The Technology War: The Debate Over “The Science of Winning” and “The Science of Losing” in the United States

Everyone, today let’s talk about how the U.S. views the Sino-American tech race. It turns out there are differing viewpoints within the U.S. itself: one camp is the “Win School,” and the other is the “Lose School.” The so-called “Win School” refers to those in the U.S. who constantly tout their country’s technological strength and innovative capabilities. They believe that as long as the U.S. continues to innovate and make breakthroughs, it will naturally gain an advantage in economic, military, and cultural spheres. As for the “Loser School,” their views are similar to those of some netizens in China: given that China’s industrial chain and manufacturing capabilities are already so strong, what’s the point of competing? Let China expand—the U.S. might as well just sit back and do nothing. In a lengthy article, former U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan put forward a theory of a “protracted battle for technological high ground.” He criticized the “Winner School,” arguing that the simplistic view—that China can only imitate and cannot innovate—is far too simplistic. The notion that the U.S. advances rapidly in technology while China takes small, incremental steps—and the U.S. takes giant leaps—is incorrect. Technology has no endpoint; a technical breakthrough does not equate to victory. Competition will not only continue but will also expand in scope, as it involves production, application, and comparisons of supply chains and production capacity. Sullivan himself was the architect of the technology war during the Biden administration; he was the mastermind behind the “small courtyard, high walls” strategy and “de-risking” initiatives. He is highly regarded domestically as a smart and cool-headed adversary. He criticized the “Win School” for simplistically assuming that China only imitates, overlooking China’s strategic positioning in key inputs. For example, in technologies such as rare earths, active pharmaceutical ingredients, batteries, and robotics, China controls critical nodes, preventing the economies and militaries of developed nations from functioning normally. To put it bluntly, manufacturing dominance does not require comprehensive leadership; it only requires controlling critical nodes—which is, in fact, precisely the United States’ own competitive logic. Sullivan believes that China’s system is different: the state can coordinate resources to achieve its goals, with state-owned banks, industrial policies, and procurement regulations all working in concert. The United States used to view China’s system as rigid and detrimental to innovation, but the reality is that China has made progress in key areas by mobilizing the entire nation. Take battery technology as an example: China not only leads in production capacity but also holds a commanding lead in technology. Therefore, the United States must focus its efforts on production, controlling key inputs, and advancing the development of cutting-edge technologies and the economic-defense industrial complex. China has established four strategic high grounds in the three major fields of computing, biotechnology, and new energy, giving it a structural advantage over the United States. Sullivan proposed four countermeasures: first, revitalize the scientific and technological industrial base—requiring not only cutting-edge laboratories but also production lines to achieve scale; second, rapidly innovate and deploy military technology to deter adversaries; third, lead the digital order among all democratic nations; and fourth, maintain a stable foundation between China and the United States, with competition in some areas and cooperation in others. To achieve these goals, the United States needs a comprehensive industrial strategy, with the government stepping in to promote the development of manufacturing. Interestingly, as a longtime Biden administration official, Sullivan also praised the political support the Trump administration provided to mobilize vaccine research, development, and distribution, arguing that the government should increase investment in cutting-edge technologies to help strategic industries attract private investment. At the same time, the United States also needs to adopt a “small courtyard, high walls” strategy—blocking at the core while cooperating at the periphery—and continue to use tariffs as a weapon, but only against strategic industries, allowing cheap Chinese goods to enter while keeping high-tech products out. The United States’ goal is not self-sufficiency, but rather diversified development within its alliance system. In summary, Sullivan believes that U.S.-China technological competition is a marathon, not a sprint. The United States needs to view this protracted struggle rationally and will not pursue a quick victory. While American culture harbors a romanticized notion of quick victories, such thinking is unrealistic. Faced with long-term national competition, the United States cannot pursue a quick victory.