keys simultaneously. The first key is the company’s market cap, which constitutes the main quest. From $2 trillion to $8.5 trillion, each milestone requires an increase of $500 billion. The second key is the operational mission. This consists of a pool of 12 side missions. Each time he reaches a new market capitalization milestone, Musk must complete another mission from the side mission pool to unlock the next level. The side missions fall into two main categories. The first category is production-related, such as cumulatively delivering 20 million Teslas, selling 1 million humanoid robots, having 1 million self-driving taxis operating on the streets, or having 10 million active FSD users. The second category of tasks is even more direct: generating astronomical amounts of revenue for the company. There are eight tiers in total, ranging from a minimum of $50 billion to a maximum of $400 billion, and this task must be repeated three times. Let’s run through a scenario. To clear the first level, Musk must first bring Tesla’s market capitalization to $2 trillion and achieve an annual profit of $50 billion. Doing so would earn him a 1% bonus—approximately 35 million shares of Tesla—and the $50 billion profit target would be checked off. To clear the second level, the market cap must reach $2.5 trillion, and he must select another objective—such as delivering 1 million robots—which, once completed, allows him to advance to the second level. Musk must repeat this process 12 times until Tesla’s market cap reaches the peak of $8.5 trillion and all side missions are cleared. Only then will he receive 424 million shares, worth $1 trillion. The game also has a hidden rule: all equity rewards Musk earns by clearing levels are subject to a lock-up period and cannot be traded for ten years. The game has now begun. The suspense lies in whether Musk can clear all the levels. With Tesla’s first-half earnings down and the U.S. government not backing electric vehicles, he’s actually facing headwinds. But the biggest advantage is that the market is driven by narratives, and Musk has always been striving to live out the greatest story in human history. Let’s wish him good luck! But the question is, what can one person possibly do with 1 trillion—equivalent to the combined GDP of 170 countries? Poverty limits my imagination. All right, all right, I’m not going to think about it anymore. I’m going to go study my materials like a good student. Bye-bye.

Black Humor in Academic Publishing: The Shady Dealings Behind Page Charges

Everyone, let’s talk about the ins and outs of the academic publishing world today. First, we need to address the issue of publishing articles in international journals. Why are some people worried that if an article is published in an international journal, the Americans will just rip it off? Actually, publishing in an international journal is like showcasing your best moves at a martial arts tournament—why would you be afraid that your opponents will steal your techniques? The reason is simple: we’re showcasing China’s solutions and defining the next generation of technical standards. The barriers to entry lie in engineering—for example, rare-earth materials and precision manufacturing capabilities—which can’t be mastered just by reading papers. But your intuition is spot-on; there is indeed a growing trend toward reducing publications in foreign journals. Starting March 1 of this year, the Chinese Academy of Sciences announced it would stop paying fees for papers published in 30 high-cost journals, including *Nature Communications* and *Cell Reports*. These journals charge an average of $5,000 per paper, exceeding the industry average of $2,000. This fee is called an Article Processing Charge (APC)—essentially, you contribute knowledge, but first you have to pay a publication fee. The traditional model relies on institutions or readers paying subscription fees, but since there aren’t that many people eager to learn, subscription growth is limited. Consequently, major publishers introduced the “open access” model, shifting the costs onto the authors. Career prospects are tied to publication output: the more papers published, the more money publishers make. Moreover, peer review is free, and the editorial costs for online distribution are virtually zero—yet access to these publications is not free. Consequently, academic publishing has become a highly capitalized, highly profitable industry with profit margins exceeding 40 percent—far surpassing those of Fortune 500 companies. Meanwhile, knowledge creators are constantly exploited, leading to severe exploitation. This distorted ecosystem is a major headache for us. Starting more than a decade ago, China’s research institutions became among the most enthusiastic adopters of the “open access” model. On the one hand, this was to elevate the level of scientific research; on the other, it stemmed from a reverence for international journals. In short, recognition from international journals may be even more important than the research findings themselves. Consequently, submitting to international journals offers excellent value for money, and the proportion of Chinese authors has continued to rise. In 2023, approximately 10% of the authors in *Science Advances* (a *Nature* journal) were from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, while another 30% came from other research institutions. Overall, 25% of the authors of all open-access papers and more than 30% of the profits come from China. We prefer journals with high impact factors, which correspondingly charge higher publication fees. Page charges paid by Chinese authors for publishing in international journals rose from 290 million in 2019 to 910 million in 2024, with an annual growth rate exceeding 20%. Publishers treat researchers’ essential needs as an opportunity to fleece them, which is why page charges keep skyrocketing. Earlier this year, the cost of publishing an article in *Nature Communications* rose from $6,990 to $7,350—more than 50,000 RMB. This has created a vicious cycle: researchers have become cash cows for international journals, and their academic contributions are being used to solidify the industry’s position at the expense of the development of domestic journals. To address this issue, we launched the “China Science and Technology Journal Excellence Action Plan” in 2019, with the goal of developing world-class science and technology journals. During the first five-year cycle, the number of domestic Chinese- and English-language journals receiving funding increased to 200. Breakthroughs were achieved in certain key fields, and the number of high-quality journals grew. By 2024, 154 journals had entered the top 25% in their respective international subject rankings, and four journals—including *Cell Research*—had entered the global top 100. Stopping the reimbursement of exorbitant publication fees for certain foreign journals is not merely about saving money; it is also about curbing international publishers’ exploitation of our nation’s public assets, reclaiming academic evaluation authority and discourse power, preventing raw data, research trends, and talent profiles from falling into the hands of Western commercial data providers, and safeguarding the security of our knowledge sovereignty. An independent knowledge system and a controllable knowledge infrastructure are absolutely essential. Ladies and gentlemen, we must recognize this trend and strive to develop domestic journals while enhancing the domestic recognition of our scientific achievements. This is the true path to academic autonomy—not a mere survival strategy under the exploitation of foreign journals.

A Race Against Time in the SLG Sector: Cash Cows Turn to Scrap, Newcomers Emerge Out of Nowhere

Hey everyone, today let’s talk about a major development that’s been making waves in the gaming industry. Can you guess what it is? It turns out that the Three Kingdoms SLG game—widely regarded as a goldmine—is currently up for sale. What happened to the “surefire profit” we were promised? What’s really going on behind the scenes? Let’s first break down the underlying logic behind this. These SLG games—you know, the strategy games where you deploy troops on a map and command vast armies—are among the mobile games with the highest spending and strongest user retention. It’s the core business segment for China’s top game studios—that’s real money we’re talking about. Does selling it mean these giants are throwing in the towel? No, this is a perfectly normal capital operation. Selling off non-core assets to focus resources on the main business—there’s nothing unusual about that. But when we examine this signal in the context of the entire SLG sector, the situation looks quite different. The growth model of traditional SLGs is losing its long-term appeal to investors. It’s not that there’s no demand in the SLG sector; rather, the old gameplay model has reached its limits. So what exactly are these old playbooks? They rely on a single hit game, followed by user acquisition to bring in new players and iterating on game mechanics to drive monetization. This model worked great during the traffic boom, but it no longer holds up. The traffic boom peaked long ago, and user acquisition costs have skyrocketed—anyone involved in game publishing knows this all too well. What’s even more troubling is the severe homogenization of gameplay: maps, structures, alliance battles, and numerical dominance. Dozens of products on the market look virtually identical, and it’s difficult for new titles to break out of this mold. The direct consequence of this is extremely poor long-term growth certainty. The capital markets fear this the most; without a clear growth trajectory for the next 3–5 years, valuations naturally cannot rise. The problem with the numerical system runs even deeper: revenue is driven by constantly releasing new cards. When new cards are introduced, old ones depreciate in value, forcing players to keep spending to maintain their combat power. This model essentially drains players’ trust. The value players get for their money is constantly eroded by round after round of numerical inflation; eventually, user retention becomes increasingly difficult, and product lifecycles grow shorter. After more than a decade, the industry has now entered a phase of diminishing returns. Looking even deeper, most traditional SLGs lack irreplaceable core competitive barriers. As soon as a new product enters the market using the same template and spends more aggressively on user acquisition, your users will defect. With shallow moats, long-term resilience to risks is weak. These three major issues are not isolated; they are intertwined. The more expensive user acquisition becomes, the more the game relies on numerical incentives. The race to the bottom in numerical stimulation accelerates user churn, which in turn forces the game to continue buying traffic—creating a vicious cycle that becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Against this backdrop, news of the outright sale of a top-tier asset valued at nearly 10 billion is actually not hard to understand. This represents a very rational capital response to the industry cycle and indirectly confirms that the underlying logic of the sector has indeed reached a point where it must evolve. Does this mean the SLG sector as a whole has lost its value? Not at all. Capital never collectively withdraws simply because a sector is undergoing a correction; it merely reevaluates and retains what it deems to be of greater value. Just as the industry as a whole enters a phase of consolidation, a Three Kingdoms-themed SLG game has, in fact, secured dual strategic investments from Tencent and Hero Entertainment. Hero Entertainment CEO Wu Dan personally took on the role of director. Having previously backed projects like *Black Myth: Wukong* and *Mingchao*, he is widely recognized in China’s gaming industry as a hunter of high-quality projects. The projects he backs generally share a common trait: they are meticulously crafted, of high quality, and designed for the long term. Let’s take a closer look at this game, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms: The Way of the King*. First, consider the IP barrier. What level of resource does Koei Tecmo’s official *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* IP represent in the Three Kingdoms SLG sector? This IP has been in operation for over 40 years, and the brand recognition it enjoys among core users isn’t something that can be bought through user acquisition campaigns. More crucially, Koei Tecmo maintains extremely high standards for IP licensing, including character designs, world-building, gameplay mechanics, and comprehensive review and oversight throughout the development process—it’s not just a matter of attaching a name to the project. What does this mean? It means users already have a mental foundation before they even join the game, resulting in naturally higher retention rates and a longer lifecycle compared to homogeneous products. This serves as the core foundation supporting long-term operations spanning over five years—and it’s precisely the kind of long-term value assurance that investors value most. Once established, it’s extremely difficult for competitors to replicate. Now let’s look at the gameplay barriers. In traditional SLG games, victory boils down to a single logic: whoever has the strongest cards wins. Therefore, players aren’t buying an experience—they’re buying raw stats. After playing this system for a while, players become fully aware of what they’re doing—they’re essentially paying for meta-based power. When the next update rolls out, that investment loses its value. This product has chosen a different path. Victory on the battlefield depends on more than just stats; terrain, positioning, coordination between front and rear units, range, and movement all influence how a battle plays out. Players must decide how to exploit terrain, arrange their formations, and use battlefield space to gain an advantage. The deciding factor shifts from who has better card draws to who makes the most accurate judgments. More importantly, there isn’t a single strategy that works indefinitely. Each season brings changes to the map, campaign scenarios, and available generals—effectively forcing players to re-evaluate the battlefield and re-build their lineups every season. With constantly updated content, players’ strategic options never run dry, naturally extending the game’s lifecycle through gameplay depth rather than numerical inflation. From a capital perspective, this transforms the game from a one-time consumable into a sustainable operational asset—with a completely different pricing logic. Let’s take a look at the monetization model. What do SLG players hate most? It’s the rapid devaluation of their investments. A lineup you spent a fortune gacha-ing for today can become completely obsolete the moment new generals are released in the next update. Combined with the lock-in mechanisms of traditional gacha pools—where duplicates are constantly drawn and storage slots fill up—players’ monetization experience has accumulated a significant amount of negative sentiment over time. This product has adjusted its monetization structure by eliminating duplicate gacha pools and offering a player-friendly pricing model—a guaranteed reward after 20 pulls for 388 yuan. While this may seem like a sacrifice of short-term revenue potential, it essentially addresses players’ biggest pain point: preventing investments from depreciating too quickly and transforming spending into a means of sustaining a long-term experience, rather than chasing the pace of new updates. Short-term spending per user may not be the highest, but players won’t churn because their money went to waste. Retention is extended, and positive word-of-mouth generates secondary exposure. From a theoretical perspective, long-term LTV is actually more substantial. In summary, this *Three Kingdoms: The Way of the King* title has undergone a systematic overhaul across three key dimensions: IP, gameplay, and monetization. Of course, its ultimate market performance will require verification through actual data; whether the “premium quality” approach can ultimately succeed will become clearer in the future. Currently, the game is set to officially launch its “Dragon Signal” beta test on July 9 at 10:00 a.m. Those interested in the Three Kingdoms strategy genre or the evolution of business models in the gaming industry are encouraged to keep an eye on the upcoming data performance. Alright, that’s all for this episode. If you found this valuable, please give it a like. See you next time.

The U.S. Tariff Game: A Global Economic Magic Trick

Folks, what we’re talking about today isn’t just your average economic news—it’s “Liberation Day,” as announced by Trump. This “Liberation Day” sure goes against the grain. Can you believe the big guy is claiming he’s being exploited by cattle and horses? What this guy calls “exploitation” is actually just free trade—a straightforward exchange of money for goods. Even though I’ve received the goods, you keep making me pay—not only emptying my pockets but also hollowing out my industry. That’s not fair. What can we do? Simple: make it more expensive for you to sell your goods. We’ll switch to domestic alternatives—no, we’ll just “re-establish Greatness.” Putting it into practice is even simpler. After all, Trump’s trade war with China during his first term already served as a blueprint. We’ll just scale it up—expand it to the entire world—and impose a minimum 10% tariff on all trading partners. It’s not aimed at anyone in particular; everyone here is in on it. Back in the day, that “IP Man” said he’d take on 10 opponents, but I, “Terraceman,” started at 180—and I didn’t even touch that little island where the penguins live. Building on that, we’ll impose customized, escalated “reciprocal tariffs” on about 50 countries that engage in particularly egregious exploitative practices. “Reciprocal,” you say? At first glance, it sounds fair—as if these countries are all imposing high tariffs on the U.S., so we’re simply returning the favor. Seems quite reasonable, doesn’t it? Trump’s trade advisor pulled out a chart: on the left were the names of all those “crooked merchants,” with “Cunning Rabbit” at the top; on the right were two columns—the first showing tariffs these countries impose on the U.S., and the second showing the U.S.’s “discounted” reciprocal tariffs. These countries have been imposing high tariffs on the U.S. “We in the U.S. only impose half of the other side’s tariff rate. If you hit us with 20%, we’ll only hit you with 10%. For example, China imposes a 67% tariff on us, so we only charge China 34%; the EU charges us 39%, so we only charge the EU 20%.” See how magnanimous the U.S. is? Even when punishing you, we give you a discount—raising the stick high but bringing it down gently. As the saying goes, “Though the world has dealt me a painful blow, I embrace it with song.” But what’s the reality? Trump pulled a petty stunt in front of the whole world—one that was bound to be exposed. Hidden in the fine print beneath the tariffs on the U.S. were a few lines stating that they included currency manipulation and trade barriers. So this percentage isn’t the tariff rate other countries impose on the U.S. Think about it: Lesotho, which was hit with Trump’s maximum 50% penalty—that would mean it imposed a 100% tariff on the U.S. How could it dare to do that? So what is this thing all about? It’s presented with a bunch of Greek letters to make it sound impressive, but it’s actually just the bilateral trade imbalance divided by that country’s exports to the U.S. Suppose China sells $100 worth of goods to the U.S. and buys $33 worth of goods from the U.S. The difference is 67; divided by China’s export value of 100, that’s 67%. So the U.S. would impose a 34% tariff on you. Is this thing scientific? It’s just as scientific as if you had a fever of 37 degrees and I had 39 degrees—and I used a 2/37-millimeter needle to prick you until we both reached 38 degrees. Soon after, China rolled out countermeasures and also imposed a 34% tariff. Trump saw this and lost his cool, slapping on another 50%, causing tariffs to skyrocket to 104%. That meant that from then on, goods that used to turn a profit at $100 would now have to be sold for $204. China responded forcefully: “If you go it alone, I’ll see it through to the end.” So they followed suit with a 50-point increase, bringing the rate to 84%. Trump didn’t back down either, raising it to 125%. “Bring it on,” they said. “Let’s hurt each other. If this business can’t be done, then let’s not do it. Let’s see who feels the pain more—and whose economy depends more on the other.” As Professor Zhang Weiwei has said, Trump might as well raise tariffs to 600% to see how many U.S. supermarkets and businesses would go under. As the world’s largest industrial nation, China certainly has the confidence to do so. But globally, aside from a few old allies who’ve lost their way and can’t support themselves, how many countries could match China’s confidence in going head-to-head like this? Almost none. Looking out from China’s perspective, the outside world is in a state of panic—this is the new normal. Trump claims that 75 countries have already come begging for mercy. Take Vietnam, for example: after reaping the benefits of rerouting supply chains away from “Made in China” for several years, it has now become a primary target of U.S. sanctions. Even when Vietnamese leaders immediately pledged to impose zero tariffs on U.S. goods, the U.S. refused to reduce or waive tariffs on Vietnam. Singapore, on the other hand, has been more reasonable. The U.S. runs a trade surplus with Singapore—selling more than it buys—yet tariffs remain in full force. Singapore bypassed the usual diplomatic niceties and put up no resistance, simply stating, “Go ahead and fight it,” "I won’t retaliate." As long as the world doesn’t unite, all we can do is wait for the club to come crashing down on our heads. Therefore, in the eyes of most people, Trump is a madman, and his tariff playbook is densely packed with plans to devour others. Only a few people, at this critical juncture, can still calmly debate whether Trump is truly stupid or just pretending to be, whether he genuinely doesn’t understand economics, truly believes that raising tariffs will force others to “eat people,” truly believes that raising tariffs will force others to “eat people,” truly believes that raising tariffs will force others to “eat people,” truly believes that raising tariffs can reduce the trade deficit—or whether he’s just playing the fool while actually playing a grand strategic game, or at the very least, secretly trading stocks. The “truly stupid” camp loves to lecture you on economic principles—what tariffs are, who ends up paying for them, what the harms are, and so on. They think it’s been too long since Trump graduated from the Wharton School, so his knowledge has faded, and that his entire presidential team is a bunch of incompetents—take trade advisor Navarro, for example, with his academic fraud and utter nonsense. They’re also particularly adept at analyzing Trump’s personality flaws—cognitive impairment, narcissism, NPD, NBTI, ADHD—you name it. They even claim Trump is showing signs of becoming like Old Deng and is starting to lose his mind. This faction, among the intellectual crowd obsessed with diagnosing stupidity, is a bit of a hidden gem—but it’s pretty useless, as it’s too easy to shoot down with “magic anti-aircraft fire.” For example, 35 psychiatrists signed a joint letter in the newspaper stating that “King Dong” is truly mentally ill and needs treatment. They said “The King of Understanding” is genuinely ill and needs treatment. Loyal young Republicans immediately proposed legislation to classify “strong opposition to Trump” as a mental illness—legislation to classify “strong opposition to Trump” as a mental illness—and fired back by saying, “Only those who claim His Majesty is ill are the ones who are actually ill.” They fired back by saying, “Only those who claim His Majesty is ill are the ones who are actually ill.” Actually, I think he’s mentally ill, too. But so what if he is? There are plenty of successful people who are mentally ill—King Ma is a classic example. Besides, even if he is mentally ill, can you cure him, or can you understand him? When you fully understand a mentally ill person, I suggest you go to 600 Wanping South Road and follow the law. I suggest you go to 600 Wanping South Road and follow the law. As for those playing dumb, there are plenty of them. But after scouring the entire internet, I think former Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis’s analysis makes the most sense. He said that tariffs are a sharp sword; Trump, wielding this sword, no longer seeks to reduce the trade deficit, but rather aims to bring about a “controlled disintegration” of the global economy by creating turmoil. So why would he undermine the very free trade and globalization that he once championed? If you’ve read my previous interview with him, he explains it very clearly. After World War II, the United States was the only remaining industrialized nation, and it relied on sending money to its allies to absorb its excess industrial capacity. By the late 1960s, due to the Vietnam War—which was a drain on resources and manpower—and because Germany and Japan had not only recovered their industrial strength but had also entered a period of rapid growth, the U.S. shifted from being a country with a trade surplus to one with a trade deficit. Consequently, the U.S. decided to dismantle the global governance system it had once spearheaded. However, because of America’s strength, the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency did not collapse; instead, it was decoupled from gold and re-pegged to U.S. sovereign credit. As a result of this maneuver, money could be printed at will, and as long as the U.S. had dollars, it could buy whatever it wanted without restraint. The world’s working class had no choice but to grit their teeth and work their fingers to the bone just to earn those precious little green pieces of paper. So what’s the point of getting those little green slips? Governments buy these theoretically risk-free green slips—that is, U.S. Treasury bonds—while business owners buy U.S. stocks and big houses. The dollars that flowed out through industrialization are sucked back in through financialization, in a never-ending cycle. Later, when China joined this system, it naturally became the U.S.’s counterpart—two engines of globalization: one producing, the other consuming. When domestic demand in the consumer nations fell short, China stepped in to fill the role of the consumer. Therefore, when China seeks to maintain economic balance, it inevitably impacts the U.S.’s role as an exporting nation. Consequently, China must undergo internal adjustments: directly intervening in income distribution, ending the cycle of low incomes and meager welfare, and achieving material prosperity. But the most crucial step remains restructuring the economy—subsidizing towns and villages in the central and western regions to enhance the people’s sense of well-being. Only such an economy can possess deep, long-term vitality. The Chinese are not born to be beasts of burden, just as Americans are not born to be lazy. As I mentioned earlier, everything is a matter of economic institutional arrangements, and now the time has come for a reshuffling of the global economic order—the United States must reshuffle, and so must we. But what will the new order look like? They are pondering what it means to be American. Different factions within the Trump administration have different answers: some advocate for the nation-state; some are rooted in Monroe Doctrine principles; some seek to cultivate a “worker aristocracy”; some aim to champion Western civilization; and still others simply do not care about humanity at all—they only want to save capitalism. Consequently, their struggle over the shape of the American economic system will only intensify. As for us, we must reflect on what socialism means. In China, how should our economic system embody fairness and justice? How can we enable people to participate in social progress and share in its fruits? How can we develop production relations commensurate with productive forces? Ultimately, the best system has only one goal: not the accumulation of wealth, but enabling people to lead happy lives without relying on wealth.